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Abstract 
This thesis examines the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis in six GCC banking 
markets, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates between 
1995 and 1999. Following Berger (1995) we distinguish among the four hypotheses [the 
two market power (MT) hypotheses (traditional SCP, and RAP) and the two efficient- 
structure hypotheses (X-efficiency and Scale-efficiency)] by incorporating into our 
performance models direct measures of X-efficiency and scale-efficiency. This provides 
more definitive results because the model specification can incorporate the reduced forms 
for all four hypotheses, and tests of the four hypotheses were performed by regressing 
measures of concentration, market share, X-efficiency and scale-efficiency against 
profitability (ROE, ROA and Alternative profit efficiency (APX). Our empirical findings 
strongly support the X-efficiency version of the efficient -structure hypotheses that cost X- 
efficiency helps in explaining the variability of bank profits. X-efficiency or superior 
management of resources is consistently associated with higher profits when controlling 
for the effects of the other three hypotheses. These findings indicate that; firstly, there is no 
evidence that market concentration enables banks to earn higher profits due to collusion. 
Secondly, market share appears to reflect bank's efficiency and not relative market power. 
The most important implications of these findings for GCC's policyrnakers, is that, they 
should not be widely concerned about increasing concentration levels in banking markets 
from a competition standpoint. 
xv 
CHAPTERI 
1- INTRODUMON 
1.1 Aims and Methodologry: 
This study aims to investigate the profit-structure relationship in GCC banking markets (Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and United Arab Emirates) by testing the market- 
power and efficient-structure hypotheses, during the 1990s. The main aim of this thesis is to 
investigate whether market structure really does matter in determining bank performance 
characteristics in the GCC member states banking markets in the period between 1995 and 
1999. It aims to present evidence of the application of the SCP framework and the efficient 
structure hypothesis for the six GCC member state banking markets. This thesis builds on the 
prior approach of Berger (1995) considering the four hypotheses outlined, namely, the 
traditional SCP paradigm, the Relative Market Power hypothesis; the Relative Efficiency 
hypothesis and the Scale Efficiency hypothesis. We investigate the efficient structure 
hypotheses in an attempt to determine whether efficiency or market power factors are the main 
explanatory feature determining banking performance in the GCC member states banks. The 
I 
efficient structure hypotheses is tested by using a stochastic cost frontier technique to derive 
measures of cost and profit X-efficiency and scale efficiency and then these are incorporated 
in the SCP regression model. The advantage of adopting this approach is that the relationship 
between performance and market structure will become clearer once the issue of efficiency 
has been adequately addressed. This empirical investigation aims to reveal interesting 
relationships and may help the relevant authorities and policyrnakers, to better evaluate and 
understand the workings of GCC member states banking systems. If the traditional SCP 
hypothesis or the relative market power hypothesis is found to be evident in the GCC member 
I 
states banking markets, this would imply that antitrust or regulatory policy should be aimed at 
changing market structure in order to increase competition or the quality of bank performance. 
If the efficiency hypotheses hold then increasing concentration in banking markets should not 
be of concern for policyrnakers in the GCC banking markets. As far as we are aware, this is 
the first study in which market power and efficiency aspects of the GCC banking markets have 
been investigated. 
There have been various studies of the relationship between structure and performance in the 
banking literature. While European empirical banking research has not matched the volume of 
the US literature, a number of recent studies have sought to redress the imbalance as outlined 
in Goddard et al. (2001). However, the majority of SCP investigations are concerned with the 
US banking system where the structure of the market is quite different from other countries. 
The main difference lies in the fact that, in the US, many of the financial products such as 
retail deposits and smdll loans are offered on a local or domestic basis, and prices can differ 
quite significantly among these local markets. Therefore, the research emphasis tends to be on 
the relationship between local market concentration and performance measures. Moreover, the 
US banking market is relatively unconcentrated at a national level, as Berger and Humphrey 
(1997, p. 195) have noted: 
Although some financial products such. as large certificates of deposits and large wholesale 
loans are competed on a nationwide basis, the US national market is extremely unconcentrated 
by world standards. for example, it would take over 2000 banking organizations to account for 
90% of deposits in the US, while in most other developed countries 90% of deposits would be 
accounted for by fewer than 10 organizations. 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether market structure or bank level efficiency are 
the main factors influencing bank performance in GCC states. The majority of the US 
literature tends to find that market structure influences bank performance although the 
2 
statistical relationship is rather weak. More recent studies, such as Berger (1995) and Berger 
and Hannan (1997) find that bank-level efficiency is a more important determinant of bank 
performance. The European studies, however, tend to find stronger evidence that the 
traditional SCP paradigm holds- concentration influences performance (see Molyneux et al. 
1996). 
1.2 Studv Motivations: 
Heggestad (1979) identifies three main questions that tests of the SCP relationship in banking 
markets aim to answer: 
Firstly, is it market structure or the complex regulatory regimes that really determine banking 
performance characteristics? 
Secondly, which aspects of market structure and which types of regulations have the greatest 
impact on banking performance? 
Thirdly, what aspects of bank performance are mostly affected by changes in market 
structure? 
Once academic researchers have shed sufficient light on these issues, they may put forward 
policy recommendations to help establish those particular market structure characteristics that 
benefit both consumers and producers of banking services. Furthermore, Molyneux et. al. 
(1996, p. 93) has noted that " the study of the SCP relationship in banking is mainly used to 
evaluate which type of banking structure best serves the public in terms of both the cost and 
the availability of banking services". In addition to the aforementioned, there are three other 
main reasons that justify this study of the relationship between market structure and 
performance in GCC member states banking markets. 
Firstly, as far as we are aware, there have been no previous studies that investigate market 
structure and performance relationships in GCC banking markets. 
3 
Secondly, the analysis will contribute to our general understanding of the determinants of bank 
performance in GCC countries. 
Thirdly, an explanation of the relationship between market structure and bank performance in 
the GCC will assist researchers and policy makers in matters relating to potential changes in 
the institutional environment of the GCC banking industry, particularly the potential impact of 
banks mergers and acquisitions on industry structure and performance. 
There are other reasons why banking provides such an interesting academic and policy experiment 
for mergers. First competition in banking has been restricted for a long time by geographic and 
other restrictions, so inefficiencies might be expected to persist. The market for corporate control in 
banking has also been quite limited, since nonbanks are prohibited from taking over banks, and the 
geographic barriers to competition have also reduced the potential for takeovers by more efficient 
banks. These restrictions on competition both in the product markets and in the market for 
corporate control may have protected inefficient managers. Humphrey et al. (I 997, p. 3) 
Thus, the importance of the relationship between market structure and bank performance in 
general, together with the lack of empirical research on this relationship in the GCC member 
states banking markets, provides the main motivation for this study. 
1.3 Backizround to the studv: 
The structure-conduct-performance paradigm, dating back to Mason (1939) and Bain (1951), 
has long dominated scholars thinking and public policy toward the effects of industry structure 
on firms' behavior, profit levels, consumer welfare, and total welfare (Shaffer, 1994). The 
conventional wisdom holds that an increase in the number of firms will generally lead to more 
competitive conduct, lower price-cost margins, reduced profitability of firms (approaching the 
competitive level as the number of firms grows large), greater output higher consumer 
welfare, better allocative efficiency, and increased total welfare. Specifically there are two 
main interpretations for a positive statistical relationship between market structure and its 
performance. The traditional interpretation of the SCP paradigm is based on the proposition 
4 
that market concentration fosters collusion among firms in the industry. According to this 
hypothesis, the degree of concentration of a market exerts a direct influence on the degree of 
competition among its firms. The more concentrated the market, the less the degree of 
competition. This hypothesis would be supported if the impact of market concentration on the 
performance of the firm was found to be significantly positive, regardless of the degree of 
efficiency of the firm. Thus, firms in more concentrated markets will earn higher profits (for 
collusive or monopolistic reasons) than firms operating in less concentrated ones, irrespective 
of their efficiency. 
The efficiency hypothesis, on the other hand, has emerged as a challenge to the traditional 
interpretation of the SCP relationship. Demsetz (1973) developed the relative efficiency 
hypothesis. In this hypothesis, the explanation for the relation between market structure and 
the performance of the individual firm is efficiency. If a firm enjoys a higher degree of 
efficiency than its competitors, that is, if it has a relatively low cost structure, it can adopt one 
of two strategies: it can maximize profits by maintaining the present level of prices and firm 
size, or it can maximize profits by reducing prices and expanding firm size. If a firm adopts 
the latter strategy, the most efficient firms will gain market share and, as noted by Smirlock 
(1985), firm efficiency will be the driving force behind the process of market concentration. 
The hypothesis is supported (in the early literature) if the performance of firms depends on 
market share regardless of the degree of concentration in the market There have been many 
empirical studies that have applied the traditional SCP framework or its variations on the US 
banking industry over the last thirty years. However, these studies have reported contradictory 
results. Some of them indicating a strong relationship between market structure 
(concentration) and performance, and others indicating no relationship at all or one of 
unexpected direction. Early US studies, for example, Vernon (1971), Fraser and Rose (1976) 
5 
and Heggestad and Mingo (1977), Spellman (1981) and Rhoades (1982), suggest that 
collusive profits occur in US banking markets by reporting strong and significant 
relationships between market structure and bank profit rates. These studies have been 
criticized, for example by Gilbert (1984) and Osborne and Wendel (1983), for containing too 
many "inconsistencies and contradictions" to provide a satisfactory description of the SCP 
relationship in banking. More recent attempts at explaining the link between market structure 
and performance have concentrated on investigating the so-called "efficiency hypothesis". As 
noted above, the efficiency hypothesis maintains that an industry's structure arises as a result 
of superior operating efficiency by particular firms. Accordingly, a positive relationship 
between firm profits and market structures is attributed to the gains made in market share by 
more efficient firms; in turn these gains may lead to increased market concentration. That is, 
increased profits are assumed to accrue to more efficient firms because they are more efficient 
and not because of collusive activities. In support of their approach, Brozen (1982), Smirlock 
(1985), and Evanoff and Fortier (1988), report that "firm-specific efficiency" seems to be the 
dominant variable explaining profitability in studies of the US banking industry. However, 
other scholars have argued that banks' objectives are different than profit maximization (a 
central implicit assumption in the SCP framework), namely, to engage in expense-preference 
behavior (that is diverting more resources to management expenses rather than maximizing 
profits) or to alter the composition of their balance sheets portfolios in favour of less risky 
assets as market structure changes. In both of these cases the relation between performance 
measures and market structure would be very much weakened. Nonetheless, Kwoka and 
Ravenscraft (1986) find evidence of both cooperative and rivalrous behaviour among the 
largest firms across a number of different industries and suggest that the SCP framework may 
be inadequate in explaining bank performance variability. More recently, studies by Hannan 
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(1991) and Berger (1995) have made important contributions to the SCP literature. Hannan 
(1991) employed an explicit model of the banking firm to derive formally the most commonly 
tested relationships between market structure and bank performance. This model's main 
distinction from the traditional SCP paradigm lies in the association of bank performance 
measures with numerous market shares in various asset and liability categories that banks 
participate in, rather than one market share or concentration ratio as predicted by the SCP 
model. On the other hand, Berger (1995) refined the previous literature and tested the profit- 
structure relationship in banking by testing four hypotheses simultaneously. These are the two 
market power hypotheses (traditional SCP hypotheses and the Relative Market Power 
hypotheses) and the two efficient-structure hypotheses (X-efficiency hypothesis and scale - 
efficiency hypothesis) - put forward by Demsetz (1973) - by incorporating measures of bank 
efficiency directly into the SCP model. These efficiency measures distinguish between X- 
efficiency (X-efficiency version of the efficiency hypothesis) and scale-efficiency (scale- 
efficiency version). X-efficiency provides a measure of how effectively banks are using their 
inputs to produce a given level of output and covers all technical and allocative efficiencies of 
individual firms (that are distinct from economies of scale and scope). Scale efficiency is a 
measure indicating whether banks with similar production and management technologies are 
operating at an optimal level of scale. 
Berger (1995, p. 405) criticized previous SCP studies because they did not include direct 
measures of efficiency in the modeling framework. He notes that: 
"Clearly this literature cannot distinguish among the various hypothesis without including direct measures 
of both X-efficiencies and scale efficiencies. Furthermore,... another difficulty with this literature is that 
the implications of the ES(efficicncy) hypothesis regarding the effects of efficiency on market structure 
have never been tested. A necessary condition for the ES hypothesis to be true is that efficiency be 
positively related to concentration and/or market share. Again, direct measures of efficiency are needed 
for this task" 
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Berger's empirical findings on US banking during the 1980s provide some support for the X- 
efficiency hypothesis but no support for the scale-efficiency hypothesis. In addition, Berger 
(1995) also finds that bank market share is also important in explaining bank performance, 
namely that larger banks earn higher profits. This study advances the approach outlined in 
Berger (1995) and includes measures of bank cost, profit and scale efficiency into the standard 
SCP modeling framework. This allows us to examine the traditional SCP relationship and 
versions of the efficiency hypothesis for GCC banking in the 1990s. 
1.4 Chapter Plan: 
The thesis is divided into eight Chapters. Chapter one provides an introduction to the study, 
outlines the study background, motives, aims and methodology adopted in this thesis. Chapter 
Two provides a general background discussing the main features of Gulf States economies. 
The chapter briefly discusses the creation of the GCC organization, and reviews the economic 
performance and development process in the six states over the last two decades. Chapter 
Three, provides an overview of the structure of the financial systems in the six countries and 
analyses in more detail the structure and performance features of the respective banking 
systems. This chapter provides a picture of the structural and other market characteristics of 
each banking system and points out the major differences and similarities that exist between 
GCC banking markets. Chapter four focuses on the concepts of market structure and 
performance in banking focusing on the theories that explain the relationship between market 
structure and firm performance. It provides definitions of market structure, market conduct 
and market performance and examines the main SCP interactions. The chapter also considers 
measures of market structure, conduct and, performance. In Chapter Five we present the 
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theoretical concepts of X-efficiency, economies of scale and economies of scope since bank's 
performance nowadays is often related to these issues (see Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
Chapter Six describes the methodology that will be used to examine the SCP relationships in 
GCC banking markets. The general modelling framework and variables used in the study are 
outlined. Chapter seven presents the data sources and provides defmitions for the variables 
used in our empirical analysis. The chapter proceeds to empirically investigate evidence of the 
four SCP hypotheses, namely; the traditional structure-conduct-performance hypothesis 
(SCP); the relative-market-power-hypothesis (RNT); the x-efficiency hypothesis (ESX); and 
the scale-efficiency hypothesis (ESS) in GCC banking markets. Chapter eight presents the 
conclusions and outlines the main limitations of this study. 
9 
Chapter 11 
The Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCQ Economies and Their 
Economic Develoment. 
2.1 - Introduction: 
Although requiring careful interpretation, perhaps the definition that would now gain widest 
approval is one that defines economic development as the process whereby the real per capita 
income of a country increases over a long period of time subject to the sfipulations that the 
number of people below an "absolute poverty line" does not increase, and that the distribution 
of income does not become more unequal. Tberefore, economic development involves 
something more than economic growth. Development is taken to mean growth plus change. 
Economic development is thus much more than simple acquisition of industries. It may be 
defined as nothing less than the "upward movement of the entire social system" or it may be 
interpreted as the attainment of a number of "ideals of modernization, " such as a rise in 
productivity, social and economic equalization, modem knowledge, improved institutions and 
attitudes, and a rationally coordinated system of policy measures that can remove the host of 
undesirable conditions in the social system that have perpetuated a state of underdevelopment. 
(Hermes, et al. 2000 p, 517). 
This chapter aims to identify and outline the economic and financial trends that have affected 
the economic development process and changed the face of the GCC member states 
economies (these are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and United Arab Emirates) 
during the past two decades. Section 2.2 provides a short note on the creation of the GCC 
organization. The main aims and objectives are outlined and the potential economic benefits 
and gains from economic integration highlighted. Section 2.3 reviews the performance of the 
six GCC economies over the last two decades. Ile stages of their economic development 
processes are outlined using some basic economic indicators including growth in national 
GDP and GDP per Capita income. The section highlights general economic development 
trends and notes various structural reforms that have been, adopted to promote economic 
growth and market development Sect ion 2.4 shed lights on the key role of oil and gas exports 
on GCC countries economic development process. And Section 2.5 discusses the various 
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challenges facing policyrnakers over the medium-term and the impact of the development 
process. Section 2.6 concludes. 
In general, GCC countries are reasonably homogenous in terms of their historical experience 
in the economic development process. A common feature of development is that all the GCC 
states began the present phase of their economic development with the substantial increase in 
oil prices in 1973. In every country, economic development that would normally have taken 
many decades was compressed into a few years (Presley, 1992). The economies of all GCC 
member states are ultimately dependent on revenues from oil production and therefore they 
depend heavily on the level of oil prices, despite attempts to diversify sources of income. This 
dependence on oil revenues, however, is gradually changing as various economies have 
undertaken policies to encourage other economic activities such as in manufacturing and 
services (Almannai, 2001). All countries are characterized by a desert environment and low 
population density (table 2.1), and the population tends to be heavily concentrated in a few 
major cities. Expatriate workers represent about one third of manpower in the region (UNDP, 
Human Development Report 2001, and table 2.1). 
The GCC, currencies are pegged to the US dollar, except in the case of the Kuwaiti Dinar that 
is pegged to a trade-weighted basket of currencies of which the dollar is believed to account 
for about 70% (Cunningham, 1995). AJI GCC countries maintain a relatively open trade 
regime and seek to strengthen common terms of external trade. Moreover, the GCC Council 
approved, in 1999, a timetable to set up a custom union by 2005 and introduce a single 
currency by the end of 2008 (GCC Economic Bulletin, 2001). GCC countries face important 
policy challenges in view of an uncertain oil market outlook and the evolving trends in the 
regional and international economy. These are compounded by domestic developments, 
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particularly the growing number of nationals entering the labor market (Azzam, 1998). To 
avoid undesirable consequences, the GCC countries, currently stress various economic 
adjustment programmes supported by structural reforms aimed at sustaining economic growth 
and promoting financial stability. That is because, insufficient policy response to less 
favourable external conditions carries the risk of low rates of economic growth, rising 
unemployment rates, and growing financial imbalances (Almannai, 2001 ). 
2.2 The GCC Organization, The Aims and the Exvected Gains from Economic 
Inte2ration: 
Globalization and regionalization are not necessarily antagonistic, but rather mutually 
reinforcing. A bolder policy to increase integration in the global market could at the same time 
favor more dynamic regional integration efforts. The Arab countries need to integrate their 
economies with the rest of the world and in doing so they must come together and establish 
their own regional economic blocs. In today's world no nation can realize its full economic 
potential on its own. Only cross-border regional cooperation will maximize prosperity for each 
of the member states. (Azzam. 1998, p8). 
This sub-section outlines broadly the main objectives and adhievements of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) since it was established in 1981. An agreement between six Arab 
states of the Gulf was signed on May 25dI 981 in Kuwait and this announced the creation of a 
new regional organization in the Middle East Known as the, "Gulf Cooperation Council for 
Arab Statee' otherwise known as the GCC. The GCC comprises Bahrain, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait (Table 2.1). The terms of 
the GCC constitution are comprehensive (for example, Article four GCC charterl981)1 speaks 
of "the ultimate aim of unity" and an eventual confederate union emerging from the GCC 
framework. 
1 (See Appendix I) 
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Table 2.1 
The GCC countries: 
GCC at a Glance 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (U. A. E. ). 
Area and population: 
The countries have 2 percent of the world's total land area, and their combined population in 2000 is 
about 30 million accounting for less than I percent of the total population of the world. In 2000 
population growth in the GCC countries was 3.5 percent higher than the world average (1.7 percent per 
annum). Non-nationals comprise on average about one third of the population in the GCC countries. 
About 43 percent of the population is below the age of 15, and 60 percent is below the age of 25. (GCC 
Economic Bulletin, volume 16,2001) 
Petroleum and 2as: 
During 1999 total GCC oil production was about 4930 million barrels. This amounts to 13.4 million 
barrels per day on average, which represents 50% of total OPEC production and 20% of total world 
production. At the end of 1999 the GCC countries held about 45 percent of the world's proven petroleum 
reserves and 15 percent of the world's proven natural gas reserves. (GCC Economic Bulletin, volume, 
16,2001, pl3-14) 
Income. and Production: 
The aggregate GDP of GCC member states was about US$ 321.5 billion at the end of 2000 and the GDP 
Per Capita income for 2000, was around US$10,500 ranging from US$7,564 in Saudi Arabia to 
US$19,666 in United Arab Emirates, compared to the world average of US$6,148. The World Bank's 
2001 World Development Report ranks three of the GCC countries, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait 
and Qatar, as high-income economies, and the other three countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman) 
as upper-income economies. (Source: World Development Report, 2001, and GCC Economic Bulletin 
volume, 16,2001). 
Social indicators: 
Life expectancy (72 years) in the GCC countries is higher than the world's average (66 years). Other 
social indicators are also very favorable: the literacy rate exceeds 70 percent; the infant mortality rate is 
less than half the world average; the physician-population ratio is about 7 times higher than the world 
average; and primary school enrollment corresponds to 90 percent of school-age population, with female 
enrollment being almost equal to that of males. 
*All data was obtained from the GCC Economic Bulletin, (200 1), ( Volume 16, Arabic Edition) and the 
World Development Report for 2001. 
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The countries have two percent of the world's total land area, and their combined population 
in 2000 according to the GCC Economic Bulletin, (2001) is around 30 million (accounting for 
less than I percent of the total population of the world) (see table 2.1 ). 
The basic aims and objectives of the Gulf Co-operation Council are outlined in Article Four of 
its charter signed on may 25h 1981, these are as follows: 
1. To implement co-ordination, integration and interconnection among member states in 
all fields in order to achieve unity among them; 
2. To deepen and strengthen relations links and the scope of co-operation in various fields 
now prevailing among their peoples; 
3. To formulate similar procedures, rules and regulations in various fields including 
economic and financial affairs, commerce, customs and communications, education 
and culture, social and health affairs, information and tourism, legislative and 
administrative affairs; and 
4. To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, mineralogy, 
agriculture, water and animal resources; and to establish scientific research centers. 
Other objectives including new rules allowing for the freer movement of GCC citizens, labour 
and goods within the region plus a relaxing of restrictions on real estate ownership, and 
licenses granted to practice businesses in any of the GCC countries are also mentioned in the 
GCC charter. 
Consistent with these objectives, a variety of agreements in the fields of economics such as 
the (Unified Economic Agreement signed in 1981 (and reformed in December 2001), 
foreign affairs, education, defence, security and energy, have been signed between the 
members of the GCC organization. According to (Azzam, 1998) it was the first major 
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attempt toward regional economic integration in the Arab world. In fact the GCC was 
established based upon the expected benefits resulting from integration similar to the 
reasons for the establishment of the European Union, (Cunningham, 1995). One of its 
main objectives is to promote economic development (GCC Charter, 1981). The 
establishment of the GCC aimed to promote economic integration by gradually lifting the 
existing barriers to freedom of entry and capital movement in the region. The removal of 
such barriers were expected to yield substantial economic gains both of a microeconornic 
and macroeconomic nature. A major microeconomic benefit was expected to occur from 
the reduction in costs stemming from the removal of a wide variety of physical and 
technical barriers that existed in the trade of goods and services. The opening-up of all 
GCC national markets was also expected to facilitate greater competition between GCC 
firms, the exploitation of economies of scale and the elimination of X-inefficiencies, thus, 
resulting in further reductions in the prices of goods and services. In turn, lower prices are 
expected to cause an increase in demand for these products and services and consequently 
an increase in output Firms increasing their levels of output may be able to reduce costs 
even further by exploiting economies of scale if such economies do exist The main group 
reaping the benefits that should follow from the establishment of the internal market would 
be GCC residents (consumers) who should be rewarded with better and cheaper products 
and services. Greater competition is also expected to lead to the creation of new products 
and services as the need to innovative and gain competitive advantages over rivals is 
increased. Market integration is also expected to lead to significant macroeconomic gains 
as well. Lower prices are widely expected to positively influence the GCC member states 
output and hence accelerate economic growth, ease unemployment and reduce government 
budget deficits (where the increase in spending is less than proportionate than the increase 
is 
in governments revenues). Furthermore, the integration process would be expected to 
result in lower inflation rates bringing about reduced interest rates and this effect should 
encourage investment (both public and private) and therefore cause further increases in 
economic growth. 
As in the case of the EU and the establishment of a single currency, the GCC's plans for 
further integration and the introduction of a Gulf single currency by 2008 places 
considerable emphasis on establishing a single fmancial services market. The single 
market for financial services is expected to benefit the GCC member states economies as a 
whole. The full liberalization and integration of GCC member states capital markets are 
expected to work towards the elimination of those distortions and negative effects that 
stem from the misallocation of capital resources. Capital will move freely across national 
borders seeking the highest returns possible. Capital will have access to a wider range of 
markets and investments and therefore better allocation will result in attaining greater 
economic efficiency for the whole of the economy. Furthermore, full integration of capital, 
money and banking markets will bring forward ever more converging real interest rates 
across the GCC member states with the positive consequences that are associated with 
such an outcome. 
We should not lose sight of the growing influence of economic integration in the Arab Gulf 
upon the nature of the Gulf financial system and the functions of banking institutions. The 
Gulf Co-operation Council is now a very active body which is framing the Gulf economy 
along similar lines to that of the European Community; trade has already multiplied between 
member states as the industriaaation process has continued, trade barriers have been 
reduced, and an increasing number of Gulf institutions formed in order to accelerate 
economic co-operation; one item on the large agenda is monetary integration and, if the 
European experience is indicative, this will embrace the harmonization of banking 
regulations, monetary controls and fiscal instruments on the process towards one Gulf 
central bank and a common currency. (Presley, et al. 1992, p 16). 
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GCC countries have moved a considerable way towards achieving integration in the traded 
goods sector although in the financial services sector the process of regulatory reform and 
integration has been slower to develop. For instance, the Unified Economic Agreement signed 
in 1981 has lifted barriers to trade between the six GCC countries. Goods and services that 
originate in the GCC countries transfer free within GCC countries without tariffs or customs. 
The free trade zone within GCC countries has been established since 1983. In addition, the 
GCC countries approved, in 1999, a timetable to setup a unified custom union by 2005. The 
custom union plans to unify customs policies including tariffs imposed on imports to GCC 
countries. 
Article seven of the Unified Economic Agreement states that: (See Appendix 1) 
Member States shall co-ordinate their commercial policies and relations with other States and 
regional economic groupings and blocs with a view to creating balanced trade relations and 
favourable circumstances and terms of trade therewith. To achieve this goal, the Member 
States shall make the following arrangements: 
1. Co-ordination of import/export policies and regulations; 2. Co-ordination of policies for 
building up strategic food stocks; 3. Conclusion of collective economic agreements in cases 
where joint benefits to Member States would be realized; and the 4. Taking of action for the 
creation of collective negotiating power to strengthen their negotiating position vis-a-vis 
foreign parties in the field of importation of basic needs and exportation of major products. 
To maintain these objectives such as coordinating exports and imports policies collective 
delegations have taken place on several occasions to coordinate policy. For example a unified 
GCC delegation to discuss the introduction of a carbon tax (also known as the environmental 
tax) imposed by the USA and the EU on imports of oil and gas from GCC countries and other 
OPEC members was established so as to coordinate a unified GCC policy response. A 
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collective delegation has also been established to coordinate the GCC imports of wheat from 
the USA and Canada, and a collective delegation is also established to negotiate live-stock 
imports from Australia and New Zealand. Furthermore, the GCC also works to coordinate oil 
policies by adopting a unified policy within the GCC itself and across OPEC countries to 
facilitate the stabilization of international oil prices. Moreover, the GCC governments operate 
to reach a common investment policy that directs domestic and foreign investments, and to 
initiate joint investment among member countries (Azzam, 1998). In this field, the GCC 
established the Gulf Investment Corporation in 1982. In terms of joint investment, the GCC 
set up the Gulf Investment Corporation in Kuwait Gulf International Bank (GIB) in Bahrain, 
Gulf Limited Bank in Bahrain, the Standardization and Metrology Organization for GCC in 
Riyadh, the Technical Telecommunication Bureau in Bahrain, the Commercial Arbitration 
Centre for GCC in Bahrain, the Regional Committee for Electrical Energy Systems registered 
in Qatar, and the Electricity Grids Linking Commission in Saudi Arabia. The GCC member 
states reformed the Unified Economic Agreement of 1981 and signed a new Economic 
Agreement in 31 st of December 200 1. Article 4 of the reformed Agreement stated that 'GCC 
member states should coordinate their financial, monetary, and banking policies as well so as 
to boost coordination between monetary agencies and central banks among member countries 
and to ensure the success of the monetary union so that a single currency could be launched in 
2008', (GCC Unified Economic Agreement 2002, p. 14, Arabic Edition). In 1997 decision 
taken by GCC finance ministers permitted national banks to open branches in GCC countries. 
This decision will helps in facilitating the cross-border expansion of Gulf banks. The GCC has 
also established the Gulf National ATM Network. Moreover, GCC states agreed in 1990 to 
collectively participate in the meetings of the Basle Committee and international conferences 
of banks, as well as to coordinate their participation in meetings of the International Monetary 
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Fund and the World Bank. In early 2001, the GCC council approved a timetable for the 
monetary union to adopt the US$ as a common peg for their currencies before the end of 2002. 
It also undertook steps to reach an agreement before the end of 2005 on the standards of 
economic performance that would be necessary to ensure the success of monetary union so 
that a single currency could be launched by the year 2008. 
In addition to the potential gains expected from economic integration the GCC has other key 
objectives, like the co-ordination of other forms of non-economic and functional co-operation. 
Functional co-operation includes agreements in a number of different areas, for example, in 
the environmental protection area the GCC Commission for Natural Life Reserve was 
established in 1995. In defense the AIjaseerah Shelled Forces was established in 1983, and in 
education the Gulf University was established in Bahrain in 1985. These non-economic types 
of co-operation are also important elements reflecting the ongoing integration process within 
the GCC. 
So far this section has provided a general overview of the main aims and objectives of the 
GCC Organization and its achievements. In the following section we discuss the economic 
performance of the GCC over the past two decades. 
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23The Reeion's Economic Development Process and Economic Performance over the 
Past Two Decades: 
23.1 GCC Member States Economic Performance from 1975 to 1985 (The Phase or 
Prosperity). 
The economies of the GCC countries share many structural features, face similar constraints, and are 
influenced broadly by the same set of trends in the world economy. Over the years, the oil income has 
created a modem physical and social infrastructure and substantially raised the standard of living of 
the population. The countries have established a tradition of open and liberal trade and exchange 
policies, low inflation, and stable currencies. They also share a relatively narrow non-oil revenue base 
and large dependence on imports of goods and labor, increasing their vulnerability to adverse 
exogcnous developments. (Sassanpour, 1996, p. 20). 
The GCC member states economies are heavily dependent on oil and they became prosperous 
in an unusually brief time span (Presley, 1992). This prosperity and wealth emerged over a 
period of less than 30 years. The sharp increases in oil prices in 1973-74 after the Arab-Israeli 
war in 1973, led to the7 rapid emergence and concentration of wealth in the GCC economies. 
Oil revenues were responsible for transforming what were previously barren and poor 
countries into modem economies with vast infrastructures (Cunningham, 1995). On the other 
hand, their sudden wealth as a result of oil means that not only the pace of development but 
also the form of development is unusual, (Wilson et al. 1992) because, usually economic 
problems are associated with the reliance on a single commodity (oil). Any adverse 
fluctuations in the price of this commodity will of course be reflected in a reverse influence 
and effect all economic activities and every aspect of life in the country. 
The GCC member states maintained continuous budget surpluses until 1982, (Presley, 1992), 
when the decline in oil prices led to a renewed budget deficit in most countries (Saudi Arabia, 
Oman, Bahrain), despite that, oil remained the most important exported good, and the main 
source of foreign exchange earnings (Sassanpour, 1996). The importance of oil as a major 
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source of wealth also means that the economies of the Gulf are subject to unusual fluctuations 
in the level of wealth and the development process is unpredictable (Cunningham, 1995). 
The prosperity in GCC states reached its highest level after the increase in oil prices in late 
1979 and the beginning of 1980 following the Iranian revolution, and the first Gulf War 
between Iraq and Iran at the beginning of 1981, but this situation did not continue. Although 
the GCC member States increased their oil production the oil price fall in the middle of 1982 
and its continued decline until 1986 resulted in an average reduction of real GDP growth of 
about 2.7% over the 1982 to 1986 period and a 12% annual decline in GDP Per Capita (Table 
2.2). 
Generally speaking, in the early part of the 1981-85 period despite declining-oil prices, export 
receipts increased allowing the GCC countries to record large external current account 
surpluses averaging around 191/o for the period between (1975-80) to 7% for the period (1981 
-1985), (see table 2.2), which enabled the GCC countries to build up foreign reserves. 
The policy objectives of improving the social and physical infrastructure, diversifying the 
economic base, and containing inflationary pressures were addressed through a two-pronged 
strategy. First, with a view to insulating their economies from foreign inflation, the GCC 
authorities abandoned the link between their currencies and a depreciating SDP,,, and 
established a de fitcto peg with the US. dollar which led to a significant real effective 
appreciation of all GCC currencies (Cunningham, 1995). Second, expenditures on 
development projects increased, and some countries actively pursued policies to promote basic 
industries based on their large hydrocarbon resources (Cunningham, 1995). Tle sizeable 
budget surpluses started to diminish from 1982 as expenditures continued to increase in some 
countries while revenues declined due to the steep slide in oil prices. While some countries 
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(Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain) had large budgetary deficits, the region as a whole 
recorded an annual average deficit of I percent of GDP and an external current account 
surplus equivalent to 7 percent of GDP during 1981-85 (table 2.2). Foreign reserve positions 
remained sustainable and inflation decelerated to an average rate of less than I percent per 
annum (table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 Basic Economic Indicators 1975-1994 
1975-80 1981.1 986-89 1990-91 1992-94 
(In percent per annum) 
Real GDP growth 9.6 -2.7 1.7 8.9 1.7* 
Oil ... -11.7 9.4 18.5 0.2* Non-oil ... 4.5 1.2 
4.7 1.9* 
Inflation 10.7 0.5 0.6 3.2 1.4* 
GDP per capita(US$) 25000 17000 7800 8300 8450 
(I n percent of GDP) 
Budget 
Total revenue 55 51 38 38 35 
of which: oil and 
gasrevenue ... 37 23 30 27 Total expenditure 45 52 50 52 46 
Current 
... 24 35 36_ 38 Capital 21 13 7 7 
Overall 
surplus/def icit 10 -1 -4 -13 -10 
Balance of payments 
Exports 78 62 49 56 50 
Imports 44 51 46 49 48 
Trade account surplus 34 11 3 7 2 
Current account 
stuplus/deficit 19 -7 1 .1 1 -7 -6 
Overall 
surplus/deficit 3 1 -2 -3 
Sources: JNW, World Economic Outlook; IMF, International Financial Statistics; 1996 
*. Excluding Kuwait. 
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23.2 Economic Reforms in G4CC countries 
With the continued erosion of oil prices during 1986-89, economic conditions represented by 
increases in fiscal deficits, rising rates of unemployment, and increasing social demands 
associated with the sluggish economic growth and large internal and external financial 
imbalances emerged (Sassanpour, 1996). In response, the authorities implemented adjustment 
policies involving mainly cuts in public expenditure, particularly capital outlays which 
declined from an average of 21 percent of GDP during 1981-85 to 13 percent of GDP during 
1986-1989 (table 2.2). Adjustment was further facilitated by the significant real effective 
depreciation of GCC currencies (Saudi Arabia, and Oman). Despite the expenditure cuts, and 
given the severity of the decline in oil revenue, the aggregate budget deficit increased to 4 
percent of GDP during 1986-89, while the external current account position shifted to a deficit 
of I percent of GDP during the same period (table 2.2). External borrowing by some GCC 
countries limited the drawdown in foreign reserves (Cunningham, 1995). 
The process of structural economic adjustment adopted by GCC countries consists of reforms and 
measures aimed at reducing internal and external imbalances, transforming the economy towards a 
market oriented one and placing it on a sustainable long-term growth path. The policy areas that are 
typically featured in the adjustment program include: reduction of budget and current account 
deficits, liberalization of pricing policies, reforming monetary and fiscal policies, removing trade 
barriers, developing financial and capital markets, improving the efficiency of the public sector 
(including privatization of public enterprises) and boosting the country's main productive sectors 
(agriculture and industry). (Azzam, 1998, p. 43). 
These adjustment efforts in the GCC countries were being implemented within an 
international economic environment which was undergoing fundamental changes on several 
fronts. Two trends were of particular importance. First, ongoing global trade liberalization 
gradually lead to the lowering of tariffs; the dismantling of nontariff trade barriers; a reduction 
in producer subsidies; an expansion of trading blocs; and the strengthening of the institutional 
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framework under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. Second, the continuing 
globalization and integration of financial markets facilitated private capital flows and created 
new financing options for many developing countries, along with greater risks. (Sassanpour, 
1996). 
The GCC countries economic reforms and adjustment process was interrupted when Iraq 
invaded Kuwait in the 2`1 of August 1990. Notwithstanding the sharp jump in oil prices in the 
initial phases of the conflict and the higher oil production in some countries, crisis-related 
expenditures and transfers created significant pressures on the budgets and external current 
account positions of the GCC countries (Cunningham, 1995). Those countries directly 
involved in the conflict suffered the worst: the budget deficit in Kuwait exceeded an estimated 
100 percent of GDP in 1990-91; that of Saudi Arabia increased to 17 percent of GDP in 1991; 
and the combined external account deficits of the two countries amounted to US$54 billion in 
1991 alone (Presley, et al. 1992). Excluding Kuwait, the aggregate external current account 
deficit of the GCC countries increased to 7 percent of GDP in 1990-91 (table 2.2), and their 
combined official foreign reserves declined fiwther. 
The GCC countries emerged from the Gulf crisis in a weaker economic and financial position 
at a time when the resumption of the adjustment process was further complicated by the 
continued downward slide in oil prices and a slowdown in global economic activity 
(Cunningham, 1995). Economic growth in the GCC moderated to an average of 2 percent per 
annum in 1992-94, (table 2.2), real per capita GDP declined, and the lingering expenditures 
and transfers related to the conflict prevented significant reductions in the internal and external 
imbalances (IMF, 2000). For the region as whole, the average budget deficit in 1992-94 (10 
percent of GDP) was higher than that of the pre-crisis period (4 percent of GDP), despite the 
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much lower levels of capital expenditure (table 2.2). Similarly, at 6 percent of GDP, the 
aggregate external current account deficit was higher than the average during the 1986-89 
period (I percent of GDP) and foreign reserves positions eroded fiwffier, (table 2.2). By 1994, 
although the stock of external debt stabilized at about 12 percent of GDP, debt service 
payments had increased sharply (Sassanpour, 1996). 
23.3 New Initiatives to Accelerate Economic Reforms 
From 1995 most GCC countries intensified their adjustment efforts in response, inter alia, to 
an unfavourable oil market outlook (Azzam, 1998). The investment income, which in some 
GCC countries comprised a large share of government revenue, has declined while debt 
servicing has increased. Expenditure on social sectors has increased in line with a growing 
population, and outlays on defense and security have remained high (Sassanpour, 1996). 
Pressures on expenditure also come from a large and growing government wage bill. 
Nonetheless, the GCC countries are undergoing major demographic changes charaýterized by 
a rapidly growing and young population, with important implications for the labour market 
(12MIF, 2000). According to (Azzam, 1998), traditionally, the government sector has absorbed a 
large number of new entrants to the labour force, reflecting the policy of guaranteed 
employment, higher wages, and the social status and other benefits associated with 
government employment. Fiscal constraints, however, currently limit this possibility while the 
number of people searching forjobs increases day by day. According to (]Iýff, 2000), the main 
challenges facing the GCC member states policyinakers are maintaining high levels of 
employment while reducing the role of the public sector in favour of the private sector. 
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In response to these challenges GCC countries, and in particular kuwait, Oman, and Saudi 
Arabia, introduced medium-term recovery package plans at the beginning of 1995 
incorporating balanced budgets by the year 2000, as well as measures to increase non-oil 
revenues-, and promote private sector growth and human resource development. In other 
countries, similar policies, have also been formulated (Mff, 2000). 
Several measures implemented, for example, include the introduction of a sales tax, and 
increasing corporate profit taxation, steps have also been taken to remove various subsidies 
that result in substantial price distortions. As regards government expenditures, the aim is to 
control the growth of wages and salaries and maintain sustainable levels of capital 
expenditure. Nevertheless, larger private sector participation in the economy, in fact, is one of 
the key objectives of privatization in the all GCC member states (Azzam, 1998). Thus, GCC 
countries have also introduced new legislation in the second half of the 1990s, aimed at 
simplifying investment procedures, and opening their economies to greater foreign 
participation. Various mechanisms of privatization, for example have been adopted (Stock 
Nfarket flotation, Build Operate and Transfer Contracts for large infrastructure projects, 
Leasing Out to Private Sector, Commercialization of Public Enterprises and so on), to promote 
the role of the private sector in production and investment and to extend the privatization 
programme to major entities and large corporations. Steps also have been taken to allow 
foreign investment participation in petrochemical activities. Consideration is also being given 
to liberalizing foreign participation in drilling and exploration activities in the oil sector. At 
the end of 2000 the private sector accounts for less than 401/o of GDP in most of the GCC 
countries (GCC Economic Bulleting, 2001). The plans also implement employment policies 
that aim to absorb the growing number of workers entering the labour market, while reducing 
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employment in the public sector, for example, the immigration of low-skilled expatriates has 
been limited. Furthermore, GCC countries have implemented what is known as the Offset 
Programme, where, foreign firms that are awarded government contracts are required to 
reinvest between 20% to 30% from the contract value in joint ventures with local-owned firms 
Privatization of certain public sector enterprises is among the general objectives and strategic principles of 
the development plans in all the GCC countries. Governments of the region arc committed to increasing 
the role of the private sector in their economies. Privatization could reduce the financial burden on the 
governments and render several public sector institutions more efficient. The income generated from 
privatization could be used to retrain the national workforce and help assimilate them in the private sector 
as well as retiring existing public sector debt (Azzarn, 1998, p. 97) 
Generally speaking, the experience of the GCC countries in diversifying their economic 
structure and reducing their reliance on oil revenue falls into three broad categories. In some 
GCC countries, such as Kuwait, the emphasis has been on downstream diversification through 
asset acquisitions in other countries. In some other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, economic 
diversification was carried out through developing a domestic non-oil sector with significant 
participation by the private sector. Other countries have followed a mix of these two policies, 
broadly defining their strategies on the basis of their oil resource profile, foreign exchange 
reserves, and investment opportunities at home. 
All oil-rich economies are making very basic decisions about economic development questions, 
but not every Gulf state has answered these questions in the same way. All have utilized their 
oil resources, but to varying degrees; all have grown dependent upon oil export markets as well 
as supplying the domestic market; but a different emphasis has been placed upon the use of oil 
revenues. Kuwait, for example, has placed a relative emphasis upon the acquisition of foreign 
assets rather than upon industrialization; Saudi Arabia has sought the creation of an 
industrialized economy through the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), the 
twin industrial cities of Yanbu and Jubail and the general support given to the private sector in 
the form of cheap finance, tax concessions, industrial estates and preferential treatment in 
domestic markets; less emphasis has been given to buying into industry abroad. Presley 
(1992, p 5). 
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23.4 GCC Economic Performance durine the 1990s 
23.4.1 Economic growth in GCC countries during the 1990s 
One of the traditional macroeconomic growth measures used to reflect economic development 
is change in Gross Domestic Product. This represents the change in value of final goods and 
services currently produced. GDP data are, in practice, used not only as a measure of how 
much is being produced but also as an indicator of the welfare of the residents of a country. 
Economists talk as if an increase in real GDP means that people are better off (Fisher et al. 
2000), although the distribution of this growth can obviously have an important influence on 
the populations well-being. GCC countries economic performance as measured by the annual 
growth in real GDP has improved from about 0.5 percent on average over the period 1980- 
1990 to around 6.8 percent between 1992-1999 (table 2.3). 
Table 23 Real GDP growth, annual percent change of GCC countries over 1980-99 
(US$, millions) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1992-99 
Average 
Kuwait -6 83.5 20.8 3.3 7.1 17.0 -3.4 -15.7 17.2 16.2 
Qatar -2 11.1 -6.4 3.0 10.4 11.3 24.7 -9.2 18.9 8 
Emirates 0 4.4 0.9 7.1 11.9 12.1 5.0 -6.0 10.1 5.7 
Bahrain 2 2.9 9.5 7.0 5.1 4.3 4.1 -2.6 7.1 4.7 
Oman 8 9.8 0.3 3.4 6.8 10.7 3.7 -10.6 10A 4.3 
SaudL A 1 4.4 -3.8 1.4 6.4 10.6 3.5 -12.4 8.5 2.3 
GCC .5 19.35 3.68 4.2 7.8 11 6.26 -9.41 12 6.86 
Source: GCC Economic Bulleting, various Editions 
The enhanced real GDP growth of these countries through the 1990s perhaps can be partially 
attributed to the economic reforms and/or various measures undertaken by most of the GCC 
countries in the early 1990s to improve market-oriented policies in these countries. It can also 
be attributed to the lower degree of oil price volatility throughout the 1990s relative to the 
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1980s. The fastest growing economies include those of Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates. 
Table 2A Per cap ita GDP for GCC countries (M), 
Country/Year 1970-79 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000 
Kuwait 24400 18500 11400 8610 13553 13160 17040.7 
Qatar 27550 25400 14600 17609 16642 21898 30205.1 
Emirates 29200 27900 20000 18250 17755 17745 21273.2 
Bahrain 12400 10000 7300 9004 10103 9956 11540.6 
Oman 3800 3600 5700 7182 6477 6724 8245.8 
SaudLA 9000 10200 5710 6662 6798 6525 8312.9 
GCC 17725 15933 10785 8144.5 8555 8712 10362.2 
Source: GCC Economic Bulletin, volume 16,2001 
In terms of real GDP per capita, GCC countries have witnessed significant changes over the 
last two decades. As shown in table 2.4 in the 1970s the GCC GDP per capita (on average) 
was around US$ 17,725, compared with US$9,000 for the 1980s and US$8900 during the 
1990s. The lack of growth in per capita GDP could be attributed mainly to the negative 
consequences of the oil market downturn during the 1980s and 1990s compared to the 1970s, 
given that oil revenues still account for more than 45% percent of GDP. It also may be 
attributed to the negative consequences of second Gulf War in 1991 where countries in the 
region were burdened with significant war expenses. Furthermore, the population growth rate 
in the GCC averaged around 3.5 % throughout the 1990s, one of the highest population 
growth rates around the world and this placed an increasing burden on public finances, (World 
Development Report, 2001 )2 and also helped reduce GDP per capita levels. 
2 GCC annual population growth during the 1990s at 3.5% was more than double the annual 1.5% growth of the 
world populadon. 
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23.4.2 Trade, Government Finances, Inflation and Investment in the GCC during the 
1990se 
Overall, the trade balance for GCC countries experienced surpluses during the 1990s, although 
these surpluses were subject to high volatility. Given that oil exports represents 80 to 90 
percent of the total exports of GCC countries, then the volatility of GCC countries trade 
balances are almost entirely determined by oil prices. Again this confirms the key role of oil 
on the economic activities of GCC countries. Economic activities in the GCC depend heavily 
on government expenditures, however, despite the efforts of GCC countries to diversify their 
income sources to avoid fluctuations in oil prices, government expenditures in turn are also 
heavily dependent on oil prices. In general, during the 1990s the GCC countries ran budget 
deficits, although, a significant improvement has occurred in the second 
half of the 1990s. 
Table 2.5 GCC direction of Trade during the 1990s Exports, Imports and Balance of trade 
(US$ Million . 
nrY ar lte 1990 199 1 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 7 
r, rts 
gj 
Expc O. B 85056 82088 91912 90931 92940 105558 124893 131060 95942 115625 172067 
Imports(C. LF) 45010 
1 
53340 64577 61300 59420 67110 70261 80147 80000 74129 79030 
TradeBalance 40045 28750 27335 29632 33520 38489 54633 50913 15941 41496 93037 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (v"wamEorg. ae). 
The aggregate budget deficit measured as a ratio to aggregate GDP was 11.5 %, on average, 
for 1990 to 1995 and this had fallen to 3% through 1996 to 2000 (see table 2.6). Clearly, the 
link between government revenues from oil and the improvements in budget deficit over the 
latter period is clear. 
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Table 2.6 GCC Total Government Revenues and Expenditures during the 1990s (US$ M) 
Year/Item Oil Non-Oil Total Investment Current Total Surplus/ %GDP 
Revenue Revenue Revenues Expenditur Expenditu Expenditu 
Ie 
re re (Deficit) 
1"0 53441.6 13577.9 69574.4 11979.2 24588.8 92758 (23183.6) 12 
1"1 48837.1 13968.4 66104.4 7521.9 39687.2 103399.1 (37294.7) 20 
1992 18798.3 5109.0 67016.0 11926.9 28601.6 88795.2 (21779.2) 10 
M 20992.8 4906.1 74305.0 10813.2 28314.4 91647.6 (17342.6) 8 
1"4 45188.7 5474.5 62577.7 12673.5 28499.8 84846.9 (22269.2) 11 
1"S 52077.8 17033.8 71770.9 19421.8 68878.6 88300.4 (16529.5) 7 
1"6 64557.9 20124.7 88380.1 20779.6 77096.9 97876.5 (9496.4) 3 
IM 72838.6 20563.8 97251.8 23912.7 79109.7 102736.4 (5484.6) 2 
1998 39715.2 26089.9 6"75.3 23261.1 74754.5 98015.6 (28040.3) 12 
1"9 55355.0 20405.1 79949.9 14113.6 81574.6 95776.2 (15826.3) 6 
2000 1 85451.7 20509.3 112350.9 16277.6 94940.5 111406.7 944.1 +. 002 
Adopted from: GCC Economic Bulletin, various Editions, and author's own estimatin. 
Inflation rates in GCC countries, as measured by changes in the consumer price index, witnessed 
favourable improvement during the 1990's compared to the levels experienced during the 1980's 
(rable, 2.7). Inflation averaged about 1.4 % per annum during the 1990s compared with 2.5% 
during the 1980s. These inflation rates are low compared to other developing countries, where, 
inflation averaged about 8 percent during 1990s and 12 percent during the 1980's (World 
Development Report, 2000). The low inflation environment resulting from global 
macroeconomic features as well as domestic restructuring programmes and tighter policy also 
helped contribute to improved government finances by the end of the 1990s. 
Table 2.7 The rates of inflation in GCC countries as (%) over (1980-2000) 
Country/Year 1980-1990 1991 1995 2000 1991-2000 
Average Average 
Saudi Arabia 2 1 3 1 1.4 
Oman 2 3 1 .1 1 
Bahrain 1 1.5 1.2 .7 1.2 
Kuwait 3.7 2.6 1.3 .9 1.2 
Qatar 2.9 3.7 1.8 2 2.2 
U. A. E 3.9 3.8 2.6 2 1.7 
GCC 2.5 1.9 1.7 
.9 1.4 Source: Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www. amEorg. ae) 
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Domestic investment as proportion of GDP in GCC countries has decreased slightly from 17 
percent on average in 1995 to 15 percent by the year 2000 (see table 2.8). This is mainly 
attributed to the large fall in government revenues in 1998 and also to a reduction in 
investment expenditures implemented by most GCC counties in order to reduce their budget 
deficits (see table 2.7). Regarding foreign investment, unfortunately, there is only limited 
information available for the first half of the 1990s, although the available indicators for the 
second half of the 1990s suggest that there was an increase in foreign direct investment in the 
region (table 2.9). This may be attributed to the new legislation and deregulations introduced 
in GCC countries to encourage foreign investment as well as the various structural reforms 
have taken place during the 1990s to improve infrastructure development. 
Table2.8 Gross Domestic Investment of GCC countries as % of GDP (1995-2000) 
Country/Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1995-2000 
Average 
Saudi Arabia 21 - 18 20 21 22 23 20.8 
Kuwait is is 14 16 12 is 14.5 
Bahrain 13 9 6 8 10 9 11 
Oman 12 14 13 14 15 15.6 14 
Qatar 23 16 18 17 19 18 18.5 
UAE 22 17 17 16 17 18 18 
GCC 17 15 15 16 16 16 15 
Soumes: Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www. amEorg. ae) 
Table 2.9 Foreign Direct investment in GCC countries as % of GDP (US$, Millions) 
Country/Year Annu. Ave 1990 1995 1998 1999 2000 1990-2000 
1980-1990 Average 
Kuwait 0 0 15 2.8 3 5 7 
Oman 9 5 4.8 4 2 6 4 
Saudi Arabia N/A N/A N/A 3 4 4 2 
Qatar N/A N/A N/A 3 3.4 3.7 1.7 
UAE N/A N/A N/A 5 5.6 4.7 3 
GCC N/A N/A N/A 3.5 4 4.5 4 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (wwwamtorg. ae) 
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2A GCC Economic Development Process and the Kev Role of Oil Revenues 
Overall, concerning the economic position of the countries under study, various indicators 
suggest an improvement in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. As already mentioned, the 
economic growth of GCC member states (as measured by change in annual real GDP) slowed 
during the 1980s, averaging 0.5 percent compared to 5 percent for other developing countries 
over the same period. This relatively slow growth led to lower levels of investment and higher 
levels of unemployment. This was also associated with rising levels of external indebtednesS3 
and fiscal deficits forcing the GCC countries to undertake macroeconomic reforms to promote 
economic growth. During the 1990s annual real GDP growth averaged 6.6 percent compared 
to 5.5 percent for all developing countries over the same period. The trade balance of GCC 
member states witnessed surpluses during the 1990s, however, these surpluses still suffered 
from high fluctuations depending on the value of oil exports. Inflation rates have also fallen. 
While the internal debt of some countries is still high (The Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy of Saudi Arabia has announced that its internal debt is about SAR 700 Billions 
double the country's GDP), (SAMA Annual Reports 2001), the external debt as a percentage 
of GDP appears to be following a declining trend. Investment levels have also witnessed 
improvement in the second half of 1990s specifically foreign direct investment. Finally, GCC 
countries have continued to reduce their budget deficits and by 2000 the bloc experienced 
budget surpluses. However, the improvement in the general economic position of the countries 
under study during the latter part of the 1990s is primarily linked to increased oil prices. The 
mining sector (oil being the main item) is still the major economic activity and dominates the 
development process. Table 2.10 shows the relative importance and growth rates of the mining 
3 In 1991 after the Gulf war the external debt of Saudi Arabia amounted to (US$ 55 Billion), (Cunningham, 
1995). 
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and non-mining sectors (aggregate values) as a percentage of the aggregate GCC GDP. It 
shows clearly how fluctuations in oil revenues directly influence the mining sector's relative 
importance and its growth rates and this, of course, is reflected in the GDP figures. For 
example when oil prices slumped in 1998 the relative importance of the sector contributing to 
GDP fell from 36%to 27% (table 2.11). However, this was not the case in 1999 and 2000 
when the growth of the sector increased by 37% and 60%, in 1999 and 2000 respectively and 
mining increased its share of GDP from 27% in 1998 to 32% and 42% in 1999 and 2000 
respectively, (table 2.11). (Again this just confirms the extent to which GCC countries are still 
heavily dependent on oil revenues). 
Table 2.10 The Relative Importance and Growth Rates of Aggregate Mining and Non-Mining Sectors 
as (%) of Agg gate GCC Countries GDP. 
Minin Sector Non-Mining Sector 
Year Rclative 
Importance 
Growth Rate Relative Importance Growth Rate 
1990 38 40 62 5 
1991 38 7 62 10 
1992 39 8 61 4 
1993 33 -18 67 8 
1994 34 7 66 1 
1995 35 14 65 8 
1996 37 15 63 5 
1997 36 1 64 6 
1998 27 -34 73 3 
1999 32 37 68 5 
2000 42 59 58 5 
Source: GCC Economic Bufleting, Volume 16,2001 
The aggregate return from GCC oil production in 1997 was about US$100 billion a fall of 
1.2% relative to 1996, this was because oil prices started to decline over the period. In 
particular between 1996 and1997, oil revenues for all the GCC countries declined: UA. E (- 
6.4%), for Oman (-0.8%), Kuwait (-12.3%), Qatar (-3%), Bahrain (-7.5%), and (-2.30/o) for 
Saudi Arabia. Oil prices continued their downward slide in 1998, worsening GCC economic 
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conditions, for example oil revenues fell by 35% in Saudi Arabia and 30% in United Arab 
Emirates. By the end of 1998 aggregate GDP of the GCC was about (US$ Bill 230) and the 
GDP Growth rate fell by 10% relative to 1997 (table 2.12). At the beginning of 1999 oil 
markets recovered having a positive impact on the GCC. Aggregate GDP revenues rose to 
US$ 265 billion with a positive growth rate about 15%, this perfonnance continued in the 
2000 where aggregate GDP increased to US$ 320 billion and GDP increased, on average by a 
massive 22% (table 2.12). Qatar GDP for 2000 increased by 30%, Kuwait by 25%, Oman by 
26%, Bahrain by 21%, U. A. E by 22% and 22% in Saudi Arabia. The revenues from non-oil 
sectors increased by 5% compared to the 1999 levels, to around US$ 185 billion, however, the 
non-oil sectors relative importance in GCC GDP fell from 68% in the 1999 to 58% by the 
2000. Average Gross Domestic Product per capita increased by 10% in 1999 compared to 
1998 and 20% in 2000 relative to 1999 (table 2.12). Taken together, one can see how the 
recent strong performance of GCC economies is inextricably linked to oil prices. 
Table2.11 heAggregat GCC Member States GDP and GDP per capita and its annual% change 
Year GDP_ %Change GDPpercapita %Change In GDP per capita 
1990 174229.4 13.0 8144.5 9.16 
1991 178122.9 2.2 8445. 3.02 
1992 201076.3 12.9 8937.0 3.04 
1993 205114.7 2.0 8412.7 -4.6 
1994 203993.0 -0.5 8233.2 -1.76 
1995 224788.2 10.2 8653.4 5.9 
1996 251001.3 11.7 9291.4 7.5 
1997 259360.6 3.3 9211.9 -. 1 
1998 231654.2 -10.7 7946 -15 
1999 2262198.6 13.3 8711.4 9.1 
2000 321384.6 22.6 10362.2 14.7 
Source: The GCC Economic Bulleting, Volume 16,200 1. 
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2.5: The Maior Challenges and Constraints to Economic Develoment Process in the 
GCC 
While the recent initiatives mentioned in section 2.3.3 have significantly strengthened the 
adjustment process that began in the mid-1980s, the nature and extent of emerging challenges 
is still on going. In almost all countries that followed a domestic investment policy, the 
development of the non-oil sector focused on petrochemical industries and other oil-based 
industries in which the countries had a clear comparative advantage. However, the 
petrochemical industries still remain vulnerable to international oil market developments and 
to restrictive trade practices in the main consuming regions. Moreover, most of the large non- 
oil industries in the GCC have remained in the public domain, reflecting the authorities' policy 
toward strategic industries and minority foreign participation, as well as the large capital 
requirements that have limited private sector entry. In agriculture and manufacturing, where 
private sector participation was significant, production has been supported by various 
subsidies and incentives that has burdened the budget and distorted the relative price structure. 
Despite the development plans outlined in the mid-1990s, the GCC countries have limited 
experience with privatization. In Kuwait, privatization has involved sales of shares of certain 
enterprises held by the Kuwait Investment Authority on behalf of the Goveniment. In Saudi 
Arabia, so far, 30 percent of shares of the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation have 
been sold to the private sector. 
A broader privatization program aiming to create a more efficient economic system should be geared 
toward not only higher private sector activity, but also private sector decision making and majority 
ownership, tapping its dynamism, creativity, and entrepreneurial skills. This should proceed in tandem 
with a further liberalization of foreign direct investment to allow majority ownership. The proceeds from privatization should be used to retire public debt. In addition to a sound regulatory framework, 
the success of the privatization programs is predicated on transmitting the right price signals to the 
market. (Sassanpour, 1996, p. 46). 
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A number of GCC countries have identified public utility companies as possible targets for 
privatization4 (Alta'awon, 2002). This would require a prior adjustment in prices to ensure 
self-financing and a reduction in the burden on the budget in the future. There would naturally 
be short-term costs associated with the resulting resource reallocation, but these trends also 
offer significant potential for welfare gains in GCC countries if proper conditions are in place. 
The basic and perhaps the most important requirement is a stable domestic macroeconomic 
setting. Within this framework, a large and adaptable trade sector and a sufficiently diversified 
economic base would be required in order to benefit from a rapidly changing international 
trade environment (EAF, 2000). Moreover, according to (Azzam, 1998) the benefits to the 
economy from closer links to international capital markets could only be maximized through a 
diversified domestic financial sector and open and well-functioning markets which are well 
supervised and regulated. 
The GCC countries have small, but growing, domestic equity markets. In the future, these markets 
would be called upon to play a more active role in resource mobilization and increased equity 
financing for the private sector. In fact, this would be a key element for the success of the 
privatization program which, in turn, would contribute to its efficiency by increasing its size and 
depth. Increased investment opportunities at home would also help in attracting substantial savings 
held by GCC citizens abroad. The recent successful floating of public shares on the local markets (in 
Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the U. A. E. ) and their oversubscription in some cases 
suggests that substantial resources could be raised through the local markets. ( DvW, 2000). 
However, despite liberal exchange policies, the links between the equity markets in the GCC 
countries and the international capital markets have not been strong because: (i) there are 
restrictions on direct foreign participation in domestic equity markets; (ii) the financing 
requirements of a dominant public sector have been typically met through bank borrowing; 
and (iii) equity markets have been dominated by a few large-and mostly closed and family 
owned-private sector companies (Azzam, 1998). At the same time, excluding joint ventures in 
4 Saudi Arabia has identified the Saudi Telecom to be privatized in Dec 2002 and Saudi Airlines in 2003 
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the oil and gas sectors, direct foreign investment in the GCC countries has been insignificant 
because of the small domestic market and public sector control in major industries (e. g., 
petrochemical industries). As such, the direct benefits to the GCC countries from a closer 
integration of capital markets would only be significant if the domestic markets become more 
diversified and open. 
At first glance, the GCC countries with their open and liberal trade regimes and a large external trade sector 
appear to be well-placed to benefit from the global trade reforms. However, the conventional measures of the 
degree of openness and the extent of integration of the OCC economies with the rest of the world need 
qualification. While in the GCC countries the share of total external trade to GDP (almost 100 percent in 1995- 
99) is probably among the highest in the world, and per capita exports (USS4,000 in 1999) reach the levels of 
industrial countries, these measures of openness are heavily influenced by oil trade Given the present production 
and export structure, the direct benefits to the GCC countries from the global trade reforms are likely to be 
limited, at least initially (Sassanpour, 1996, p. 45) 
2.6 The Conclusion: 
On the May 25,1981 the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) for the Arab States of the Gulf 
was created. The GCC, comprising Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, became the first major attempt toward regional economic 
integration in the Arab world. One of the GCC's main objectives is to promote economic 
development. A number of agreements in the fields of economics, foreign affairs, education, 
defense, security and energy, have been signed between the members of the GCC organization 
in order to promote economic development and broader integration process. This chapter has 
outlined and discussed the economic and financial trends that have affected the economic 
development process and changed the face of the GCC member states economies over the past 
two decades. In section 2.2 we outlined the main features of the GCC organization, its 
formation and major objectives. The potential benefits arising from GCC member state 
economic integration are also highlighted. In section 2.4 the performance of six GCC 
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economies and the stages of economic development over the last two decades are reviewed 
and discussed using various economic indicators. The broad structural reforms and various 
government plans implemented by GCC member states to improve economic performance 
during the 1990s are also outlined. Challenges and constraints to the economic development 
process in GCC member states are briefly discussed in the final section. 
All in all, it can be seen that, the economies of all GCC states are strongly dependent on oil 
prices, despite recent attempts to diversify industrial bases and sources of revenue.. Plans to 
encourage further economic diversification in the manufacturing and services sectors are 
ongoing. Since the early 1970s, oil revenues have transformed the GCC member states into 
modem economies. Crude oil exports, which are the preserve of the governments, remain the 
mainstay of economic activity, but refining industries, petrochemical plants, light industries 
and retailing are gradually assuming a larger role. Nevertheless, the basic structure of the 
economies, whereby the oil sector accounts for at least 30% of National GDP and government 
activity as a whole for around 60%, will probably remain the same for the foreseeable future. 
Sharp swings in oil prices have meant that economic growth in the GCC countries has been 
erratic during the last 20 years. After oil booms in the mid 1970s and the early 1980s, prices 
slumped in the mid 1980s bringing unfavourable economic conditions represented by 
increases in fiscal deficits, rising rates of unemployment, and increasing social demands 
associated with the sluggish economic growth and large internal and external financial 
imbalances. The GCC Countries were just emerging from recession when the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait ushered in an era of higher oil prices and, due to the removal of Iraqi oil from 
international markets, increased oil export revenues. As a result, the economies of the GCC 
member states experienced a mini-boom in 1991 and 1992. This was brought to an end by the 
precipitous fall in prices at the end of 1993. The aggregate GDP growth of the GCC countries 
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was slightly negative in 1993 (-1%) but it resumed a positive increase of around 2% in real 
terms by the end of 1994, and 7% on average over the period 1995-97. However, this was not 
the case in 1998, when the oil prices slumped again causing aggregate GDP growth of GCC 
countries to decline substantially, on average a fall of II percent for the bloc overall. In 1999 
and 2000 oil prices increased, shifting aggregate GCC Countries GDP growth from -11% in 
1998 to 13% in 1999, and 23% in 2000 respectively. 
The GCCs heavy dependence on oil has lead to a wide-ranging debate on the future of GCC 
member states economies. In the past these countries were able to survive periods of low oil 
prices by drawing on their reserves, but by the early 1990s the effects of budget deficits 
became more structural in nature, which meant that this policy was no longer sustainable. 
Furdiermore, recurrent government spending and defense purchases have grown to the extent 
that even in years of reasonably high oil revenues the GCC Countries were still in deficit. The 
governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman signaled their recognition of the problems by 
announcing five-year plans (1995-2000), ( while other countries implemented similar policies) 
stressing the need to expand private sector activity within the economy and the increased 
privatization of various state industries. 
This chapter provides a general overview of macroeconomic conditions of GCC member 
states economies. An important feature of the development process relates to improvements in 
the performance in the banking and financial system as well as further integration of the GCC 
financial systems. The following chapter, therefore, outlines the main characteristics of 
financial and banking systems of the countries under study. The aim is to investigate the role 
of financial institutions in the process of economic development in GCC countries. 
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Chapter III 
The GCC Financial Systems: 
Structural Developments and Performance 
3.1: Introduction 
In chapter two, we analysed the broad macroeconomic features of GCC economies. This 
chapter outlines the main characteristics of the banking and financial systems of the six 
countries under study. Section 3.2 discusses the relationship between the development of 
the financial system and economic growth by describing the functional role of financial 
institutions in the economic development process. Section 3.3 presents an overview of the 
financial systems of the countries under study; these are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, 
Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Section 3.4 discusses the stages of financial 
development, namely monetization and financial depth using some basic economic and 
financial indicators. It has been argued that the structural characteristics of banking 
markets are important determinants of how well individual banks operating in the market 
might serve their customers (Rose, 1987). Section 3.5, therefore, investigates the main 
structural features of the six banking markets including the level of concentration. Section 
3.6 examines the recent performance of GCC banks and section 3.7 is the conclusion. 
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3.2 Financial Svstem Desi2n and the Svstem Functional Role in Economic 
Development 
One critical factor that has begun to receive considerable attention more recently is the role 
of financial markets in the growth process. The positive link between financial depth, 
defined broadly as the level of development of financial markets, and economic growth is 
in one sense fairly obvious. That is, more developed countries, without exception, have 
more developed firmcial markets. Therefore, it would seem that policies to develop the 
financial sector would be expected to raise economic growth. Indeed, the role of financial 
development is considered by many to be the key to economic development and growth 
(Khan et, al. 2000, p. 3). 
In general, financial system can be broadly divided into four main parts: The banking 
system, non-bank financial institutions, financial/capital markets (equity, bonds, and other 
financial derivatives), and the regulatory and supervisory system that represents the role of 
government policies related to stabilizing and controlling the financial system (Hermes, et 
al. 2000). Basically, financial development involves the evolution of financial instruments, 
financial markets and financial institutions (Azzarn, 1998). In recent years, financial 
system development has gained increasing attention, both in academic and in policy 
circles. As is acknowledged in the recent literature, the financial system plays a crucial role 
in economic development [(Levine, 1997), Levine and Loyaza (2000), Beck et. al (1999), 
Khan (2000)]. Many papers have established a strong positive correlation between 
financial system characteristics and economic growth [see, among others (King and 
Levine, 1993ab), (Hermes and Lensink 2000)]. The main functions of a financial system 
are to intermediate between saving and investing economic units. This includes selecting 
investment projects and the final users of financial resources according to their 
creditworthiness and monitoring the use of these resources. In particular, financial systems 
transform the maturity, liquidity, risk and return characteristics of the liabilities issued by 
borrowing units to meet the preferences of lendels (Levine, 1997). Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990). emphasize the role of financial intermediaries in risk pooling and 
monitoring functions by pooling savings for diversified investment projects and by 
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monitoring the behaviour of the borrowing firms, banks ensure higher expected rates of 
retums which help to promote economic growth. Pagano (1993) provides a theoretical 
contribution showing how financial development may have a positive effect on economic 
growth. He stresses the role of financial institutions, e. g., banks, in providing important 
services such as facilitating trading, hedging, diversifying and pooling of risk, which 
stimulates savings mobilization, and allocates financial savings to the most efficient 
investment projects by screening and monitoring boffowers. Moreover, he points out that 
financial development may influence the private saving rate. Levine (1991) incorporates 
both portfolio diversification and liquidity management aspects to show the role of 
financial inter-mediaries in pooling consumers' liquidity risks via the securities market and 
concludes that setting up a stock market enhances economic growth. Chen, Chiang and 
Wang (1996) also suggest that financial intermediation increases investment projects and 
spurs economic growth by utilising more sophisticated and specialised. production 
processes. 
In both developed and developing economies, banks are the principal source of non- 
market finance to the economy (Khan, et al, 2000). Banks gather and assess information 
about prospective borrowers and their investment opportunities. The second function 
performed by banks is to serve as the principal repository for liquidity in the economy 
(Levine, et al. 1999). By pooling the transaction balances of many different transactors, 
banks can acquire large, diversified portfolios of direct claims on borrowers which enable 
them to meet liquidity demands while still holding substantial amounts of illiquid assets. 
Furthermore, banks offer longer-term deposits that must compete directly with other 
instruments available in the financial markets. The return on deposits must be sufficient to 
compensate for the risk and delayed consumption associated with accepting deposit claims 
on the bank. Furthermore, banks transform the longer-term, risky, illiquid claims that 
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borrowers prefer to issue into safer, shorter-term, more liquid demand and savings deposits 
that savers prefer. This asset transformation often involves maturity transformation as well. 
Financial intermediaries enhance economic efficiency by overcoming fictions through 
channelling resources toward the most efficient investment, giving households access to 
economies of scale in processing information that enables the identification of investment 
projects and ensures that businesses act in ways that do not conflict with saver's interests. 
Becsi and Wang (1997) note that while there is no single general model that explains why 
banks exist, fundamental market frictions are probably the main rationale for the existence 
of financial intermediaries. Market fictions can be classified into either technological or 
incentive. Technological frictions prevent individuals from having to access economies of 
scale in the processing of financial services relating to potential borrowers. Overall, 
financial intermediaries have major roles to play in the economy; in particular, they help 
overcome various sources of market frictions and therefore help transform financial 
resources to their most efficient use, thus enhancing economic growth. Nevertheless, 
financial markets worldwide are rapidly becoming more integrated and thus better at 
allocating capital to its most productive uses (Azzam, 1998). The continuing liberalization 
of financial markets; the trend towards securitization (and hence tradability) of financial 
assets; and more effective management of risks and returns through the use of derivatives 
are all helping to lower barriers between domestic financial markets worldwide (Hermes, 
et al. 2000). A more efficient global capital market should be better able to match savings 
in the developed world with the profitable investment opportunities in developing 
countries (Azzam, 1998). However, the positive contribution the financial system can 
make to the process of economic growth depends, among other things, on how the system 
is designed (Lensink et al. 2000). Knowledge of exactly how the design of the financial 
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system may help to improve welfare is of course of particular importance to under- 
developed economies. 
Niany different aspects of financial system design play a role, such as the type of financial 
institutions that should be established, the design of the regulatory and supervisory system, 
and the role of government policies related to stabilizing and controlling the financial 
system. In a broad sense, the design of the financial system involves the choice between 
two dominant systems: the market-oriented financial system - which can be found in 
countries like the United States and the United Kingdom - on the one hand, and the bank- 
dominated system - which is in place in countries like Germany and Japan - on the other 
hand. Of course, a country may also opt for intermediate ways of designing its financial 
system. ( Lensink et al. 2000, p5 10). 
The choice for a particular financial system has direct implications for the type of financial 
institutions to be established, for regulatory and supervisory design and for the choice of 
government policies (Khan, 2000). In general, the design of the financial system involves 
the choice between market-oriented or bank-oriented financial system. However, the 
relative merits of bank-based financial systems versus market-based financial systems also 
have been the focus for recent empirical research. Proponents of bank-based systems note 
that: 
(1) In highly liquid markets, information is quickly revealed to investors at large, 
creating a free-rider problem; 
(H) Small outside investors are unable to exert corporate control due to superior 
information of managers and the likely collusion between managers and a few 
powerfW members of the board; and 
(III) Liquid markets make it easy for concerned stockholders to simply sell their 
shares rather than coordinate pressure against management. 
The combination of all of these market failures leads to an inefficient allocation of saving. 
Those favoring bank-based systems argue that banks with their long-tenn relationships 
with particular fi I rms, mitigate these market failures. . 
45 
On the other hand, proponents of market-based systems focus on the weaknesses of bank- 
based systems, arguing that: 
(1) Large banks tend to encourage firms to undertake overly conservative 
investment projects, and extract large rents from firms leaving them with low 
profits and little incentive to engage in new and innovative projects; and 
(II) Shareholders have little oversight over bank managers who control not only 
banks but also, indirectly through financing, the firms. Furthermore, the 
advocates of market-based systems claim that the latter provide a richer set of 
financial instruments that allows greater customization of risk management 
techniques than in a more standardized bank-based system. 
Emerging evidence suggests that neither view is Mly correct (see among others Shleifer, 
and Vishny, (1997), Levine (1998,1999b). However, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2000) 
suggested that establishing a legal environment that credibly protects the right of investors 
is much more important than considerations involving comparisons between bank-based or 
market-based systems. Levine (1999b) on the other hand, convincingly argues that the 
choice is not either banks or markets. Rather, banks and markets provide complementary 
financial services to the economy, with both having positive implications for economic 
growth. In this context, the financial systems of the GCC states are all considered as bank- 
dominated systems similar to that in countries like Germany and Japan. Moreover, these 
markets are also considered underdeveloped markets by global standards. The capital 
markets (equity and bonds) are still in their early states of developments (Azzarn, 1998). 
The Arab Gulf bond nwkets are still in their early Slatcs of development mostly in 
government debt instruments denominated in the local currencies. The bond markets in 
the region arc likely to gain added depth and versatility in the con-dng few years as the 
need increases for long-term capital borrowed at a fixed rate to spend on infrastructure 
and as international investors seek higher yields from newly emerging markets. This 
will complement the region's fast developing equity markets and provide a fresh source 
of financing for private and public projects. It mill also encourage the creation of new 
risk management instruments such as interest rates futures and options, while adding to 
the scope of central banks to conduct monetary policy through open markct operations. 
(Azzam, 1998, p 69). 
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In developing countries, banking markets are characterized by high liquidity and a lack of 
complex financial instruments, either on the asset or liability side. 
In the majority of the developing countries where the financial system is less developed, 
competition is limited and most of the financial activities are dominated by a small number 
of financial institutions, usually commercial banks. 'Me degree of competition among 
different financial institutions constituting the financial system can be measured by the 
concentration of the banking system's total assets. (Hermes et al. 2000, p. 5 11). 
While regulations concerning -financial institutions exist in all countries, these appear to be 
enforced more consistently and effectively in the developed countries compared to under- 
developed ones (Cunningham, 1995). Finally, financial innovation in developed countries 
has typically been led by market forces and the liberalization of markets, whereas in 
developing countries, such as the GCC, it has been predominantly at the behest of 
governments (Azzam, 1998). 
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3.3 An Overview for The Financial Svstems in the GCC Countries 
This section outlines from a historical point of view the development of the financial 
systems of the six countries under study Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and 
United Arab Emirates. The structure and performance features of these banking systems of 
are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
3.3.1 Financial System of Saudi Arabia 
The Saudi financial system is centred on 9 commercial banks, and one money exchanger 
all of which are wholly or majority owned by Saudi interests. The history of financial 
institutions in Saudi Arabia commenced in the 1900s when several foreign banks had 
offices in the Yingdom before the period of high oil revenues (Presley, 1992). The first 
local bank, National Commercial Bank, was licensed in the early 1950s. However, the 
modern history of the banking system in Saudi Arabia started in 1952 when the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was created to achieve a stable monetary mechanism. 
Before the establishment of SAMA, there was no Saudi currency until 1952 when the 
Saudi Riyal was issued (Cunningham, 1995). In 1976 the Saudi Council of Ministers 
ordered that all foreign banks in the Kingdom had to be put under majority Saudi 
ownership and a maximum foreign shareholding at 40% was set. During the next few years 
seven foreign banks converted their local offices into joint ventures. The last banking 
licence to be issued was to Al-RaJhi Banking and Investment Corporation, which began 
operations in 1988. The company had been operating as a money changer for many years 
and had strayed into the business of accepting deposits. By issuing a licence the financial 
authorities regularized this anomalous situation and brought the company within the 
purview of local banking regulations (Cunningham, 1995). Apart from the granting of a 
licence to A]-Rajhi, which must be considered an exc&ptional case, the banking market bas 
been closed to newcomers since the early 1980s. The only other banking institutions are the 
48 
five major state development banks which extend soft loans to infrastructural, agricultural 
and other strategic projects. These development banks established during the 1970s, 
include, Saudi Credit Bank, Saudi Agricultural Bank, Public Investment Fund, Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund and the Real Estate Development Bank. These institutions 
finance medium and long-term projects to supplement the short-term funds provided by 
commercial banks (Presley, 1992). 
Central Banking and Regulation 
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) is the Kingdom's central bank. It was 
created by royal decree in 1952 and given a charter in 1957 (Cunningham, 1995). SAMA's 
responsibilities vis-a. -vis commercial bank legislation were laid down in the Banking 
Control Law of 1966 which still forms the basis of banking regulation in the Kingdom 
(Azzam, 1998). SAMA reports to the Ministry of Finance and National Economy whose 
approval is required for many aspects of its regulatory activity. In practice, however, 
SAMA is free to act 6n its own initiative in technical matters relating to the management of 
the banking system (Alsuhaimi, 2001). Although SAMA is not technically a lender of last 
resort, it acts as one for all practical purposes (Cunningham, 1995). It is highly unlikely to 
allow any bank to collapse as a result of financial difficulties. In the days which followed 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, SAMA moved swiftly to inject liquidity 
into the banking system to help the banks cover the massive withdrawals and transfers 
made by depositors. Its efforts extended to the import of actual US dollar bank notes which 
were distributed to the banks (Presley, et al. 1992). 
No bank has collapsed since the formation of SAMA in the 1950s although in the late 
1980s it was clear that some would have negative net worth if they made provisions 
commensurate with the size of their problem debt portfolios. These banks were allowed to 
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continue operations until they were able to raise fresh capital with which to make 
provisions and strengthen their balance sheets. 
SAMA is responsible for managing the exchange rate of the currency, the Saudi riyal, 
which is officially linked to the Special Drawing Right but effectively pegged to the dollar 
at $I=SR3.75. The riyal stabilised at this rate in -1986 after a series of small devaluations as 
the Kingdom struggled to balance its payments during the period of low oil prices. The 
currency came under pressure at the end of 1993 as speculation grew that low oil prices 
would again force a devaluation. Pressure was resisted, however, and in his budget speech 
on I January 1994 King Fahd specifically ruled out devaluation (Azzam, 1998). SAMA is 
also responsible for managing the bulk of Saudi Arabia's reserves. SAMA does not have a 
foreign office dedicated to managing its investments abroad (as Kuwait does with its 
Kuwait Investment Office in London). Most of the reserves which it manages are placed 
with overseas fund managers, (Cunningham, 1995). 
In regulating the local commercial banks SAMA employs several key ratios. 
* All banks must conform to the 8% capital to risk weighted assets ratio commonly 
known as the "Basle ratio". Conformity does not present the banks with problems 
and many exceed the 8% minimum with ease. Nearly all banks added substantially 
to their capital in 1991-93 either through public share issues or by retaining 
earnings. The large amounts of Saudi government debt which many banks now 
hold also ease the capital requirement (since government debt is zero-weighted for 
regulatory capital purposes). 
SAMA's guidelines state that loans should not exceed 65% of customers' deposits. 
Although the 65% figure is only a guideline it is closely monitored as an indicator 
of lending capacity in the kingdom, (Cunningham, 1995). 
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"A bank's deposits may not exceed 15 times its capital, reserves and retained 
earnings. Half of any excess deposits have to be placed with SAMA- A banles 
obligation to do this is calculated on the basis of its end of year accounts, and 
deposits made with SAMA are not released during the course of the year even if the 
bank's ratio falls below the 15: 1 multiple. 
" Banks must place with SAMA 7% of their current account deposits and 2% of all 
other account liabilities, including margins and certificates of deposit. The banks do 
not receive interest on these deposits. Banks must keep 20% of their customer 
deposits as liquid reserves. Saudi treasury instruments and interbank deposits with 
maturities of less than 30 days, may be included in the calculation of this ratio. 
" Banks may not lend more than 25% of their capital and reserves (excluding 
retained earnings) to a single customer. This percentage may be increased to 50% 
with SAMA's authorisation. 
Financial Markits 
According to (Azzarn, 1998), Saudi financial markets are surprisingly underdeveloped 
given the size of the country's economy and banking system. This is a reflection of the 
historical importance of cash and liquidity in the banking system, and the fact that until the 
early 1990s the banks had no difficulty in attracting the funds they sought and borrowers 
had no difficulty in finding willing lenders. This situation started to change in 1993 when a 
slowdown in deposit growth, resulting from reduced repatriation of capital from abroad 
and a reduction in government oil revenues, combined with increasing demand for credit 
on the part of the government, and, to a lesser extent, the private sector. Referring to 
(Presley, 2000), the main gap in Saudi financial markets is the lack of medium-term 
liability instruments. The vast bulk of Saudi banks' 'deposits, both from customers and 
banks is in short term money. No Saudi bank has issued medium-term notes or bonds as 
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part of its funding programme. Historically, Saudi banks have had large amounts of assets 
placed with banks abroad and these could be repatriated to cover any short-term liquidity 
requirements (Azzam, 1998). 
Government Development Bonds 
There has been some development of products on the asset side, although these have arisen 
mainly in the context of government debt, (Cunningham, 1995). In 1988 SAMA began to 
issue government development bonds (GDBs) on behalf of the Ministry of Finance and 
National Economy. The stated intention was to cover the government deficit (Presely, 
1992). Yields on the bonds are theoretically linked to profits on unspecified development 
projects. In practice they are directly linked to the returns on US treasury bonds (Wilson, et 
al. 1992). The GDBs give a premium of 0.2% over US treasuries on the two-year bonds 
rising to a premium of 0.5% over five years on the five-year bonds. By the end of 1993 it 
was estimated that bonds outstanding totalled around $46bn of which about half were 
taken up by governmental institutions, (Wilson, 1996). Bonds may be bought on the 
secondary market by GCC institutions or individuals, Bahrain offshore banks and the 
overseas-based branches of Saudi companies. The GDBs proved popular with the banks 
when interest rates were falling in the early 1990s but when rates started to rise again in 
early 1994 purchases quickly tailed off (Azzam, 1998). The secondary market in bonds is 
thin, not least because all the banks are using the same criteria in determining whether to 
buy or not to buy (Alsahlawi, 1997). SAMA does, however, offer a repurchase facility for 
up to 25 % of banks' holdings of the bonds. In November 1991 SAMA started to issue 
treasury bills with maturities up to one year. Repurchase facilities (. for up to 75% of 
holdings) and reverse repurchase facilities exist (Cunningharn, 1995). 
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Stock Market 
Activity on the Saudi stock market started to increase towards the end of the 1980s with a 
series of public share issues. This trend accelerated after the Gulf war and in the two and a 
half years to the middle of 1994 llinstitutions (10 commercial banks and one Islamic 
bank) raised a total of$4.7bn in capital in response to the new capital adequacy policy 
imposed by SAMA, (Cunningham, 1995). Moreover, new publicly traded firms were 
established. However, after that the pace slackened reflecting a decline in the Saudi stock 
index and tightening liquidity in the economy (Azzarn, 1998). From a peak of 1233 in 
April 1992 the Saudi stock index sank to around 1135 in July 1994 and hovered around 
that level until the end of the year. In fact, in the early 1990s the Saudi share market 
witnessed a systematic transformation, represented by the introduction of the Electronic 
Share Information System (ESIS). ESIS has contributed to the regulation and development 
of the operation of the market and restricted trading only through the central trading units 
at commercial banks, which are continually supervised and monitored by SAMA. At 
present SAMA undertakes the responsibility of developing, regulating and directly 
supervising the Saudi share market and its day-to-day operations (SAMA Annual Report, 
2001). The Saudi share market recorded a marked improvement during 2000 due to 
increased economic activity and the ongoing policy of restructuring aimed at partially 
privatising state sectors. The share price index stood at 2258.29 at the end of 2000, rising 
by 11.5 percent over the end of the preceding year, and the total value of shares traded 
went up by 15.5% percent from US$ 15,078 million in the preceding year to US$ 17,411 
million in 2000 (see table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 Saudi Share Market indicators over period from 1990-2000 
Year No. of shares 
traded (1000) 
Value of Shares 
Traded(US$, Mill) 
Market Value of 
Shares (US$ M) 
Number of 
Transactions 
General Index 
(National Stock 
Indicator)(Points) 
1990 17000 1,173 25,866 85,298 979.80 
1991 31000 2,275 48,266 90,559 1765.24 
1992 35000 3,651 54,933 272,075 1888.65 
1993 60000 4,629 52,800 319,582 1793.30 
1994 152000 6,632 38,600 357,180 1282.90 
1995 117000 6,191 40,800 291,742 1367.60 
1996 138000 6,770 45,780 283,759 1531.00 
1997 312000 16549 59,456 460,056 1957.80 
1998 293000 13,736 42,650 376,617 1413.10 
1999 528000 15,078 61,045 438,226 2028.53 
2000 555000 17,411 68,000 498,135 2258.29 
ISource: Saudi Monetary Agency Annual Report (2001, p. 331). 
Furthermore, the total number of shares traded increased to 555 million from 528 million 
in the preceding year, recording a rise of 5.1 % percent, and market capitalization stood at 
US$ 68,000 million at the end of 2000 as against US$ 61,045 in the preceding year, rising 
by 11.5%, (SAMA, Annual Report, 200 1). 
To conclude, despite the downturns in the domestic economy resulting from the instability 
in oil prices and the Gulf War, the Saudi financial system has witnessed substantial 
progress over the past decade. Many banks have increased there capitalization, and the 
number of publicly traded firms also increased. Further, the stock market witnessed 
substantial expansion. 
3.3.2 Financial Svstem Of Oman 
Until 1970, there was no national authority responsible for the supervision of the incipient 
banking system. The number of banks was small and banking activities were limited in 
scale (Presley, 1992). The two monetary authorities that preceded the establishment of the 
Central Bank of Oman, namely the Muscat Currency Authority in 1970 and the Oman 
Currency Board in 1972 were not vested with full banking status, but, they had well 
prepared the ground for the emergence of the Central Bank of Oman. However the major 
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event heralding the creation of the Central Bank of Oman was the launching of the 
Banking Law in 1974. At the end of 2001 the Omani banking system comprised seven 
local banks, II branches of foreign banks and three specialised banks. The financial system 
as a whole also includes leasing companies, investment funds which are listed on the 
Muscat Securities Market (stock exchange) and 14 insurance companies, four of which are 
locally incorporated (Oman Central Bank Report, 2001). In 1995 the Central Bank issued 
regulations governing investment banking activities. Those banks which wished to conduct 
such activities had to apply for a special licence. At the end of 2001 five banks had been 
awarded investment licences. The five were Bank Muscat Al-Ahli Al-Omani, Commercial 
Bank of Oman, Bank of Baroda, Habib Bank A. G. Zurich and Habib Bank Ltd. The 
introduction of investment banking licences will not result in a clear separation between 
investment and commercial banks. Most local banks will in future conduct both types of 
business. The Central Bank's purpose in introducing the new legislation was to ensure that 
investment activity, -Aich was only just beginning in Oman, would be properly regulated. 
The seven local banks dominate the market, accounting for about two-thirds of banking 
assets and up to three-quarters of deposits. Local banks have been reduced to their present 
number as a result of mergers carried out during the early 1990s. Three of the seven banks 
are the product of mergers or takeovers: Bank Muscat A]-Ahli A]- Omani (formed at the 
beginning of 1993 from Bank Muscat and Bank A]-Ahli Al- Omani), Commercial Bank of 
Oman (formed from the merger in October 1993 of Commercial Bank of Oman and Oman 
Banking Corporation) and Oman Arab Bank (which bought Omani European Bank in early 
1994). Three other long-standing banks have retained their independence: National Bank 
of Oman, Oman International Bank and the Bank of Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait. Bank 
Dhofar A]-Ahli A]-Ornani was established in 1990 and has been unaffected by the merger 
policy, (Cunningham, 1995). 
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In April 1992 the Central Bank gave local banks 18 months in which to raise their capital 
to OR 10 m (US$26m). Foreign banks had to show a minimum capital of OR3m. The 
previous minimum, for both local and foreign banks, had been ORIm. The Central Bank 
also offered incentives to merger in the form of a five-year tax break and cheap deposits 
which would be awarded according to the size of the new bank's capital. Oman is the only 
Gulf country successfully to have implemented a policy of bank mergers (Azzam, 1998). 
Several local banks have non-Omani shareholders. The position at the end of 2000 can be 
summarised as follows: 
Bank Muscat A]-Ahli A]-Omani: Societe Generale has a 10% stake. 
Oman Arab Bank: Jordan's Arab Bank has a 49% stake and the managing director is 
seconded from Arab Bank. 
Bank Dhofar A]-Omani A]-Fransi: Banque Paribas has a 10% stake and the general 
manager is seconded from Paribas. 
Bank of Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait: Bahrain-based Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait, itself 
50% owned by Kuwaiti financial institutions, has a 49% stake. 
Commercial Bank of Oman: GIBCORP, the local joint venture between Bahrain- 
based Gulf International Bank and local interests, has a 42% stake and a management 
contract. 
National Bank of Oman and Oman International Bank are wholly owned by local interests. 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) had a 40% stake in National Bank and 
a management contract before it was closed in July 1991. 
Three of the local banks are clearly bigger than the others: Bank Muscat AI-Ahli al- 
Omani, National Bank of Oman and Oman International Bank. All had assets of around 
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$14,800m and deposits of around $13,500m at the end of 2000, (OCB annual report, 
2001). 
The Omani banking system is the smallest in the GCC. At the end of 2000 it had assets of 
$24.812bn which accounted for only 8% of the GCC total banking system assets 
(excluding the Bahrain offshore sector). 
The banking system is regulated by the Central Bank of Oman. The Central Bank exercises 
considerable influence over local banks and there have been no recent examples of 
commercial banks in Oman defying their central bank's wishes. The Central Bank regularly 
reviews banking regulations. Changes to the rules are published in its twice monthly 
English-language newsletter A] Markazi and in the annual report. The most important 
regulations affecting Omani banks, as listed in the Oman Central Bank Reports 2001 are 
the following: 
* Banks may not lend more than 15% of their net worth to anyone client. 
* Total lending may not exceed 75% of deposits and net worth. This ratio rises to 
85% when bills of exchange are included in the loan portfolio. 
e Banks' open foreign exchange position may not exceed 40% of their net worth. 
* 5% of customers' deposits must be kept with the Central Bank. Treasury bills may 
account for up to 60% of this 5% (that is, 3% of customers' deposits). In this and 
other Central Bank calculations, borrowings from banks overseas are counted as 
customers' deposits, while borrowings from local banks are not. 
Omani financial markets are based on bank lending and trade finance for the major private 
sector companies (Azzam, 1998). In 1987 the Central Bank started issuing treasury bills 
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and in 1991 began issues of bonds. The stock market, which opened in 1989, became an 
important feature of the local financial scene during the mid 1990s (Cunningham, 1995). 
Treasury bills, which have 90 day maturities, are issued by the Central Bank every two 
weeks. The value of bills outstanding can vary considerably from year to year depending 
on the banks' liquidity position. In 1999-2000 bills outstanding were valued at about $3 00- 
400m and accounted for about 1-1.5% of banks' total assets. The introduction of 
Government Development Bonds (GDBs) was a significant addition to Omani capital 
markets. The bonds are used as a way of funding the government deficit and may be 
bought by Gulf citizens as well as Omanis. The bonds usually have maturities of 5-7 years 
although there are occasional issues with longer or shorter maturities. (Presley, et al. 1992). 
During 1999 the Muscat Securities Market (MSM) started to play an important role in local 
financial markets. During the year $186m in equity finance was raised by new companies 
and a further $63m was raised by existing companies seeking additional capital, 
(Almarkazi, 2000). The government is committed to privatising part of its holdings in local 
companies, and new investment opportunities will also arise from the government's policy 
of having new infrastructural. projects, such as power stations and sewerage systems, 
constructed on a build-own-operate-transfer basis. The first such project, the Manah power 
station, was awarded in 1997 to an international consortium led by Belgium's Tractebel 
and including four local contractors. Authorities are keen to encourage overseas fund 
managers to invest in Oman and various regulations covering foreign direct investment 
have been upgraded and clarified during the 1990s. In theory, foreign direct investment is 
already possible, although in practice it shall remains subject to various restrictions 
(Azzain, 1998). 
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3.3.3 Financial system of Kuwait 
There are six commercial banks in Kuwait, two specialized banks and one Islamic bank. 
There are also a large number of financial companies that are not regulated by the Central 
Bank of Kuwait, and these play an important role in local financial activity. Foreign banks 
are not allowed to have branches or representative offices. State-owned institutions, such 
as pension funds and overseas aid organizations also have a high profile in the market. 
All six commercial banks are wholly owned by Kuwaiti interests, and the government has 
an indirect controlling interest in two of them: Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East and 
Burgan Bank. National Bank of Kuwait (NBK) is the pre-eminent bank and is universally 
recognised as an- institution of international standing. In 1994 the Kuwaiti parliament 
passed a law allowing foreign investors to hold up to 40% of local banks, subject to 
approval by the Central Bank of Kuwait. (the law came into effect on I August 1994). No 
new banks have been licenced in Kuwait since 1977, when Burgan Bank started 
operations. The two specialised banks, Industrial Bank of Kuwait and Kuwait Real Estate 
Bank, are state owned and as their names imply, their role is to lend for industrial and real 
estate projects, although they do so at commercial rates of interest. Kuwait Finance House 
is the only wholly Islamic bank in Kuwait. Despite this difference, it competes with the 
commercial banks for deposits and assets and is very much part of the local financial 
scene. 
There is one foreign branch in Kuwait: Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait. This is anomalous, 
since in theory foreign banks are not allowed to have branches. Bank of Bahrain and 
Kuwait is based in Manama and is 50% owned by Kuwaiti institutions. It is the large 
Kuwaiti stake which persuaded the Central Bank to allow a presence to what is almost a 
majority Kuwaiti-owned bank. 
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United Bank of Kuwait is a London-incorporated bank wholly owned by Kuwaiti financial 
institutions. The bank focuses on funds management (where it is active in Islamic banking 
products) and on commercial lending such as property, aircraft finance and housing. The 
bank is not permitted to have a branch in Kuwait. 
Financial companies have in the past played an important role in local and international 
financial markets. The most prominent have been the companies known as the "three Ks": 
Kuwait Investment Company (KIC), Kuwait Foreign Trading Contracting and Investment 
Company (KFTCIC) and Kuwait International Investment Company (KIIC). The fist two 
are state owned and they merged at the end of 1996. The Kuwaiti banking system is the 
third largest in the GCC, after Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with assets at the end of 2000 of 
$47,864.3 Million. 
The Central Bank is a powerfW body in Kuwait, and is legally a lender of last resort. It is 
unlikely that the central bank would allow a local bank to collapse, or force an unhealthy 
bank to close. It stood behind Kuwait's banks when most were technically insolvent after 
the stock market crash in 1982 (also known as Souk al-Manakh) and it guaranteed 
customers' deposits (Azzarn, 1998). The Central Bank is responsible for the exchange rate 
of the Kuwaiti Dinar (KD) which is pegged to a trade-weighted basket of currencies. 
The Central Bank uses a standard array of regulations to monitor and control commercial 
banks'balance sheets: 
All banks must conform to the Basle ratios for risk weighted capital adequacy, 
although they are allowed to weight GCC risk as if it were OECD. 
A bank may not lend more than the equivalent of 10% of its capital base to anyone 
counterparty or group of counterparties. 
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Banks are not allowed to take collateral against loans. (This prohibition is a legacy 
of the stock market crash in 1982, before which banks had lent recklessly on the 
basis of collateral). 
Banks may not lend more that 10% of their capital base to any other bank. 
Consumer loans may not exceed 10% of a bank's capital. There are no restrictions 
on the ratio of loans to deposits. 
The maximum permitted aggregate foreign exchange position is 15% of the capital 
base. Liquidity regulations are based on a weighted system whereby the short term 
liabilities have to be backed by a higher proportion of liquid assets than medium 
and long term liabilities. In addition to this main calculation, a bank's sight liquidity 
position is also calculated. Liquidity calculations are carried out twice a month. 
Whatever other conditions may obtain in a bank's balance sheet, liquid assets in 
KDs must constitute at least one-third of all liquid assets, and treasury bills and/or 
cash must constitute a minimum of total deposits up to one year. 
Financial Markets 
In general, the heyday of Kuwaiti financial markets was in the years before the 1982 stock 
market crash, when local companies and banks played a leading role in channelling surplus 
oil revenues from the Gulf into western capital markets (Presley, 1992). The year of the 
crash also marked the high point of Arab oil revenues, and by the mid 1980s lower oil 
prices and healthy economic growth in western countries had diminished the importance of 
Arab money to the world financial system. Arab financial institutions in general, and 
Kuwaiti ones in particular, focused more on internal markets and on readjusting to 
increasingly strained economic circumstances, (Cunningham, 1995). 
From 1982 until the early 1990s Kuwaiti financial markets were in limbo as they reeled 
from the effects of the crash and were then hit by the Iraqi invasion, (Wilson, et al. 1992). 
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The only significant development of the market was the launching, in 1987, of Central 
Bank treasury bills and bonds. The general downturn in the Gulf economies at this time 
meant that banks were looking abroad for assets and that treasury instruments were a way 
of keeping the money in the country (Presley, 1992). 
The commercial bond market started to revive in'1994-95. Kuwait Real Estate Bank issued 
KD15m ($50m) in five-year bonds at the end of 1995 to replace an issue which was 
maturing. It then issued a further KD20m in May 1996 to provide additional funding. In 
October 1997 the Kuwait Investment Projects Company issued KD12m in five-year bonds. 
The only other issue since the Iraqi invasion was for a local leasing company, Commercial 
Facilities Company. Demand for all the issues was healthy and it is expected that the bond 
market will continue its revival in the years ahead. Both of the Real Estate Bank issues 
were managed by National Bank of Kuwait while the Projects Company issue was 
managed by Kuwait Investment Company. 
Stock Market 
The Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) plays a major role in local financial markets and the 
government has committed itself to an extensive privatisation programme which will 
involve the floating of large blocks of shares in local companies. These sales were 
expected to be the main force reviving stock market activity during the late 1990s. In mid 
1998 two stock market investment funds were launched with the aim of attracting new 
money into local stocks. For the first time, subscription was opened to resident expatriates. 
However, neither was well received by the market and government companies had to step 
in to cover the subscription. The KSE had languished since trading resumed after the Iraqi 
occupation and at the time when the funds were launched the prospects for significant 
capital growth across the index as a whole were minimal. While the success of the 
Commercial Facilities Company issue was expected to lead to subsequent successful offers 
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for existing companies, there was little expectation that the stock market would develop as 
a vehicle for raising new capital, as was starting to happen in other Gulf Countries. 
The Kuwaiti government periodically commissions consultants to propose long term 
strategic plans for the Kuwaiti economy. The best known of these was a lengthy study by 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which was circulated around government 
ministries in 1998. These studies invariably propose a liberalisation of financial markets 
and the development of Kuwait into a regional financial centre. Offshore banking is 
sometimes mentioned as an option. There is almost no evidence to suggest that the 
government wants to pursue this course. The development of a major offshore banking 
centre appears unlikely and developments of capital markets businesses will probably 
occur at a gradual pace. In this respect, the development of financial markets reflects "the 
lack of vision and initiative which characterises much of Kuwaiti decision making in the 
1990s". 
3.3.4 Financial svstem of Oata 
Qatar has six locally incorporated banks and eight branches of foreign banks. All are 
classified as commercial banks and the local regulations make no distinction between 
commercial and investment banking. The financial system also includes 16 foreign 
exchange houses and seven insurance companies. Three of the insurance companies are 
locally incorporated and four are branches of foreign companies. All the locally 
incorporated banks are wholly owned by Qatari interests. Two of the local banks classify 
themselves as "Islamic banks" and so do not engage in interest based transactions, but in 
practice they compete for deposits and assets alongside the conventional banks. 
The only recent changes in the number of banks in Qatar involved the withdrawal of 
Citibank in the middle of 1990s; the closure, in 1989, of Bank al-Mashreq, a branch of the 
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failed Lebanese bank of the same name; and the licensing, in 1991, of Qatar International 
Islamic Bank which is wholly owned by Qatari shareholders and is the smallest of the local 
banks. (Bank al-Mashreq has no connection with Dubai-based Mashreq Bank which has a 
branch in Doha. ) The Central Bank of Qatar has not ruled out the possibility of issuing new 
banking licences (as some other Gulf central banks have done). In theory foreign branches 
may compete on equal terms with the local banks but in practice they sometimes find that 
they are disadvantaged by regulations covering bids for government business. Total assets 
in the Qatari banking system stood at US$32,541 m at the end of 2000, representing 9% of 
total GCC banking assets (excluding the Bahrain offshore market). Qatar is therefore the 
largest of the three small banking markets in the GCC (the other two being Bahrain and 
Oman). The size of the banking system has grown with reasonable consistency since the 
early 1980s. In the five years to the end of 2000 it grew by an average annual rate of 8%, 
which is well in excess of GDP growth. The locally incorporated banks dominate the 
financial scene: at the end of 2000 local banks accounted for 85% of total banking assets 
and 82% of deposits. Qatar National Bank (QNB), in which the government of Qatar has a 
50% stake, is by far the largest bank, accounting for about 35% of local assets and 
deposits. The other local banks have market shares ranging between 5% and 13%. Among 
the foreign banks, British Bank of the Middle East, Grindlays and Standard Chartered have 
traditionally been the most active, although Banque Paribas was the second largest at the 
end of 1999. British Bank of the Middle East is the biggest foreign bank by a clear 
margin'. 
The Qatar Monetary Agency (QMA) fulfils central banking functions in Qatar. On 5 
August 1993 an Emiri decree was issued establishing the Central Bank of Qatar. The 
governor of the Qatar Monetary Agency (QMA), Mr Abdullah Khalid Alattiya, became 
1 Recently the nwne changed to HSBC 
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governor of the Central Bank. The change of name and statutes has had little effect on 
central banking in Qatar since the regulatory improvements which have occurred since 
August 1993 could have been implemented just as easily under the QMA. 
e Loans and overdrafts may not exceed more than 95% of a bank's customer deposits. 
Overdrafts may not exceed 50% of total lending. In a normal banking market this 
would not be a problem, but Qatari banks have traditionally extended a large 
amount of credit on an overdraft basis. 
* Neither marketable securities nor long term investments may exceed 20% of a 
bank's equity. No single marketable security or long term investment may exceed 
4% of equity. 
* Liquidity regulations have been upgraded in recent years but the basic rules are that 
liquid assets may not exceed 35% of interbank borrowings and deposits, and that 
fixed assets may not exceed 20% of equity. 
e No single interbank placement may exceed 20% of a bank's equity or QR200rn 
($55m). 
* No single loan may exceed 25% of equity or QR50m. 
9 Lending to members of the bank's directorate may not exceed 25% of its equity and 
lending to any single director may not exceed 7% of equity. 
* Banks must conform to the risk-weighted capital to assets ratio laid down by the 
Basle committee. In addition, a bank's equity must be equivalent to at least - 6% of 
its assets on a non-risk weighted basis. 
Deposit rates must be within 0.75% of the Central Bank's range, which is typically 1.5% 
wide. It also sets maximum rates for lending. These maxima are qualified by two factors: 
the spread between lending and deposit rates for equal maturities may not exceed 3%, and 
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banks may charge an additional I% on credits which exceed an approved limit or are 
extended without prior commitment. Until 1992 the QMA (as it was then) did not alter 
local lending rates to take account of international trends. Deposits other than savings 
accounts had been subject to a 5-7% range. Overdrafts and loans had similarly been 
restricted to 9.5% limit. In 1992 the deposit rates were reduced to 3.75-5.25% and the 
maximum rate on loans and overdrafts to 7.5%. After that, interest rates have responded in 
a limited way to international trends. 
Financial Market 
Qatari financial markets are the smallest in the Gulf and are unlikely to develop much 
during the next few years (Azzam, 1998). The banks' overwhelming focus on the liabilities 
side is on attracting deposits (especially from the government). The Qatari market is highly 
liquid and Qatari banks remained net placers of interbank funds even after banking 
conditions started to tighten in the early 1990s(Presley, 2000). The government of Qatar 
raised its first Euroloan in 1989 - $400m for the first phase of a major gas development 
project - and has since borrowed a number of times on international markets. Almost all 
the money raised in this way has come from international banks with QNB the only local 
bank to have had any significant role in the syndications (it often takes the role of agent 
bank). Project finance for industrial expansion has also been dominated by foreign banks. 
The stock exchange opened in early 1999. Limited share trading is conducted through local 
banks but the market is not a significant factor in the domestic financial scene. 
3.3.5 Financial System Of Bahrain 
The Bahraini financial system is best known outside the region as an offshore banking 
centre (Cunningham, 1995), but it also comprises commercial banks, which focus on local 
business, and a small number of investment banks. Bahrain's financial sector also includes 
two specialised banks, namely the Housing Bank and the Bahrain Development Bank. The 
Housing Bank was established in 1979 as a government entity to support the construction 
industry in line with the government's policy of providing adequate housing for Bahrain's 
steadily increasing population. The Bahrain Development Bank, on the other hand, was 
incorporated in 1991 to enhance business activity and industrialisation in the country 
(Presley, 1992). 
Although offshore financial business has declined considerably since the oil-boom phase 
which started in the middle of 1970s, till the first half of 1980s, Bahrain remains the most 
diverse financial centre in the GCC countries and has the greatest concentration of foreign 
banks of any country in the region (Azzarn, 1998). Banking started in Bahrain when a 
branch of the Eastern Bank opened in 1921. This was followed by the British Bank of the 
Middle East in 1944, the National Bank of Bahrain in 1957 and the Arab Bank Limited in 
1960 (Presley, 1992). 
The offshore market %ýas created as a result of a tacit agreement among Gulf countries at a 
time when the spoils of new-found oil wealth were being divided (Cunningham, 1995). It 
was decided that Bahrain would be given a free run to develop an offshore centre. Bahrain 
was a natural choice since the country's history as a trading nation gave it a cosmopolitan 
atmosphere and its government had no qualms about encouraging foreign institutions to set 
up offices there (qualms which other GCC countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
have to this day) (Wilson, et al, 1992). A further point in Bahrain's favour was that it was 
(and remains) the only GCC country without substantial oil exports, so it had no option but 
to promote itself as the region's service centre (Azzam, 1998). A major step forward came 
in 1975 when the Bahrain Monetary Agency announced its plan to develop a centre in the 
Arab World for dealing in international liquidity that offered an attractive package to 
prospective participants in terms of regulatory and fiscal incentives as well as favourable 
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working conditions including free exchange and trade controls. In particular, offshore 
banking units were exempted from maintaining reserves with the agency and from 
observing liquidity ratios. No tax was to be paid on the banks' income, and this exemption 
continues to be effective to date. 
According to (Aljarrah, 2002) there was an Arabisation of Bahrain's offshore banking 
sector when ma or Arab banks established their headquarters on the island during the 
1980s. The number of licensed offshore banking units reached 76 in 1984, but the number 
had declined to 47 by 1995 and 38 in 2000, in response to the international consolidation 
trend. According to the report of the World Trade Organization (2000), Bahrain's financial 
services, especially offshore banking, are well developed and the Govenunent has 
continued to pursue reforms to further enhance and strengthen the financial services sector. 
There are no foreign ownership restrictions for offshore banks, whereas up to 49% of the 
total equity of a local bank may be held by foreign nationals. The insurance sector, which 
is regulated and supervised by the Ministry of Commerce, is subject to similar restrictions 
with regard to foreign investment. Furthermore, in 1977 the Bahrain authorities decided to 
introduce an exempt company (EC) registration, which enabled companies to incorporate 
in Bahrain without a Bahraini shareholding as long as they did not conduct business in the 
domestic market. In the same year, the Agency introduced a further category of banks to 
carry out investment business. The number of these investment banks grew from a small 
number in the 1970s to reach 23 in 2000 (BMA, Annual Report, 2001). These banks were 
allowed to participate in traditional investment or merchant banking business, particularly 
securities business., According to (BMA, Annual Report 2001) Of the 23 investment banks 
registered in 2000, there are six major locally incorporated institutions. These are Albaraka 
Islamic Investment Bank, Arab Financial Services, Arab Islamic Bank, Investcorp Bank, 
TAIB; Bank(formerly Trans-Arabian Investment Bank) and United Gulf Bank. The others 
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are foreign institutions such as Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Sumitomo Finance 
which are engaged in investment management. 
The Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) acts as a central bank and regulates the offshore, 
commercial and investment banking markets. It was set up in 1973 with advice from the 
Bank of England and replaced the old Currency Board. In August 1994 the BMA removed 
the 12% ceiling on consumer loans, the final interest rate which had been subject to 
control. Other rates had been gradually removed during the preceding years. In November 
1993 the BMA introduced a deposit protection scheme modeled on that run by the Bank of 
England. (Bahraini depositors are guaranteed to receive three-quarters of their deposits or 
BD 15,000 (US$40,000) whichever is less). In 1995-96 the BMA introduced regulations to 
cover the managing and marketing of mutual funds and the activities of financial advisors 
and agents. Prudential regulations governing banks' balance sheets are similar for all types 
of banks on the island. The principal regulations which apply equally to commercial, 
offshore and investment banks are as follows: 
-. *- No more than 15% of capital and reserves may be extended on one counter-party. 
-. *- No more than 30% of capital and reserves may be extended to the board of 
directors collectively, and no more than 15% may be extended to any single board 
member. 
44- Loans may not exceed 65% of deposits. For this purpose, 'deposits' include 
interbank lines as well as customers' deposits. 
-*. - Bank must conform to the Basle guidelines on risk-weighted capital adequacy but 
they are allowed to classify all GCC countries as the same degree of risk as OECD 
financial institutions. 
4. - Five percent of customer deposits must be kept with the BMA. 
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-le Banks' gearing ratios (ratio of non-capital liabilities to capital and reserves) may 
not exceed 20: 1. The gearing ratio for investment banks is 10: 1. 
There are no restrictions on the percentage of securities which banks may hold in 
the balance sheet, nor are there restrictions on the amount of consumer loans which 
banks may have. 
The RVIF noted that the Bahrain Monetary Agency had achieved full compliance with 24 of 
the 30 Core Principles of Basle and is largely compliant with another five (4 core and I 
sub-core) Principles. These 29 Principles cover virtually all of the supervisory factors that 
broadly encompass the fundamentals of a sound supervisory system (EVIF, 2001). 
There are 18 full commercial banks in Bahrain of which five can be considered "local". 
The others are branches of non-Bahraini banks. The five are National Bank of Bahrain, 
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait, A]-Ahli Commercial Bank, Bahraini Saudi Bank and 
Grindlays Bahrain Bank. Bahrain Islamic Bank, although not classified as a commercial 
bank, should be grouped with the five since it competes with them for local deposits and 
lending business (Azzan-4 1998). The commercial banks had assets of about US$24 billion 
at the end of 2000, representing 7.5% of total GCC commercial banking assets. In recent 
years the combined assets of the banks have been increasing steadily, with the sole 
exception of 1990, when the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caused an outflow of funds. 
Two local banks, National Bank of Bahrain and Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait, account for 
about 60% of local assets. They are both three times the size of their nearest rival among 
the local banks, A]-Ahli Commercial Bank. 
For the commercial banks, financial market activity consists mainly of lending to local 
companies. Since competition for this business is intense, most banks try to maximise their 
consumer finance business, which offers higher returns. Banks also attempt to get an edge 
on their competitors by offering better banking technology in the form of payment cards 
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and telephone banking. Nevertheless, the market is claustrophobic and will offer few new 
opportunities in the immediate future. As in other GCC countries, government deposits and 
government accounts in general are an important source of business (Azzarn, 1998). 
According to A1jarrah (2002) the government of Bahrain has identified Islamic banking' as 
one of the main economic growth areas. Islamic banking has similar principles to 
conventional banking, with the only exception that they must conform to Islamic law. 
Islamic finance prohibits charging interest for the use of money and disallows dealing in 
prohibited commodities. Islamic banking falls under four main categories: Murabaha is 
cost- plus financing (Le, buying a product from a supplier and selling it to a customer for a 
profit; Musharaka, is a profit sharing system that is similar to equity participation; Ijara 
involves leasing and Istisna is the financing of construction and manufacturing. Islamic 
banking is growing rapidly in the region and is attracting investors due to its profit 
potential in addition to religious factors, A]-Jarrah (2002). Referring to the report of the US 
Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, (2000), Bahrain claims to 
be the centre of the Islamic banking market in the region, 17 out of 30 Islamic banks in the 
Gulf region are located in Bahrain. In November 1999, Bahrain signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Lubuan, the offshore financial centre in Malaysia and the Jeddah- 
based Islamic Development Bank to create an International Islamic Money Market (BMA, 
Annual Report, 2001). In an effort to create a secure market, the BMA has issued 
regulations specifically for Islamic banks to prevent and detect institutional weaknesses 
(Aljarrah, 2002). 
Bahrain's Capital Market: 
The government debt market consists of the market for treasury bills and bonds. Since the 
end of 1992 the BMA, which issues these instruments on behalf of the government, has 
only sold new bills and bonds to cover maturing issues. The total outstanding remains a 
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little below the government-imposed ceiling of BD300m ($800m). Bills have a maturity of 
91 days and the bonds range from five years to seven years. In late 1998, Alba issued 
$50m in medium term bonds and further issues were planned by other local companies. 
The Alba issue was well received and the fact that it was tradable on the Bahrain Stock 
Exchange (BSE) added to the issue's attraction. The BSE itself is taking steps to widen 
share ownership and trading. In the mid 1990s trading was still thin, but in time the BSE 
aims to become a more important part of the local financial scene (Almannai, 2001). 
There is a limited amount of corporate advisory work required by local industries which 
are contemplating expansion or privatisation. New ventures, such as a proposed power 
station to be financed on a build-operate-transfer basis also offer opportunities for advisory 
work. However, only the bigger banks have the expertise to undertake this Oust as only 
they have the expertise to structure bond issues) and they usually face competition from 
offshore banks, which can easily get permission to engage in this type of local business 
(Azzam, 1998). 
The government of Bahrain established an organized stock market in Manama in 1989 to 
regulate the listing and trading of securities and to control the members of the market. The 
objectives of the stock exchange market are to enhance the exchange in a way that serves 
the country's economic and development policies. Foreign or non- Bahraini companies 
listed on the BSE must be either joint stock companies or closed ' companies that have 
been incorporated at least three years prior to listing, and must have a paid-up capital of at 
least $US 10 million and have been making net profits from their principal activity three 
years before listing. Equities, bonds, mutual funds and currency warrants are currently the 
main listed securities on the exchange (US Department of commerce 2001). Efforts are 
under way to strengthen the role of the stock exchange in the economy by increasing the 
number of listed companies, introducing new investment instruments, cross-listing shares 
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at the regional level, and developing automated depository, clearing and settlement 
procedures. The BSE's operations became fully automated in 1999, a service that enhanced 
its regional links and other services. By the end of 1999, there were 41 listed companies, 
with a market capitalization amounting to around BD 2.7 billion (BMA, Annual Report, 
2001). The exchange is heavily dominated by commerciai banks, investment firms, and 
insurance companies (Aljarrah, 2002). 
Overall, the Bahraini financial system has been set up to be a financial centre in the Arab 
World that plays a major role in attracting oil money and re-investing this in international 
markets (Azzarn, 1998). The participants in the Bahraini market, especially the offshore 
banking units, are offered attractive packages in terms of regulatory and fiscal incentives. 
Recently, the Bahraini authorities have introduced various international prudential 
regulations in line with the Basle supervisory core-principles. In addition, Islamic banking 
activity developments are well-advanced and are supported by the Bahraini authorities. 
3.3.6 Financial System or United Arab Emirates 
There are 19 locally incorporated commercial banks in the UAF, and 23 foreign banks 
which have branches in the country. This gives the UAE more commercial banks than any 
other GCC state. A number of foreign banks have representative offices. The financial 
system also comprises seven investment banks. Despite the existence of the investment 
banks, there is effectively no distinction between commercial and investment banking as it 
is practised in global financial markets. In any case, financial markets in the UAE are at an 
early stage of development and the amount of investment banking activity is extremely 
limited (Azzam, 1998). 
In recent years the only changes to the structure of the banking system involved the take 
over of the troubled Dubai-based Middle East Bank by another Dubai bank, Emirates Bank 
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International, and the closure and subsequent recapitalisation of Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International. In the mid 1980s Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and Emirates 
Bank International (which was then called Union Bank of the Middle East) were used to 
take over the assets of banks which had run into difficulties. During the early 1990s, banks 
in Shaýah successfully resisted strong pressure from the Central Bank to merge. 
The 19 local banks comprise four based in Abu Dhabi, six in Dubai, four in Shaýah, two in 
Ras al-Kheimah, and one in each in Fujeirah, Umm at-Quwain and Ajman. Abu Dhabian 
interests control three of the four banks based in Abu Dhabi: National Bank, Commercial 
Bank and Union National Bank (this last being the new name for the local operations of 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International - BCCI). Arab Bank for Investment and 
Foreign Trade (known as Arbift) is owned by Libyan Arab Foreign Bank. 
The six Dubai banks include two which are state owned: National Bank and Emirates Bank 
International. Commercial Bank of Dubai and Mashreq Bank (which was formerly known 
as Bank of Oman) and Dubai Islamic Bank are partially owned. Middle East Bank is 
owned by Emirates Bank International. United Arab Bank has its head office and general 
manager in Abu Dhabi, but qualifies as a Sharjah bank because that is where its 
shareholders come from and because it is treated as a Shadah bank by the Central Bank of 
the UAE. The other two Sharjah banks are Bank of Sharjah, which is managed by Banque 
Paribas, and Investbank. The national banks of the other Emirates are controlled by their 
respective ruling families. 
Commercial banks' assets totalled $54.532 bn at the end of 2000, representing 25% of all 
banking assets in the GCC. (Saudi Arabia accounted for 45% of GCC assets and Kuwait for 
15.5%). Assets in the banking system grew at an average rate of 7% in the four years to the 
end of 2000 (the latest available Central Bank figures): 
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Five banks dominate the UAE banking scene in terms of market share: National Bank of 
Abu Dhabi, National Bank of Dubai, Abu Dhabi Commercial Banký Emirates Bank 
International and Mashreq Bank. The first two had assets just in excess of $26 billion at the 
end of 2000, while the other three had assets of around $15.3 billion. At the other end of 
the scale, five banks had assets of less than $1.3 Billion. 
The UAE banking system is regulated by the Central Bank of the UAE which is a federal 
body based in Abu Dhabi. The principal financial ratios imposed by the Central Bank are 
as follows: 
Banks must conform to the Basle guidelines on risk-weighted capital adequacy, 
with two important qualifications. First, the ratio of risk-weighted capital to assets 
is 10%, rather than 8%, and no more than 4% may be tier two capital. Second, GCC 
countries are treated as if they are OECD risk. 
Large exposures to single customers are governed by rules laid down by the Central 
Bank in October 1996. The two main provisions specify a maximum exposure to 
corporate clients of 7% of net worth and to banks of 30% of net worth. The rules 
caused uproar when they were first announced, with banks saying that the 7% 
figure was far too low. Despite pressure from the financial community, the Central 
Bank did not alter its provisions and several banks subsequently increased their 
capital so as to be able to maintain existing commercial relationships. 
A loans to deposits ratio of one to one must be maintained, with "loans" being 
taken to mean all loans to non-banks and all exposure (including placements) to 
banks with a residual life of three months or more. "Deposits" consist of all 
deposits from customers and banks with a residual maturity of over one year and 
85% of all customer deposits with a residual maturity of less than six months. 
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Deposits from banks with a residual maturity of less than six months are not 
included in the calculation. 
Banks must place with the Central Bank an interest-free deposit equivalent to 30% 
of all dirham-based lending to non-resident banks with a residual maturity of less 
than one year. 
No more than 25% of net worth may be invested in non-government securities. 
Government securities are excluded from this ceiling. Until recently "government 
securities" was taken to refer only to securities issued by the government of the 
UAE or the financial authorities of individual Emirates. However, the banks started 
to test the rule by buying securities issued by other governments, and it is now 
tacitly accepted that the 25% figure refers to securities of any government. 
Financial Markets 
Financial markets in the UAE are not sophisticated, lending to local companies and 
financing trade (particularly in Dubai, which acts as a re-export centre to the region) are 
the mainstays of local banking, business. Portfolio management is important, particularly in 
Abu Dhabi, although in this the foreign branches have a clear advantage over the local 
banks. As in other Gulf countries, the banking market is so liquid that there has been no 
need to develop medium-term debt liability instruments. The shortage of local assets is 
seen in the fact that foreign assets accounted for 55% of all commercial bank assets in the 
UAE at the end of 2000. The government of the UAE does not issue treasury bills or bonds 
and does not appear to have any intention to start doing so in the near future. 
In April 1999 the Central Bank initiated a new certificates of deposit programme with 
maturities ranging from one to 18 months. They aýe priced slightly below US dollar 
interbank rates and may be bought by local banks. 
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Stock Market: 
The official stock market in the UAE opened at the start of 1999 in Dubai, before that most 
trading was conducted informally on the telephone through brokers, located mainly in Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai. At the end of 1998, there were 40 shares traded and 10 brokerage 
companies licensed by the central bank. Share prices are published in newspapers and price 
movements are monitored by the unofficial index set up by the National Bank of Abu 
Dhabi in 1989 with a base of 1,000 points. 
In 1995 the central bank issued new regulations imposing minimum capital adequacy 
requirements for brokers and placing them under its direct control. The minimum capital 
requirement was set at Dhl million ($272,000) for brokerage houses dealing in domestic 
shares and Dh 2 million ($545,000) for those trading internationally. The central bank 
made it necessary for brokers to obtain a license and prohibited dealers to operate in the 
market without authorization. The new regulations also made it mandatory for brokerage 
houses to be audited and their personnel to be qualified and reliable. The new rules were 
designed to end confusion in the market as several brokers were practicing without central 
bank permission, while others were not qualified to deal in shares. 
The UAE Stock Market in its present form lacks rules and regulations. There is uncertainty 
about fair pricing and a reluctance amongst joint-stock companies to publish regular, 
timely and complete financial information. Furthermore pricing methodologies are not 
transparent and very little information is available on the companies whose shares are 
traded. Shareholding companies are not required to publish half-yearly results and the 
market is not open to international investors. Moreover, there is heavy concentration of 
share ownership with the government. Abu Dhabi has a majority stake in the Emirates 
Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat), the largest listed company with a market 
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capitalization of Dh17.8 billion ($4.85 billion) in 1999. At the end of 1999, total 
capitalization of listed companies reached Dh 85.6 billion (US$ 22.75 billion), making the 
UAE market the second largest in the Gulf after Saudi Arabia (National Bank of Abu 
Dhabi, Economic and Financial Report, January 2000). 
To conclude this section, the financial systems of the GCC countries under study have 
witnessed major developments and reforms, especially over the last decade. These 
developments include the liberalisation of interest rates, the'adoption of policies aimed at 
strengthening the financial capital of the banking and financial system, the introduction of 
prudential regulations in accordance with international standards and the modernization of 
stock markets aimed at providing a wider role in mobilising financial assets. These reforms 
have been aimed at improving the competitive advantage of the respective financial 
systems and enhancing the efficiency of the financial institutions operating in these 
countries. 
3.4 Monetization, Financial Deepening and Economic Growth in the GCC countries 
Each financial system in every different country has its own characteristics and structure. 
Identifying the structure of the financial system is important if one wishes to examine the 
efficiency features of such systems (Hermes. 2000). In addition, the development of an 
efficient financial system that can harness sufficient resources has been recognized as an 
important factor in promoting rapid economic growth in a country (Khan, et al. 2000). This 
development, referred to as "financial deepening", involves the design and implementation 
of policies that facilitate an increase in the monetization of the economy and at the same 
time fosters and develops a sound and diversified financial structure in order to, maintain 
monetary stability. As one of the measures of structure of the financial sector, financial 
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deepening (financial depth) generally leads to lower transaction costs, an optimum 
distribution of risks and better investment choices (Lensink, et al. 2000). Thus, financial 
deepening encourages economic efficiency and is in line with the objectives of economic 
development. Therefore, the aim of this section is to investigate empirically the differences 
in the structure of the financial systems between the GCC countries. This task is 
accomplished by examining several indicators (measures) of financial depth, in the 
respective countries. 
Several indicators of financial depth have been proposed in the literature and different 
indicators act as proxy indicators for different aspects of the financial system. Initially, 
such indicators were based on monetary aggregates, such as MI or M2, mainly because 
these aggregates were widely available (Levine, 1997). However, such indicators may be a 
poor proxy for financial development, since they are more related to the ability of the 
financial system to provide transaction services than to the ability to channel funds from 
savers to borrowers. Ihdeed, economies with underdeveloped financial systems may have a 
high ratio of money to GDP, as money is used as a store of value in the absence of other 
more attractive alternatives (Hermes, et al. 2000). Consequently, researchers have shifted 
from narrower monetary measures (MI and M2) to broader definitions, such as M3, which 
generally measure the total stock of liquid liabilities in the banking system. Although m3 
overcomes various shortcomings associated with MI and M2, it still contains M2 and 
therefore may be influenced by factors other than financial depth (Lensink, et al. 2000). 
More, recently, credit to the private sector has been favored as an alternative measure of 
financial intermediation. The main advantage of this indicator is that, by excluding credit 
to the public sector, it measures more accurately the role of financial intermediaries in 
channeling funds to the private sector. This is also, however, only a partial indicator of 
financial development. It only reflects developments in the banking sector (Khan, 2000). 
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Stock and bond markets, for example, are not taken into account. This weakness at first 
glance may be more relevant for industrialized than for developing countries. 
Industrialized countries have experienced significant non-bank financial 
development, while most of the financial development has occurred within the 
banking system in developing countries.. Nevertheless, securities markets are 
becoming more important in a number of developing countries, and their role should 
not be ignored, (Levine, 1999, p. 42). 
There has been extensive empirical work on the relationship between financial 
development and growth which has been largely surveyed in Levine (1997) and Levine 
(1998,1999a, b). One of the most influential studies on the subject is King and Levine 
(1993b), which shows that financial development has predictive power for future growth 
and they interpret this finding as evidence of a causal relationship that runs from financial 
development to growth. The study uses four measures of the level of financial 
development. The first is the liquid liabilities of banks and non-bank institutions as a share 
of GDP, which measures the size of the financial intermediaries sector. The second is the 
ratio of bank credit to the sum of bank and central bank credit, which measures the degree 
to which banks versus the central bank allocate credit. The third is the ratio of private 
credit to domestic credit, and the fourth is private credit as a ratio of GDP. The last two 
indicators measure the extent to which the banking system channels funds to the private 
sector. 
The empirical evidence finds a strong and statistically significant relationship between 
financial development and growth. It can, however, be argued that the relationship reflects 
reverse causality. 'I'liat is, it is faster growth that leads to financial deepening. While this 
arguinent carries some weight, the large body of empirical evidence cannot be dismissed on 
the basis of this premise, since it would amount to assuming not only that growth affects 
financial development, which is realistic, but also that financial development has no cffect 
on growth, which is certainly counterintuitive. Indeed, it is easy to think of many channels 
through which both variables affects each other, and therefore the real issue in the 
empirical literature is not of spurious correlations but one of simultaneity bias. In principle, 
it is possible to eliminate the simultaneity bias and some studies have attempted to tackle 
this problem by using instrumental variables or related econometric techniques. (Khan, 
2000, p. 7). 
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The financial indicators in Table 3.2 summarize the development of monetization and 
financial deepening in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and UAE over the 
period 1995 to 2000. Strictly speaking, no ideal method has yet been put forward in the 
literature to measure the process of financial deepening, (Levine, 1999). However, we 
examine how effective the banking system is in the process of channeling the loanable 
funds from savers to borrowers by examining the ratio of total assets held by the financial 
system to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). If the financial system of a country holds more 
assets relative to its GDP than others, then it is more likely for this system to capture a 
higher percentage of the funds in the whole economic system. At the same time, since 
money supply is the main component of financial assets, financial depth can also be 
measured by the ratio of money supply to GDP. In this context, differences in the 
definition of money supply should be considered: narrow money (Ml) consists of currency 
in circulation plus banks' demand deposits, whereas broad money definition (M2) is MI + 
banks' time and savings deposits. Narrow money is primarily a means of payments 
therefore the MI to GDP ratio suggests the level of monetization of the economy, whereas 
M2 to GDP provides a broader measure of financial deepening. However, the ratio of 
demand deposits to total assets in the banking system is also considered. This ratio is a 
good indication of financial system deepening. If the banking system has a larger portion 
of total assets in the form of demand deposit accounts, the system is more capable of 
dealing with banking crises. The International Monetary Fund (M) provides standard 
definitions for these measures and publishes them for all member countries. The measures 
are in fact limited in that, some countries are more apt to use foreign currencies in making 
domestic payments and for the coverage of deposit. institutions, and also, the types of 
deposits included in M2 tend to differ across countries (Levine, 1999). Recognizing these 
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problems, we present these ratios along with other measures in Table 3.2 in order to give a 
rough indication of the different levels of financial development in the countries under 
study. 
Despite differences relating to establishment and branching, every banking system in GCC 
countries has a group of dominant or 'core banks' which are recognized by both the 
authorities and the general public. If we take the size of individual economies into 
consideration the relative importance of bank assets in relation to gross domestic product 
can be analyzed. Table 3.2 shows that deposit banks' assets as a percentage of GDP for 
almost all GCC countries have increased substantially between 1995 and 2000. This 
measure is sometimes used to gauge the degree of financial depth in an economy. If we 
accept this as an acceptable measure then it would be fair to say that the financial systems 
of, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirate, hardly deepened between 1990 and 
2000, whereas those of Oman, Kuwait and the Kingdom of Bahrain benefited from 
improved deepening. Table 3.2 also shows that commercial banks in GCC countries 
dominate the financial systems. In fact the relative importance of commercial banks has 
increased in the second half of the 1990s. Commercial banks are clearly the most important 
constituents of the financial system in these countries. Referring to the same table, the 
currency ratios for the six countries under study show that, in most cases, that time and 
saving deposits have become relatively more important between 1995 and 2000 . Taken 
together, this suggests that the financial systems in these countries are not in the early 
stages of financial development and these financial systems have the ability to provide 
instruments that convince savers to deposit their funds in banks. Deposit rates have become 
more competitive and the increasing number of ATM machines have probably helped the 
financial deepening process. The narrow money indicator (MI/GDP) also suggests an 
increase in the majority countries under study. 
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Table 3.2 G4UC Monetization and Financial Deepening Indicators (%) Ratios 
Kingdom of Bahrain 
1995 1997 1999 2000 952000 
(Average 
Currency outside banks/GDP 0.048 -- - -- 
0.041 
Demand. Deposits/GDP U. = 
- -- - 
Tri 
- - - 
UT07 
- - 
0.12 
- - Ml/GDP 03U U. ZU -U. 6T V. 3T U. 37 
M2/GDP 0.65 1 0.70 1 0.73 -- . 
75 0.71 
- , - Total Financial System Assets/GDP 1.75 . 80 
TT6 =. Y. 79 
Commercial Bank Assets/GDP 1.20 E 1.30 E 1.01 -- - Commercial Banks Assets/Total Financial system Assets DW 1 U. 3T 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabi a 
Currency outside banks/GDP 0.05 - 0.05 - - 
0.04 
- - 
0.03 0.04 
Demand. Deposits/GDP U. T5 
- - 
7FT07 0.17 
- - Ml/GDP U. T5 
-- - 
=. 
-- ' - 
T. 7N 
-- - M2/GDP 6753 
-- - 
U. 3 97 
- - 
U3T 
-- - Total Financial System Assets/GDP U. 76- 9.7T TU U7F 
_ Commercial Bank Assets/GDP .T 1 
0.75 
Commercial Banks Assetsffotal Financial system Assets 1 0.731 1 0.84 1 0.87 0.89 0.86 
Sultanate of Oman 
Currency outside banks/GDP 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 
Demand. Deposits/GDP 0.09 0.09 
MI/GDP . 53 - - M2/GDP T. T5 
-- - Total FInancial System Assets/GDP T. z3 
Commercial Bank Assets/GDP 0.85 
Commercial Banks Assets/Total FInancial system Assets (). b6 1 0-88 0.88 0-91 0-9u 
State of Qatar 
Currency outside banks/GDP 0.03 -- - 
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.015 
Demand. Deposit&IGDP U 0.02 
M1/GDP 
- 
0.24 
M2/GDP 
- - -- - -- - . 
467 
- '- -- - Total Financial System Assets/GDP U. 3Y T66 76-T T66 D-62 
Commercial Bank Assets/GDP 1 7F2 
, Commercial Banks Assets/Total Financial system Assets 1 0.85 1 0.88 1 0.91 1 0.93 1 0.91 
Unitcd Arab Emiratcs 
Currency outside banks/GDP 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.12 -- 
Demand. Deposits/GDP 
- - -- - 
0.28 
-- - - Ml/GDP 6 ý 
- 
T9T TTT 
-- - 
=. 1.04 
M2/GDP T-IF T-57 -T6U- 
Total Financial System Assets/GDP 2.22 2.63 
- 
2.65 2.66- , 
---2-. 47- 
Commercial Bank Assets/GDP 1.66 - 
2.02 1 2.16 2.20 2.0- 
Commercial Banks Assets/Total Financial system Assets . 97 1 _ __. 
Z; 8 . 90 . 92 0.90 
State of Kuwait 
- Currency outside banks/GDP 0.056 0.056 - - 
0.049 
-- 
0-. M 0.045 
Demand. Deposits/GDP U. Tr a- 
Ml/GDP ' 
TN- 
M2/GDP 0.82 0.84 . 
qT- 0.88 
Total Financial System Assets/GDP 2.03 2.25 1.97 
Commercial Bank Assets/GDP 1.2 1.22- 1-T. 497- 1- 1.2 
Commercial Banks Assets/Total Fln; nclal system Assets 0.65 0.64 1 0.52 1 0.54 1 0.3T- 
_ Sou Authar-'s own estimation 
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Table 3.3 shows the growth of credit to the private sector in GCC countries as measured by 
the ratio of private sector credit to GDP. This measure, as noted by Levine et al. (1998, 
1999) show the extent to which financial intermediaries are channeling pooled savings to 
borrowers. As table 3.3 shows, these ratios have increased in all countries under study, 
suggesting that financial institutions are more efficient in employing their sources of funds, 
as the private sector is assumed to be more efficient than the public sector. Furthermore, 
such ratios capture the efficiency of financial intermediaries in monitoring, screening and 
controlling for credit risks. 
Overall, these indicators suggest a growing role of financial institutions in the financing 
process and a wider role of commercial banks relative to other players in these financial 
systems. Financial development ratios suggest that the financial systems under study have 
deepened during the 1990s. It is also clear that banks operating in these countries play a 
major role in mobilizing financial assets and directing investment to supposedly efficient 
uses. Other factors that may have contributed to promoting financial deepness in the 
countries under study include the globalization of financial services that one would expect 
to increase competition and lead to improvements in the quality of financial services 
provision (Azzam, 1998). Presley, (2000, has noted the innovations that have occurred in 
GCC banking markets during the 1990s, for example, new products have been introduced, 
such as credit and debit cards, automated teller machines, interest bearing current accounts 
and cheque clearing has been speeded up. Moreover, competition for deposits has been 
broadened in urban areas with strong evidence of an increases in both price and non-price 
competition. 
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Table 3.3 Growth of credit to the private sector in GCC member states(USS, Millions) 
Country/Year Credit to private Total Credit Credit to private Sector Credit to private 
Sector frotal Credit 0/6) Sector/GDP (%) 
Saudi Arabia 
1995 32400 43600 74 25 
1996 33200 42725 77 23 
1997 35700 50500 71 24 
1998 42900 60100 71 26 
1999 43300 49700 87 31 
2000 44200 49900 89 33 
Kuwait 
1995 9120 11135 81.3 36 
1996 9525 11560 82.6 34 
1997 13100 15590 84.1 48 
1998 14500 16820 86 62 
1999 15200 17480 86.9 55.6 
2000 15800 18112 87.2 45 
Oman 
1995 4058 5320 76 51 
1996 4327 5455 79 54 
1997 5832 6370 91 57 
1998 6839 7112 96 58 
1999 7221 8815 92 59 
2000 7742 8567 91 62 
Qatar 
1995 12 100 25700 47 26 
1996 13250 27300 48 28 
1997 14600 26400 55 39 
1998 15650 28550 54 39 
1999 17250 28000 61 32 
2000 17500 34000 51 33 
Bahrain 
1995 6756 8780 75 44 
1996 7580 10100 70 43 
1997 8250 11970 68 42 
1998 9200 13250 70 45 
1999 10350 13560 76 50 
2000 10860 15100 72 52 
U. A. E 
1995 24929 25890 96 58 
1996 28600 29700 95 58 
1997 28710 30650 93 60 
1998 33022 34980 94 73 
1999 35994 36788 90 75 
2( 39650 91 77 rSource: 
GCC economic Bullet in, various editions. 
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3.5 The Structure of GCC Banking Systems: 
3.5.1 Whv Does Structure Matter? 
The preceding sub-section alluded to the considerable role played by financial systems in 
the economic growth process. The stages of monetization and financial depth in the six 
GCC countries are highlighted. However, given that the banking system is the cornerstone 
of financial systems in the GCC this section examines some of the major differences in the 
structural characteristics of various GCC banking markets. 
It has been argued that the structure of any market is determined by a broad range of 
economic as well as non-economic factors (Gardener, et al. 1996). These non-economic 
factors include various geographical, legal, philosophical, political and social forces which 
mould the institutional character of banking markets over time. Consequently, GCC 
banking systems are characterized by a different array of institutions, organizational forms 
and legal frameworks, all of which have contributed to create their different market 
structures, for example, Bahrain is well-known as an offshore market. Furthermore, the 
United Arab Emirates, Oman and Qatar allow foreign banks to fully operate after they are 
licenced in these countries, while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are virtually closed to foreign 
banks. (Although, recently, both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait granted licenses to some GCC 
banks to operate in their national market). 
The aforementioned background begs the question: 'Why does structure matter? 
Industrial economic theory suggests that there is a causal link between market structure 
and bank conduct and performance. More specifically it has been argued that, in 
concentrated markets, banks may earn collusive Profits (Weiss, 1974; Heggestad and 
Mingo, 1977; Spellman, 1981; Rhoades, 1982). A substantial literature has burgeoned 
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aimed at testing the theoretical SCP (structure-conduct-performance) relationship. It has 
been argued, however, that this literature contains various inconsistencies and 
contradictions to provide a sati. sfactory description of the SCP relationship in banking 
(Gilbert, 1984; Osborne and Wendel, 1983). Contemporary approaches to the explanation 
of the link between market structure and performance have emphasized an alternative 
'efficient structure' hypothesis. This postulates that an industry's structure arises as a result 
of superior operating efficiency by particular firms. As a result, a positive relationship 
between bank profits and structure can be attributed to gains made in market share by more 
efficient banks. Various studies undertaken on the US banking industry (Brozen, 1982; 
Smirlock, 1985; Evanoff and Fortier, 1988), suggest that firm-specific efficiency seems to 
be the dominant variable explaining bank profitability. One of the major problems 
associated with the structure-performance literature is how to measure structure. Most of 
the studies use measures of concentration to proxy for market structure. Others consider 
measures that encapsulate the degree of openness of markets by considering exit and entry 
barriers. 
Overall, structural measures are extremely nalve (Molyneux, et al. 1996). They barely take 
account of the main forces that influence the institutional nature of banking markets, such 
as the regulatory framework, sector-ownership and so on. It seems indisputable, however, 
that the structure of a market influences the way in which banks operate in that market. 
With these points in mind, we can examine a number of important factors affecting 
banking structure in GCC member states. 
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3.5.2 Banking Market Size and Concentration in GCC countries 
When we refer to 'concentration', what is meant is the extent to which assets, funds and 
sources of revenue are controlled by the leading firms in the market place. The degree of 
market concentration will therefore depend on identifying the size of the market and of the 
firms that serve it. This section of the thesis, therefore reviews the changes in the banking 
structure of the countries under study over the last decade. It outlines the developments in 
the relative importance of the banks in the respective banking systems, the level of market 
concentration measured as market shares of the top three banks, and the growth of the 
financial assets of the banking systems under study. Table 3.4 illustrates the number of 
credit institutions in each country classified according to organisational form. It is possible 
to see from table 3.4 a slight overall reduction in the number of financial institutions at the 
GCC level, (specifically in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Oman) and this is 
attributable to the few mergers and acquisitions that occurred through the 1990s between 
various banks. The commercial banks dominate the banking systems in all GCC member 
states. The banking system of United Arab Emirates is the largest in terms of the number 
of banks followed by the banking system of Bahrain. There still remain a large number of 
banks operating in these two financial systems. However, the Saudi banking system is the 
largest in terms of total assets. In fact, the Saudi banking system, in terms of asset size 
dominates the others. The total assets managed by Saudi banks account for around 47% of 
the total assets of all GCC banks (see table 3.5). Following the stages of banking sector 
development of banks as outlined by Gardener et al, 1996, it can clearly be seen that all 
GCC countries are characterized by the bank-oriented rather than the market-oriented 
stage, because capital markets are still underdeveloped compared with other industrialised 
countries (Azzarn, 1998). 
88 
Table 3.4 The Structure of GCC countries Banking Systems by financial institution 
organizational form. 
Bahrain 
Type of Banks 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Central Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Commercial 23 23 23 23 23 
Investment 6 6 6 6 6 
Islamic 5 5 51 5 5 5 
Specialist 2 2 2 2 
Total 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Kuwait 
Central Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Commercial 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Investment 5 5 5 5 5 
Islamic 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Specialist 3 3 3 3 3 
Total 16 16 16 16 16 16 
baud! Arabia 
Central Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Commercial --f 1- 12 11 11 10 
Investment 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Islamic I 1 1 1 1 1 
Specialist F-3- 1 5 15 15 5 5 
Total 19 ig 18 18 17 17 
Oman 
Central Bank I I 1 1 1 1 
Commercial 7 7 6 6 6 
Investment 4 4 4 3 3 3 
Islamic 2 2 2 2 2 
Specialist 3 3 3 3 3 
Total 17 17 17 16 16 16 
Oatar 
Central Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Commercial 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Investment 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Islamic 3 3 3 3 3 
Specialist 3 3 3 3 3 
Total 21 21 21 21 21 
Unit ed Arab Emirates 
Central Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Commercial 25 25 25 25 24 
Investment 8 8 8 7 
Islamic 4 5 5 5 
Specialist 3 3 3 
Total 41 41 41 41 39 39ý- 
Source: Bank and various GCC Central Banks Reports. 
The 
%Bam banking system included only the full incorporated local banks. The Offshore unit 
banks excluded. 
Money exchangers and non-bank investment institutions. excluded from all financial systems. foreign banks representative offices excluded from Bahrain, Oman, and United Arab Emirates 
banking systems. 
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For the purpose of comparing bank sector concentration across the GCC, we use 
concentration ratios based on a denominator consisting of national market banking system 
total assets and total deposits for the three largest banks in each country. Table 3.5 shows 
the number of banks, the total assets and the three-firm concentration ratios in terms of 
(assets and deposits) in 2000. Although the Saudi banking system is the largest in asset size 
and has the smallest number of banks it is also the least concentrated. The Bahraini 
banking market is the most concentrated followed by Qatar. However, in terms of deposits, 
the Qatari banking system is the most concentrated. All -in all, apart from the Saudi 
banking system, the degree of market concentration measured by the 3-firm assets or 
deposits ratio is similar across the rest of GCC banking systems. 
Table 3: 5 Market Size and Concentration of GCC Banking Sectors (2000). 
Size of Banking Sector Concentration 
Country Number of Banks Total Assets (Mill USS)2 
Concentration% of total 
National Ma t(3-Firm) 
Assets Deposits 
Kuwait 16 47854.2 59 61 
Saudi. A 17 122256.6 66 71 
Qatar 21 32541.8 87 91 
Bahrain 37' 25564.7 85 93 
Oman 16 24812.2 62 74 
U. A. E 39 54532.4 65 72 
GCC 186 305561.3 70.3 75.8 
I-Offshore Banks Units not included, in the Bahrain total assets banks 
2- Ile assets of state-owned development banks and central banks are excluded from all banking 
systems. 
Source: GCC, Economic Bulletin, volume, 16,2000 1, p. 2 1). 
To illustrate the growth features of the respective countries banking systems, we evaluate 
changes in the consolidated balance sheet of the banking systems over the period 1995- 
2000. In particular, we analyze: total assets and asset. s quality, capital adequacy, customer 
deposits and off-b4lance sheet items. These items help to illustrate the growth of financial 
intermediation and provide an overview of the change in the soundness and efficiency of 
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the banking systems over the last decade. Table 3.6 shows that the banking sectors in the 
six countries under study witnessed considerable growth in the size of their assets, 
deposits, equity, loans and off-balance sheet activities (in terms of nominal values) during 
the second half of the 1990s. However, there were significant increases in the size of 
problem loans and loan loss reserves in these countries. This perhaps was attributed mainly 
to the change in classification of the debts according to international standards. The 
favourable growth in the size of equity outlines the move to strengthen the financial 
position of the banking sector in these countries. The high growth on off-balance sheet 
items in general may be attributed to several reasons: firstly, this may reflect greater 
deregulation in GCC financial systems. Secondly, it may reflect the fact that banks in the 
GCC (like in western countries) have followed a strategy of diversification with respect to 
non-interest income by expanding into investment management and securities businesses. 
This of course, helps reduce the influence of unfavourable interest rate changes (and 
reduced margins) and at the same time may help lead to a greater stability in revenue 
generation. 
Table 3.6 Average annual growth (%) of the main banking sector indicators (nominal 
values) for the six GCC member states over 1995-2000 
Indicator/Country au S di. I Qatar Ba wait Oman 
Asset Quality Indicators 
Total Assets 4 6 9 6 5 5 
Loans (nct) 7 8 7 8 4 4 
Problem Loans 2 4 3 3 1.6 1 
Loan loss reserves 41 5 6 5 4 4 
Capital Adequacy Indicators 
Total Equity 12 11 10 11 9 9 
Other Indicators 
Customer Depositi 7 9 5 8 7 7 
Off-Balance sheet items 14 10 15 12 16 9 
Source: various editions of G CC central banks reports 
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3.6 The Performance of GCC Bankini! Svsterns: 
The aim of this section is to evaluate profitability trends in GCC banking to see how 
structural developments may have influenced banking sector performance. Table 3.7 
illustrates the trends in return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and net interest 
margins across GCC banking markets between 1995 and 2000. Profitability figures show 
generally improved returns: average return on Equity (ROE) within the GCC banking 
, 
system increased from 12.4% in 1995 to 14.7% in 2000 while the average Return on 
Assets (ROA) rose from 1.5% to 1.7% over the same period. The profitability indicators 
also indicate improvements that reflect the ability of banks to better utilize their assets and 
improve their competitive advantage. Table 3.7 shows the trend in traditional margin based 
business. Net interest margin indicates the level of return generated on interest earning 
business therefore, a decline in interest margins may indicate an increased competitive 
pre ssure on interest related business. As can be seen from table 3.7 interest margins have 
fallen in the majority of GCC member states in the period 1995-2000. An important 
influence on interest margins in GCC banking markets has been a shift of emphasis to 
other non-interest income sources of earnings as noted in the previous section. This trend, 
indicative of the growth of securitization, off-balance sheet activity and non-banking 
product cross-selling opportunities, (for example, brokerage and mutual funds 
management) has been witnessed across virtually all the GCC banking markets. This is 
reflected in the increase in non-interest income (see table 3-8) and can also be linked to the 
I 
downward trends in interest rates, which has contributed to the boosting of capital gains, 
and strengthened returns from securities trading and underwriting activities in general. 
Overall, given the increasingly varied and sophisticated demands of banks' customers, 
non-interest based income is increasingly likely to replace interest earnings on most banks' 
income statements. While trends in the sources of bank income can be characterized as a 
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fall in interest margins compensated by an increase in non-interest income, the trend in 
cost levels show improved efficiency since 1995 over all countries. 
Table 3.7: Banks' Aggregate Profita ility Measures: 
State Return On As sets Retu On E uity Net Interest argin 
1995 2000 %Change 
1995-2000 
1995 2000 1 %Change 
1995-2000 
1995 2000 %Change 
1995-2000 
Bahrain 1.5 1.7 7 12.2 14.1 11.7 1.4 1.2 -8 
Kuwait 1.4 1.5 6 10.6 13.3 12.4 3.6 3.2 -6 
Oman 1.4 1.6 1 8 12.6 15.1 14.3 2.5 2.3 -7 
_Qatar 
1.5 1.8 9 13.4 15.7 15.2 4.3 3.8 -11 
Saudi. A 1.6 1.9 9 11.7 15.1 16.8 3.6 3.2 -6 
U. A. E 1.7 1.8 7 10.8 13.3 12.1 2.1 2 -4 
GCC 1.5 1.7 8 12.4 14.7 13.7 3.8 3.2 -8 
Source: Calculated from banks consolidated balance sheet data obtained from Bankscope 
Table 3.8: Non-Interest Income Contribution to Total Inc=e: 
Country Non-Interest Income as a Percent ge of Total In come 
Kuwait 1995 1997 1999 2000 % Change 
1995-2000 
Saudi. A 27 29 30 34 17% 
Qatar 25 26 28 32 15% 
Oman 28 33 35 37 18% 
Bahrain 30 32 35 36 14% 
U. A. E 26 28 31 33 16% 
GCC 27 29 33 35 17% 
Source: calculated from banks consolidated balance sheet data obtainea- 
fr= Bankscope 
The usual measure for bank efficiency is the cost-income ratio. This measure can be 
influenced both by endogenous and exogenous factors. Adverse economic conditions 
affect the cost-income ratio in the sense that banks do not have total control over their 
income streams whilst obstacles such as restrictive labour law may hinder staff reduction 
and productivity improvements on the cost side. Table 3.9 shows that in all countries under 
study the general trend in bank efficiency has been upward. The improved cost 
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performance of GCC banks in the second half of 1990s can be seen mainly as a 
consequence of lessons following the banking difficulties of the 1980s and early 1990s 
Table 3.9: Co st to Income Ratio: 
Country Cost to Income Ratio 
1995 1998 1999 2000 % Change 
1995-2000 
Kuwait 59 59 55 54 -8.8% 
Saudi. A 62 62 57 55 -14.7% 
Qatar 65 62 60 57 -12.7% 
Oman 63 60 56 54 -7.9% 
Bahrain 56 56 55 53 -5.3% 
U. A. E 57 58 56 54 -3.2% 
GCC 60.8 57 56.2 53.3 -7.8% 
Source: Calculated from ban ks consolidated balance sheet d ata obtained from Bankscope 
Most comparisons of cost efficiency usually use aggregate ratios relating cost to revenue or 
assets. Although these measures do not account for business mix, the risk profile of a bank 
nor the quality of services provided, it is these measures which are most frequently drawn 
up to use cross-country comparisons of bank operating efficiency(as shown in table 3.9). 
Table 3.10 illustrates the staff costs as a percentage of operating expenses ratio which is 
another commonly used measure of banking sector efficiency. The table shows that there 
seems to have been an overall fall in the proportion of staff costs in banking during the 
second half of the 1990s. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman respectively seem to have been 
the most successful in reducing staffing costs compared to other GCC countries during the 
second half of the 1990s. 
Taking the cost and profit figures together, it appears that the performance of GCC 
banking markets have improved during the second half of the 1990s. While interest 
margins have fallen, banks have increased their non-interest income sources of revenue, 
and at the same time reduced costs. As a consequence, profit levels have improved, 
typically ROE's around the 15% benchmark, a level cited as what would be expected for a 
2 full service commercial bank . 
2 Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson (200 1) note that for banks to ac e added value for their sharehold 
full service commercial bank(undertaking retail, corporate, 
hicv ers a 
ROE's of 15'/o+. 
investment banking), ", ould be expected to earn 
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Table 3.10: Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating Expenses: 
State Staff Costs as a Percentage of Ove ting Expen ses 
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 %Change 
1995-2000 
_Kuwait 
58 58 57 55 54 -4.5% 
Saudi A 58 54 54 53 52 -9.7% 
- 
Qatar 62 61 61 60 60 -1.6% 
Bahrain 51 51 50 50 49 -1% 
Oman 59 59 56 55 55 -3.2% 
U. A. E 55 55 55 54 54 -1.4% 
GCC 56.8 56 55.3 54.1 53.5 -2.6% 
Note: Operating expenses include all expenses relating to regular banidng business other than 
interest expenses. Staff costs are a part of the operating expenses. Staff costs include salaries and 
other employee benefits. 
Source: Consolidated Banks financial statements, BankScope. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the main features of the GCC financial systems under study; Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. In general, these countries 
have experienced various financial reforms aimed at strengthening the positive role of their 
financial systems in the economic growth process. The reforms in the six countries have 
mainly included moves to improve bank capitalisation. in accordance with Basle standards 
and the introduction of other new prudential guidelines. Stock markets have been upgraded 
and they have begun to play a wider role in financing various economic sectors within their 
respective countries, although their importance still remains limited. Commercial banks 
still dominate GCC financial systems, where their share of total financial system assets 
ranged from about 58 percent in Saudi Arabia to about 85 percent in Bahrain. In addition, 
the banking systems of GCC countries are highly concentrated with the assets share of the 
largest three banks ranging from 59 percent in Saudi Arabia to about 90 percent in Bahrain, 
on average over 1995-2000. The banks in the countries under study also show favourable 
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growth in terms of their asset quality, capital adequacy and profitability during the 1990s. 
Such indicators reflect an enhanced role for financial intermediaries in the process of 
economic growth and exhibit the positive impact of economic and financial reforms 
undertaken in these countries. Furthermore, financial systems have deepened in these 
countries and the proportion of credit allocated to the private sector as a percent of GDP 
has increased in all six countries, suggesting that banks have become more efficient in 
allocating financial resources within the respective countries. 
Taken together, this suggests that the performance and efficiency of the financial and 
banking systems under study is likely to have improved during the 1990s. Although it is 
difficult to say specifically whether this improvement is a result of various reforms or 
improvements in the general macroeconomic environment, perhaps one can at least suggest 
that the reform process has had some positive influence. 
Since the aim of this thesis is to investigate structure-performance relationships and 
efficiency in the six GCC banking systems the following chapter investigates the main 
theoretical concepts relating market structure to bank performance. 
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Chapter four: Structure-Conduct-Performance 
Theoretical concepts, definitions and measures 
4.1 Introduction: 
This chapter discusses the theoretical concepts of market structure, conduct and performance. 
Section 4.2 provides definitions of market structure, conduct and performance and 4.3 
examines the interactions in the SCP framework. Section 4.4 considers measures of market 
structure, focusing on traditional concentration measures, and inequality indices. The major 
empirical problems associated with such measures discussed in section 4.5. Section 4.6 
outlines the determinants of the level of concentration and the following section 4.7 discusses 
the main features of bank performance. Section 4.8 outlines the theories describing the 
relationship between SCP and the fmal section 4.9 is the conclusion. 
4.2 Definitions of Market Structure, Conduct and Performance: 
To understand the link between market structure, conduct and performance it is best to first 
provide a clear indication as to the various definitions of market structure, conduct and 
performance. 
4.2.1 Market Structure 
A market could be defined as a mechanism where buyers and sellers exchange goods or 
services achieving the desired terms for both buyers and sellers. Shepherd (1985) defined a 
market as a group of buyers and sellers exchanging goods that are highly substitutable. This 
substitutability may be measured in terms of cross-elasticity of demand, which shows how 
sharply a price change for one product will cause the quantity sold of another product to 
change. Cross-elasticity of demand would be expected to be high between products within the 
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market and low against products outside the market under study. Another definition provided 
by Houck (1984, p. 3 56)) notes that a market is: 
A collection of actual or potential sellers and buyers of a specific good or service, this collection has 
two characteristics (1) none of the buyers has the option of purchasing the item from sellers outside 
this collection and(2) none of the sellers has the option of selling the item to buyers outside this 
collection. The interaction of these buyers and sellers generates a set of interrelated prices and 
conditions of sale or use. The principles or facts determining which buyers and sellers are in this 
collection identify the market spatially, tcmporallyand politically . 
In the context of banking, however, it is difficult to delineate the boundaries of banking 
markets (Gardener, et al, 1996). Problems relating to the definition of the banking market arise 
especially if there are a large number of firms providing close substitutes. George and Joll 
(1988), argued that consumer substitutability is the main criterion for defining the market but 
in practice, a great deal ofjudgment must be used in classifying firms, and the researcher must 
always be alert to the possibility that empirical results may be sensitive to the particular 
industry grouping that have been used. Moreover, defining the scope of banking markets 
becomes more complex when considering banking as a multi-product industry. The same bank 
may compete in both local, national and international markets, and across a wide array of 
product segments. According to Rose (1987), banking markets may be viewed in terms of 
transaction costs that includes the time and expense incurred in searching for information 
concerning the availability of product and prices, the costs of communication and delivery and 
commissions or fees needed to enlist the services of a broker or dealer. For example, chequing 
accounts can usually be associated with local markets because the marginal benefits for 
customers can be very low compared to the cost of looking for other alternatives. However', in 
the mortgage market, where the magnitude of benefits is worthwhile relative to the time spent 
and other costs associated with shopping around, the market may be national or even 
internatioril. Rose also emphasises the size of the customer and the bank in the structure of 
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banking markets. Where the customer is bigger in size (according to income or assets) then 
the demand for loans and other financial services is usually higher which leads to a larger 
banking market. In other words, where customer demands are relatively large, then markets 
will tend to become more national or international. Market structure therefore, describes the 
characteristics and composition of markets and industries in an economy. Structure can refer 
to the number and size distribution of firms in the economy as a whole, and also relates to the 
importance and characteristics of individual markets within the economy. The characteristics 
of market structure could be described by examining (either jointly or separately): the number 
of firms, the extent of product differentiation, entry conditions or (the extent of entry barriers), 
the level of integration within the market, and market concentration which represents that 
part of total market goods or services supplied or managed or produced by a few large firms in 
the relevant market. In the context of banking, Rose (1987) defines market structure as the 
number of banks and competing nonbank financial service firms serving in a given place, the 
-particular services they offer in that market, the size distribution of banks and bank customers, 
the barriers to market entry, and the geographic dispersion of both banks and their customers. 
Greenbaum (1971) points out that the structure of banking also relates to aspects of 
organization and control in the banking industry. Thus, structure may also be described by the 
type of ownership, the number of bank offices and other properties. 
There are several types of markets which describe the structures of firms, from markets with 
many firms which are equal in size with competitive rivalry to markets where there is only one 
supplier of financial services. The various categories of market, as presented in table 4.1, have 
been defined to reflect the degree of competition. At the extremes are pure monopoly with just 
one firm and pure competition in which there are many competitors, none having any 
significant influence on the market. 
99 
Table 4.1: Types of Market 
Market Type Main Condition Familiar instances 
Pure monopoly One firm has 100 percent of the Market Electric, telephonewater busses 
Dominant firm One firm has 50-100 percent of the market and no close 
rival 
Soap (Campbell), razorblades 
(Gillette), 
Tight. oligopoly The leading four firms combined have 60-100 per=t of 
the market: col. lusion among them to fix prices is relatively 
easy 
Copperalurninium, JV broadcasting 
and Banking industry 
Loose oligopoly The leading four firms combinedhave 40 percent or less of 
the market; collustion among them to fix prices is virtually 
impossibl 
Lumber, Furniturehardware small 
machinerymagazines 
Monopolistic 
competition I 
Many effective competitorsnone with more than 10 
percent of the market. 
Retailing and clothing 
Pure competition I Over 50 competitors, all with negligible shares Wheat, corn, cattlehogs 
ISources: Adapted from Shepered(1985, page 4). 
It is clear from the table above that the main elements of market structure relate to the market 
share of individual companies and the sum of market shares of the largest firms in the industry 
(these elements of market structure are mostly described as an internal elements). The 
industrial organisation literature refers to the relative size of the top firms as market 
concentration. Market concentration can range from 100 per cent (if one firm controls the 
whole market) down to nearly zero (if there are an infinite number of firms in the market). 
Market type can range from pure monopoly to perfect competition. 
Another aspect of market structure is the existence of barriers to entry. Entry barriers play a 
crucial role in defining industry structure (Goddard et al, 2001). If established finns are able to 
prevent entry, the extent to which competitive pressure imposes restraints on their pricing 
decisions and other aspects of conduct may be severley curtailed. This is likely to have far- 
reaching consequences for performance indicators as well. For instance, in a particular market 
there may exist a potential competitor ready to enter the market and likely to increase rivalry 
in the market. Anything that decreases the likelihood (or slows down the process) of these 
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potential competitors coming into the market is a barrier to entry, (Molyneux, 1996). In 
contrast the entry of firms into the market is considered as a catalyst to competition, and 
theory suggests that, if the number of firms in the market increases, it will become more 
competitive and therefore less concentrated. Bain (1956) defines entry as the establishment of 
a new firm that introduces new capacity that did not previously exist, or the conversion of 
existing plant and machinery already used by an established firm in another industry for use in 
the new venture. Bain's broad definition of barriers to entry includes any factors that allow 
established firms to earn abnormal profits without attracting entry. Stigler defines entry 
barriers as "a cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) which must be bome by a 
firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry. . ." 
(Stigler, 1968, p. 67). Entry barriers can be created by incumbents' favoured access to high- 
quality inputs that are in short supply, cheaper long-term finance, or from learning economies 
of scale. According to Caves and Porter (1977), such barriers may not only separate 
incumbents from potential entrants, but also separate groups of existing firms. Such groups 
may emerge due to product differentiation, vertical integration or differences in ownership. 
Shepherd (1997) distinguishes between exogenous and endogenous entry barriers. Exogenous 
barriers derive from structural characteristics of the industry, such as product characteristics 
and production technology. Endogenous, barriers derive from conscious decisions taken by 
incumbent firms to seek to impede entry, through their own price or non-price decisions. Tbus; 
a market's structure is comprised mainly of the market shares of incumbent firms and the 
barriers to entries. In general, each market's structure lies somewhere between pure monopoly 
(a high market share and high entry barriers) to pure competition (a low market share and low 
barriers). 
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Table 41 Sources of entry barriers 
1. Exoeenous causes: external sources of barriers: 
1. Capital requirements: related to minimum efficient scale of plants and firms, capital intensity, and capital 
market imperfections. 
2. Economies of scale: both technical and pecuniary, which require large-scale entry, with greater costs, risks 
and intensity of retaliation. 
3. Absolute cost advantages: many possible causes, including lower wage rates and lower-cost technology. 
4. Product differentiation: may be extensive. 
5. Sunk costs: any cost incurred by an entrant that cannot be recovered upon exit. 
6. Research and development Intensity: requires entrants to spend heavily on new technology and products. 
7. High durability of finn-specif ic capital (asset specificity): imposes costs for creating narTow-use assets for 
entry, and losses if entry fails. 
8. Vertical integration: may require entry at two or more stages of production for survival; raises costs and 
risks. 
9. Diversification by incumbents: mass resources deployed among diverse branches may defeat entrants. 
10. Switching costs: complex systems may entail costs of commitment and training, which impede switching to 
other systems. 
11. Special risks and uncertainties: cntran& higher risks may raise their costs of capital. 
12. Gaps and asymmetries of Information: incumbents! superior information helps them bar entrants and may 
raise entrants' cost of capital. 
13. Formal, official barriers set by government agencies or Industry-wide groups: examples are utility 
-franchises, bank entry limits, and foreign trade duties and barriers. 
H. Endoeenous causes: voluntary and strateizic sources of barriers: 
1. Pre-emptive and retaliatory actions by Incumbents: including selective price discounts to deter or punish 
entry. 
2. Excess capacity: the incumbcnfs excess capacity lets it retaliate sharply and threaten retaliation credibly. 
3. Selling expenses, including advertising: increases the degree of product differentiation. 
4. Segmenting the market: segregates customer groups by demand elasticities, and makes broad entry more 
difficult 
S. Patents: may provide exclusive control over critical or lower-cost technology and products. 
6. Exclusive controls over other strategic resources: such as superior ores, favourable locations, and unique 
talents of personnel. 
7. Raising rivals' costs: actions that require entrants to incur extra costs. 
8. Packing the product space: may occur in industries with high product differentiation. 
Source: Goddard et ali (2001, p. 42). 
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4.2.2 Conduct 
Conduct, according to Ferguson (1988) refers to the behaviour (actions) of firms in a market, 
to the decisions these firms make and also to the way in which these decisions are taken. 
Conduct, therefore, focuses on how firms set prices, whether independently or in collusion 
with other firms in the market It also influences the way the firms set policies on advertising 
and other matters such as research and development. 
Conduct relates to the way in which firms behave in a market including the nature of decisions 
these firms take and the way in which they are taken. It, therefore, focuses on such issues as firm 
price setting behaviour, how firms decide on advertising and R&D activities and such like. These 
factors are difficult to evaluate empirically compared with structure and performance 
characteristics. (Molyneux, 1996, p. 160) 
Industrial organisation literature primarily focuses on the measurement of firm performance 
from which conduct is implied. Different types of market structure, however, will influence 
the conduct/ behaviour of firms. For example, under pure competition, each firm is a price 
taker and has no significant influence on price, where under imperfectly competitive market 
structures such as monopoly, each firm in the market believes that it can influence the price by 
changing the quantity of goods or services it produces. In other words the conduct of firms 
depends on the relevant market structure including such features as the number and size 
distribution of sellers and buyers, the extent of physical or subjective differentiation existing 
among competing sellers products, the ease of entry into the market, the ratio of fixed to total 
costs in the short-run for a typical firm, the level of vertical integration in the industry, and the 
amount of diversity or conglomeration characterising individual firm's product lines (see 
'Scherer 1980, p. 4). Market structure then is important in determining the conduct and 
performance of firms which in turn are instrumental in shaping the future evolution of the 
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industry concerned, (Goddard, et al. 2001). The relationship between market structure, 
conduct and performance will be discussed in more detail in section 4.3 
4.2.3 Performance: 
Firm performance in various industries or markets is said to depend upon the conduct of 
sellers and buyers in such areas as pricing policies and practices, inter-firm co-operation, 
product line and advertising strategies, research and development, and so on (Wilson, et al, 
2001). In general, firm performance can be divided into two main elements: profitability and 
efficiency. Profitability represents a measurement of the relationship of the different 
components of costs and revenues and provide the basis to evaluate firm performance 
(Shepherd, 1997). It is usually used as the main index of a firm's economic performance, 
(Sinkey, 1999). Efficiency on the other hand, refers to how well a firm can yield a maximum 
value of outputs from a given total of input, (Mester, 1996). For the market as a whole, 
efficiency refers to the ability of the market to utilise scarce resources to meet consumers' 
demand for goods and services; that is, how well firms operate in order to optimise economic 
welfare, (Shaffer, 1994). (The concept of firm level efficiency is discussed in more detail in 
chapter 5). Performance measurement, therefore, is the quantitative assessment of efficient 
progress towards achieving a particular goal (Shepherd, 1997). In the case of banks, 
performance may be particularly affected by factors such as concentration in the local market 
asset and liability management, the structure of the bank's branching operations, the level of 
M&A activity in the industry and so on (Hannan, et al, 1998). Moreover, as in other industries, 
the structure and the behaviour of banks will affect their market performance (Wilson, et al, 
2001) and this interaction link will be discussed in the following section. 
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UThe Interaction Relationship between Market Structure, Conduct and 
Performance 
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) approach based upon neoclassical theory has long 
been the predominant methodology in the study of industrial economics (Shaffer, 1994). It has 
been suggested that a bank's market structure, especially the number and size distribution of 
firms and the condition of entry, influences to some degree firm behaviour and performance, 
(Shepherd, 1997). In other words, there exists a relationship between structure, 
conduct/behaviour and performance. Structure can be considered as a major determinant of the 
degree of competition and the resultant performance in a particular market (Goddard, et al, 
2001). The general view is that competition in a more concentrated market will be less 
vigorous as compared to a less concentrated market and, as expected, the performance of more 
concentrated markets may be less desirable in social terms. The existence of rivalry leads to 
unique levels of profits, prices, advertising and other aspects of market performance that are 
desirable in social terms, (Berger, et al, 1998). Through the link of conduct the performance 
of firms in a particular market is tied to the structure of that market (Molyneux, et al, 1996). 
Industrial economists have sought to identify sets of attributes or variables that influence 
economic performance and to develop theories describing the links between those attributes 
and end performance and these theories will be discussed later in this chapter (see section 4.8). 
However, the general descriptive model of these relationships was conceived initially by 
N4ason (193 9,1949) and his model of industrial organisation analysis, nowadays referred to as 
the SCP approach, is shown diagrammatically in figure 4.1. The linkage between structure, 
conduct and performance then turns to identifying structural characteristics against models of 
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firm and market behaviour, namely, perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition 
and oligopoly as discussed in section 4.2.1 and shown in table 4.1. 
supply Demand 
Raw materials Price elasticity 
Technology Substitutes 
Unionization Rate of Growth 
Product durability Cyclical and seasonal 
Value/Weight Character 
Business attitudes Purchase methods 
Public Policy Marketing type 
Market Structure 
Number of seHers and buyers 
Product differentiation 
Barriers to entry 
Cost Structures 
Vertical integration 
Conglomerateness 
Conduct 
Pricing behaviour 
Product strategy and advertising 
Research and innovation 
Plant investment 
Legal tactics 
Performance 
Production and allocative efficiency 
Progress 
Full employment 
Equity 
I Sorce: Scherer [1980P. 41. I 
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Nbrket theory focuses mainly on aspects of market structure which have an important 
influence on the behaviour of firms and buyers and on market performance, (Molyneux, et al, 
1996). NIarket structure involving many firms of equal sizes is often assumed to generate 
superior performance (Shephered 1997). In this highly competitive market, excess profits 
above normal returns are quickly eliminated by the existing and new competitors. In the end, 
no one firm is likely to dominate the market. As Scherer (1982) points out, in the SCP model, 
markets that are characterised by one or a few firms with significant size disparities are more 
likely to be characterised by co-ordination of policies and collusive agreements. This will in 
turn lead to inferior performance in terms of the quality and the quantity of the services 
offered, higher prices, and profits that exceed a normal return. 
So far we have noted that the direction of causality in the traditional SCP approach flows from 
market structure through conduct to performance in a unidirectional manner. This rests on the 
view that market structure is exogenously determined. In reality, however, firm performance 
and conduct affect market structure. For example, if market structure permits conduct which 
increases prices and enhances profits, this would attract new entry into the market, changing 
the structure of the market. Conversely, aggressive pricing strategies could force firms to leave 
the - market. Concentration may influence performance, not only directly, say through 
collusion, but indirectly through its impact on advertising, research and development, and 
product differentiation. Non-price forms of competition may become more intense in 
concentrated markets that find it profitable to limit price competition (Gardener, et al, 1996). 
Performance (profitability) may be an important determinant influencing the level of 
advertising, research and development and (through investment) of scale economies in an 
industry. Figure 4.2 illustrates how the SCP relationship can be adopted to incorporate these 
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more complex relationships. Part a) of the figure shows the traditional SCP relationship, and 
part b) shows the various interactions that exist between structure, conduct and performance, 
Note, however, that despite these more complex relationships, the main causality still runs 
from the structural criteria. 
Nlarket performance is therefore determined by the interaction of market structure and market 
conduct and at the same time market performance can be affected by structure and conduct. In 
the banking market however this is best illustrated by the descri'Ptive model shown in table 4.3 
which has been widely used in studies of industrial organisational structure. 
Table 43 The Structure-Conduct-Performance Mode l 
External Factors =Structure =Conduct =Werformance 
Available technological structure of banking Bank management strategy price, quantity, and 
methods for the production markets (number and and objectives (including quality of financial 
and delivery of financial relative sizes of pricing behaviour marketing services offered to 
services competitors supplying programs and goals new public 
Regulatory supervision by and demanding service innovations and the 
federal and state authorities banking services, development of new 
Economic conditions (level entry barriers and production and delivery 
and growth of production geographic dispersion systems) 
availability and cost of of suppliers and 
productive resources, demanders)=> 
elasticity and growth of 
demand, and the price and 
availability of substitute 
_products 
and services) =: > 
Demographic 
factors(distribution, growth 
and social profile of the 
population to be served) 
Isource: Adapted from Rose(1987, p. 36). 
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I Figure 4.2 The Traditional SCP and SCP Interrelationship 
I 
A) The Traditional SCP Approach 
-1 
Structure: Conduct-Influence on Performance- 
Pricing Iinplications For. 
Economies of Barriers to entry Profit rates R f 
scale PrIcel-cost margins 
[-Brand loyalty 
7 
Product differentiation 
Co-operation and Collusion 
Concentration 
I-B) SCP interrelationships 
34 
2 Influence of Implications 
Expenditure on Structure: Pricing: For: 
Investment +10- 1 Economies of Scale 
Process R&D 
Advertising II Brand loyalty 
Production 
differentiation 
Concentration 
Sou=: Haymd Morfis (1990), p. 206 
1 
Barriers to entry 
Co-operation/ 
CoHusion 
Profits rates 
Price-cost 
mar s 
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4.4 Measures of Market Structure: 
Among the most important characteristics that define the four main theoretical market 
structures are the number of firms, the degree of product differentiation, and the height of 
barriers to entry. The number and size distribution of firms are usually the most easily 
quantified aspects of market structure. (Goddard et al., 2000, p. 68). 
Market structure can be described by examining (either jointly or separately) the number of 
firms, the extent of product differentiation, entry conditions, and the level of integration within 
the market. The most commonly used measure is market concentration. A concentration 
measure shows the level to which the production of a good or service is restricted to a few 
large firms. If a market has a small number of firms, or a great disparity in size between firms, 
the more concentrated and so less competitive the market will be. Ferguson (1988, p. 23) notes 
why concentration measures are the most widely used measures of market structure: 
The attraction of this measure is easily understood. Differences in the number and size distribution 
of fums arc key factors distinguishing the theoretical models of perfect competition, oligopoly, 
monopoly and monopolistic competition. Market concentration is easily estimated since published 
data on the number and size distribution of firms are generally available. For other structural 
variables, published information is rare. 
However, a major problem associated with S-C-P studies in banking relates to a seemingly 
simple but controversial issue; namely, how do we measure bank structure and performance, 
generally, as mentioned above. Defining what constitutes the "markef' is, of course, 
problematic in banking, in view of the multiproduct nature of the modem-day financial 
services firm, although, the most commonly used measures are the three-firm or five-firm 
dep . osits or assets concentration ratio (Wilson, et al, 2000). 
in general, banking structure will refer to the number, size and location of banks in a market 
(Molyneux, 1996), note that the problem of characterising banking structure by size and 
concentration involves setting criteria for size, choosing a method of determining significant 
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market areas, defining products and taking into account the influence of all competitors in 
these markets. 
However, while all market structure measures, in general, are subject to their own idio- 
syncracies and limitations, they do usually tend to correlate highly with one another (Curry 
and George, 1983; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Goddard et al., 2001). The following section 
focuses on the desirable properties of market structure measures. Although, not all of the 
measures of concentration satisfy all of these criteria, and there is no perfect measure, 
(Wilson, et al. 200 1). 
4A. 1 Desirable Proverfies of Measures of Market Structure: 
As we mentioned above, the most common measure of market structure is concentration. 
However, there are a wide range of statistical measures of concentration and it is important to 
analyse these measures because if they provide us with contradictory rankings of industry 
concentration then this has implications for how we interpret the SCP relationship. But before 
we consider the various concentration measures we should first discuss what constitutes a 
desirable property of a concentration measure. Hall and Tideman (1967) identified the 
following desirable properties: 
I- The measure used must yield an unambiguous ranking of industries. 
2- The measure should be independent of the size of industry but be a function of the 
combined market share of firms. 
3- Concentration increases if the market share of any firm is increased at the expense of a 
smaller firm, that is, the 'principle of transfers' should hold. 
4- If all firms are divided into a given number of equal parts, the concentration measure 
should fall in the same proportion. For instance, if all firms are divided into two equal 
parts, the concentration measure should halve. 
III 
5- The concentration measure should be a decreasing function of the number of firms. 
6- The limits of a concentration ratio measure should be zero and one. (some proposed 
measures do not exhibit this property per se but can be normalised to do so by expressing 
them as a proportion of their maximum value). Subsequently Hannah and Kay (1977) have 
proposed several other criteria that concentration indices should meet; 
I- If one concentration curve lies entirely above another, it represents a higher level of 
concentration. An example of a concentration curve is shown in Figure 4.3 and shows 
the cumulative shares of market output attributable to the largest firms in the market. 
Figure 4.3 Concentration Curves 
100 
50 
Curnulat 
ive % 
Market 
output 
048 12 Cumulative number of 
Source: Adopted from Molyneux (1994, p. 136) 
firm from largest to 
smaIlegt 
On the above criterion, industry A is more concentrated since a given number of firms 
accounts for a higher proportion of output in A than in either B or C. the case is 
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ambiguous for industries B and C because the four firm concentration ratio shows 
industry C to be more concentrated than industry B, whereas the twelve firm 
concentration curves do not intersectý the ranking of industries is unaffected by the 
number of firms chosen to calculate the concentration ratio. 
2- If a large firm wins a customer from a small firm, concentration has increased. This is 
what is known as the 'principle of transfers'. A transfer of output from a smaller to a 
larger firm, which will increase the degree of inequality, should increase the value of 
the concentration index. 
3- The entry of a new firm below some significant size reduces concentration. The entry 
of a new firm increases the number of firms in the industry and, therefore, decreases 
concentration, but if the new entrant has a sufficiently large market share, it could 
move the concentration curve upwards and, therefore, increase concentration. 
4- Mergers increase concentration. 
5- The contribution of a firm to the concentration measure tends to zero with its market 
share. Given these criteria and bearing in mind that there is no general consensus as to 
the relative importance of the above requirements, the fOllOwing will examine the 
actual measures. 
Cameron (1972) identifies two measures of banking structure: 
I- Quantitative measure such as density, measured as a ratio of the number of 
bank offices to either population or area, the size of the banking system relative 
to the total economy, the size distribution of banks witifin the system and the 
geographical concentration or dispersion of bank offices and 
2- None-quantifiable aspects such as the legal status of banking which may range 
from absolute prohibition to free banking. 
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In general, however, the degree of concentration in banking markets can be categorised using 
either static or dynamic measures. Static measures defme concentration at a single point of 
fime whereas dynamic measures focus on changes in concentration across time. 
4A. 2 Static Measures: 
The traditional static measures of market concentration include the number of firms serving 
the market as of a given date and the percentage of financial resources, such as assets, deposits 
and loans, controlled by the one, two ...... 
k largest banks in the market 
The first static measure commonly used in banking studies is simply the number of banks (N) 
in the market area. This method has a disadvantage in the fact that it ignores the relative size 
distribution of competing firms in the market. 
4.4.2.1 Concentration ratio 
Ile second simple static measure is the concentration ratio. The concentration ratio shows the 
share of the total market (e. g. measured by employment, sales, assets, deposits, and credits) 
that is accounted for by relatively few of the largest firms in that particular market. 
The fewer the number of firms and / or the more disparate their sizes, the more concentrated 
(and less competitive) the market. For example, one, two,... k concentration ratios measure the 
proportion of banking sector assets or deposits controlled by the one, two, A largest banks in 
the markets. The calculation of concentration ratio is as follows; 
x 
-Si 
W 
Where CR is the x firm concentration ratio, and S is the percentage market share of the ith 
firm. X can be taken as any value, one, two, three, or five being the most usual in empirical 
research in banking (see Hannan et al, (1998). 
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,A value which 
is close to zero would indicate that the largest x firms supply a small 
proportion of the market, whereas 100 percent would indicate a single supplier. However, 
using the concentration ratio has its disadvantages: The selection of the number of firms to be 
included is highly arbitrary and ignores the structure of the remaining firms, in the market, 
Goddard et al (2001), (i. e. the medium-sized and small firms). However, these shortcomings 
may be partially corrected using an alternative measure of market concentration such as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HIR), entropy, Lorenz curve, Hall-Tideman index or the 
dominance index developed by Kwoka (1977). 
4.4.2.2 The Herfindahl-Hirschman index MM) developed by lErschman (1964) takes into 
account the number and market shares of all firms in the market. It is calculated by summing 
the squared market shares (in percentage terms) of all firms as follows: 
N 
HHI = Z, [SIJI 
Where N is the number of firms in an industry and S is the percentage of deposits or assets 
controlled by the ith firm and J is total market share. The index can vary between the value of 
zero (where there are a larger number of equally sized firms) and one (where there is only one 
tý 
firm). The higher values of the index indicate a more concentrated market which presumably 
is less competitive and may generally generate less desirable performance from the social 
point of view. This index is often referred to as the 'numbers equivalent' measure of 
concentration. For example, say the HHI gives a value of 0.2; taking the reciprocals shows that 
this is the value that would be obtained if the market were made up of five equal-sized firms. 
4.4.23 Rosenbluth or Hall-Tideman index 
Hall and Tideman (1967) pointed out that the Herfindahl-Hirschman index has a major 
shortcoming in that, since the HHI weights each firm iýy its relative share, it implies that the 
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relative sizes of firms are more important than the absolute number of firms in determining 
firm concentration. Hall and Tideman argue that the absolute number of firms in the industry 
should be stressed in a measure of concentration. To do this, they suggest weighting each 
firm's share by its industry rank thus giving emphasis to the absolute number of firms in the 
market 
The Hall-Tideman index is as follows: 
TH = 1/(2 - I: iSi) -I 
i=l 
Where n is the number of firms in the market area; I is the industry rank of each firm; and Si 
is the percentage of deposits or assets controlled by the ith firm. TH has a range of zero to 
unity. 
4.4.2.4Entrovv: 
Another static measure is the entropy co-efficient which is an inverse measure of relative 
concentration. The basic entropy measure developed by Theil (1967), analysed in detail by 
Jacquemin and De Jong (1977). It weights each firm's share by the logarithm of its reciprocal 
It is defined as: 
n 
E= ZSi log Si 
1=1 
Where, E= entropy, Si = firm size relative to market structure. Entropy Indices of market 
concentration involve a more complex weighting scheme for firm size than the H-index 
(Molyneux, 1994). 
Ibis index measures the degree of disparity between the firms in the market If all firms have 
an equal share, entropy is at a maximum and concentration at a minimum. If there is only one 
firm in the market, entropy is at a minimum (E=O) and concentration is at the maximum. The 
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advantage of this measure is that it can be decomposed to show how different sub-groups 
contribute to the overall level of concentration. 
4.4.2.5 Lorenz Curve 
Another alternative measure is the Lorenz curve, a graphical technique which shows, as a 
continuous function, the percentage of, for example, total industry sales accounted for by any 
given fraction of the total company population, with the firms ranked in order of market share 
or size. Lorenz curves can be characterised numerically by means of the Gini coefficient 
which measures the departure between the Lorenz curve actually observed and the curve that 
would appear if all firms had equal market shares or sales. The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 
(indicating perfect equality of firm shares) to I (indicating total inequality). 
Figure 4.4 explains graphically the deviations of the Gini coefficients from the Lorenz curve. 
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The figure shows a Lorenz curve for a given industry. The firins are ranked by size and 
cumulated from smallest to largest as a percentage of the number of firms in the market. This 
is plotted against the cumulative percentage of output. The greater the deviation of this curve 
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Cumulative % of Firms 
Source: Fergson (1988, p. 27) 
from the diagonal line, the greater the inequality of firm sizes. Thus, the Gini coefficients 
summarise this information, i. e. is the shaded area OAC divided by the triangle OAB. 
As mentioned above, the coefficients can vary between zero, when all firms are of equal size 
(i. e. when the Lorenz curve completes the areaOAB). However, the Lorenz curve has two 
main disadvantages: 
I- It may suggest paradoxical inferences when an industry is occupied by a small number of 
evenly matched firms. For instance, the Gini coefficient for duopolists or triopolists with 
equal market shares is zero, but one could hardly conclude that monopoly power is absent 
in such cases. 
2-The shape off the Lorenz curve and the value of the Gini coefficient are quite sensitive to 
errors in defining the number of firms in the industry. 
The more borderline firms are included, the higher the indicated degree of inequality tends to 
be. 
4A. 2.6 Hannah and Kav index 
This index devised by Hannah and Kay (1977) is similar to the I-lirschmann-Herfindahl index 
and, in fact, can be regarded as a special case of the latter. The Hannah and Kay index is: 
Hannah and Kay number equivalent index = [EW ]1/1-, m 
NIarket share is raised to the power (cc), which is left up to the researcher. 
Hannah and Kay suggest that the range 0.6 to 2.5 gives the best results, and one can see that if 
one choses A=2 then the index becomes the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index. 
4A. 2.7 Hart and Prais: Variance of loe of firm sizes. 
Another widely used measure of inequality (or relative concentration) is that developed by 
Hart and Prais (1956) known as the variance of the logarithms of firms size (v) where: 
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N Ar 
V= I1Nj: (IogSi)112[Zlog Sj] 2 
1=1 i=l 
Where Si is the market share of the ith firm 
The measure is close to zero if firms are of a similar size, irrespective of the number of firms 
in the market It is, therefore, subject to the same criticisms as the Gini co-efficient and can 
generate ambiguous concentration measures. 
Finally, another static concentration measure is the dominance index developed by Kwoka 
(1977) which is: 
n 
D. 1 = 1: [SIlSi _ Si +I IMSi + 1] 
1=1 
Where the differential market share between successively chosen firms is ranked by firm size. 
This index ranges between 0 and I with a value of unity denoting a monopoly. 
4.4.3. Dynamic Measures 
Traditionally, dynamic concentration measures are based on first differences (changes) in any 
of the other static measure mentioned above between a given initial year (t) and 
any future year (t+1) as follows: 
AC-- ACt+l - Ct 
Superior measures of dynamic market structure include the share stability index developed by 
Prais (1958) and the dynamic concentration index developed by Grossack (1965) and Salley 
(19,72) and the dynamic Hirfindahl index. 
The share stability index developed by Rose and Fraser (1976) relates the market share held 
by a bank in a given base year with its share at the end of the period under study. 
Hymer and Pashigian (1962) developed this model in the form 
n 
I= E[Si, tsit + 1] 
I 
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This index (1) increases with greater changes in market share over the period from point t to 
t+l: the more unstable market shares are over the period, the higher the index. The dynamic 
concentration index is obtained through a linear regression of market shares for all firms in a 
given market at the end of the period upon their market shares at the beginning of the study 
period. 
Finally the dynamic Herfindahl index which calculates the change in the level of the 
Herfindahl index between base and terminal years as follows: 
DJLI=M-M 
A positive value for the index shows that concentration has increased and a negative value 
implies that concentration has decreased. 
In a review of 73 US SCP studies from 1961 to 1991, Molyneux et. al. (1996) summarised the 
market structure measures using in the banking literature used in the banking literature. These 
are shown in table 4.4. 
Table: 4A Market Structure Measures Used In the US SCP Literature 
Measures of Market Structure Number of times the respective market structure 
measures have been used in the SCP literature 
Concentration ratios 
5-firm deposits 2 
3-firm deposits 37 
2-firm deposits 3 
1 -firm deposits 
9 
Herfmdahl Index (H) 18 
Deposits 2 
Numbers equivalent (I/H) 16 
Number of firms in the market 2 
Gini co-efficients 2 
Entropy I 
Hall-Tideman index 1 
Dummy variables for markets with relatively 
low H 
I 
Change in HI 
Note: These market structure measures were found to be used in a review of 73 SCP studies 
Source: Molyneux et al (1996, p. 101ý 
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It can be seen from the table that the most frequently used measure of market structure is the 
3-firm deposits concentration ratio which is used in 37 studies out of the 73 studies reviewed. 
The second most frequently used is the Hirfindahl index followed by the number of firms in 
the market. 
4.5: Practical Problems Associated with Concentration Measures: 
Three major problems may a rise when measuring the structure of a banking market. 
These are: 
I- Difficulties in defining the scope of the banking industry; for example, whether or not to 
include all financial institutions; and ascertaining whether the market is exclusively 
national or it extends to international banking. Problems also of defining product areas 
given that the bank is a multi-product services firm. 
2- Difficulties in choosing a method of measuring the size of the institutions. 
3- Different concentrition indices may yield conflicting measures of market structure. 
In the. context of the first problem the size of the market is difficult to define, especially if 
there are a large number of firms providing close substitutes. Measurement problems are 
compounded given the multi-product nature of banking businesses. Asch (1983) notes that 
consumer substitutability is the main criterion for defining the market but 'in practice' a 
greater deal ofjudgement must be used in classifying firms, and the researcher must always 
be alert to the possibility that empirical results may be sensitive to the particular industry 
grouping that have been used. However, in defining the scope of the banking industry, the 
majority of US empirical SCP studies have only included the number of the commercial 
banks in their studies; for example, Edwards (1964), Frazer and Rose (1971), Smirlock (1985) 
and Evanoff and Fortier (1988). On the other hand, Goldberg and Rai (1996) include 
commercial and saving banks in their study covering eleven European countries,, and 
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Molyneux and Teppet (1993), Lloyd-Williams etal. (1994), and Molyneux and Forbes (1995) 
include all relevant financial institutions in their research design. The majority of US studies 
focus on local domestic banking markets, usually defined as Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (SMSA) (but sometimes as rural counties). Studies such as those undertaken by Short 
(1979), Bourke (1989) and Goldberg and Rai (1996) provide international comparisons and 
therefore focus on national banking markets, thus treating each single country as a market and 
eliminating the kind of problems that a rise in defining local areas for each country. 
In relation to the second problem, there are also difficulties in choosing a method to measure 
bank size. The market share of individual firms can be measured by using a whole range of 
variables, for example, total assets, output, value added, employment, etc. Different variables 
are quite likely to yield different concentration rankings and therefore it is up to researchers to 
provide both empirical and theoretical justification for the choice of the market share measure 
used in SCP type studies. However, the use of total assets is far from ideal, either for 
measuring concentration or for acting as a denominator of various other ratios (Goddard, 
2001). Another measure of size is total deposits but its shortcoming is that it includes both 
domestic and international deposits. The term total deposits can be defined in a number of 
ways; including or excluding inter-bank, foreign currency and non-resident deposits. Size can 
also be measured using the shares of demand deposits in differing size categories, for example, 
segregating customers according to size of accounts. Yet another measure for size is in tenns 
of the total credits of the banking firm. However, this measure is seldom used empirically. 
In the context of different concentration indices, Jacquernin and'de Jong (1977) in a study of 
European manufacturing industries estimated rank correlation coefficients for different 
concentration measures. They found a high correlation between rankings using the four and 
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eight-firm concentration ratios. Correlation between the H-index and the entropy coefficient 
were much lower. George and Ward (1975) have also shown that changes in the measure of 
concentration can effect empirical results. In a study of the change in concentration among the 
top European Community companies between 1962 and 1972, they found that the Herfindahl 
and entropy measures showed that concentration had declined, whereas the variance of logs 
method recorded an increase in concentration. Other studies by Bailey and Boyle et al. (1971), 
Aaronovich and Sawyer (1975) and Vanlornmel (1977) have found various concentration 
measures to be highly correlated with one another. However, in this context, mention should 
also be given to the Honohan and Kinsella (1982) study which provides a critique of cross- 
country comparisons of traditional measures of concentration. Ibis study notes that when one 
compares concentration across countries one must take into account the effects of market size 
on the, "minimum practicable degree of concentration having regard to the desirability of an 
efficient scale of production". (P. 262). They develop, with the help of a theoretical model, a 
measure which takes account of market size - essentially Herfmdahl indices scaled-up by an 
amount proportionate to the level, or the square root of GDP. Their study, using data obtained 
from Short (1979) for 1973, shows that if their measures are used, Japan which had the least 
concentrated market as measured by the Herfindahl index would have almost the highest 
degree of concentration of any country if either of their measure were chosen. Belgium and 
Sweden which appeared among the most concentrated according to the Herfindahl index 
would seem to have the 'minimum feasible level' of concentration across countries if the 
Herfindahl multiplied by GDP measure was used. 
All in all, from this latter literature, it appears that four- and eight-firm concentration ratios, 
the H-index and entropy measures are all highly correlated, and thus provide similar 
concentration ratings. Inequality measures of concentration, such as the Gini coefficient 
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variance of logs method appear to be less closely correlated and also are more likely to 
provide conflicting rankings to the aforementioned concentration measures Molyneux et al 
(2001). 
4.6 Determinants of the Level of Concentration 
4.6.1 Economies of scale 
In general, the link between economies of scale and concentration is non-contentious, 
however, this area has probably received the most attention from industrial economists as a 
determinant of the level of industry concentration. Market concentration is expected to 
increase as economies of scale increase. If market concentration reaches a level dictated by 
available economies of scale, then it would be futile for policy makers to influence the level of 
market concentration because, in the long-run, market concentration will move towards the 
level as dictated by the cost function. In analysing the structure of a market, it is important to 
know how large the rfiinimum optimal size of firm is in relation to the size of the market 
Figure 4.5 illustrates a long-run average cost curve and economies of scale are shown on the 
downward sloping part of the curve. 
Figure 4.5: The long-run average cost curve and economies of scale 
Cos't 
RAC 
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Economies of scale are present along the output range OY., where long-run average cost is 
falling. OX represents the minimum optimal size of the firm in the particular industry because 
it is the smallest size of firm that can benefit from all the 'economies of scale and thus 
minimise long-run average cost. The rationale behind measuring the minimum optimal size of 
firm in relation to the size of the market is to see whether the size of market is large enough to 
support the firm scale economies. In addition, the steepness of the cost curve is also of interest 
I 
because this can indicate the cost disadvantages suffered by firms which are of suboptimal 
size. 
There is an enormous industrial organisations; literature on economies of scale which is well 
beyond the scope of this thesis to tackle in detail. However, Scherer (1975) and (1980, chp. 4) 
provides a good review of the early literature. In his 1980 study he discusses five main types 
of scale economies that could impact on the level of concentration: 
I- product-specific economies- cost economies generated by the specialisation of production 
relating to individual products. 
2- plant-specific econornies- cost economies coming from the expansion in size of individual 
processing units. 
3- Multi-plant economies-the multi-plant enterprise can employ a more richly specialised 
array of accounting, licence, marketing, production process, research and legal talent than 
a single plant firm, all these being equal. This may be reflected in lower administration 
costs and/or higher productivity (Scherer, p. 84). 
4- Capital raising and other pecuniary economies-cost economies encountered when firms 
raise capital through common stock issues, borrowing and such like-based on the view that 
the larger the amount raised, the lower those costs are per dollar of capital raised. 
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5- Economies of large-scale promotion-cost economies generated through large scale 
promotion and marketing campaigns, for example, one possible source of scale economies 
is, the'need to attain a certain minimum level of TV advertising before reaching maximum 
effectiveness (see Scherer, p. 108). 
Various studies, such as Scherer (1975), have sought to estimate various industries minimum 
efficient scale (OX in figure 4.6 ) and compare this with the observed levels of market 
concentration. In his study for United States, he finds that the four-firm concentration ratios 
are much larger than the operation of minimum efficient scale plants would suggest. A similar 
study, reported by silberston (1972) on economies of scale across 25 UK manufacturing 
industries found that the minimum efficient scale of production of aircraft, diesel engines and 
certain types of machine tools was greater than the size of the whole UK market. 
Overall; the literature suggests that in the case of the United States, "national market 
concentration in most industries appears to be much higher that it needs to be for leading firms 
to take advantage of all but slight residual scale economiee' (Scherer [1975, p. 54]). The case 
is not clear-cut for industries in other contries. 
In relation 
-to 
the SCP framework, this result is not so surprising (Molyneux, 1996); one might 
expect that leading firms will maintain positions of market power (through entry deterring 
tactics), even if market shares are much larger than those necessary for efficient operation. 
Some economists, referred to in the industrial organisations literature as the Chicago School, 
arguethat, estimates of scale economies and minimum efficient scale are irrelevant, because 
the market structure observed in the real world is efficient: 
I see little reason to spend much more time estimating optimum Plant or firm size except perhaps, 
in a completely centralized and governmentally controlled economy in which the State tries hard to 
keep markets from working and consumers from expressing preferences. When property and 
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markets are at work, and consumers are permitted to choose what and from whom to buy, it is, as 
far as I am concerned, a trivial matter what the facts of technical economies are, or what 
economists and engineers have to say about them. Consumers will choose products and firms will 
offer what is, to their tastes, the best deal. Consumers will make the trade-off between prices and 
product qualities. The prices they pay for the qualities they buy are signals to anyone who would 
do better by them. Such economies as there are will assert themselves, and no-one need be 
concerned how large or small they are. (MacGee, 1974b, p. 84) 
4.6.2 Barriers to Entrv 
Another factor classified in the literature as a determinant of market concentration is the level 
of entry barriers. The concept of entry barriers was extended in Bain (195 6) where he defined 
barriers to entry as any constraint which puts potential entrants at a competitive disadvantage 
compared with established firms and which enables established firms to generate abnormal 
profits in the long-run. He argued that concentration is preserved by various types of entry 
barriers, in other words where industrial concentration is higher than can be justified by 
superior performance or economies of scale. The level of entry barriers therefore can 
determine the level market concentration and industry profitability. Bain (1956) identified four 
main types of entry barriers: absolute unit cost differences; product differentiation; capital cost 
requirements; and economies of scale. 
The first type of barrier identified by Bain (1956) relates to absolute cost advantages of 
established firms: that is, for any given level of output, incumbent firms can produce and 
market their product at a lower cost per unit than newcomers. This situation may arise because 
new entrants may have to pay more for scarce raw material, use inferior production 
technologies, the cost of capital may be higher, or they may not be able to have access to 
relevant marketing outlets. 
A second type of barrier relates to product differentiation and, in particular, differentiation 
supported by heavy sales promotion. Bain (1956) concluded that product differentiation was: 
'of at least the'same general order of importance... as economies of large-scale production and 
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distribution' (pp. 142-43) in providing the largest firms a price or cost advantage over rivals 
and specially over new entrants. A later study by Scherer et al. (1975) found that, although 
product differentiation was important firms with only a single plant of efficient scale could 
promote their products on equal terms by directing their promotional campaigns at specific 
market segments. 
The reason for the interest in advertising and product differentiation in general is typified by 
the findings of Mueller and Rogers (1980) who noted that consumer goods industries that 
spent especially large sums on TV and radio advertising have also experienced high increases 
in concentration over the period 1947 to 1977. Consumer goods industries that spent heavily 
on newspaper advertisements or did not advertise at all and producer goods industries 
experienced either falls or no increase in their respective industry concentration levels. The 
role, of advertising and product differentiation as forming a barriers to market entry is 
discussed in substantial detail in Bain (1968), Ferguson (1988, chapter 4) and Hay and Morris 
(199 1, chapter 5). 
A third type of entry barrier relates to capital cost requirements. Potential entrants may find 
the capital needed to enter an industry may be a considerable barrier, but for existing firms in 
the, market, this may not be a constraint. For example, if the industry is identified as having a 
large minimum efficient scale of operations, this may necessitate a large capital cost outlay. 
The deterrence of this barrier, however, depends on the nature of the potential entrant as well 
as the type of industry being entered. If a major potential entrant is already a large firm, then 
capital costs may not pose a serious problem. 
The final barrier to entry as identified by Bain (1956), are economies of scale which we have 
already discussed in the previous section. 
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To restate the main issue- 
If the minimum efficient scale of firm is large in relation to the size of the whole market, and 
if operating at suboptimal costs yields significant cost disadvantages, then there will be a 
ma . or barrier to entry for new firms. u 
4.6.3 Other Determinants of Concentration 
There are a wide range of other causes that are believed to have an impact on the type of 
market structure and hence the level of concentration. These are shown below 
4.6.3.1 Size of the Marke 
The size of the market can have an impact on the level of market concentration because 
smaller markets would tend to support a smaller number of firms and thus the likelihood of 
collusion and anti-competitive practices may be more likely. In addition, many studies of 
concentration have focused on national markets, yet this may tend to understate the degree of 
concentration. Weiss (1972), for example, noted that the average four-firm concentration ratio 
for a variety of thirteen industries (ranging from cigarette producers to cement manufacturers) 
increased from 19.6 per cent when viewed in a national context to 35.7 per cent after 
adjustment for regional markets. 
4,6.3.2 Market Growth Rate 
When economies of scale are tending to increase concentration, this effect will be weakened 
by an increase in the size of the market. It is likely that slow growth industries become 
monopolised more easily. 
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4.6.3.3 Government Poliev 
Government policies such as: antitrust legislation; regulations governing patents, licences, 
tariffi and quotas; procurement policies; and other regulations specific to various industries, 
such as public utility regulation and banking regulation have an impact on concentration. With 
Iý 
regard to antitrust legislation, governments have created various laws to limit or prohibit 
excessive concentration of market power. On the other hand, Greer (1984, p. 120) notes that 
various anti-competitive government policies such as: licences - restrict the entry of firms into 
particular markets; franchises- grant monopoly rights to bus companies, water companies and 
other business; tariffs and quotas- inhibit the flow of imports; and patents - award x-year 
monopolies over the use of new inventions and processes. 
In the case of public procurement programmes, governments may show a bias in favour of 
large firms, mainly because of the nature of the products that they purchase, e. g. defence 
equipment, transport, etc. All the above policies could lead to increased concentration in the 
market place. 
4.6.3.4. Business Policies 
Businesspolicies such as mergers, restrictive practices and product differentiation (which we 
have already discussed) are all deemed to have an impact on market concentration. As George 
and Jol I (198 8, p. 132) state: 
The single most important cause of increases in concentration is undoubtedly merger 
activity ... It need not 
be the case that all, or even the majority of, mergers are the results of 
attempts to monopolise industry. But whatever the precise cause Of merger there can be no 
doubt that they have contributed massively to increases in concentration. 
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The first systematic study examining the impact of mergers on industry concentration was 
undertaken by Weiss (1966) who traced the effects of mergers on four-firm and eight-firm 
concentration ratios in six US manufacturing sectors between 1930 and 1960. Changes in 
concentration were categorised according to merger, internal growth, entry and exit of firms 
and a value described as displacement, which allowed for changes in the identity of the major 
firms in each time period. Weiss found that mergers contributed the largest component to 
increased concentration. 
Various similar studies of mergers and concentration for the United Kingdom undertaken by 
Hart and Walsh (1973), George (1975) and Hannah and Kay (1977) arrived at similar findings. 
Restrictive practices, which include such things as collective rebates, predatory price 
discrimination, exclusive dealing, and barrier pricing have no immediate effect on 
concentration although, over a long period of time, they might help consolidate market power. 
4.6.3.5. Stochastic Processes or 'Luck' 
The extreme alternative to the view that concentration is determined by economies of scale, 
barriers to entry and so on is based on the assertion that it is brought about by pure (statistical) 
chance. A casual inspection of data on firm size across countries reveals that in many 
industries the data exhibit a similar pattern, 'the size distribution of irms is hi hly skewed, fi 9 
with a few large firms, rather more medium-sized firms, and a large 'tail' of smal I firms' guy 
and Morris (1991, p. 537) . Such 
distributions can be approximated by a number of related 
skew distributions- of which the most widely used is the lognormal. These distributions can be 
generated by a stochastic process in which the variable (in the case above, the size of firms) 
can be subjected to cumulative random shocks over time. The size distribution of firms in an 
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industry, therefore, may be related to a series of random growth patterns in the history of the 
particular market This process of random growth which generates a log-normal distribution 
was first identified by Gibrat (1931) and his formulation is known as Gibrat's Law of 
Proportionate Effect (LPE). 
Various researchers, such as Hart and Prais (1956) and Simon and Bonini (1958), identified 
that such stochastic processes could be used to explain concentration. This is clearly illustrated 
using a simulation experiment reported in Scherer (1980, p. 146). Scherer simulated sixteen 
separate histories of a market under the following assumptions: 
In the first period the market consists of fifty firms each with $100,000 in sales and a2 per 
cent market share. The four-firm concentration ratio is then at 8 per cent. 
The chance for growth of each firin is identical. The chances are specified by each firm 
annually drawing a year's growth from an identical probability distribution. 
The probability distribution from which the annual growth rates are obtained provides for an 
average annual growth rate of 6 per cent but a variance of growth rates around this average, 
such that the distribution is normal with standard deviation of 16 per cent. 
These assumptions also conform to Gibrat's Law of Proportionate Growth. Scherer's (1980) 
simulation exercise shows that concentration rises dramatically over the first twenty years and 
more slowly thereafter. Why is this, the case? Well, as Scherer (I 980, P. 146) states: 
The answer: in a word, is luck. Some firms will inevitably enjoy a run of luck, e)Tcricncing 
several years of rapid growth in close succession. Once the most fortunate firms climb well 
ahead of the pack, it is difficult for laggards to rally and rectify the imbalance for, by 
dcfinition, each firm - large or small - has an equal chance of growing by a given 
percentage amount 
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If a firm has managed to become one of the market leaders, its position will be enhanced if it 
continues to be luckier than average (as in fact it will be in roughly half the cases). However, a 
number of studies have sought to compare the actual distribution of firms with that predicted 
by similar forms of stochastic process, found that the distribution generated by stochastic 
processes were generally a rather poor fit. 
4.7 Performance measures: 
As mentioned earlier performance measurement is the quantitative assessment of efficient 
progress towards achieving a specific goal. However, a question of interest perhaps is 'how do 
we measure performance? ' are firms that make large profits considered to be performing well 
or vice versa? In the following pages we will review the most commonly used performance 
measures. 
Competition theory states that in a perfectly competitive market price equals marginal cost, in 
contrast the larger the margin between price and marginal cost the greater'the firm's degree 
of monopoly power. This could be illustrated as follows. The profit maximising margin of 
firm L can be shown as: ml = (Price-Marginal Cost)/Price. This can be used to illustrate 
different competitive environments and it has been used as the main firm performance 
measure in the industrial economies literature. This measure, known as the Lerner index, 
equals zero under perfect competition (because price equals marginal cost) and under 
monopoly it is large and positive. The Lerner index is also equivalent to the inverse of 
elasticity of demand, so as elasticity of demand tends towards infinity (the competitive case) 
monopoly power tends to zero. This measure, however, is subject to three criticisms. Firstly, 
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the index depends on the level of costs, yet high marginal cost may produce a low index even 
if monopoly power is significant Secondly, the index takes no account of the size of the 
market. Finally, the index depends on price elasticity which is only partially determined by 
industry structure because it is also influenced by the type of goods being sold. It is, however, 
difficult to obtain data on firms' marginal costs or the ratio of marginal costs to prices 
(especially in the banking sector), so researchers have chosen proxy measures. By assuming 
marginal costs could be approximated by average variable cost, we arrive at what is 
sometimes referred to as the profits-revenue ratio: 
prords-revenue ratio or/return on sales = (Profits attributable to shareholders/sales revenue) 
There are two main other measures of performance: return on shareholders equity and return 
on capital assets employed and these are shown as: 
Return on shareholdees equity - (Profits attributable to shareholders/Shamholders equity) 
Return on capital assets employed = Profits attributable to shareholders/Total Assets) 
The latter two ratios are ambiguously referred to in the industrial economics literature as 
return on capital ratios or the "accounting rate of return!. All the above ratios are subject to 
criticisms relating to how firms arrive at their accounting profits, for example, how costs (such 
as operating costs and depreciation) are measured, (Molyneux, 1996). In the latter two ratios, 
the valuation of capital (however defined) is also important, Hay and Morris (1991). 
In the 
_banking 
literature studies on the relationship between market structure and bank 
performance have typically used two measures of performance: profitability, and the price of a 
particular product or services (Goddard, et al, 2000). The most commonly used profitability 
measures are return on assets and return on equity whereas the price measures include such 
variables as: the interest rates charged on business loans, the interest rates charged on 
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residential mortgages, the average interest rates charged on all loans, the average interest rates 
paid on time and saving deposits, and the ratio of loans to total deposits or assets (Mester et al, 
1998). 
Fraser and Rose (1971) point out that bank operating performance is difficult to measure 
because of the diversity of bank output, ranging from trusts and corporate accounting to the 
underwriting of home construction and municipal expansion Tbus, bank performance can not 
be adequately proxied by any simple production function with, for example, total loans or total 
deposits as the sole index of bank output. Accordingly, Rose and Fraser (1976) use 
profitability and price measures which include average loan rates, average saving rates and 
ratio of 'net current operatmg earnings to average total capital. Edwards (1964), Flechsig 
(1965) Kaufinan (1966) use interest rates charged on business loans as the measure of bank 
performance. Short (1979), Kwast and Rose (1982), Rhoades (1985), Evanoff and Fortier 
(1988) and Berger (1991,1995,1998) use profitability measures such as return on assets and 
return on equity to measure the performance of banks. 
in a review of 73 studies on bank structure and performance in the US, Molyneux et. aL(I 996) 
find that there are three main categories of performance measures: Firstly, price measures, 
secondly, profitability measures, and thirdly, other measures. Table 4.5 presents a summary of 
the performance measures used in the literature of the banking industry. 
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'Table 4.5: Summary of the performance measures used in the literature of the banking industry. 
performance measure No. of times the respective performance 
measures have been used in the SCP 
literature 
No. of studies finding the 
performance measure to be 
unambiguously significantly 
related to market structure 
Loan interest rates 
Interest and fees on loans/Total loans 19 7 
Interest rate on business loans 6 3 
Interest rates on new car loans 3 2 
Interest rates on residential mortgages 2 2 
Total 30 14 
Deposit interest rates 
Interest payment on time & savingdepositaltotal 
time and saving deposits 
16 5 
Interest rates on money-market deposit acoounts 2 
3,6,12 and 30-month CD rates 2 
Interest rate on Super-NOW accounts I 
Interest payment on time dep/Tatal. T. D I 
Interest irate on passbook savings I 
Interest rate on S 1000 CD I 
Total 25 10 
Service Charges 
Revenue from service charges on demand 
deposits/Total demand deposits 
14 3 
Revenue from service charges on demand 
deposit ýI 
5 2 
Mcmthly service charge on demand Dep. I I 
Charges for returned cheques . 1 0 
Service charges on a standardised account 1 0 
Total 22 6 
Profitability Measures 
Return on Assets 24 12 
Return on Equity 14 8 
Total 38 20 
Other Measures _ 
Lerner index 2 0 
Elasticity of loan demand 2 - 1 
Number of employees 1 0 
Standard deviation of return on Equity- 2 2 
Concentration Measures 1 0 
Market share stability indices 2 2 
Portfolio selection 2 2 
Senatorial votes 1 0 
Service quality measures I I 
Labourexpenses 2 2 
Other expenses 2 ................... .......... 2 Total 133 62 
I Source: Molyneux ef a] (1970, pp. Y5-yy) 
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Of the price measures, such as loan interest rates, deposit interest rates and service charges, the 
most commonly used were loan interest rates and fees on loans divided by total loans; interest 
payments on time and savings deposits divided by total time and saving deposits; and revenue 
from service charges on demand deposits divided by total demand deposits. However, the use 
of price measures has received many criticisms by authors such as Evanoff and Fortier (1988), 
wh. o note that since banking is a multi-product industry, using individual prices may be 
misleading. This is because of the fact that banks may have different pricing strategies, thus 
perhaps charging low loan rates but also paying relatively low deposit rates. For example, 
Gilbert (1984) concludes that, using average interest rates and average service charge rates are 
I 
poor measures of bank performance. One reason for this is the fact that average measures 
combine flow variables; the numerator measures annual flows and the denominator is a 
balance sheet item recorded at a point of time. These may be different from the average loan 
or deposit balance over the year. Bank profit rates are generally regarded as the most 
appropriate measure of bank performance. For instance, Gilbert (1984 p632) states: 
The average interest paid on time and saving deposits is more likely to be a function of the maturity 
distribution of a bank's deposits and their denomination than a function of market structure. The 
only measures of bank performance derived from the report of income and report of condition that 
do not have major measurement problem are bank profit rates. If banks in areas with higher market 
concentration charge higher interest rates on loans, set higher service charges on demand deposits, 
and pay lower interest rates on deposits, these effects will be rellected in the pattern of bank profit 
rate, even though it may not be possible to measure accurately the effects of market concentration 
on interest rates and service charges with data from the report and report of condition. 
One of the main advantages of using profitability measures is the fact that they are simple and 
readily available. Moreover, as banking is a multi-product business, it consolidates 
information into one single figure (De Young et al. 1998). 
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On the other hand, its main disadvantage is that it combines a flow variable (i. e. profits) with 
a stock variable (i. e. assets or capital). The most commonly used performance measures in the 
banking literature were found to be return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) 
(Mesteret al. 1998). 
4.8 Theories Describing the Relationship between Market Structure and 
Performance. 
Three main hypotheses aim to explain the relationship between Nlarket Structure and firm 
Performance. These can be categorised as the following: 
4.8.1 The SCP HylRothesis: 
Mason (1939,1949) and Bain (1951,1956,1959) were the originators of what has become 
known as the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. Both of whom adopted a 
methodology that was primarily empirical rather than theoretical Goddard et al, (2001). In 
contrast to the deductive approach of standard microeconomic theory, the field of industrial 
organisation analyses empirical data and by a process of induction develops theories that 
attempt to explain the real-world behaviour of firms and industries (Schmalensee, 1988). The 
SCP model suggests that market structure is expected to influence the conduct of the firms that 
comprise the industry. Conduct variables include price setting, collusion and other forms of 
strategic behaviour, expenditure on advertising, research and development and innovation. 
Conduct, dictated or influenced by structure, in turn determines performance (Goddard, et al, 
2000). According to the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypotheses, the degree of 
cor npetition among firms in the market is influenced by the degree of concentration among a 
few 
-relatively -large 
firms, since a more highly concentrated market structure is assume d to be 
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conducive to more effective collusion. At high levels of concentration, effective monopoly 
exists through the recognition of mutual interdependence, and market participants are able to 
achieve the monopoly price-output configuration that maximises industry profits. Prices, 
therefore, are unlikely to increase any further in response to further increases in concentration. 
A positive relationship between market concentration and performance is interpreted by SCP 
advocates as evidence that banks are able to extract monopolistic rents in concentrated 
markets. through their ability to offer lower deposit rates and to charge higher loan rates. In 
summary, the SCP hypotheses is derived from the model of oligopolistic, behaviour of firms 
which implies that collusive arrangements are less costly to maintain in concentrated markets 
(Stigler 1964). Most early empirical research based on the SCP paradigm focused on the 
relationship between concentration and performance measured by profitability. A positive 
correlation between concentration and profit was typically interpreted as evidence that firms 
act collusively in order to achieve high profits, (Molyneux, et al, 2001). As mentioned above, 
the earliest work on the relationship between market structure and performance was 
undertaken by Nfason (1939,1949) and Bain (1951,1956,1959 and is viewed as the 
foundation of modem empirical work in the industrial organisations literature. Bain (1951) 
tests the concentration hypotheses using data for US manufacturing industries covering the 
period 193640, and finds that in industries with eight-finn concentration ratios (CI; 4) above 
70%, profits were significantly higher than in those with CIZ8 below 70%. These results have 
been -interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that concentration facilitates collusion and limits 
rivalry. Bain's findings were confirmed by numerous other studies, which at the time were 
interpreted as providing empirical justification for government intervention aimed at 
increasing competition. Bain's (1956) study extended his analyses to include the effects of 
both concentration and entry barriers on industry performance. Weiss (1974) undertook a 
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detailed literature review of SCP studies undertaken since Bain's seminal work up to the early 
1970s. Overall, the majority of the studies analysed by Weiss confirmed the Structure- 
Performance relationship, that is, concentration is a statistically significant determinant of 
profitability. As Weiss (1974) concludes: 
The theory of the dominant firrn unequivocally points to high prices and suggests high profit rates 
for dominant firms... our massive effort to test these predictions has, by and large, supported them 
for 'normal' years such as the period 1953-1967, though the concentration profits relationship is 
weakened or may even disappear completely in periods of accelerating inflation on directly 
following such periods. By and large the relationship holds up for Britain, Canada, and Japan, as 
well as in the United States ... Altogether, there is still plenty of reason to believe on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds that high concentration facilitates tacit or explicit collusion 
(Weiss, 1974, pp. 231-32). 
In general, the early literature, therefore, supported the view that more concentrated industries 
earn monopoly profits. Proponents of the SCP paradigm therefore tend to view most existing 
I 
markets as, imperfect in terms of their competitive structure, and in need of some form of 
regulation in order to check the abuse of market power, (Wilson et al. 2001). 
4.8.2 The Efficient Structure Hypotheses: 
A challenge to the SCP relationship in the form of an "Efficient Structure" hypotheses was 
made by Demsetz (1973) and later by Brozen (1982). Demsetz (1973) argued that the 
explanation for the relation between market structure and the performance of firms related to 
firm efficiency. If a firm enjoys a higher degree of efficiency than its competitors, that is, if it 
has a relatively low cost structure, it can adopt one of two strategies: it can maximise profits 
by maintaining the present level of prices and firm size; or it can maximise profits by reducing 
prices and expanding firm size. If a firm adopts the latter strategy, the most efficient firms Will 
gain market share and firm efficiency will be the driving force behind the process of market 
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concentration. In any event, given that industry profits are a size-weighted average of 
individual firm profits, concentrated industries will tend to be more profitable even if there is 
no causal link between concentration and profitability as a result of collusion. The debate 
between the two camps stimulated a large volume of empirical research, which attempted to 
resolve the matter using empirical criteria, (Goddard, et al, 2000). Demsetz (1973) tests the 
efficiency hypotheses using data from the US Internal Revenue Service for 95 industries. The 
data are classified by industry concentration and firm sizes. The profit mtes of firms in the 
three smallest of four size classes do not rise with concentration. No association between 
collusion and concentration is evident in the profits data of firms in these three size classes. In 
the largest size class, however, profits do increase with concentration, lending support to the 
efficiency hypotheses. Subsequently, Smirlock et al. (1984) test the efficiency hypotheses 
using data on 132 US manufacturing firms covering the period 1961-69, and his findings in 
general, lend support to the efficiency hypotheses. Schmalensee (1985) uses US Federal Trade 
Commission line of business data for 456 firms in 261 industries for 1975 to investigate the 
relative importance of firms-specific and industry-specific determinants of profitability. 
Schmalensee finds that industry effects are very important explaining 75% of the variations in 
profits, while firm effects are less important This seems to lend credence to the traditional 
SCP hypotheses. Schmalensee's estimations can, however, be criticised for omitting relevant 
firm. and industry-level explanatory variables, possibly biasing the empirical results, (Wilson, 
et, al. 2000). Moreover, Eckard (1995) uses US data for five cohorts Of firms (based on size) 
to examine the relationship between changes in profits (measured by the price-cost margin), 
arising from changes in market share between 1967-72 and 1972-77. If the efficiency 
hypotheses is valid, a positive relationship should hold between changes in profit and changes 
in market share. This is confirmed in the empirical results, suggesting "a market process in 
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which firms become large and profitable through superior efficiency... ." (Eckard, 1995, p. 
223). Finally, Berger (1995) substantially refines this debate by differentiating various market 
power and efficient structure hypotheses. He identifies two market power hypotheses: the 
traditional SCP and the Relative Market Power (RMP) hypotheses. The RNIP hypotheses 
asserts that only firms with large market shares and well-differentiated products are able to 
exercise market power in pricing these products and thus earn super normal profits. He also 
argues that there are two other explanations of the profit-concentration relationship in banking, 
relating to the efficient structure hypotheses. The first is what may be generalised as the 
Relative Efficiency (RE) version of the efficient structure hypotheses, which asserts that firms 
gain higher profits because they possess equally superior management and production 
technologies and therefore they can produce output at a lower cost. These firms also gain large 
market shares that result in higher concentration. (This is similar to the original efficient 
structure hypotheses described above). The second explanation is the Scale Efficiency (SE) 
version of the efficient structure hypotheses, where some firms can produce on a more 
efficient scale than others with equally good management and technology, i. e., produce at 
lower cost because of local circumstances and therefore gain higher profits. Again, these firms 
are assumed to have larger market shares which results in higher concentration. Berger's 
empirical results indicate some limited support for two of the four hypotheses, the relative 
market power hypotheses (RNIP) and X-efficiency version of the ES hypotheses (ESX). The 
data do not support the scale-efficiency version of the ES hypotheses (ESS) and the traditional 
structure-conduct-performance hypotheses (SCP). As a general conclusion, however, the 
empirical evidence for and against the concentration and efficiency hypotheses is somewhat 
mixed and inconclusive, (Molyneux, et, al. 2000). 
142 
4.8.3 The Ouiet Life Hvvotheses 
Thisl hypotheses was developed by Hicks (193 5). He suggests that a bank with greater market 
power will be more risk-averse, and thus will be able to achieve some combination of both 
higher returns and lower risks than firms possessing lesser power in the market. Hicks (1935, 
p. 8) notes: 
It seems not at all unlikely that people in monopolistic positions will very often be people 
with sharply rising subjective costs; if this is so, they are likely to exploit their advantage 
much more by not bothering to get very near the position of maximum profit, than by 
straining themselves to get very close to it. The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life. 
In this concept of a quite life, there is tendency to which firms will utilize the greater 
efficiency that they possess by way of expense preference behaviour, to relax the strict 
adherence to cost minimization, and thus weaken the relationship between firm profits and 
structure. With this, it implies that there will be a negative relationship between efficiency and 
market structure variables. Higher degrees of efficiency will be found in markets with low 
concentration and in firms with a smaller market share. Generally speaking, traditional 
concerns about concentration in product markets have centered on the social loss associated 
with the mispricing that occurs when market power is exercised. Harberger (1954) suggested 
that eliminating monopolistic resource misallocation in manufacturing during the 1924-1928 
period would have increased social welfare by less than 0.1 % of gross national product 
(GNP). Rhoades (1982) applied the same methodology to the banking industry and concluded 
that the "deadweight welfare loss due to monopoly in banking is undeniably very small" (P. 
385). As suggested by the quote from Hicks above, the reduction in competitive pressure in 
concentrated markets may result in lessened effort by managers to maximize operating 
efficiency. Thus, in addition to the traditionally recognized higher prices and reduced output 
from market power, there may also be higher cost per unit of output in concentrated markets 
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because of slack management (Hannan, et al, 1998). In addition to this "quiet life" effect 
there are also several other related mechanisms (described below) through which market 
power may result in reduced operating efficiency and higher costs. According to Berger et al, 
(1998) numerous observations of this efficiency cost have been made over the years, however, 
the reasonableness of this educated guess has not been firmly established. Williamson (1963), 
Leibenstein (1966), and others found very substantial cost differences within industries owing 
to inefficiencies. Scherer (1970) speculated that the efficiency cost from concentration may be 
as high as 10% of costs-much above the social loss from mispricing as measured by the 
welfitre triangle. Carlsson (1972) and Caves and Barton (1990) estimated the relationship 
between cost efficiency and market structure using interindustry data. According to Hannan et 
al, (1998) a potential problem encountered by previous interindustry studies stems from the 
fact that efficiencies are generally measured by how close units of production (plants or firms) 
are to the best-practice units of production observed in the industry, rather than by how close 
they are to the technological frontier. If concentration affects the performance of the best- 
practice units in each industry as well as the performance of other units, then the relationship 
between measured efficiency (the distance from the best-practice frontier) and market 
concentration may underestimate the true relationship between efficiency and concentration. 
For example, if the market power associated with concentration raises costs by 10% for every 
firm in a concentrated industry, there will be no effect on the measured efficiencies of these 
firms relative to those in an unconcentrated industry, since the frontier moves along with the 
other firms. Other comparability problems also arise in interindustry studies, such as 
differences in the availability of close substitutes for the products. Berger and Hannan (1998) 
seek to resolve these problems by measuring efficiencies against the same frontier for firms in 
the same industry with similar availability of close substitutes, but located in different local 
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markets with different degrees of market concentration. Berger and Hannan's (1998) 
celebrated work suggests that a potentially greater loss from market power is a reduction in 
cost efficiency brought about by the lack of market discipline in concentrated markets. 17hey 
employ data from the US commercial banking industry, arguing, that this produces very 
homogeneous products in multiple markets with differing degrees of market concentration. 
Iley focus on commercial banking, an industry in which all firms have access to virtually the 
same technology and produce relatively homogeneous products in geographically limited 
markets with dramatically different market structures. According to Hannan et al (1998), bank 
prices are virtually unregulated, and banks can and do charge different prices for their deposit 
and loan products in different local markets. Thus the effects of concentration on efficiency 
can be well isolated from confounding influences of interindustry differences in products, 
technologies, and external competition. The main findings of this study is that banks in more 
concentrated markets exhibit poorer cost efficiency than do other banks, all other things being 
equal. - 
Traditionally, research and public policy concerns about concentration in product markets have focused 
on the social loss associated with the exercise of market power at high levels of concentration. The 
higher prices in concentrated markets bring about a restriction of output relative to the competitive level 
and thereby misallocate resources. The social cost of this misallocation has been approximated by the 
familiar welfare triangle, which represents the difference between the loss in consumer surplus and the 
gain in producer surplus oczasioned by noncompetitive pricing. Attempts to measure this loss have 
generally resulted in exceedingly low estimates. However, it seems quite plausible that the efficiency 
cost associated with market power would exceed the social losses measured by the welfare triangle. 
This is because the efficiency cost may apply to every unit of output , produced by fu= in 
noncompetitive markets, whereas the loss measured by the welfare triangle applies only to the units of 
output that were foregone as a result of the higher prices charged by these firms. (Berger et al. 
1998, p. 454). 
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4.9 Conclusion: 
This chapter has discussed the theoretical concepts of market structure, conduct and 
performance. We have looked at the definitions of each and how they are interrelated. Theory 
suggests that a firm's market structure influences to some degree its behaviour and 
performance. External factors such as technology, regulation, pricing, and demographic 
factors influence the structure of banking markets and also the conduct of banks with regard to 
strategy and objectives, and these in turn influence performance in bpking markets. The 
literature has sought to distinguish between two main hypotheses, and has increasingly 
focused on the role of firm market share and its relationship to market power, where the 
traditional SCP hypotheses suggests that the positive relationship between market structure 
and performance can be interpreted as the ability of banks to extract monopolistic rents in 
concentrated markets. The efficient structure hypotheses asserts that the positive relationship 
between firm profit and structure can be attributed to the gains made in market share by more 
efficient firms resulting in increased concentration. Berger (1995) refined and re-tested the 
theoretical underpinning of the positive statistical profit-structure relationship in banking by 
including direct measures of efficiency for the two versions of efficient-structure hypotheses. 
His study was unique, because not only did he consider the traditional SCP model, which 
suggested that the positive profit-structure relationship reflects the setting of prices that are 
less favourable to consumers (low deposit rates, high loan rates), in more concentrated 
markets, and the Relative Market Power model (RMP), which states that only large firms, with 
la rge market shares and well differentiated products, are able to exercise market power in 
pricing these products thereby earning supernormal profits. He also outlined the two efficiency 
explanations of the positive relationship between profits and either concentration or market 
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share, these are the X-efficiency version of the efficient-structure hypotheses (ESX) and the 
scale-efficiency version of the efficient-structure hypotheses (ESS). Under the former, firms 
with superior management or production technologies have lower costs and higher profits than 
firms lacking these skills. These firms are also assumed to gain large market shares, which 
may result in high levels of concentration. The latter states that some firms produce at more 
efficient levels than others which result in lower unit costs and higher profit levels. Again, 
such firms are assumed to have large market shares resulting in high concentration ratios. 
However, under both efficient-structure hypotheses, the positive profit-structure relationship is 
spurious, rather than of direct origin, with efficiency driving both profits and market structure. 
The analysis in the following chapter aims to explore the theoretical concepts of efficiency, 
and emphasises the conceptual aspects of (X-efficiency), economies of scale, and economies 
of scope. The chapter explains why the concept of efficiency is important in understanding the 
performance of banks. 
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Chapter Five: Efficiency, Economies of Scale, and Economies of 
Scope in Banking 
5.1: Introduction: 
"How banks will be affected by the increased competitive 
pressure depends in part on how efficiently they are 
run". Mester (1996, p. 5) 
The previous chapter has discussed the theoretical concepts of market structure, conduct 
and performance. Industrial economic theory suggests that there is a causal link between 
market structure and bank conduct and performance. More specifically it has been argued 
that, in concentrated markets, banks may earn collusive profits (Weiss, 1974; Heggestad 
and Mingo, 1977; Spellman, 1981; Rhoades, 1982). A substantial literature has burgeoned 
aimed at testing the theoretical SCP (structure-conduct-performance) relationship. It has 
been argued, however, that this literature contains too many inconsistencies and 
contradictions to provide a satisfactory description of the SCP relationship in banking 
(Gilbert, 1984; Osboibe and Wendel, 1983). Contemporary approaches to the explanation 
of the link between market structure and performance have emphasized an alternative 
'efficient structure' hypothesis. This postulates that an industry's structure arises as a result 
of superior operating efficiency by particular firms (Demzetz, 1973). As a result, a positive 
relationship between bank profits and structure can be attributed to gains made in market 
share by more efficient banks. The level of efficiency of a firm and its dynamics are 
therefore, important elements in understanding structure-performance relationships. 
Various studies undertaken on the US banking industry (Brozen, 1982; Smirlock, 1985; 
Evanoff and Fortier, 1988) suggest that firm-specific efficiency seems to be the dominant 
variable explaining bank profitability. Therefore, this chapter presents a theoretical 
overview on efficiency as this will support our empirical framework for analysing the 
market-power and efficient-structure hypotheses in GCC banking. The chapter explores the 
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theoretical concepts of efficiency, and emphasises the conceptual aspects of (X-efficiency), 
economies of scale, and economies of scope. The chapter explains why the concept of 
efficiency is important in understanding the performance of banks. Section 5.2 discusses 
the reasons for the focus of attention on efficiency in the banking industry. Section 5.3 
provides a definition of efficiency in general and section 5.4 discusses specific definitions 
of economies of scale, economies of scope and X-efficiency. Section 5.5 provides a brief 
survey of the empirical literature on X-efficiency. and cost economies in banking. Section 
5.6 discusses methods and techniques used to evaluate bank efficiency. Section 5.7 
discusses the practical problems usually encountered when measuring financial 
institutions' efficiency and section 5.8 provides some conclusions. 
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5.2 Reasons for Examinini! Effliciencv in the Bankinp-Industry 
The question that might be asked is why the concept of efficiency is important in 
understanding the performance of banks? The following may provide an answer to this 
question: 
For financial institutions, efficiency would imply improved profitability, greater amounts of 
funds intermediated, better prices and service quality for consumers, and greater safety and 
soundness if some of the efficiency savings arc applied towards improving capital buffers that 
absorb risk. Of course, the opposite is the case if structural changes result in 'less cfficient 
intermediaries, with the additional danger of taxpayer-financed bailouts if substantial losses are 
sustained( Berger et al. 1993, p. 22 1) 
According to Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987), the study of the economic efficiency of the 
banking industry is important for three reasons: Firstly, an improvement in cost efficiency 
means achieving higher profits and increasing the chance of survival in deregulated and 
competitive markets. Secondly, customers are interested in knowing the prices and the 
quality of bank services as well as new services that banks could offer. Thirdly, an 
awareness of economic efficiency is important to help policy makers formulate policies 
that affect the banking industry as a whole. 
Berger and Mester (1997, p. 14), note that 
II 
for the purposes of public policy research and managerial performance, once the conceptual 
and measurement issues have been controlled for, it is important to explain the remaining 
differences in efficiency across banks,:. In a perfectly competitive or contestable market, 
efficient firms should drive out inefficient ones, so that there would be only a residual level of 
inefficiency across firms remaining at a given time. Iberefore, an empirical finding of 
substantial incfflcicncics raises the question as to whether inefficiencies will continue in a 
deregulated and more competitive conteA 
Moreover, for antitrust and mergers analysis it is important to know: I- the effects of 
market concentration and past mergers on banking efficiency; 2- whether one type of 
organisational form is more efficient than another; and 3- whether inefficiency manifests 
itself in the form of poor production decisions, risk management decisions, or both 
(Akhavein, et al, 1998). From a public policy perspective, concern about the economic 
efficiency of banks is also rationalised on the grounds that the efficiency of individual 
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banks may affect 'the stability of the banking industry and, in turn, the effectiveness of the 
whole monetary system' Kolari et al, (1987, p. 45). Furthermore, Berger and Humphrey 
(1997, p. 175), observe that: The information obtained from the evaluation of bank 
performance can be used: 
To inform govermnent policy by assessing the effects of deregulation, mergers or market 
structure on efficiency. 
To address research issues by describing the efficiency of an industry, ranking its firms, or 
checking how measured efficiency may be related to the different efficiency techniques 
employed; or 
To improve managerial performance by identif)ing 'best practices' and 'worst practices' 
associated with high and low measured efficiency, respectively, and encouraging the former 
practices while discouraging the latter. 
5.3 Definition of Efficiency! 
In most of the empirical research on the topic of bank efficiency, firms are assumed to 
have a common production structure; what makes them different from each other is an 
invisible input, called "managerial ability" (Sungopta, 2000). To measure it, an efficient 
production frontier is estimated, from which, it is possible to infer the level of costs or 
profits that each firm could realize if it had the managerial ability of the best firm of the 
sample; in fact, the benchmark is the best practice firm, not the one that achieves in theory 
the best results. Hence, recent research has focused on this concept of efficiency otherwise 
known as "X-efficiency". 
Generally speaking, productive efficiency has two components (Lovell, et al. 2000); 
Technical efficiency relates to the extent to which firms maximize outputs given inputs, or 
equivalently the extent to which they minimize inputs given a level of output. Allocative 
efficiency relates to the optimal combination of inputs and outputs given their prices. 
Another source of efficiency is technical change where efficiency is said to result when the 
maximum efficient output that can be produced from any given set of inputs increases over 
time due to such factors as experience, increased knowledge, new innovations, and better 
production techniques Battese, et al, (1998). That is; technical change arises when a given 
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set of inputs are capable of producing a larger maximum output. Revell (1983) has argued 
that technical change in banking has mainly occurred on two fronts; (1) the development of 
electronic funds transfer systems and (2) advances in back-room computer operations. He 
argues that the early computer technologies were highly involved record-keepers of 
customer accounts. Furthermore, the effect of technological changes, Le, the cheapening of 
computers and the development of new information networks, has led to a sharp reduction 
in the average cost of electronic information processing. Advances in new technologies, 
have also reduced the entry barriers to the financial marketplace. Shepherd (1985) 
pinpoints two categories: Interml efficiency and Allocative efficiency. Internal efficiency 
refers to effective management within the firm itself; for example, the ways in which 
management inspires the staff, controls costs and keeps operations lean. However, When a 
firm is large and profit flows are also large, management tends to become less than fully 
effective. Such shortcomings in management are known as "X-inefficiencie! e' and can be 
attributed to the excess costs divided by actual costs. The X-efficient and X-inefficient cost 
curves can be illustrated, as in Figure 5.1. The excess costs are shown by points A and B 
for output QI and C and D for output Q1,411ocative efficiency, on the other hand, refers to 
a set of general equilibrium conditions which occur when output is at the level where 
marginal cost equals price for each product of each firm. In the long run, in the absence of 
allocative inefficiency, price will also equal the minimum possible level of average cost. In 
this contextý the consumers' surplus is maximised which means that consumers' surplus is 
achieved when consumers receive more value for consuming goods than the money value 
they must pay to the seller. In other words the lower the price, the larger the consumers' 
surplus and vice versa. However, A fundamental decision in measuring the efficiency of 
financial institutions is which concept of efficiency to use. The terminology used to define 
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efficiency in economics is varied, and can give rise to confusion, Goddard, et. al 
(2001, p. 105). 
Productive efficiency is defined as the sum of two components: the purely technical or physical 
component, and the economic component 11c purely technical or physical component refers to the 
ability to avoid waste by producing as much output as input usage allows, or by using as little input as 
output production requires. 71e analysis of technical efficiency can have an output-augmenting 
orientation or an input-conscring orientation. Economic efficiency, however, refers to the ability to 
select the optimal set of inputs to obtain a given level of output in the light of prevailing input prices. 
It is important to distinguish productive efficiency from an alternative cfficiency concept used by 
economists: allocative efficiency. Allocativc efficiency refers to the social welfare gains that accrue if 
all production takes place under competitive market conditions, in which price is equal to marginal 
cost in long-run equilibriurn. Aflocative incfficicncy arises when fMUS exploit monopoly power in 
order to restrict output and to set price above marginal cost, creating welfare loss from a social 
perspective Goddard et. al (200 I, p. 106). 
Figure 5.1 X-efficient and X-inefficient cost Curves 
cost I Average cost curves: 
Hig X 
inefficiency 
Moderate X 
ýc ýinefficiecy 
The X 
efficient 
curve 
Ql Q2 Quantity 
Source: Shepherd (1985, P. 19) 
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5.4 Cost Efficiency in Banking: Defining Economies of Scale, Economies of Scope 
and X-efficiency: 
5.4-1: Introduction 
Interest in the subject of scale and scope economies in banking has been stimulated in 
recent years by the wave of mergers and acquisitions that have occured in Europe, the USA 
and elsewhere. One of the reasons commonly put forward to justify merger and acquisition 
activity relates to the potential gains that may result through larger size (economies of 
scale) and the ability to diversify (economies of scope) (Berger, et al, 1998). Optimal firm 
size and product mix are also important issues for an industry undergoing a restructuring 
process. Technological change may also have important implications for the nature of scale 
and scope economies. For example, the application of new technologies often entails heavy 
expenditure which becomes profitable only if a sufficient number of transactions take place 
subsequently (Mester, et al 1997). 
The general meaning. of efficiency has been discussed in the previous section however, in 
the following section we will illustrate in more detail the specific meanings of the three 
concepts: scale economies, scope economies and X-efficiency. 
5.4.2 Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale exist if, over a given range of output, costs per unit decline as output increases. 
Increases in costs per unit correspond to decreasing returns to scale. It is of interest to investigate 
whether there is potential for average cost savings if a firm were to produce at a higher or lower scale 
than at present. In order to produce at the lowest attainable average cost, a firm must produce at the 
point or points of constant returns to scale, where any change in output results in an equiproportionate 
change in costs. Molyneux, et al. ( 2001 p. 109) 
Economies of scale or alternatively the returns to scale, refers to changes in output as 
factors of production change, Humphrey, et al, (1993). Economies of scale are based on the 
shape of the average cost curve, which shows average costs at each level of output 
(Molyneux et al. 1996). Generally, economies of scale are achievable only in the long run, 
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Altunbas et al, (1996). In other words, scale economies occur when the average cost of 
production in the long run declines as output increases. In order to isolate the effect of 
scale on costs, all other factors (such as technological improvements) have to be held 
constant. Costs can be divided into short-run costs and long-run cost. With short-run costs 
covering a period of time during which some factors of production are fixed whereas the 
long-run costs cover a period long enough to permit change in all factors of production. 
Therefore, in the long-run, all factors of production become variable (Molyneux, et al. 
1996). The concept of long-run average costs is illustrated in Figure. 5.2 below. 
TC 
Ac 
0 
Figure 5.2: EconOmies of scale and the Average and Marginal 
Cost Curves Shapes. (Adopted from Koutsoyiannis, 1979, p. 81) 
The figure shows a series of short-run marginal* costs curves, (SMC), long-run Marginal 
cost curve (LMC) and long-run average cost curve (LAC). The average cost is simply the 
average cost per unit of output, whereas the marginal cost is the change in total costs 
resulting from producing an extra unit of output. The long-run average cost curve is 
derived from the short-run cost curves, where each point of the LAC corresponds to a point 
on the short-run cost curve tangential to the LAC. It can be seen ftom the figure that the 
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LAC curve declines to output level Qm at the point m where the LMC intersects the LAC. 
Beyond point rn, the LAC begins to rise and any increase in output will increase costs. 
Thus, at point m, SACrn = SMCm =LAC=LMC. 
The U shape of the LAC reflects the law of returns to scale or, alternatively economies of 
scale in which, accordingly, the unit costs of production decrease as firm size increases. 
Economies of scale exist only up to a certain firm size also known as optimum firm size, 
beyond which diseconomies of scale exist. One of the several types of criticisms may be 
levelled against most of the recent scale economy literature as noted by Berger et al. (94- 
p. 8) is that: 
Most studies measure only the scale economy effects of marginal changes in output near the point of 
evaluation. The commonly used definition of scale economies is the ratio of marginal cost to average 
cost, taken along a ray that holds output mix constant. Scale efficiencies, in contrast, take into account 
'the fidl difference in ray average costs between the point of evaluation and the scale-cfficient point 
(the bottom of the U if the average cost function is U-shaped), which may be quite a distance away 
from the point of evaluation. 
However, referring back to the LAC curve, where LAC falls, the firms are not working to 
full capacity; where LAC rises, the firm's resources are overworked; only at the minimum 
point m are the (short-run) firm's resources optimally employed, Berger, (1994). 
Economies of scale are measured in terms of percentage changes in output. As a firm 
expands its scale of operations, economies of scale occur if the firm is able to reduce costs 
per unit of output, if all other factors are held constant. Economies of scale or increasing 
returns to scale arise, if proportionally, the level of output increases more than the increase 
in input factors; decreasing returns to scale occur if output increases less than 
proportionally with the increase in input factors; and constant returns to scale occur if 
output increases by the same proportion as the input. Given the following total cost 
function, TC=f (Q), Where TC is total cost and Q reflects output, then the average costs 
can be derived by ATC=f (Q) /Q and marginal costs then can be shown as MC = dTC / dQ 
which is simply derived by multiplying the elasticity formula by the TC /Q ratio. The 
156 
long-rUn marginal cost curve of the firm will have a negative slope and, by definition, there 
will be economies of scale which are calculated as follows: 
SE = ATC/MC = f(Q)/ Q(drC/dQ) 5.1 
If SE > =1, we have increasing returns to scale; if SE = 1, the returns to scale are constant; 
and if SE is less than 1, decreasing return to scale prevail. The derivative of average cost 
with respect to output is negative, zero or positive, respectively. Economies of scale in 
banking are defined in terms of individual bank's production process. The cost of 
producing bank output (services) is dependant on the production process used by the 
individual bank. Thus, based on equation 5.1 above, each bank's output (Q) is a function of 
the productive factors (inputs), labour (L), managerial skills (M), natural resources (N) and 
real capital, in the form: 
N, Q 
Economies of scale in banking arise when doubling the bank outputs requires less than the 
doubling of every productive factor. 
While the concept of economies of scale in a single product firm applies to the behaviour 
of total costs as output increases (and economies of scale exist if total costs increase less 
proportionately than output), for multi-product firms the concept of average cost is more 
complicated (Panzar et al, (1988). Average cost is defined only for single-product firms, 
unless all products are aggregated into a single index (Sinkey 1992). Thus, in order to 
measure scale economies for financial services firms, it is necessary to refer to another 
notion of cost, Ray Average Cost (RAQ which was introduced by Baumol et al. in 1982. 
Ray Average Cost is an extension of the concept of single product scale economies and 
imply the behaviour of cost as the production levels of a given bundle, change 
proportionately (Altunbas, et al, 2000). It requires that firms expand all outputs at the same 
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rate while mixing inputs optimally. In this case, economies of scale occur if the RAC of 
composite output decreases. 
For a single-product firm, the concept of scale economies (or returns to scale) refers to the rate at 
which output changes as all factor quantities are varied. Specifically, economies of scale are measured 
by the ratio of the proportionate change in output to a given proportionate change in all inputs. When 
a firm increases its output, there are economies of scale if the average cost per unit of output falls. 
Economies of scale can therefore be defined in terms of either the production function or the 
corresponding cost function. However, the multi-product nature of banks makes the analysis and 
interpretation of returns to scale more complex. When a firm is multi-product, global scale economies 
are defined relative to a proportionate increase in the production of all outputs, the productive mix 
being held constant. Economies of scale can be measured by employing Baumol's (1982) concept of 
ray average cost (RAQ. Molyneux et al (200 1, p. I 10). 
As pointed out by Baumol et al (1988), the term RAC refers to the geometry of the 
construct and it is essential that an arbitrary unit output along the ray is chosen. In this 
way, the average cost of a composite good can be defined as: RAC = C(ty) ft, where. ýP 
is the unit bundle for a particular mixture of outputs (the arbitrary bundle assigned the 
value 1) and I is the number of units in the bundle y=ty Figure 5.3 illustrates the 
concept of RAC for a multi-product firm in a three-dimensional diagram ( Baumol et al. 
1988). The ray average cost of producing the output vector Q# 0, denoted RAC (Q) is 
as TQQ) j: h', Qi. Ray Average Cost is said to be increasing (decreasing) at Q if RAC J= 
is an increasing (decreasing) function of a scalar 1, at t--1. Ray average cost is said 
to be minimised at Q if RAC (Q)<RAC(tQ), for all positive I; e 1. It is important to note 
that the unit output along the ray is arbitrary. Geometrically, the concept of RAC is 
illustrated in Figure 5.3, which also shows the behaviour of total cost (TC) along the ray 
OR. 
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Figure 5.3 Economies of scale for multiproduct firms: the concept 
of RAC. 
TC 
R 
0 
Ql 
Source: Adapted from Baumol et al. (1988, p. 50) 
It is possible to see that RAC and TC intersect at the unit output level Q0 and RAC reaches 
its minimum at the output Q= Q' at which the ray OT is tangent to the total cost surface in 
the hyperplane erected on OR. Therefore, if e is the elasticity of RACQq) with respect to t 
at the output point Q, then, at Q scale economies over the entire product set (SCALE) 
11(1+e). it follows that it is possible to interpret SCALE as a measure of the percentage 
change of decline or increase of RAC with respect to output. Thus, returns to scale at the 
output point Q are increasing, decreasing or locally constant (SCALE > 1, SCALE < 1, 
SCALE = 1, respectively). Economies of scale can also relate to overall and product- 
specific scale economies whilst holding the other 
factors constant. Overall economies of 
scale relate to cost savings resulting 
from an increase in all of a firm's output and can be 
detected by declining average costs as the firm increases production while keeping the 
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product mix constant. If average costs rise with output, diseconomies of scale are present. 
More specifically, economies of scale are measured by the ratio of the percentage change 
in costs relative to the percentage change in output: when the scale economies ratio is less 
than one, scale economies exist, as average cost is falling. When the ratio is equal to one, 
no scale economies exist, as average cost is constant and, finally, when the ratio is greater 
than one, decreasing returns to scale exist as average cost is rising. On the other hand, 
product-specific economies of scale refer to economies that rise from an increase in *the 
production of individual products (Willig, et al 1988). For instance, they can be measured 
to determine whether the output of certain products should be increased, although it is 
difficult to change the output of one product while holding constant the output of other 
products. 
In the banking context, Freixas and Rochet (1997) argue that the reason why borrowers do 
not engage in asset transformation is because there are economies in the intermediation 
process. These econ6mies are brought about by the transaction costs associated with 
linking savers to borrowers. These include monetary transaction costs as well as search, 
monitoring and auditing costs. Moreover, if associated with a rational risk spreading, scale 
economies may result in lower loan rates, and may diminish the problems of information 
asymmetries and moral hazard with lenders (i. e. the so-called scale economies in the 
monitoring activity). However, scale economies do not continue indefinitely with the 
expansion of size because as the scale operations increase, there is a point where firm do 
not usually produce a level of output below a 'minimum efficient scale' (i. e., at point in in 
figure 5.3 above) because according to Shepherd (1985), this raises costs and squeezes 
profilts.. Kollari and Zardkoohi (1987) point out that scale economies do not continue 
indefinitely with the expansion of size, because, as the scale of operation increases, there 
comes appoint at which limitations to efficient management set in, and, long-run marginal 
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costs tend to rise. This fact explains why many firms may find it necessary to decentralize 
operations in order to avoid the costs of organisational rigidity that largeness entails. 
Therefore, the firm (bank) may decide to decentralize functions by dividing its operations 
into separate branches to the point at which no cost gains are available from large-scale 
operations. Finally, it is useful to mention that it is possible to distinguish between branch 
and firm level scale economies. In particular, a number of studies separate scale economies 
at the single branch office or plant level from those for all offices together [Benston et 
al. (1982) and Humphrey(1985)]. The importance of these approaches, comes from the fact 
that banks can expand their operations or output by either increasing services to existing 
branch networks in a given market, or adding new branches, which attract new accounts 
and deposits, in new market areas [ Molyneux. et al. (1996)]. 
5.4.3 Potential Sources of Cost Economies in Banhj= 
Various authors (such as Scherer, 1980; Patten, 1971; and Bell and Murphy, 1968) have 
argued that there are many sources of cost reductions brought about through the expansion 
of banks output. Firstly, economies of scale are the effect of a more efficient use of some 
or all inputs with an increasing volume of output. Firms may have excess capacity of some 
inputs so that an increase in output cannot require a proportionate increase in all inputs 
over the entire production period. Specifically, some inputs might be, as a whole or partly, 
indivisible by output. The existence of indivisibility may help reduce costs per unit of 
output as the output level is increased. Secondly, increased size could allow a more 
efficient organization of resources. For instance, in small banks, where volume can not 
permit specialization, the same machines and workers must often be employed for a variety 
of tasks, say, tellers may also be assigned to sorting cheques and auditing accounts part- 
time. Large banks, however, may divide tasks so that employees and machines can be used 
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in one facet of their operation. Thus, the productivity between both capital and labour 
arises with the scale of operations. Specialisation could also result in a more economical 
use of materials purchased by the bank. Thirdly, some types of technological innovations, 
such as computers, may be economically more feasible for large banks. Thus, according to 
asset size, banks could employ different compositions of inputs with varying efficiencies. 
Fourthly, Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987) state that the law of large numbers accounts for 
certain scale economies. Large banks do not need to hold cash balances in the same 
proportion as smaller banks. Since holding cash balances is costly, larger banks can lower 
cost of holding cash balances than their smaller counterparts, to the extent that the law of 
large numbers smooth transactions demands. Moreover, larger banks are seemingly better 
able to diversify their assets and reduce risk as well as to offer various services to 
customers. In more details, Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987) divide the causes of increasing 
returns to scale into the following four categories: I) indivisibility, or unavoidable excess 
capacity of some inputs: for example, the cost of inventing a new technique is indivisible 
with respect to the level of output produced by using the technique. That is, a bank may 
have excess capacity of some inputs for most of the year, so that an increase in all outputs 
may not require a proportionate increase in all inputs for the entire year; ii) the inverse 
relationship between the productivity of some inputs and their cost per unit of productivity: 
that is, many inputs cost less when they are purchased on a larger scale; iii) specialisation. 
of the production process: greater specialisation and reduction in per unit cost is possible 
with increases in size; and iv) a statistical property of large numbers: as a firm expands 
sales, the appropriate quantity of inventory to be maintained need not to increased 
proportionately, because the demand of goods is spread across a greater number of 
customers. In this sense, larger banks can incur lower costs of holding cash balances than 
do small banks. Benston (1972) indicated that the sources of economies of scale are 
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characteristic to the use of lower skilled labour, use of fewer processing and administrative 
officers, and shifts in new technology available to larger scale operations. Bell and Murphy 
(1968) examined the sources of economies of scale in the US banking industry, and 
suggested that for the processing of chequeing accounts economies of scale arise partly 
from the use of different kinds of equipment and party from the specialization of labour 
and machines. To summarise, potential sources of cost economies in banking are usually 
based on the following considerations: 
* Information Technology [Revell (1984); Humphrey (1985); Hunter and Timme 
(1986); Evanoff et al. (1990); Landi (1990)]. As the firm's size increases, IT allows 
for a greater efficiency because of imperfect divisibility of investments; ii) high 
professional skills necessary to integrate complex technologies; iii) a more flexible 
production process which may reduce scale barriers; iv) a more general effect on 
efficiency associated with technological innovation. 
Specialised labour [Bell and Murphy (1968); Clark (1988); Muldur (1991)]. A 
larger bank in terms -of size 
is able to employ more technical and managerial 
labour, thereby achieving a more efficient organisational form, while favouring 
. 
expansion into innovative business. 
Information [Arrow (1965); Williamson (1975); Berger et al. (1987); Shaffer 
_(1991); 
Humphrey (1991)]. Financial intermediaries have a fundamental role in 
mitigating the asymmetric distribution of information between borrowers and 
lenders. Therefore, as they grow in size and intensify their diversification, they can 
lower delegation costs. 
strategic and organisational flexibility [Mudlur (1990); Berger et al. (1987); Gilbert 
and Steinherr (1989); Litan (1987); Berger et al. (1998)]. The consequences of 
increased size may be: I) improved flexibility and greater cost minimisation; ii) 
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fixed costs can be managed more efficiently; iii) the diversification of assets and 
liabilities can reduce income variability. On the other hand, drawbacks which are 
likely to be incurred as the firm grows larger include an increase in organisational 
complexity and wider diversification may actually aggravate risk since it may result 
,, in an entry into a business area in which the financial institution has no experience. 
9 Demand side benefits [Herring and Santomero (1990)]. If consumers have a 
c6package-acquisition behavioue,, demand side benefits may favour output 
.. 
diversification, thereby benefiting consumers through cost savings or in terms of 
the perception of a quality advantage from entertaining a global relationship. 
5.4.4 Scope Efficiency: 
Economies of scope generate cost savings from delivering multiple goods or services 
. jointly through the same organisation rather than through specialized providers. These 
potential cost savings are to be differentiated from economies of scale, which refers to 
lower, costs per unit of a single good or service as total output of that good or service rises. 
Econon-des of scope occur when it is more economical to produce two or more products jointly in a 
single production unit than to produce the products in separate specializing firms. Scope economies 
can arise from two sources: 1) the spreading of fixed costs over an expanded Product mix; and 2) cost 
complementarities in producing the different products. Spreading fixed costs occurs, for example, 
when the fixed capital of a bank branch is more fully utilized by issuing many types of deposits to 
local residents than building separate offices to fulfil the separate demands for transactions accountý 
savings accounts, consumer loans, and trust services. Such economical spreading of costs occurs to 
the extent that the production of different types of services require much the same qW of computer, 
accounting system and other fixed inputs of a branch and there is insufficient local demand to justify a 
full specialized branch for each of the services. In contrast, cost complcmcntarities between deposits 
and loans occur, for example, when the payment flow information developed in providing deposit 
services is used to reduce the costs of acquiring credit information about and monitoring loans to he 
same customers. 
Berger et al. (1994, p. 10). 
TWO groups of potential economies of scope should be characterised. Firms can realise 
internal scope economies through joint production and marketing, whilst consumers can 
realise external scope economies through joint consumption. On the production side, scope 
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economies seem to be available where facilities devoted to one objective or to serving a 
single market are not fully utilised and are capable of being deployed simultaneously to 
serve other targets and other markets. On the consumption side, whereas scope economies 
exist where providing multiple products or services at a single location or through a single 
firm saves consumers the time and expense of searching for and purchasing these items 
through specialised providers. Willig et al. (1988) states that there are two fundamental 
reasons to study multi-product firms. Firstly, casual empiricism indicates that there are 
virtually no single product firms. Secondly, the technological characteristic which is 
named economies of scope may force firms industry equilibrium to produce more than one 
good. Panzar, Baumol and Willig (1988) suggested that economies of scope are said to 
exist if the cost of producing outputs jointly is less than the total cost of producing the 
same outputs separately. That is, considering two outputs, Q, and Q2, and their separate 
cost function, TC (Q1) and TC (Q2). If the joint cost of producing the two outputs is 
expressed by TC (Q1, Q2) then economies of scope are present if: TC (Q,, Q2) < TC (Q1) + 
TC (Q2). There are said to be diseconornies of scope if the inequality is reversed. The 
concept of scope economies can be explained geometrically in Figure 5.4. The figure 
illustrates that the scale economies concept involves a comparison of TC (Qi, O) + TC 
(O, Q2), the sum of the heights of the cost surface over the corresponding points on the 
axes, with TC (Q1, Q2 ), the height of the cost surface at point (Qi. Q2), which is the vector 
sum of (Q1,0) and (O, Q2). If TC (Q1, Q2 ) lies below the hyperplane OAB which goes 
through the origin and points TC (Q1,0) and TC (O, Q2). then the condition for scope 
economies is achieved. Thus, in Figure, 5.6 the height of D, the point on plane OAB above 
(Q1, Q2), must equal TC (Q1,0) + TC (O, Q2), since the hyperplane is defined by TC = aQ, + 
bQ2 for, some constants a, b. Hence TC (Q1,0) = aQ, and TC (OsQ2) = bQ2 , and 
TC (Qi, 
Q2 must be less than aQ1 + bQ2 for scope economies to hold. 
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Figure 5.4: The Concept of Economies of SCope 
Q2 
According to Panzar Baumol and Willig (1988 p. 73) "it is clear that the presence of 
economies of scope will give rise to multi-product firme' and also "with economies of 
scope, joint production of two goods by one enterprise is less costly than the combined 
costs of production of two specially firms" (Willig 1979, p. 346). The degree of economies 
of scope can be measured as follows: 
TI 
SC = 
TV) + 7C(Q) - lo(Ql') Q2). 
TVl9Q2) 
Baurnol, Panzar, and Willig (1988, p. 72) indicated that: 
When the firm produces many products, even where ray average costs decline everywhere, the 
absence of economics of scope may prevent natural monopoly. For example if there arc no economics 
of scope, a multi-product institution can be split up into several specialised firms without any increase 
in cost. Economics of scope, and the concepts related to it, play an important role in the analysis of the 
banking firin given its multi-product industry structure. 
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Source: Adapted from Bauinol et al. (1988, p. 72). Qj 
5.4.5 X-efficiencv: 
This concept is based upon the work of Farell (1957), and Leibenstein (1966) and indicates 
the effectiveness of the decisions and activities of management (Kumbhakar, et al, 2000). 
In general X-efficiency, relative efficiency and managerial efficiency, are all 
interchangeable definitions describing the differences between actual and minimum costs, 
reflecting differences in managerial ability to control costs (or maximise revenues) 
(Carmello, et al, 1999). A deficiency of external or market pressures from the firm's 
environment may give rise to such inefficiency. It is important to note that X-inefficiency 
appears to be greater than the cost effects of the choices of scale and scope of production, 
in this context, some US banking studies have found that X-inefficiencies were more 
significant in explaining cost differences between banks than scale or scope economies. 
Bauer et al (1993, p. 286) mentioned that 
"Until recently, bank cost studies focused almost exclusively on scale and product mix (scope) 
economies. - While this has been useful, a potentially more important dimension of bank cost 
economies appears to be differences in cfficiency. Recent studies have estimated incfficiencies 
of 20 percent or more of costs, even for banks of similar scale and product mix. These 
inefficiencies appear to dominate scale and product mix effects, which usually average 5 
percent or Icse'. 
Figure 5.5 Overall, Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
p 
xi 
Source: Adopted from Aly et-al. (1990, p. 212). 
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Recent academic literature, such as Berger et al. (1993,1995), Berger and Mester (1997), 
also have drawn attention to this important source of inefficiency: Berger et. al. (1993, page 
222) note that: 
While scale and scope efficiencies have been extensively studied, primarily in the context of US 
financial institutions, relatively little attention has been paid to measuring what appears to be a much 
more important source of efficiency differences - X-inefficiencics, or deviations from the efficient 
frontier. 
The term X-efficiency, as we have discussed earlier, covers all the technical and allocative 
efficiencies of individual firms which are distinguished from scale and scope economies 
(Mester, 1996). The essential ideas about aflocative and technical efficiencies are 
illustrated in Figure 5.5. In this figure, it is assumed that a firm uses two inputs, XI and X2 
to produce output y. pp' is the isocost line whereas y and y' represent the production 
frontier. The production frontier is a set of all combinations of inputs which can produce 
the same level of output and any reduction of at least one input may cause output to fall. 
Firms, a, b and c each produce a given level of output. Efficient operation in production 
(cost minimization) occurs at point b. All costs minimising firms are labelled as being 
overall efficient. In terms of Figure 5.5 the overall efficiency for firm c is measured by the 
ratio of distances Oc"/Oc which represents the potential of efficient input to actual input 
. usage. The extent of technical efficiency of firm c is measured by the ratio of distances 
Oc'/Oc. By reducing the input quantities used by firm c by this amount, the firm could 
move. to point c' and would be considered efficient. For firm c allocative efficiency is 
given by the ratio of distances 06"/Oc'. 
As mentioned earlier, allocative inefficiency arises from choosing the wrong input 
combinations given input prices, as opposed to technical inefficiency, which is a 
proportionate overuse of all inputs. 
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Berger and Mester (1997, p 3) emphasized the importance of cost, standard profit and 
alternative profit efficiency concepts in case of measuring financial institution X- 
efficiency. They stated that: 
A fundamental decision in measuring financial institution efficiency is which concepts to 
use. This of course, depends on the question being addressed. But we discuss here what we 
consider to be the three most important economic efficiency concepts - cost, standard 
profit, and alternative profit efficiencies. We believe these concepts have the best economic 
foundation for analysing the efficiency of fmancial institutions because they are based on 
economic optiniisation in reaction to market prices and competition, rather than being 
based solely on the use of technology. 
A major theme in recent work on efficiency is the close relationship between the concepts 
of efficiency and productivity. While efficiency has been discussed in the previous 
sections, firm productivity refers to total factor productivity, a measure incorporating all 
production factors (Battese et al, 1998). According to Grosskopf (1993), productivity 
growth is the net change in output due to change in efficiency and technical change, where 
efficiency is understood to be the change in how far an observation is from the frontier of 
technology the technical change is understood to be shifts in the production frontier. Thus, 
efficiency is a component of productivity. 
The terms productivity and efficiency, have been used frequently in the literature over the last ten 
years by a variety of commentators. They are often used interchangeably, but this is unfortunate 
because they are not precisely the same things. in fact when we refer to productivity, we are referring 
to total factor productivity, which is a productivity measure involving all factors of production. other 
traditional measures of productivity, such as labour productivity in a factory, fuel productivity in 
power stations, and land productivity (yield) in farming, are what is known as partial measures of 
productivity. 'Ibcsc partial productivity measures can provide a n-dsleading indication of overall 
productivity when considered in isolation. Coelli, et. al. (1998, p. 3). 
Productivity change occurs when an index of outputs changes at a different rate than an 
index of inputs. Productivity change can be calculated using index number techniques to 
construct various indeces, such as the Fisher (1922) or Tomqvist (1936) productivity 
index. Both indexes require quantity and price infi ormation, as well as assumptions 
concerning the structure of technology and the behaviour of producers, but neither requires 
the estimation of anything (Brown, et al, 1996). In view of the existence of numerous index 
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number, formulae, Fisher (1922) proposed a number of intuitively meaningful criteria, 
called tests. Theses tests are used in the process of choosing a formula for purposes of 
constructing price and quantity index numbers. An alternative (yet closely related) 
framework is to state a number of properties, in the form of axioms, and then to find an 
index number that satisfies a given set of axioms. This approach is known as the axiomatic 
approach to index number construction. Eichorn and Weller (1976) provide a summary of 
the axiomatic approach. Balk (1995) provides a recent summary of some of the axiomatic 
price index number theory. Diewert (1992) provides a range of axioms for consideration in 
productivity measurement and recommends the use of the Fisher index. However, 
productivity change can also be calculated using nonparametric techniques, or estimated 
using econometric techniques, to construct what has come to be known as Malmquist 
(1953) productivity index (MPI), which has been applied to banking and other sectors 
(even to whole economies), can be used to measure total factor productivity in a multiple 
input-output framework. Calculation of the MPI only requires data for quantities of inputs 
and outputs, not prices. This is especially useful in banking where definitions of price are 
problematic and sometimes difficult to operationalise. Thus information on the structure of 
the technology that generates the quantity data can serve as a substitute for price data and 
assumptions. A disadvantage of index number techniques is that they do not provide an 
answer about the sources of measured productivity change, whereas nonparametric 
techniques and econometric techniques can be informative in this respect. Although 
nonparametric techniques and econometric techniques are capable of providing answers to 
both questions, how can productivity change be measured? And what are the sources of 
measured productivity change? Only the econometric approach is capable of doing so in a 
stochastic environment. 
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5.5 The Measurement of Efficiencv: 
5.5.1 Introduction 
Over the past several years, substantial research effort has gone into measuring the 
efficiency of financial institutions, particularly commercial banks. The focus has been on 
estimating an efficient frontier and measuring the average differences between observed 
banks and banks on the "best practice" frontier, (Berger, et al. 1997). This section outlines 
and compares the different econometric models used in estimation banks' efficiency and 
the assumptions that these models impose on the data. 
The most common efficiency estimation techniques are data envelopment analysis (DEA), 
free disposal hull analysis (FDH), the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), the thick frontier 
approach (THA), and the distribution-free approach (DFA). The first two of these are non- 
parametric techniques and the latter three are parametric methods. Berger and Humphrey 
(1997) reported roughly an equal split between applications of non-parametric techniques 
(69 applications) and parametric methods (60 applications) to depository institutions data. 
The nonparametric methods generally ignore prices and can, therefore, account only for 
technical inefficiency in using too many inputs or producing too few outputs. Nor can they 
compare firms that tend to specialize in different inputs or outputs, because there is no way 
to compare one input or output with another without the benefit of relative prices. In 
addition, similar to the cost function, there is no way to determine whether the output being 
produced is optimal without value 
information on the outputs Mester et al, (1998). Thus, 
the nonparametric techniques typically focus on technological optimisation rather than 
economic optimisation, and do not correspond well to the cost and profit efficiency 
concepts. Another drawback of the nonparametric techniques 
is that they usually do not 
allow for random error in the 
data, assuming away measurement error and luck as factors 
affecting outcomes (although some progress 
is being made in this regard). In effect, they 
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disentangle efficiency differences from random error by assuming that random error is 
zero., Studies of U. S. banks that use nonparametric techniques report lower efficiency 
means on average than those using parametric techniques (an average of 72% versus 84%) 
with much greater variation (a standard deviation of 17% versus 6%), Which could, in part, 
reflect some random error being counted as variations in measured efficiency in these 
studies (see Berger and Humphrey 1997, table 2). In the parametric methods, a bank is 
labelled inefficient if its costs are higher or profits are lower than the best-practice bank 
after removing random error term. Parametric models are characterised by the fact that an 
explicit functional form that presupposes the shape of the frontier for the production 
function, cost function or profit function is assumed. For example, parametric frontiers 
have often been specified in the form of. Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) [Arrow 
et al. (1961)]; transcendental logarithmic (translog) [Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau 
(1973)] and more recently the Fourier Flexible Function (Altunbas et al 2002). 
To estimate an efficient frontier function, residuals from the cost or profit function must be 
analysed; they measure the difference between expected and observed costs or profits. 
Residuals are composed of two parts: a random one, due to measurement errors or 
idiosyncratic shocks and a systematic one that identifies every single firm. To separate the 
two components, it is necessary to make assumptions on their probability distributions. 
Usually, the random component is assumed to have a normal distribution with zero mean 
and finite variance; the systematic component is assumed to have a semi-normal or a 
truncated normal distribution with finite variance (Stevenson 1980). The two components 
are separated using the technique proposed by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmedt 
(1982); it is then possible to estimate the efficiency level of each firm and of the sample. 
The systematic part of the residual is an efficiency indicator that can be used to compare 
172 
firms; the ratio between the residual of a firm and the highest residual for profit functions 
and the lowest for cost functions that identifies the best practice firm, is a measure of 
relative efficiency. Given the importance of the residuals for the measurement of 
efficiency, it is particularly important to minimize specification errors due to wrong 
functional forms that could bias the results. The translog function (Christensen and 
Greence 1976) is flexible in that it allows to estimate a large family of functional forms. its 
high number of parameters, however, makes it difficult to adopt when estimating frontiers 
on a small sample. The translog is a second-order approximation around the mean values 
of the sample. Furthermore, the translog is a quadratic function; its symmetrical structure 
forces 'symmetry on the data; for example, if there are strong economies of scale in the 
sample for small firms, the translog, which tends to fit U-shaped curves, will erroneously 
find diseconomies of scale for the larger firms of the sample. McAllister and McManus 
(1993) were among the first to suggest that most of the previous empirical literature on 
bank X-eff iciency might be biased because of problems related to the statistical techniques 
used. Wilson, et al. (200 1, p. 116), note that. 
The tianslog offered at least two important advantages over the Cobb-Douglas functional 
fornL First, it allowed for a U-shaped average cost curve or, more generally, for a cost Curve 
that is not uniform for all sizes. Second, it dispensed with the ancillary hypothesis of an input 
elasticity equal to one, which is implicit in the Cobb-Douglas functional form. It also imposed 
fewer constraints on the structure of costs than the CES production functiom it is therefore 
possible to test for any non-monotonic trend in the cost function, and for the relationship 
between multiproduct operations and costs. In general, the translog functional form appeared to 
be more suitable to represent the true nature of the activity of financial institutions. 
Meanwhile, Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993a, p. 227) reckoned that the translog was: 
"insufficiently flexible to describe an industry with increasing returns to scale up to some 
point and constant returns thereafter, and seems to have difficulties when firms tend to 
change product mix significantly as they change scale" A semi-parametric flexible form, 
that overcomes the problems of a translog function, is in fact a translog with trigonometric 
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factors added on, derived from a Fourier transform of the variables (Gallant 1981). The 
Fourier-flexible function is the best global approximation of an unknown function, such as 
a cost or profit function, but the number of parameters that have to be estimated is so high 
that it can be used only on very large samples (Berger et a]. 1998). However, (Altunbas et 
al. 2000, p. 2) note that 
"Although the Fourier flexible functional forni better approximates the 
underlying cost function than the translog formulation, neither functional form 
is an appropriate descriptor of the cost function. As a consequence, it is 
concluded that even the use of more flexible functional forms such as FF may 
lead to misleading estimations of the inefficiency values" 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) have also pointed out the limitations of the non-parametric 
approaches and they suggest that such approaches should consider using a re-sampling 
technique,, such as boolstrapping, in order to accommodate random error in the efficiency 
estimates. This technique, [Simar (1992); Simar and Wilson (1995)] appears to be a way of 
obtaining an empirical approximation to the underlying sampling distribution of DEA and 
FDH efficiency estimates. However, these are not the only criticisms of previous research. 
In an important recent study, Bauer et al. (1997) argued that it is not necessary to have a 
consensus on what is the single best frontier approach for measuring efficiency for the 
efficiencies to be useful for regulatory analysis. Bauer et al. (1997, p 3) propose a set of 11 
consistency conditione' that efficiency measures derived from various approaches should 
meet to be most useful fbrý regulators or other decision-makers. These consistency 
conditions note that: 
1. The efficiency scores generated by the different approaches should have I comparable means, standard deviations and other distributional properties. 
2'. The different approaches should rank the institutions in approximately the same 
I order. 
3. The different approaches should identify mostly the same institutions as "best 
practice" and as "worst practice". 
4. All of the useful approaches should demonstrate reasonable stability over time. 
5. Ile efficiency scores generated by the different approaches should be 
reasonably consistent with competitive conditions in the market. 
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6. The measured efficiency from all of the useful approaches should be reasonably 
consistent with the standard non-frontier performance measures, such as return 
on assets or cost/revenue ratio. 
Consistency conditions (1), (2) and (3) may be thought of as measuring the degree to 
which different approaches are mutually consistent, while conditions (4), (5) and (6) may 
be thought of as measuring the degree to which the efficiency generated by the different 
approaches are consistent with reality or are believable. The former are more helpful in 
determining whether the different approaches will give the same answers to regulatory 
policy questions or other queries, and the latter are more helpfiil in deter-mining whether 
these answers are likely to be correct. Finally, it is important to note another criticism of 
bank cost studies- ignoring the profit side of the banks' operations. Recently, studies 
employing profit functions or investigating both banks' cost and profit efficiency have 
gradually acquired greater importance. The rationale for these studies is that banks that 
show the highest inefficiency and incur the highest costs might be able to generate more 
profits than the more cost-efficient ones. Of the 130 studies on financial institutions' 
efficiency reviewed by Berger and Humphrey (1997) only nine analysed profit efficiency 
although there have been some recent additions to the list, such as Rogers (1998); De 
Young and Hasan (1998); Dietch and Weill (1998) and Maudos et al. (1998). Thus in our 
study we provide measurement for cost and profit efficiency for the GCC six states banks. 
Here, we focus on the parametric techniques primarily because they correspond well with 
the cost and profit efficiency concepts (Mester, 1997). In particular we apply a parametric 
technique, that is, the stochastic frontier approach to calculate the cost and profit efficiency 
scores for the banks in the six GCC member states. In the following sections we discuss in 
more details the non-parametric and the parametric approaches. 
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5.5.2 The non-parametric apiDroaches: 
5.5.2.1 The Data Envelopment Analvsis (DEA) 
The main non-parametric approaches are the data envelopment analysis (DEA) and free 
disposal hull (FDH) methods. 
New efficiency theory known as "data envelopment analysis" (DEA) purports to measure the relative 
cfficicncy of a set of units that are similar. Ile units are often called 'decision making units' or DMUS 
and their similarity lies in their pattern of input and output processes. When data arc available for 
input costs and revenues from sale of output, the DEA model can be applied to firms in an industry to 
analyse their technical (production) and allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency measures the 
DMU's success in producing the maximum possible output from a given set of inputs, while 
allocafive efficiency measures the firm's success in choosing an optimal set of inputs with a given set 
output and /or output prices. Clearly the allocative efficiency concept is most suitable for Profit- 
oriented firms facing competitive markets. Singupta (2000, p. 1). 
Development of DEA has followed three important phases. The first phase started with the 
engineering concept of efficiency as a ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs and this 
concept of performance efficiency was applied by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) in a 
linear programming (LP) formulation to compare the relative efficiency of a set of DMUs. 
A similar approach was developed by Farrell (1957) to compare the relative efficiency of a 
cross-section sample of agricultural farms, but this was limited to one output for each firm. 
This approach required the empirical data on the input and output quantities only and no 
prices are required. Hence only technical efficiency can be estimated by this approach. 
The second phase introduced the concept of allocative efficiency, which leads to the 
specification of a cost frontier instead of a production frontier. The econometric studies of 
cost frontier functions have frequently used the allocative efficiency criterion based on the 
observed price data. 
The third phase extended the cost efficiency approach further, by using inputs and/or 
outputs as policy variables to be optimally chosen by each firm or DMU, when it faces 
market prices under perfect or imperfect competition. Two features of flexibility in this 
approach are to be noted. One is that the optimal input levels can be used for future by 
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firms, who have to adjust their inputs accordingly. This permits a dynamic view of the 
optimal input paths over time, when market prices change in a predictable manner. 
Secondly, the stochastic aspects of learning and adjustment, when firms adjust their sub- 
optimal input levels to the optimum, can be directly introduced in this framework. 
However, the economists' view of the DEA approach is that it is a technical method of 
efficiency measurement that is unrelated to the economic environment under which firms 
or DNWs operate. 
5.5.2.2 The Free Disposal Hull Avvroach: 
The second non-parametric approach is the free disposal hull (FDH) approach, developed 
by Deprins et al. (1984), and this is a special case of DEA. Here, the hypothesis of 
convexity of the production possibility set ( PPS ) is abandoned, and the PPS is composed 
only of the DEA vertices and the FDH points interior to these vertices. Because the FDH 
frontier is either congruent or interior to the DEA frontier, FDH will typically generate 
larger efficiency estimates than DEA (Tulkens, 1993). The FDH approach allows for a 
better, approximation or envelopment of the observed data. DEA is a more efficient 
estimator than FDH, but only if the assumption of convexity is correct. Both DEA and 
FDH permit efficiency to vary over time, and neither method requires prior assumptions 
regarding tI he form of the distribution of inefficiencies across observations, except that 
undominated observations are 100% efficient (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). A drawback 
of non-parametric approaches, however, is that they generally assume there is no random 
component affecting a firm's performance. There have been a number of attempts to 
generalise and extend the standard DEA non-parametric approach. These include the 
polyhedral cone-ratio DEA model (Chames et al., 1990; Brockett et al., 1997; Resti, 1996); 
the assurance region DEA model (Thompson et al., 1997; Tylor et al., 1997); the non- 
parametric Malmquist Index method of productivity measurement (Griffell-Tatje' and 
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Lovell, 1994); and tests of the sensitivity of DEA and FDH efficiency models to different 
radial and non-radial measurement techniques (Ferrier et al., 1994; Pastor, 1995; DeBorger 
et al., 1995). Bergendahl (1995) has suggested the concept of a composite frontier: the DEA 
frontier should be composed of the most efficient parts of banks within the sample, 
forming a composite or representative firm, instead of being composed of separate and 
individual firms. The composite frontier would indicate the efficiency that had been 
achieved within the sample, though not necessarily within a single institution. In this way, 
the frontier would represent best practice, without confounding efficient results achieved in 
one specific area with inefficiencies elsewhere. The main difference between DEA and the 
parametric approaches (SFA, TFA, DFA) is that the DEA production frontier is not 
determined by a specific functional form; instead it is generated directly from the actual 
data for the evaluated firms. The DEA frontier is formed as the piecewise linear 
combination that connects the set of best-practice observations, yielding a convex 
production possibility set (PPS). As a consequence, the DEA efficiency score for a specific 
firm (or decision-making unit, DMU) is not defined by an absolute standard, but is defined 
relative to other firms. Extensive reviews of the relevant literature on applications of DEA 
to banking can be found in Seiford and Thrall (1990), Lovell (1993) and Berger and 
Humphrey (1997). 
5.5.3 The parametric approaches: 
I 
5.5.3.1 The Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA): 
The SFA originated with two papers, published nearly simultaneously by two teams on two 
continents. Meeusen and van den Broeck (MB) (1977), and Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 
(ALS) (1977). The ALS paper was in fact a merged version of a pair of remarkably similar 
papers, ' one by Aigner and the other by Lovell and Schmidt. The ALS and MB papers are 
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themselves very similar. Both papers appeared shortly before a third SFA paper by Battese 
and Corra (1977). These three original SFA models shared the composed error structure 
mentioned previously, and each was developed in a production frontier context. The model 
can be expressed as 
y =ftx; 0). exp(v - u), wherey is scalar output, x is a vector of inputs, and P is a vector of 
2.. 
technology parameters. The first error component v-N(0; 07,, ) is intended to capture the 
effects of statistical noise, and the second error component u ý- 0 is intended to capture the 
effects of technical inefficiency. Thus producers operate on or beneath their stochastic 
production frontier [f(x; p . exp(v)] according as u=0 or u>0. MB assigned an 
exponential distribution to u, Battese and Corra assigned a half normal distribution to u, 
and ALS considered both distributions for u. Parameters to be estimated include B., (T 
2 
VI 
1, and a variance parameter 0- 
2 associated with u. Either distributional assumption on u 
implies that the composed error (v - u) is negatively skewed, and statistical efficiency 
requires that the model be estimated by maximum likelihood. After estimation, an estimate 
of mean technical inefficiency in the sample was provided by 
E(-u) = E(v-u) (21; r)"2 a, in the normal-half normal case and by E(-u)=E(v-u)=- a. in 
the normal-exponential case. In an early survey of various approaches to fi7ontier analysis 
and efficiency measurement, Forsund, Lovell, and Schmidt (1980) wrote that "the main 
weakness of the stochastic frontier model [is that] it is not possible to decompose 
individual residuals into their two components, and so it is not possible to estimate 
technical inefficiency by observation. The best that one can do is to obtain an estimate of 
mean inefficiency over the sample. " Jondrow et al's (1982) paper, tackled this problem and 
provide's a technique in which either the mean or the mode of the conditional distribution 
[uilvi ui] was proposed to provide estimates of the technical inefficiency of each producer 
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in the sample. The possibility of obtaining producer-specific estimates of efficiency has 
greatly enhanced the appeal of SFA. The half-normal and exponential distributions 
assigned to the one-sided inefficiency error component are single-parameter distributions, 
and researchers soon developed more flexible two-parameter distributions for the 
inefficiency error component. Afriat (1972) and Richmond, Greene (1980a, b) proposed a 
Gamma distribution, and Stevenson (1980) proposed both the Gamma and truncated 
normal distributions. Other, more flexible distributions have been proposed by Lee (1983). 
Nonetheless the two original single-parameter distributions remain the distributions of 
choice in the vast majority of empirical work. 
Ile distributional assumptions of the stochastic frontier approach are fairly arbitrary. Two prior 
studies found that when the inefficiencies were unconstrained, they behaved much more like 
symmetric normal distributions than half-rionnals, which would invalidate the identification of the 
incfficicncics. Berger et al. (1997, p. 12). 
It is a simple matter to change the sign of the inefficiency error component u and convert 
the stochastic production frontier model to a stochastic cost frontier model 
E=c(y, w; /, 8). exp(v+u), where E is expenditure, [c(y, w; fl). eXP(v)] is a stochastic cost 
frontier, and u is intended to capture the cost of technical and allocative inefficiency. 
The Jondrow et al. (1982) technique may be used to provide an estimate of overall cost 
inefficiency, but the difficult remaining problem is to decompose the estimate of u into 
estimates of the separate costs of technical and allocative inefficiency. Schmidt and Lovell 
(1979) accomplished the decomposition for the Cobb-Douglas case. Kopp and Diewert 
(1982) obtained the decomposition for the more general translog case, although 
econometric difficulties with their decomposition remain to this day. Cross-sectional data 
provide 'a snapshot of producers and their efficiency. Panel data provide more reliable 
evidence on their performance, because they enable us to track the performance of each 
producer through a sequence of time periods. Long and Hoch (1955,1962) and Mundlak 
(1961) utilized panel data to purge agricultural production function parameter'estimates of 
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bias attributable to variation in what Hoch called technical efficiency and what Mundlak 
called management bias. Eventually Pitt and Lee (1981) extended cross-sectional 
maximum likelihood estimation techniques to panel data, and Schmidt and Sickles (1984) 
extended the work of Hoch and Mundlak by applying fixed-effects and random-effects 
methods to the efficiency measurement problem, where the effects are one-sided. The 
objective of these latter studies was not so much to eliminate bias from parameter estimates 
as to obtain producer- specific estimates of technical efficiency, or of the management 
effect. A significant advantage of (sufficiently long) panels is that they permit consistent 
estimation of the efficiency of individual producers, whereas the Jondrow et, al. technique 
does not generate consistent estimators in a cross-sectional context. Early panel data 
models were based on the assumption of time- invariant efficiency. The longer the panel, 
the less tenable this assumption becomes. Eventually this assumption was relaxed, in a 
series of papers by Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990), Kumbhakar (1990), and Battese 
and Coelli (1992,1995). 
If a number of firms are observed over a number of time periods, then the data obtained are known as 
panel data. Panel data have some advantages over cross-sectional data in the estimation of stochastic 
frontiers models. Ile availability of panel data generally implies that there are a larger number of 
degrees of freedom for estimation of parameters. More importantly, panel data permit the simultaneous 
investigation of both technical change and technical efficiency change over time, given that technical 
change is defined by an appropriate parametric model and the technical inefficiency effects in the 
stochastic frontier model are stochastic and have the specified distribution. Coelli, et al. (1998, p. 
202)., 
If efficiency varies, across producers or through time, it is natural to seek determinants of 
efficiency variation. Early studies adopted a two-stage approach, in which efficiencies are 
estimated in the first stage, and estimated efficiencies are regressed against a vector of 
explanatory variables in a second stage. More recent studies, including those of 
Kumbhakar, Ghosh, and McGuckin (1991), Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), Huang 
and-Liu (1994), and Battese and Coelli (1995), have adopted a single-stage approach in 
which explanatory variables are incorporated directly into the inefficiency erro r 
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component. In this approach either the mean or the variance of the inefficiency error 
component is hypothesized to be a function of the explanatory variables. However, if 
productive efficiency changes through time, then it must also contribute to productivity 
change. Bauer (1990a) incorporated efficiency change into models of productivity change. 
Griliches (1996) provides an illuminating survey of research into "the residual, ". 
Nonetheless, in addition to the stochastic frontier approach, two other parametric 
approaches to the estimation of cost efficiency have recently been developed both can be 
based on a translog system consisting of a cost equation and its associated input cost share 
equation. However, neither approach attempts to decompose estimated cost inefficiency 
into its technical and allocative components. The first approach is dubbed a "distribution- 
free approacW' DFA for shorý because although it contains a -one-sided error term 
representing cost inefficiency, it imposes no distributional assumption on it. DFA requires 
panel data. The second approach is an admittedly ad hoc approach named thick frontier 
analysis, (TFA) for short, Berger, et a] (1998). TFA does not require a one-sided error 
term, and so is not really a frontier approach to the estimation of cost efficiency. However, 
in contrast to some of the more sophisticated approaches (SFA, DFA, DEA) TFA is easy to 
implement using either cross-sectional data or panel data, De Young et al, (1998). In the 
following are more details about the two approaches. 
5.5.3.2 The Distribution-free approach: 
The, second parametric approach is the distribution-free approach, (DFA) due to Berger 
(1993) This method assumes that there is a core efficiency or average efficiency for each 
firm over-time. The core inefficiency is distinguished from random error (including any 
ff - temporary fluctuations in efficiency) by assuming that core ine iciency is persistent over 
time, while random errors tend to average out over time [see Berger (1993) and Deyoung 
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(1996) and Mester et al, (1997)]. In particular, a cost or profit fiinction is estimated for 
each period of a panel data set. The residual in each separate regression is composed of 
both inefficiency, Inu, and random error, Inv, but the random component, Inv, is assumed 
to average out over time, so that the average of a bank's residuals from all of the 
regressions', InO for each bank is used to compute its core efficiency. However, the 
reasonableness of these assumptions about the error term components depend on the length 
of period studied, (Mester, et al. 1997). If too short a period is chosen, the random errors 
might not average out, in which case random error would be attributed to inefficiency 
(although truncation can help). If too long a period is chosen, the firm's core efficiency 
becomes less meaningful because of changes in management and other events, i. e., it might 
not be constant over time period. Despite the small number of studies comparing different 
cost frontier approaches, (Berger et al. 1997), DFA was found to be the most consistent 
with the non-frontier efficiency measures. Bauer et al. (1998) applied four approaches for 
the same data set. They found that DFA gives the highest mean of efficiency estimates 
combined with the lowest standard deviation. 
5.5.3.3 The Thick Frontier Approach (TFA): 
The thick frontier approach (TFA) [see Berger and Humphrey (1991) Bauer et al. (1993)] 
simply_ assumes that inefficiency is represented by deviations in predicted costs between 
the hI ighest and lowest quartiles while deviation from the predicted costs within the highest 
and lowest average cost quartile of firms represent random error. it is reasonable to assume 
that the firms in the lowest cost group are greater than the average efficiency. Similarly, 
the firm in the highest cost group is considered to operate at lower than the average 
efficiency. Certainly, these assumptions do not hold and more importantly, do not yield a 
precise efficiency measurement for each bank, which is our primary focus of this study. 
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TTA gives'an estimate of efficiency differences between the best and worst quartile to 
indicate the general level of overall efficiency, but does not provide point estimate for each 
individual firm. This study, however, implemented the stochastic frontier approach and 
adopted the Battese and Coelli (1995) model to estimate the cost and alternative profit 
efficiency scores for our sample of Six GCC countries. 
5.6 Problems Arising when Studying Bank Efficiency: 
Measuring bank efficiency creates several problems, these problems arise as a result of the 
nature and function of financial intermediaries, especially as banks are multi-product firms 
and they do not produce physical products (Goddard et al, 2000). One of the major 
problems in the study of bank efficiency is the specification of bank inputs and outputs. 
There has been long-standing disagreement among researchers over what banks produce. 
Debate centres around the issue of the role of deposits and, more specifically, whether they 
should be treated as inputs or outputs. However, according to contemporary banking 
theory, the process of resource allocation is improved by financial intermediaries through 
the following functions that banks perform [Freixas and Rochet 1997]: 1- offering access 
to a payment system 2- transforming assets; 3- managing risk; 4- processing information 
and monitoring borrowers. In this sense, banks are typically multi-product firms in that 
their activities include at least the supplying of deposits, loans and securities, which in turn 
can be divided into various classes and provided in geographically different markets. f 
Moreover, many banking services are jointly produced so that certain kinds of costs are 
jointly related in the production of a variety of services. Thus, any efficiency measurement 
for the banking sector has to deal with the problem of the definition of inputs and outputs. 
In this" context, two main alternative methods are used with depending on different 
assumptions. According to the first approach, banks gather liquidity and savings in ordeito 
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produce loans and payment services (production approach). Hence, their outputs are 
measured by the number of deposits and loan accounts or by the operating costs used to 
produce these products. The underlying rationale is that depositors receive a service and 
banks employ resources to provide it: deposits are treated as outputs because in accepting 
deposits banks provide customers with value-added outputs in the form of clearing, record- 
keeping'and security services. It follows that only physical inputs, such as labour and 
capital and their costs should be included in the analysis. [see for example, Bauer et al. 
(1993); Berger et al. (1997)]. Given that these are hard to measure, research has focused 
from the beginning on the lending function of banks (Benston 1965), defining loans as 
outputs and deposits, labour and physical capital as inputs (intermediation approach). 
Under this alternative approach [see for example, Mester(1993 and 1996); Allen and Rai 
(1996); Molyneux et al. (1996); Berger and Mester (1997)], banks are considered as 
intermediaries between liability holders and those who receive bank funds, rather than 
producers of loan and deposits accounts services. As a consequence, the values of loans 
and other assets are defined as bank outputs, while deposits and other liabilities (capital 
and labour) are inputs to the production process. It follows that operating costs and 
financial expenses (interest on deposits) are the relevant components of total costs. 
Originally, this was the view of Sealey and Lindley (1977) who developed a model 
consistent with the neoclassical theory of the firm within which they analysed the role of 
production and costs for depository financial institutions. Sealey and Lindley (1977) 
reckoned that the individual banking firm's decision-making process focused on the 
production of earning assets where "loanable funde' borrowed from depositors and 
serviced by the firm are inputs together with labour and capital. Berger et al. (1997) 
maintain that under most circumstances, the intermediation approach is to be preferred for 
bank analysis because it is more inclusive and it captures the essence of a bank as a 
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financial intermediary. Despite this, they reckon that in analysis at the branch level, the 
production approach may be more appropriate because branches act primarily as producers 
of depositor services on behalf of the bank which then invests the funds in various assets. 
Thus, usually, each definition carries with it a particular set of banking concepts, relating 
to the production characteristics of the industry. In other words, when evaluating bank 
efficiency, the way output is defined and measured may influence considerably the results 
obtained, Berger and Humphrey (1997). Another problem that arises when dealing with 
production efficiency measurement is the distortion on prices induced by market power; 
firms operating in oligopolistic markets are not price takers; they face downward-sloping 
demand functions. But the price-taking assumption is essential when estimating cost 
functions, because the equivalence between cost and production function is guaranteed by 
duality theorems that rest on perfect competition assumptions. A proxy for market power, 
such as market share or a concentration index (the most widely used is the Herfindahl 
index) can be introduced as an independent variable. This way, the impact of market power 
is isolated and the omitted variable problem is dealt with. The other problem that a rises is 
the importance of output quality and management risk preferences when analysing cost and 
profit functions. if two firms produce similar goods of different quality, the one that 
produces higher quality goods will presumably have higher costs but also higher profits. if 
only cost efficiency is measured, this firm will be erroneously classified as inefficient. For 
the banking sector the problem is particularly relevant: the riskiness of loans can be 
proxied but there is no quality indicator for financial services. A measure of loan quality 
remains to be found. The traditional measure of riskiness, the ratio of bad loans to total 
loans, - 
I is correlated with managerial efficiency. Bad loans could be a consequence of 
sloppy monitoring; on the other hand, a downturn in the local economy could spur a 
growth in bad loans, which in turn cause a rise in costs and make the bank look inefficient 
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of compared to banks located in booming regions. In principle, if bad loans are exogenous 
to bad management, they should be included in the estimated function, so as to isolate their 
effect; if they are not, a separate study of the relationship between efficiency and bad loans 
should be conducted. 
5.7 A survev of the Empirical Literature on Bank Efriciencv: 
Ile focus on bank efficiency has spawned a substantial literature examining scale (size), scope 
(product mix) and productive efficiency (technical and economic efficiency). Generally speaking, 
research using banking data for periods before the mid-1980s found that scale economics tended 
to be apparent at relatively low asset size levels, but, became exhausted as size increased. More 
recent US and European studies, however, have found stronger evidence of economics of scale for 
large banks. Empirical estimates of scope econon-des in banking tend to be mixed - and not 
necessarily very reliable. The main empirical regularity that does appear widely in the efficiency 
literature, however, is that productive inefficiencies are much larger than scale economics. This 
means that banks can improve their overall efficiency to a greater extent by emulating industry 
best practice (by improving managerial efficiency and their use of technology) than by increasing 
their size. Goddard et al. (2001, p. 74). 
This section reviews the results of some of the major studies investigating economies of 
scale, economies of scope, and X-efficiency in US and European banking industry. 
Many studies have focused on the productivity and efficiency of banks, mostly based on 
American data, usually specifying translog cost function within an econometric 
framework. The first studies on production functions of banks were performed in the mid. 
sixties (Benstonl965) and this line of research is ongoing. Usually, bank efficiency studies 
can be divided intg those that examine scale and scope efficiency alone, and those that also 
examine X-efficiency. As Mester (1995, p. 3) notes: 
Bank efficiency studies can be divided into those that examine scale and eI en one, d Scope frci cy al an 
those that also examine X-cfriciency. The scale and scope studies estimate an average practice cost 
function, which relates bank cost to output levels and input prices. The technique implicitly assumes 
all banks in the sample arc using their inputs efficiently - in other words-, there is no 'X-inefricicncy" 
an that the banks are using the same production technology. The studies concerned with X-efficiency 
estimate a best practice costfunction, which represents the predicted cost function of banks that are 
X-efficient, and then measure the degree of inefficiency of banks in the sample relative to this best 
practice technology. 
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Results of these studies vary substantially; the majority of the US literature on economies 
of scale in banking markets has analysed the cost structures of relatively small banks and 
found that scale economies are usually exhausted somewhere around $100 million asset 
size. The survey articles by Gilbert (1984), Clark (1988) and the OECD (1992) support this 
overall finding. A handful of these studies (Gilligan and Smirlock, 1984; Gilligan et al., 
1984; Kolari and Zardkoohi, 1987) have also found scope economies, again for relatively 
small banks (a summary of the main scale and scope studies in US banking market are 
presented in table 5.1). More recent studies, however, have examined cost economies for 
large bank (or other financial institutions) and these have found slight evidence of 
economies of scale and scope, (see Hunter and Timme, 1986,1987; Shaffer, 1988; Evanoff 
and Israilivich, 1991; Hunter et al., 1990; Noulas et al., 1990, Mester, 1992,1993,1995, 
1996, Berger et al. 1993). Large banks exhibit economies of scale if small banks are 
omitted 
ýom the sample, which is in accordance with the problems derived from the use of 
a translog function. Scope economies are controversial; they are particularly hard to 
measure and sometimes the economies of scope found between different pairs of products 
are inconsistent with each other; in this case the interpretation of results is not 
straightforward. All in all, economies of scale appear to be small (with a maximum value 
of 10 percent: see McAllister and McManus 1993), while the diseconomies found for large 
banks, may well depend on the translog cost function specification. These results imply that 
"the functional form employed in these studies may not be capable of incorporating the 
technologies of both large and small banks together in a single model, or that some 
important factor that varies with bank size may be excluded from the model (Hannan, et al, 
1998). In general, it appears that the criticism of the translog cost functional form, that it is 
not capable of incorporating the technologies of both large and small banks together in a 
single model, is partially based on the inability of previous US studies to find strong 
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evidence of economies of scale for the largest banks, (Mester, 1996). Berger, Hancock et 
al. (1994) point out a major difficulty in the scale economies literature, namely that most 
studies did not use a frontier estimation method. In fact, they note that scale economies 
theoretically apply only to the efficient frontier, and the use of data from banks off the 
frontier could compound inefficiencies due to failure to achieve economies of scale with 
differences between firms in productive efficiency. However, since the mid-1980s, 
considerable attention has been devoted to the estimation of productive efficiency, (Bauer, 
et al. 1994). 
Several types of criticisms may be levelled against most of the recent scale economy literature. 
First, scale economies arc usually measured using data on all of the banks in the sample rather than 
just using the data on the most efficient banks. Scale economies theoretically apply only to the 
production possibilities frontier-where firms are fidly X-efficient and minimize costs for every scale 
of output. The use of data from banks other than those on the frontier could confound scale effects 
with differences in X-efficiency. Second, most studies measure only the scale economy effects of 
marginal changes in output near the point of evaluation. The commonly used definition of scale 
economics is the ratio of marginal cost to average cost taken along a ray that holds output mix 
constant Scale efficiencies, in contrast, take into account the full difference in my average costs 
between the point of evaluation and the scale-efficient point (the bottom of the U if the average cost 
function us U-shaped), which may be quite a distance away from the point of evaluation. Tilird, the 
finding that large and small banks do not appear to fit on the same parametric cost function as each 
other suggests that nonparametric methods might be more appropriate for examining scale economies. 
The commonly-spccified translog functional form forces large and small banks to lie on a U-shaped 
(or possibly flat) my average cost curve and disallows other possibilities, such as an average cost 
curve that falls up to some output point and remains flat thereafter. Thus, if there are strong economies 
for the smallest banks and flat average costs for larger banks, the filanslog form would likely 
incorrectly find measured scale diseconon-des for the largest banks. In addition, the tninslog 
approximation may behave poorly away from the mean product mix, which can create problems in 
measuring scale efficiencies because large banks tend to have very different product mixes from the 
average. Nonparametric estimation methods, such as Kernel regressions and Fourier Flexible forms 
allow the date more freedom to choose shapes for the average cost curve. Fourth, recent scale 
economy analyses generally do not take into account financial scale economies associated with risk 
reduction. As ba , 
nks grow larger, their loan portfolios generally become more diversified, lowering the 
amount of equity capital which must be held t keep the risk exposure of the bank's creditors 
(including the deposit insurer) at a given level. Because equity is the most expensive marginal source 
of funding, this creates a financial scale economy by which banks can lower their average costs of 
funds as scale increases by holding a smaller proportion of capital (to the extent that this is allowed by 
regulators. ). Berger et al. (94, p. 9) 
The literature on scope economies seems to be even more problematic. Berger et al. (1994) 
point out three major problems. First, the translog functional form, on which many studies 
have been based, is insufficiently flexible to describe an industry with increasing returns to 
scale up to. some point and constant returns thereafter. It also has difficulties when firms 
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tend to change product mix significantly as they change scale. The translog and the Box- 
Cox approximation perform poorly in estimating scope economies because they have 
trouble with estimations at or near zero. Second, there are often little or no data on firms 
that specialise. Third, it is difficult to evaluate scope to address these limitations. Berger et 
al (1994), proposed the concept of optimal scope economies, based on the profit function 
instead of the cost function. This incorporates the revenue effects of output choices as well 
as the cost effects of input choices, providing at least a partial solution to the above 
limitations. 
Compared with the US literature, the much smaller number of cost studies on European 
banking appears to reveal greater evidence of scale and, to a lesser extent, scope economies 
for larger banks (see table 5.2 for a summary of the main scale and scope studies in 
European baks). Levy-Garboua and Renard (1977) examine scale economies in French 
banking using a sample of 94 banks for 1974. The methodology combined the production 
and intermediation aýproach and their results suggested evidence of increasing returns to 
scale. These results for French banking-were later confirmed in two studies undertaken by 
Dietsch (1988 and 1993). Dietsch in 1988 adopted the intermediation approach for a cross- 
sectional analysis of 243 banks in 1986. Using the translog methodology this study 
concluded that as far as ray economies of scale were concerned, the elasticity of total costs 
with respect to bank output was close to unity (. 97). This study seemed to indicate that 
overall scale economies were rather limited. However, further analysis of costs associated 
with individual bank outputs suggested that there are significant potential scale economies 
to be had (that is, the partial elasticities of cost with respect to credits and deposits were 
equal to 0.56 and 0.23 respectively). Dietsch (1993) extended his previous analysis and 
examined both economies of scale and scope in the French banking markets. Using a 
sample of 343 banks for 1987, he found strong evidence of economies of scope in the 
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banking industry across all output ranges, whereas economies of scope were not observed 
at a high level for all combinations of outputs (that is, the cost complementarity coefficient 
for loans and investments was 0.093). Dietsch (p. 17) stated that "For the French banking 
industry, our results tend to demonstrate that universal banking gives an advantage 
compared to specialisation and that competition between banks in the future must be 
analysed on the ground of the imperfect competition theory". Cost economies studies in the 
UK have focused on the building society sector mainly because of the limited number of 
domestic commercial banks with similar business profiles. Hardwick (1990), using a 
two-output model, indicates that there are statistically significant scale economies for 
societies with assets under 1500 million yet there is no evidence of scope economies. 
Drake and Weyman-Jones (1992), using the same methodology but a different data sample 
(76 building societies in 1988), indicate mild economies of scale for societies in the 1120 
million to 1500 million assets size range but finds no evidence of economies of scope. 
Glass and McKillop (1992) use the data from one of the largest Irish banks, the Bank of 
Ireland, for the period 1972-90 to estimate a hybrid translog model. They investigate the 
process of natural and non-natural technical change, overall scale economies, product- 
specific scale economies, and scope economies. Their results show that, apart from the 
sub-period 1975-8, the bank was characterised by overall diseconomies of scale, whereas 
product-specific scale economies were reported to be decreasing for investments and 
increasing for loans. Also, the estimated cost function showed diseconomies of scope over 
the production of two outputs. The estimated parameters reflected technical change in the 
Bank of Ireland, which was both natural and non-natural in character (the average annual 
overall rate being 4.96 percent). Additionally, a positive interaction between scale 
economies and technical change is indicated. Casu and Girardone (1998) found that slight 
scale economies existed in the Italian banking market, and that banking groups realised 
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greater scope economies compared with non-group banks. These findings are in line with 
other studies that found strong evidence of scope economies for large banks in many 
European banking sectors (European Commission, 1997). 
Several studies have investigated scale and scope economies across European banking 
markets. Molyneux et al. (1996) used the hyprid translog cost function to examine 
economies of scale and scope in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. There were noticeable 
differences in cost characteristics between countries. Scope and scale economies appeared 
to be evident in each country, however, over a wide range of bank output levels. The 
European Commission (1997) also investigated the cost characteristics of various 
European banking sectors, while assessing the potential gains brought about by the 1992 
Single Market Programme (SMP). In all countries, there was evidence of both economies 
and diseconornies of scale. The preponderance of increasing returns to scale was found 
mainly for small banks, particularly in Germany and France. The existence of 
diseconomies of scale in several size bands suggested that with the existing distribution of 
banks and current technology, the opportunities from exploiting economies of scale might 
be quite limited. There was clear potential for an SNIP effect in that substantial economies 
of scale existed. 
Strong evidence of large economies of scope was also found for Europe's largest banks. 
Vander Vennet (1998), however, found that scale economies existed only for the smallest 
banks, with assets under ECU 10 billion, with constant returns thereafter and diseconomies 
for the largest bank, with assets exceeding ECU 100 billion. Vander Vennet suggests that 
the bank sizes for which no diseconornies are found are higher than in the 1980s, a result 
that was also reported for US banks by Berger and Mester (1997). Altunbas, Gardener et 
al. (2001) estimate scale economies, efficiency and rates of technical change for a large 
sample of European banks between 1989 and 1997 (a summary of the main scale and 
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scope studies in European banks are presented in table 5.2). The results reveal that scale 
economies are widespread across different countries, and that they increase with bank size. 
Cost elasticities with respect to output range between 90% and 95%, suggesting that cost 
penalties of between 5% and 10% are incurred through failing to realise economies of 
scale. In any case, beside the problems of heterogeneity of the samples used, the 
specification issues, and the disputes on estimation methods, it remains true that the results 
depend on the assumption that all firms are on the efficient frontier; otherwise, the omitted 
variable (efficiency) introduces a bias in the results because it is correlated with other 
variables, for example banks'size. 
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So far, the above brief literature review focuses on the empirical literature on bank scale 
and scope economies in US and EU markets, yet recent academic literature, such as Berger 
et al. (1993,94,1995,1997), has drawn attention to what appears to be more important 
source of inefficiency, that is "X-inefficiency". 
There is virtual consensus in the literature that X-efficiency across banks are relatively large and 
dominate both scale and scope efficiency differences. The X-inefficiencies are usually found to be 
primarily technical in nature, meaning that inputs are simply overused, rather than allocative, meaning 
that the choice of inputs was a poor reaction to the prices faced. However, there is no consensus on the 
best method for estimating X-efficiency or on the average level of X-cfficiency of the banking 
industry. Berger et al. (1997, p. 11). 
Research on banking efficiency has grown substantially over the last decade. For instance, 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) review more than 130 studies on efficiency in the financial 
sector for 21 countries. In general, the results are sensitive to the method of estimation, the 
distributional assumptions for the residuals and in the course of parametric estimation the 
fiinctional form adopted. Pooling all results, Berger and Humphrey find that the average 
level of efficiency is 79 percent, (median 83 percent), with standard error of 13 percent. 
Usually, non-parametric results show lower efficiency levels and a higher dispersion than 
results derived from studies that estimate stochastic frontiers, because non-parametric 
techniques do not incorporate any form of randomness into the inefficiency measure. More 
specifically, Berger and Humphrey (1997) found that for the US studies that used DEA and 
other non-parametric methods, the average efficiency score was 0.72 overall. The standard 
deviation of efficiencies in these studies was 0.17, and the efficiencies ranged between 
0.31 and 0.97. The average efficiency scores for the non-US studies that used non- 
parametric methods was 0.71. Studies that employed parametric methods reported an 
overall mean efficiency of 0.84 for the US banking, with a standard deviation of 0.06, and 
efficiency estimates ranging between 0.61 and 0.95. As Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
pointed out, however, the similarity in average efficiency values across different methods 
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does not carry over strongly into similarities in the efficiency of rankings of individual 
firms. This suggests that the confidence intervals surrounding individual firm or branch 
efficiency estimates are substantial (a summary of the main X-efficiency studies in US 
banking are presented in table 5.3). 
Application of efficiency analysis seek not only to provide information for policy makers 
(identifying the efficiency implications of deregulation, financial institution failure, 
mergers, and so on) but also to investigate a host of other issues, such as those relating to 
corporate control and the impact of risk on efficiency (Altunbas et al., 2000; Altunbas, 
Evans et al., 2001). 
Some studies have investigated the stability of bank efficiency over time, while others 
have suggested ways to help managers improve performance. Any classification of the 
studies according to the specific issues they raise is to some extent arbitrary, since the 
conclusions drawn are often of interest to more than a single party (Goddard et al., 2001, 
p. 127). Moreover, the distinction between studies that employ parametric and non- 
parametric approaches has recently started to become blurred, as increasing attention has 
been devoted to comparisons between different methods (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Giokas, 
1991; Ferrier et al., 1994; DeBorger et al., 1995; Resti, 1997; Eisenbeis et al., 1996; Casu 
and Girardone, 1998). Applying parametric and non-parametric methods to the same 
sample, Ferrier and Lovell (1990) find a rank correlation of 0.02, while Eisenbeis, Ferrier 
and, Kwan find the highest value of the Spearman index at 0.59. The different ranking of 
banks according to different estimation techniques implies that for policy purposes only the 
average data, that seem to converge, can be of any relevance; and research based on 
individual levels of efficiency will be flawed by the instability of these levels. 
Furthermore, international comparisons are difficult. If the frontier is estimated separately 
for each country, - the inefficiency measure obtained is a national one, not 'directly 
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comparable across countries. If a joint frontier is estimated, noise is introduced because of 
the different economic and regulatory environments that hold for each country of the 
sample. Pastor et al. (1997) carried out international comparisons by defining a common 
frontier that incorporated various country-specific environmental conditions. The common 
frontier is built under the assumption that the environment is likely to differ across 
countries more than banking technology. To test this hypothesis, DEA efficiency scores for 
each European country were obtained from a common frontier with and without 
environmental variables. With environmental variables omitted, the average efficiency 
scores were lower than then these variables were included. Overall, the results indicated 
that there were three groups: Denmark Spain, Germany, Luxembourg and France had the 
highest average efficiency scores between 1.00 and 0.88; the Netherlands, Belgium, the 
UK and Portugal had average efficiency scores between 0.69 and 0.56; and Italy had the 
lowest average efficiency score (0.35). Dietsch and Weill (1998) used unconsolidated 
accounting data of 
ý61 commercial, mutual and savings banks from II EU countries 
covering the period 1992-96 to estimate changes in efficiency and productivity. Overall, 
the results suggested an increase in efficiency when measured using both a cost and a 
profit frontier. This trend, however, was not observed in all countries: France, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the UK experienced decreasing efficiency measured in terms of costs. 
Productivity results showed an increase in total productivity, mainly due to technological 
change. Overall, European integration appeared to have had a small but positive effect on 
efficiency in banking prior to 1996. 
Vander Vennet (1998), compared the efficiencies of European universal and specialist 
banks measured in both cost and revenue terms. Using a sample of 2375 European Union 
banks from 17 countries for the years 1995 and 1996, Vander Vennet finds that in terms of 
revenues, financial conglomerates are more efficient than their specialised competitors, and 
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universal banks are more efficient than non-universal banks. In estimates based on 
traditional intermediation outputs (loans and securities), the average bank incurred costs 
30% higher than the most efficient bank. In estimates based on non-traditional outputs 
(interest and non-interest revenue), the corresponding average inefficiency score was 20%. 
For diversified banks, inefficiency is uncorrelated with size; however, small specialised 
banks appear to be relatively inefficient. Vander Vennet's results are broadly in accordance 
with Allen and Rai's (1996) cross-country comparison of universal versus specialist 
banking systems. Maudos et al. (1999) examined efficiency for a sample of banks from II 
EU countries with data covering the period 1993-96 using cluster analysis to group banks 
according to specialisation, efficiency estimates increased when separate frontiers were 
estimated for each cluster, instead of estimating a common frontier for all bank. Using the 
cost frontier, the average efficiency score for the whole sample was 0.44, compared with 
0.74 when estimation of separate frontiers was carried out. Differences in product mix 
therefore seem to be important in explaining efficiency. Altunbas, Gardener et al. (2001) 
used a Fourier-flexible functional form to estimate a stochastic cost frontier from which 
estimates of scale economies, productive inefficiencies and technical change were obtained 
for a sample of European banks covering the period 1988-95. The country estimates 
revealed that the relative inefficiency of various banking sectors (Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Italy and the UK) increased over time. On average, inefficiencies appeared to be 
around 25%. Inefficiency was more variable across countries and bank size bands and over 
time than the scale economy estimates. Molyneux (2002) examines the impact of technical 
change on European bank costs and profits between 1992 and 2000. The estimate suggest 
that technological change reduced the total costs of European banks at an average rate of 
3.8% per annum. However, technical change reduced profits by 0.45% annually over the 
same period. As found in an earlier study by Altunbas et al (1999) pure and non-neutral 
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components of technical change appear to have contributed most to the reduction in total 
cost and the fall in profits. Large banks and commercial banks are found to experience the 
smallest cost reductions but the largest profit gains from technical change. Banking 
systems that experienced the smallest cost reductions seem to have experienced the biggest 
profit gains. In general, the results indicate that technical change can have a differential 
effect on bank costs and profits. While technology can reduce costs as well as increase the 
revenue earning capacity of banks it seems that some banks focus on the former and others 
the latter. Large cost reductions may feed through into poorer service quality and lower 
earning capacity and this is presumably why those banks that gained the most on the cost 
side seem to suffer in terms of profitability. Those banks that appear to have small 
reductions (or increases) in cost as a result of technical change see to gain most in terms of 
profits. The results suggest that there may be a clear trade-off between how technology is 
implemented in terms of whether the focus is primarily on cost reduction or revenue (and 
therefore profits) growth. These findings confirm the recent findings on US banking of 
Berger and Mester (2002) who show that reductions in cost productivity between 1991 and 
1997 resulted in increases in profit productivity. They argue that banks increased their cost 
productivity to improve service quality that was reflected in greater profits. Finally, 
Altunbas, Carbo, Gardener and Molyneux extend the approach suggested by Altunbas, 
Evans and Molyneux (2001) to investigate ownership and efficiency issues in banking. 
They estimate cost and alternative profit efficiencies for a large sample of commercial, co- 
operative and savings banks operating in Europe and the US. Overall they find that 
commercial banks tend to be less cost efficient but more profit efficient than their mutual 
sector competitors. The higher costs incurred by the commercial bank sector appear to be 
reflected in higher revenues. Large banks also appear to be more profit efficient than 
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smaller banks from the same ownership category. (A summary of the main European X- 
efficiency Studies are presented in table 5.4). 
While scale, scope and X-efficiency have been studied extensively, specially in the context 
of US and recently EU financial institutions, however, more recently, attention has been 
paid to measuring efficiency in other banking markets. For example Fukuyama used non- 
parametric analysis (DEA) to estimate efficiency in Japanese banks for the years 1989- 
1991. The main finding was that average annual efficiency was 46%. Schaffinit, Rosen and 
Paradi use DEA analysis and data on 291 Ontario based branches of a large Canadian 
bank, subdivided into four groups according to size for 1993. Main finding was that overall 
average efficiency was 0.72 %. AIjarrah, (2002) investigate efficiency in Arabian banking 
markets used a Fourier-flexible functional form to estimate a stochastic cost frontier from 
which estimates of productive inefficiencies were obtained for a sample of 82 banks of 
four Arabian countries (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan) covering the period 
1992-2000. The estimate revealed that on average, inefficiencies estimates appeared to be 
around 5%. Recently Lui, Molyneux, Sith and Altunbas investigate the impact of risk and 
quality factors on banks' cost by using stochastic cost frontier methodology to evaluate 
SI cale and X-inefficiencies, as well as technical change for a sample of Japanese 
commercial banks between 1993 and 1996. The main findings are that optimal bank size is 
considerably smaller when risk and quality factors are taken into account when modelling 
the cost characteristics of Japanese banks. (a summary of the main X-efficiency studies in 
other banking markets are presented in table 5.5). 
All in all, Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest that there is a clear need for more work in 
the area of international comparisons. In Europe, it is a topic of growing interest in view of 
the trend towards closer integration of national markets in financial services as a result of 
the SNP and European Monetary Union (EMU) 
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5.8 Conclusion: 
in this chapter we presented a theoretical overview of the banking efficiency literature. 
Reasons for examining efficiency in the banking industry are highlighted. We also provide 
definitions for the concepts of X-efficiency, scale and scope economies and draw attention 
to the significance of empirical efficiency studies in US and European banking markets. 
We show how overall productive efficiency can be decomposed into technical and 
allocative efficiency. Concerning the empirical findings of the bank efficiency literature, 
the chapter shows that X-efficiency dominates scale and scope economies. The chapter 
also reviews both the parametric and non-parametric approaches utilised in the banking 
literature to measure efficiency. The main differences between parametric and non- 
parametric are discussed and the advantages of parametric efficiency approaches 
highlighted. The chapter also outlined the theoretical underpinnings of the empirical 
economies of scale and scope studies. Moreover, it shows that banks are defined as multi- 
product, multi-plant and multi-input firms, since they engage in the production of various 
services utilising factors of production as diverse as labour, capital equipment and deposits. 
Empirical studies face various problems when they examine the cost structure of these 
firms. Such problems relate to; the definition of output and bank total cost; the cost concept 
of multiproduct firms; and the functional form of the cost (or Profit) functions that are used 
to derive efficiency measures. The chapter also shows that there is still no agreement as to 
the definition and measurement of bank inputs and outputs. In general, two main 
approaches labelled the "intermediation approach" and the "production approach" have 
been adopted to define financial firm input and output relationships. 
The following chapter presents the statistical methodology and the general framework 
adopted in this thesis to analyse the influence of market-power and efficient-structure 
variables on GCC banks' profitability. 
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Chapter Six: The Modelling Framework 
6.1 Introduction: 
Ile Structure-Conduct-Perforniance (SCP) relationship has been extensively researched in the 
industrial organization literature and in the financial area for'several decades. Most of these 
studies have centred on the US banking industry. In recent years the SCP relationship has been 
investigated in the European banking industry. Most of this literature has focused on how the 
market structure influences bank performance within one single financial market structure. 
However, there are very few studies that analyse the SCP model across banking markets. This 
study attempts to remedy this imbalance by extending the current SCP literature by examining 
the banking industries of six member states of the Gulf Co-operation Council, (GCC) these 
include: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, and Kuwait. 
Following Berger (1995) the study also analyses two market power hypotheses and two 
ve I rsions of the efficient-structure hypotheses, across these six banking markets. As far as we 
are aware there has been no previous structure-performance studies on the banking industry of 
the GCC states. Further, in addition to the standard accounting profitability measures which 
are widely used in the structure-performance, literature, this study utilize a parametric 
profitability measure [this is the alternative profitability estimates (APX)]. As far as we are 
a. ware this is the first study to use parametric measures of profit efficiency in the structure- 
performance literature. 
This chapter describes the methodology that will be used to examine SCP relationships in 
GCC member states banking markets. The next section describes the general modelling 
framework. Section 6.3 will investigate the variables used in the study. Section 6.4 details the 
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model specification and the variables employed in the empirical analysis. The final section 6.5 
is the conclusion 
6.2The General Model: 
Berger (19ý5) refined and re-tested the theoretical underpinning of the positive statistical 
profit-structure relationship in banking by including direct measures of efficiency for the two 
versions of the efficient-structure hypotheses. His study was unique, because not only did he 
consider, the traditional SCP model, which suggested that the positive profit-structure 
relationship reflects the setting of prices that are less favourable to consumers (low deposit 
rates, high loan rates), in more concentrated markets, and the Relative Nlarket Power model 
(RNP), which states that only large firms, with large market shares and well differentiated 
products, are able to exercise market power in pricing these products thereby earning 
supernormal profits. He also outlined the two efficiency explanations of the positive 
relationship between profits and either concentration or market share, these are the X- 
efficiency version of the efficient-structure hypotheses (ESX) and the scale-efficiency version 
of the efficient-structure hypotheses (ESS). Under the former, firms with superior 
management or production technologies have lower costs and higher profits than firms lacking 
these skil Is. These firms are also assumed to gain large market shares, which may result in 
higher, levels of concentration. The latter states that some firms produce at more efficient 
levels than others which result in lower unit costs and higher profit levels. Again, such firms 
are assumed to gain larger market shares resulting in higher concentration ratios. However, 
under both efficient-structure hypotheses, the positive profit-structure relationship is spurious, 
rather than of direct origin, with efficiency driving both profits and market structure. This 
study builds upon the work undertaken by Berger (1995), who created and implemented tests 
that distinguish among these hypotheses as they apply to the banking industry. 
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Many studies in the banking literature and in the more general industrial organization literature find a 
positive statistical relationship between profitability and measures of market structure-either 
concentration or market share. The traditional structure-conduct-performance hypothesis (SCP) asserts 
that this finding reflects the setting of prices that are less favourable to consumers (lower deposit rates, 
higher loan rates) in more concentrated markets as a result of competitive imperfection in these markets. A 
related theory is the relative-market-power hypothesis (RW), which asserts that only firms with large 
market shares and well-differentiated products are able to exercise market power in pricing these products 
and cam supernormal profits. In contrast to these two market-power theories, there are also two efficiency 
explanations of the positive relationship between profits and either concentration or market share, that is, 
of the positive profit-strucWre relationship. Under the X-efficicncy version of the cfficicnt-structure 
hypothesis (ESX), firms with superior management or production technologies have lower costs and 
therefore higher profits. These firms are also assumed to gain large market shares that may result in high 
levels of concentration. Here, the positive profit-structure relationship is spurious, rather than of direct 
origin, with efficiency driving both profits and market structure. Under the scalc-cfficiency version of the 
efficient-structure hypothesis (ESS), firms simply produce at more efficient scales than others, and 
therefore have lower unit costs and higher unit profits. These firms are assumed to have large market 
shares that may result in high levels of concentration, again yielding a positive profit-structure relationship 
as a spurious outcome. The purpose of this paper is to create and implement tests that distinguish among 
these hypothesis as they apply to banking. These theories have been tested in numerous previous studies 
using both banking and intcr-industry data without a consensus arising, the results have been difficult to 
interpret because efficiency variables, particularly X-efficiency or managerial efficiency measures, have 
generally been excluded from the analyses, we attempt to distinguish among all four hypothesis by using 
direct measures of both market structure and efficiency, the tests are flexible in the sense that all four 
hypothesis, SCP, RNT, ESX, and ESS represented by different variables, so that any or all of them may 
be found to be consistent with data. Berger (1995, p. 404 -5). 
The results, presented later, will concentrate on the four hypotheses within Berger's structureý 
using a multiple regression analysis to test the effects of concentration, market share, bank x- 
efficiency, and scale-efficiency on bank profitability in GCC banking markets. Furthermore, 
our study will adopt the stochastic frontier analysis technique and specify a translog functional 
form which is commonly used in banking literature to capture GCC bank's cost and profit X- 
efficiency scores and scale efficiencies. The profit X-e iciency est tes (APX) derived from ff ima 
stochastic and translog functional form will be used as a dependent variable in addition to the 
standard accounting profitability measures these are the return on equity (ROE) and the return 
on Assets (ROA) to test for the efficiency determinants 
in GCC banking systems. Moreover, 
the panel data used in the study covers six separate countries, this allows for an assessment of 
estimates of the hypothesised relationships after taking 
into account country differences. 
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Following Berger (1995) the reduced form equation that explain the profitability per unit of 
output is as follows: 
7ri = f(CONC, M%. X-EFFi, S-EFFi, Z. ) + ei ............... 6.1 
Where = is a profit measure, usually a standard profit measure (ROE, and ROA) (our study 
also will utilise the alternative profit X-efficiency measure (APX) as a profitability measure). 
CONC is some market concentration measure, MS is an individual bank market share 
measure, X-EFF relates to the bank X-efficiency measure, S-EFF is a scale-efficiency 
measure, and Z are a vector of control variables, capturing other firm and market-specific 
differences, e is random error, in indexes the market, and i indexes the banks in market m. 
This may be viewed as the reduced form for n of all four hypotheses, the traditional structure- 
conduct-performance hypothesis (SCP), the relative-market-pOwer hypothesis (RW), the X- 
efficiency hypothesis (ESX), and the scale-efficiency hypothesis (ESS), with some of the 
explanatory variables irrelevant for some of the hypotheses (Berger, 1995). Under the 
efficient-structure (ES) hypothesis, the coefficient of the appropriate (EFF) variable is 
positive, and the coefficients of all the other key variables are either relatively small or zero. 
CONC and MS, although endogenous in the ES model, may be included but should be found 
to have no explanatory power. T'heir irrelevance stems from their logical ordering in the 
model, since they are correlated with 7r only because they reflect the effects of EFF and Z, 
which are controlled for in this equation. Similarly, under the NW hypothesis, the appropriate 
market structure variables, CONC or MS, have positive coefficients. For instance, if only 
RMP holds, CONC has zero coefficient because CONC is only spuriously related to R through 
its correlation with MS. Under NW, the EFF are appropriate exogenous variables, but are just 
viewed as relatively unimportant, (Berger, 1995). Note that the reduced form in equation (6.1) 
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allows all four hypotheses to be valid simultaneously. To the extent that any of the key 
variables have positive estimated coefficients, this may be taken as evidence of the marginal 
contribution of the corresponding hypothesis. 
An important limitation of the reduced-form profit equation is that it tests only one of the two 
necessary conditions of the ES hypotheses. "In order to explain the profit-structure 
relationship spuriously, both profits and the market structure variables must be positively 
related to efficiency" Berger (1995, p 412). 
This requires estimates of the reduced forms for CONC and MS from the ES model: 
CONC. =f( X-EFFj, S-EFFj Z. ) +e,, f,, al i j,, . 6.2 
MSj, =f (X-EFFj, S-EFFi, Zij +ej, 6.3 
And test whether the EFF coefficients are positive. 
Several variations on the above model specification have been used in the study of the 
relationship between market structure and performance [see among others, Smirlock (1985); 
Evanoff et al. (198 8); Hannan, et al, (199 1)] . Particularly in the US market and to some extent 
in UK and other countries of EU. NIAny of these studies regress profitability on concentration 
and market share and find similar results, but interpret them very differently. Some argue that 
the common findings of a positive, dominating coefficient estimate for market share and 
insignificant coefficient for concentration justifies acceptance of the RMP, which for example 
relates market share to market power (Shepherd 1986a. Kurts and Rhoades 1991). Others 
argue that these findings support ESY, since market share may be positively related to X- 
efficiency under (ESX) in the absence of any direct measure of x-efficiency in the equation. 
For instance, leading researchers such as Smirlock (1985), Evanoff and Fortier (1988) and 
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Molyneux and Thoronton (1992) included proxies measures of efficiency, where the market 
share variable is assumed to capture firm specific characteristics, rather than using a direct 
measure. Other studies (Berger and Hannan 1989, HannanI 991) have tested the market-power 
(XV) hypotheses alone by examining the price-concentration relationship without the benefit 
of efficiency variables. Prices are regressed against concentration and/or market share, and a 
finding of less favourable prices for consumers of firms in more concentrated markets or with 
larger market shares is taken as support for the appropriate NT hypotheses. In this study, direct 
efficiency measures obtained from a stochastic frontier analysis are incorporated into the 
model Berger (1995, p. 406), identified two reasons that are used to justify the inclusion of 
direct measures of both x-efficiencies and scale efficiencies in the SCP framework. 
Firstly because indirect measures of scale efficiencies have often been specified that do not allow 
for U-shaped average cost curves; 
Secondly the implications of the ES hypotheses regarding the effects of efficiency on market 
structure have never been tested, A necessary condition for the ES hypotheses to be true is that 
efficiency be positively related to concentration and/or market share. Again, direct measures of 
efficiency are needed for this task. 
6.3 Variable Selection: 
In order to investigate the relationship between profits, concentration, market share and 
efficiency we follow an approach similar to Berger (1995). The choice of variables used in our 
estimation depends on data available on Bank Scope, the International Bank Credit Analysis 
Ltd (113CA), a London-based bank credft-rating agency and data published by GCC central 
banks, the M, and the other financial institutions of the six states under study. A sample of 
balance sheet and income statement data of GCC member states banks was taken over the 
period from 1995 to 1999. Standardised year-end accounting data for the banks were obtained 
from International Bank Credit Analysis Ltd (IBCA), and the variables chosen were classified 
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into groups according to the specification of the general model discussed above (see chapter 7 
for a detailed discussion of the data). 
63.1 Performance Measures: 
Most SCP studies also experience difficulties in measuring structure and performance variables 
adequately. Using the price of a single banking product as a measure of performance may be misleading 
because most large banks are multi-product firms. Profit measures may be more informative in this 
respect, but may also be more difficult to interpret because of the complexity of the accounting procedures 
involves. Goddard et A (2001, p. 73). 
The three main performance measures used for our analysis are pre-tax return on assets 
(ROA), Pre-tax return on equity (ROE), and the alternative profit efficiency estimates derived 
from the alternative profit function. ROA and ROE are standard accounting performance 
measures widely used in the empirical banking literature (Hannan et al, 1998). These 
accounting measures are used in favour of market-value measures for two main reasons. First, 
many of the banks in our sample do not have publicly quoted equity on which market-based 
estimates could be made. Secondly, ROA and ROE are generally regarded as the most 
appropriate overall bank performance measures (Sinkeyl992). Gilbert (1984) identified that 
th e only measures of bank performance obtained from bank financial accounts that do not 
have major measurement problems are bank profit rates. Others, such as Rhoades (1981, 
1985a, 1985b) and Evanoff and Fortier (1988), provide support for the use of profitability 
measures to account for the performance of banks. In addition to use these "standard" 
performance measures we also use alternative profit efficiency measures as another indicator 
of bank performance. These we derive from estimates of a stochastic pro it ontier that uses f fr 
the same independent variables as the cost frontier but replaces total cost with profit, as 
authored in Berger and Mester (1998) this provides us with a parametric estimate of profit 
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efficiency which can be compound to the results derived from standard profit measures. 
However, as far as we are aware, this is the first study used alternative profit efficiency 
estimates as profitability measures in structure-performance studies. 
SCP studies generally can be divided into two groups according to the measure of 
performance that they use (Wilson, et al, 2001). The first group uses some measure of the 
price of certain banking products and services in order to capture the performance of the firmi, 
while the second group uses some kind of profitability measure, such as return on assets or 
return on equity. Evanoff and Fortier (1988) suggest a number of reasons why the ROA 
measure is preferable to other profit measures. Firstly, although some studies have used bank 
product prices as the dependent variable, banking is a multi-product business and individual 
prices may be misleading. Prices can only be used if costs directly associated with these prices 
are explicitly accounted for as explanatory variables, 'even then, given the regulatory 
constraints on the industry, the expected structure-price relationship may not be realised for a 
particular service because of differing pricing strategies among banks' (Evanoff and Fortier, 
1988, p. 281). Secondly, the potential for significant cross-subsidisation between products 
obviously exist and pricing strategy would differ across markets. As a result, the use of profit 
measures should eliminate many of these potential problems. Recent studies, for example, by 
Molyneux and Thoronton(1992), Molyneux and Forbes (1995), Berger (1995), Goldberg and 
Rai (1996), provide support for the use of these profitability measures as opposed to other 
product price. measures. 
profitability measures, where all product profit and losses are consolidated into one figure, are 
generally viewed as more suitable because they by-pass the problem of cross-subsidization. 
Molyneux and Forbes (1995, p 156). 
ROA is generally regarded as a more satisfactory measure because of the significant discretion 
that individual banks in different countries have in dividing capital between debt and equity. 
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Equity values may not be comparable across countries between banks, therefore bank assets is 
a more common denominator. However, difficulty in identifying the objectives of bank 
owners and managers may also tend to make SCP relationships tenuous (Molyneux, et al 
2001). For example, if banks are sacrificing potential profits in order to reduce risk by 
investing in more secure activities, then researchers should be more interested in variability in 
profit and not in profit per se (Neuberger, 1998). Alternatively, if managers are maximizing 
utility through expense preference behaviour, then large banks in concentrated markets will 
not necessarily make abnormal profit (Berger and Hannan, (1998). Indeed Berger (1995) 
argues that many of the regression models used to test SCP relationship may be mis-specified 
due to omitted variables. Berger et al. 1997. p. 23 notes that: 
The dependent variable in the profit functions is essentially the return on equity, or ROE, achieved by 
the bank (normalized by prices and with a constant added). Or a measure of how well the bank is 
using its scarce financial capital. This measure may be closer to the goal of the bank than maxi iig 
the level of profits, particularly in banking, which is one of the most highly financially levered 
industries. Shareholders are interested in their irate of return on equity, which is approximated by 
ROE, and most debtholders do not put much pressure on banks to earn profits because their return are 
guaranteed by deposit insurance. 
Of course, neither of the above measures is ideal (Goddard, et al. 2001). For example, if banks 
with monopoly power have higher capital-to-asset ratios, because they are more conservative 
or they have generated larger absolute profits over time and have retained these funds, their 
ratios of profits to capital may be low, even though their net return on assets is high. 
63.2 Concentration Measures: 
Theoretical market structures have a multidimentional array of defining characteristics, including the 
number and size distribution of firms, the extent of product differentiation, and the size of entry barriers. 
Nevertheless, much empirical research into the link between market structure and the behaviour and 
performance of firms tends to rely heavily on a number of alternative measures of the first of these 
characteristics, the number and size distribution of firms. No doubt the emphasis on this aspect of 
structure is influenced strongly by the relative ease with which firm size distributions can be observed and 
quantified, in comparison with some of the other structural characteristics. 
Moluneux et al. (2001, p. 30). 
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Following Berger (1995) we choose to use a three-firm. assets concentration ratio as a measure 
of market structure. Berger also used the Herfindahl index and the three-firm Herfindahl index 
and obtained similar results to these given by the three-firm deposits concentration ratio. 
However, while theory suggests that there may be a link between the level of output controlled 
by the largest firms and profitability there is no agreement as to the exact number of firms 
needed for this relationship to be established. In previous SCP studies, the majority of authors 
appear to have chosen arbitrarily a three-firm concentration raiio (Goddard, et al, 2001). This 
implies equal impact by the three leading firms, although nothing in theory suggests that the 
behaviour of the largest three firms is all-important to market performance or that their relative 
impact is uniform (Hannan, et al, 1998). 
Among the most important characteristics that define the four main theoretical market structures are 
the number of firms, the degree of product differentiation, and the height of barriers to entry. The 
number and size distribution of firms are usually the most easily quantified aspects of market 
structure. Defining what constitutes the "market" is, of course, problematic in banking, in view of the 
multiproduct nature of the modern-day financial services firm. Nevertheless, the most commonly used 
measures are the three-firm or five-firm deposits or assets concentration ratio (Molyncux ct al., 
1996, p. 93), 
63.3 Market Power Variables: 
In this study market share is used as a proxy for market power. Two measures for market share 
are calculated. The first measure is the ratio of individual bank, s loans to the market total 
loans calculated as, the individual bank's total loans divided by the market total loans. The 
second measure is the ratio of individual bank's deposits to the total market deposits 
calculated as that individual bank's deposits divided by the total market deposits. Following 
Berger (1995), the positive findings of these measures will support the relative market power 
I hypotheses, (RNT). 
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63.4. Derivation of the X-Efficiency and Scale Efficiency Measures: 
63.4.1 Derivation of the Cost X-Efficiency 
As discussed in detail in the previous chapter, a large number of studies have measured firm- 
specific x-efficiency in banking, yielding a wide variety of estimates (see Berger and 
Humphrey 1997). The most important difference among the methods used in these studies has 
been the handling of the difficult problem of disentangling inefficiencies from short-term 
differences in luck or measurement error that temporarily give banks relatively high or low 
costs or input requirements. The most common efficiency estimation techniques are data 
env elo I pment analysis (DEA), free disposable hull analysis (FDH), the stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA), the thick frontier approach (TTA), and the distribution-free approach (DFA). 
The first two of these are nonparametric techniques and the latter three are parametric 
methods'. ý Data envelopment analysis (DEA) assumes that there is no random error, so that all 
unexplained variation in costs reflects inefficiency [Aly, Grabowskiý Pasurka, Rangan, (1990), 
Elyasiani and Mehdian (1990), Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Fare, Grosskoff, and Lovell (1994), 
Sengupta (2000)]. The econometric (Stochastic) Frontier Approach (SFA) assumes that 
inefficiencies typically follow an asymmetric half-normal distribution, while random errors 
follow a symmetric normal distribution [ Ferrier and Lovel (1990), Bauer, Berger, and 
Humphrey, (1992), Cebenoyan et A0 993), Mester (1996), Allen and Rai 0 996), Altunbas, 
Liu, Molyneux and Seth (2000), Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000)]. The Thick Frontier Approach 
(TFA) assumes that cost differences within the highest and lowest average cost quartiles of 
banks primarily represents random error, while differences between these quartiles primarily 
reflect ý efficiency differences [Berger and Humphrey (1991 ab), Bauer. Berger, and 
]Flumphrey(I 992)]. 
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The nonparametric methods generally ignore prices and can, therefore, account only for technical 
inefficiency in using too many inputs or producing too few outputs. They cannot account for allocative 
incfficiency in misresponding to relative prices in choosing inputs and outputs. Nor can they compare 
firria that tend to specialize in different inputs or outputs, because there is no way to compare one input or 
output with another without the benefit of relative prices. In addition, similar to the cost function, there is 
no way to determine whether the output being produced is optimal without value information on the 
outputs. Thus, the nonparametric techniques typically focus on technological optimisation rather than 
economic optimisation, and do not correspond to the cost and profit efficiency concept. 
Mester, et aL (1997, p. 11). 
Following Mester (1996), and Allen and Rai (1996), Altunbas, Molyneux, Liu, and 
Seth (2000), this study uses the stochastic cost frontier methodology specifying a 
translog functional form to estimate cost and profit X-efficiencies and Scale- 
efficiencies for the GCC member states banking markets. This stochastic frontier 
approach that is used follows the lines suggested by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 
(1977) and Meeusen and van den Boerck (1977). This approach labels a bank as 
ineffi. cient if its costs (profits) are higher (lower) than those predicted for an efficient 
bank producing the same combination of input and output and if the difference can not 
be explained away by statistical noise. 
The possibility remains that a producer will end up above the deterministic kernel of an 
estimated production, revenue, or profit frontier, or beneath an estimated cost frontier due to an 
unusually favourable operating environment. Thus an unfavourable operating environment is 
just as likely to occur as is a favourable operating environment, and this causes a producer to 
end up beneath, or above each of the previous senses. but it is-considerably more likely that 
failure to optimise in each of the senses discussed previously also causes a producer to end up 
beneath an estimated, production, revenues, or profit frontier or above an estimated cost 
frontier. 
Kurnbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 3). 
For the ith firm, the single equation cost function model is represented in natural logs 
by; 
In TQ 
,= 
In TC(QiP4KB) +ei, 6.4 
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Where TCj, is the observed total cost of production for bank i, Q, -, is the vector of banking 
output for bank L Pi, is the vector of input prices for bank LK is the level of equity included as 
a control variable for risk, and B is a vector of parameters need to be estimated. In TC(QiP4K 
, B) 
is the predicted log cost function of a cost-minimising bank operating at (QiPiX, B) and e4 
is a two-component error term. As mentioned above the stochastic cost frontier model used in 
this'empirical study implies that a banking firm's observed total cost will deWate from the 
cost-eff icient frontier because of random noise v and possible inefficiency, u, the composite 
error term for the ith firm is presented by this equation. 
vi+ u4 6.5 
Where v4 is a two-sided error term representing statistical noise which is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed; (i. i. d) and u4 is a non-negative one-sided random 
variable representing inefficiency and assumed to be distributed independently of the Vi. 
The inefficiency factor, uj, incorporates both allocative inefficiencies, from failing to react 
optimally to relative prices of inputs, Pi, and technical inefficiencies, from employing 
excessive (or extra) inputs to produce the outputs Q94. it is also assumed that the vý are 
nornmlly distributed with mean zero and variance Cýv, which capture the effects of the 
statistical noise and the U, are the absolute values of a random variables are assumed to 
account for technical inefficiency in cost, and assumed to be independently distributed as 
truncation at zero of the normal distribution, see for example, (CoellL et. al. 1995). A common 
criticism of the stochastic frontier method is that there is no a priori justification for the 
selection of any particular distributional form for the technical inefficiency effects, u. The 
half-riormal and the exponential distributions are arbitrary selections, (Kumbhakar, et al, 2000). 
Since both of these distributions have a mode at zero, it implies that there is the highest 
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probability that the inefficiency effects are in the neighbourhood of zero (Battese et al, 1998). 
This, in turn, implies relatively high technical efficiency. In practice, it may be possible to 
have a few very efficient firms, but a lot of quite inefficient firms (Lovell, et al, 2000). A few 
researchers attempted to address this criticism by specifying more general distributional forms, 
such as the truncated-nonml (Stevenson, 1980) and the two-parameter gamma (Greene, 1990) 
distributions for the technical inefficiency effects. These two distributions allow for a wider 
range of distributional shapes (including ones with non-zero modes), but this comes at the cost 
of computational complexity (Battese, et al. 1998). The truncated-normal model appears to 
suffer from fewer computational problems than the gamma distribution. The truncated-norml 
distribution is a generalisation of the half-norml distribution. It is obtained by the truncation 
at zero of the normal distribution with mean, p and variance, a 2. If p is pre-assigned to be 
zero, then the distribution is the half-riornial. The distribution may take a variety of shapes, 
depending upon the size and sign of p. Estimation of the truncated-nonmi stochastic frontier 
involves the estimation of the parameter, IL , together with the other parameters of the model. 
The log-likelihood function required for the NIL estimation of the parameters of the model was 
first given by Stevenson (1980). Expressions for appropriate predictors of the technical 
efficiencies of firms were given in Battese and Coelli (1988,1993,1995,1998). A number of 
empirical studies (e. g., Pitt. and Lee, 1981; and Kalirajan, 1981) have investigated the 
determinants of technical inefficiencies among firms in an industry by regressing the predicted 
inefficiency effects, obtained from an estimated stochastic frontier, upon a vector of firm- 
specific factors, such as firm size, age and education of the manager, etc., in a second-stage 
analysis. There is, however, a significant problem with this two-stage approack[see among 
others Coelli, et al. (1998); Gardener & Williams (2000); Iovell et al, (2000); In the first 
stage, the inefficiency effects are assumed to be independently and identically distributed in 
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order to use the approach of Jondrow, et al. (1982) to predict the values of the technical 
inefficiency effects. However, in the second stage, the predicted inefficiency effects are 
assumed to be a function of a number of firm-specific factors, which implies that they are not 
identically distributed, unless all the coefficients of the factors are simultaneously equal to 
zero. Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGuckin (1991) and Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) 
noted this inconsistency and specified stochastic frontier models in which the inefficiency 
effects were defined to be explicit functions of some firm-specific factors, and all parameters 
were estimated in a single-stage ML procedure. Huang and Liu (1994) also presented a model 
for a stochastic frontier production function, in which the technical inefficiency effects were 
specified to be a function of some firm-specific factors, together with their interactions with 
the input variables of the frontier function. Battese and Coelli (1995) extended these 
approaches to accommodate panel data, which permits the estimation of the parameters of the 
factors believed to influence the levels of the technical inefficiency effects, together with the 
separate components of technical inefficiency change and technical change over time. 
11is study adopts the model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), that specifies technical 
inefficiency effects in the stochastic frontier model that are assumed to be independently 
distributed non-negative random variables. For the i-th firm in the t-th period, the technical 
inefficiency effect, u,,, is obtained by truncation of the N(p,, c; 2) distribution, where 
pit - zits, 6.6 
where z,, is a (lxNO vector of observable explanatory variables, whose values are fixed 
1 11 1 
constants; and 6 is an W) vector of unknown scalar parameters to be estimated (which 
would generally be expected to include an intercept parameter). The log-likelihood function 
234 
for this stochastic frontier and inefficiency model is presented in the Appendix in Battese and 
CoeHi (1993,1995,1998), together with the first partial derivatives of the log-likelihood 
function with respect to the different parameters of the modeL These expressions are given in 
terms of the variance parameters, 
as =Cv+(T and$ 
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V=a 07,6.7 
Where the y-parameter has value between zero and one, and the technical efficiency of cost for 
the i-th firm at the t-th observation is defined by the fbHowing equation: 
TE, t - exp(-ud = exp(zab + wid 6.8 
In this study the sample data from GCC banks and financial institutions for the period 1995- 
1999 are organised in a panel. Specifically, we employ the above, Battese and Coelli model 
(1995) of a stochastic frontier function for panel data with firm effects which are assumed to 
be distributed as truncated-normal random variables (that is, N( pi,, c; ') 
Panel data have some advantages over cross-sectional data in the estimation of stochastic 
frontier models. The availability of panel data generally implies that there are a larger number 
of degrees of freedom for estimation of parameters. More irnportantly, panel data permit the 
simultaneous investigation of both technical change and technical efficiency change over time, 
given that technical change is defmed by an appropriate parametric model and the technical 
inefficiency effects in the stochastic frontier model are stochastic and have the specified 
distribution. Battese and Coelli (1998, p2O2). 
Therefore it is possible to express this model as follows: 
Wit, xi46+vit+uit, [wfth i, =(1,2 ...... N) and t= (1,2,..., T) 6.9 
Where TCj4 is the logarithm of the total costs for the i-th firm on the t-th time period; xi4 is a 
k: xI vector of (transformations of the) input prices and output quantities, and other explanatory 
variables associated with the i-th firm in the t-th time period; 8 is the vector of unknown 
parameters; and the vil and the uit are defined as above. Moreover, the parameterisation of 
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Battese and Corra (1977) is employed. They replaced cy 2 and a2,. with a 2= u2, + c; 
2, and -f = 
22 
c; u cr ,+ cy2u 
). As recently emphasised by Coefli and Battese (I 998, p2O8) 
The y parameterisation has an advantage in seeking to obtain the maximum likelihood 
estimates because the parameter space for -f can be searched for a suitable starting value for the 
iterative maximisation, algorithm involved. 
In particular, a value of -y of zero indicates that the deviations from the frontier are due entirely 
to statistical noise, while a value of one would indicate that all deviations are due to 
inefficiency. 
63.4.2: Specification of the Functional Form: 
To estimate an efficient frontier function, residuals from the cost or profit function must be 
analysed; they measure the difference between expected and observed costs or profits. 
Residuals are composed of two parts: a random one, due to measurement errors of 
idiosyncratic shocks and a systematic one that identifies every single flim. To separate the two 
components, it is necessary to make assumptions about their probability distributions. Usually, 
the random component is assumed to have a normal distribution with zero mean and finite 
variance; the systematic component is assumed to have a semi-normal or a truncated normal 
distri. bution with finite variance (Stevenson 1980). The two components are separated using 
the technique first proposed by Jondrow, Lovell, NUterov and Schmidt (1982); it is then 
possible to estimate the efficiency level of each firm and of the sample. The systematic part of 
the residual is an efficiency indicator that can be used to compare firms; the ratio between the 
residual, of a firm and the highest residual (for profit functions, the lowest for cost fiinctions), 
that identifies the best practice firm, is a measure of relative efficiency. Given the importance 
of the residuals for the measurement of efficiency, it is particularly important to minimize 
specification errors due to wrong functional forms that could bias the results. The translog 
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function (Christensen and Greene 1976) is flexible in that it allows to estimate a large family 
of functional forms. Its high number of parameters, however, makes it difficult to adopt when 
estimating frontiers on a small sample. The translog is a second-order approximation around 
the mean values of the sample, therefore measures for data points far away from it are 
necessarily imprecise. Furthermore, the translog is a quadratic function; its symmetrical 
structure forces symmetry on the data; for example, if there are strong economies of scale in 
the sample for small firms, the translog which tends to fit U-shaped curves, will erroneously 
find diseconomýies of scale for the larger firms of the sample. 
Translog functional form has been widely used in the empirical investigations of the cost economics 
of financial institutions, it is the most popular form in the literature, however, it doesn't necessarily 
very well fit data that are far from the mean in terms of output size or mix, 
Berger, et, al. (1997, pl3). 
Furthermore, Wilson, et al. (200 1, p. 116), note that. 
The translog offered at least two important advantages over the Cobb-Douglas functional form. 
First, it allowed for a U-shaped average cost curve or, more generally, for a cost curve that is 
not uniform for all sizes. Second, it dispensed with the ancillary hypothesis of an input 
elasticity equal to one, which is implicit in the Cobb-Douglas functional form. It also imposed 
fewer constraints on the structure of costs than the CES production function. It is therefore 
possible to test for any non-monotonic trend in the cost function, and for the relationship 
between multiproduct operations and costs. In general, the translog functional form appeared to 
be more suitable to represent the true nature of the activity of financial institutions. 
A semi-parametric flexible form, that overcomes the problems of a translog function, is in fact 
a translog with trigonometric factors added on, derived from a Fourier transform of the 
, variables 
(Gallant 1981). The Fourier-flexible function is the best global approximation of an 
unknown function, such as a cost or profit function (Mester et al, 1998), but the number of 
parameters that have to be estimated is so high that it can be used only on very large data 
samples. Moreover, (Altunbas et al, 1998, p. 2) note that: 
Although the Fourier flexible functional form better approximates the underlying cost 
function than the translog formulation, neither functional form is an appropriate descriptor 
of the cost function. As a consequence, it is concluded that even the use of more flexible 
functional forms such as FF may lead to misleading estimations of the inefficiency values. 
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Due to the limited size of our sample, we use a translog functional form specification to 
estimate the cost and profit efficiencies as well as cost scale elasticities and scale-eff iciencies 
across the GCC member states banks. The translog cost function we intend to estimate is as 
follows: 
TC 23 
In(.! --:: -) = ao + 
ya, In Q, +I/ A j=l 
fjlnp, + TkInK+, rsInS+ 
2333 
+112[1: 1:, 3,, InQ, InQ +J: i, 
Ey 
u 
lnp, inpj+, r,, InKInK+, r. InSInS]+ 
2 
1=1 J=3 i=l J=l 6.10 
+I: E,, o InQInpj+l: akInQInK + 1:, B,, InpjlnK + Ea,, InQ, Ins + 1=1 j=l J=l 3' 
+E, 8, lnp InS+, r,. InKInS+C, 
J= i 
Where TC is a measure of the costs of production, comprising operating costs and financial 
costs (interest paid on deposits); the Qi, (i= 1,2 ........ m) are output quantities, Pj 
......... n) are input prices. Moreover, standard symmetry has to be imposed on the 
translog function that is: 
Sji and yy = yji, where (i--1,2) and (i--1,2,3), and the following linear restrictions are 
necessary and sufficient for linear homogeneity in factor prices: 
nn 
0 and Z Py = 0. 
J=l j=l 
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In this study the parameters of the stochastic frontier cost function, defiried by (6.10 ) are 
estimated using the Maximum-likelihood (ML) approach For instance, the UL estimates of 
2 
Cr and y are obtained by finding the maximum of the log-likelihood function as specifie 
S 
in Coelli et. al (1995). The nature of the log-likelihood function of the model given the 
distributi. onl assumptions on v and u can be also found in Battese and Coelli (1995,1998). 
For the- purpose of our efficiency measurement, we use the intermediation approach which 
defined total costs as the fimancial and operating costs. We use two output measures: total 
loans (Ql); and total other eaming assets (Q2); and three input prices these are: 
PI the price of funds defined as the ratio of(trading expenses+ interest paid to purchased funds 
(customer and short term funds plus other funding), to total customer deposits (we included 
trading expenses as a fund price for Islamic banks, because deposits are interest free at these 
banks as they following the islamic law which prohibited the interest), P2 is the price of 
labour defined as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets and P3 the price of capital 
defined as the ratio of non-interest expenses to total fixed assets. Moreover, the level of equity 
is included to control for differences in risk incurred by banks. The specification of equity in 
the cost and profit functions goes part of the way toward accounting for different risk 
preferences, if some banks are more risk-averse than others, they may hold a higher level of 
financial capital than maximize profits or minimize costs (De Young, et al, 1998). if financial 
capital is ignored, the efficiency of these banks could be mis-measured, even though they are 
behaving optimally given their risk preferences. Hughes, et al(I 998, p. 7), noted that 
since capital is a cushion against losses and , hence, protection against 
financial distress, its level 
influences the probability of financial distress and is a critical consideration in dealing with 
liquidity risk, Moreover, since capital represents the bank's own bet on the quality of its assets and 
on its efforts at maintaining asset quality, the level of capital can function as a credit signal of the 
bank's exposure to risk. 
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However, larger banks usually depend more on debt financing to finance their portfolios 
than smaller banks do. Thus failure to control for equity could yield a scale bias. 
Furthermore, Bergeret al (1998), p. 8). stated that 
Given their asset sizes, lower-risk banks may choose to hold higher levels of capital as a signal to 
outsiders that their exposure to risk is lower. A higher-risk bank cannot afford to mimic a lower- 
risk bank's signal because the opportunity cost of holding this extra capital is greater for them. 
These banks, by definition, hold riskier assets than lower-risk banks, and, in an informationally 
efficient loan market, they expect a higher return on their assets fl= do lower-risk banks to 
compensate them for their assets' greater expected losses and variance. 
Nonetheless, Mester (1996, p. 2) emphesized that: 
Financial capital should be accounted for in the cost function and the level rather than the price 
of, financial capital should be included, since there is good reason to believe that cost- 
minimization doesn't fully explain a bank's capital level-e. g., regulations set minimum capital- 
to-asset ratios, and bank managers may be risk-averse. 
The cost,, model we use is similar to that used in previous efficiency studies[ Mester 
(1996); Berger et al (1997,1998); Altunbas et al, (2000); and Casu (2001); in that it 
explicitly accounts for the quality of bank's assets and the probability of failure, which 
can influence banks' costs in a number of ways. For example, a large proportion of non- 
performing loans may signal that a bank used fewer resources than usual in the initial 
credit evaluation and monitoring of its loans. Unless quality and risk are controlled for, 
one might easily miscalculate a bank's level of inefficiency; e. g. banks scrimping on 
credit evaluations or producing excessively risky loans might be labelled as efficient 
when compared to banks spending resources to ensure their loans are of higher quality, 
(Mester, 1996). Table 6.1 summarise the descriptive statistics of the bank's inputs and 
outputs variables for GCC countries over 1995-1999 (Cost and Alternative Profit 
240 
Efficiency) and other control and environmental variables included in the cost and profit 
functiom 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of the bank's Inputs and outputs variables for GCC countries over 1995-1999 
(Cost and Aftemative Profit EMciency) 
Variables Description Mean St. Dev NEn Max 
TC Total cost- (Interest expense, Personnel expense, trading 
expense, other operating expense) (USSMIlions). 
175 1345 76 1865 
Net Income -Total Revenues - Total Cost (we add the 
absolute value of the minimum value of the sample to all 
observations in order to have only positive values; (see 
Berger ct al. 1998). 
380 1471 87 2345 
Pi Price of funds (0/*)- (total interest expense + trading 
expcnsr-/ total customer deposits)** 
0.06 0.11 0.04 035 
P2 Price of labour(%)ý(total personnel expensel total assets) 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.19 
P3 Price of physical capital-(other operating expense/total 
assets 
0.02 0.03 0.01 0.14 
Y1 The US$ value of total aggregate loans(Millions) 1547 2862 30 14760 i 
Y2 The US$ value of total aggregate other earning assets 1344 2652 40 
1-i 
iii- 
Descriptive statistics of the banks' control and environmental variables included in the cost and profit 
function, for GCC countries over 1995-1999. 
K Capital Adequacy(book value of equity) 467 4780 140 12645 
-S Asset quality (Loan Los Reserves/Total Loans) (0/6) 0.18 OAO 0.13 0.78 
BA Dummy variable for Bahrain 0.00 1 
SA Dummy variable for Saudi Arabia 0.00 1 
Ku Dummy variable for Kuwait 0.00 1 
0M, Dummy variable for Oman 0.00 1 
QA Dummy variable for Qatar 0.00 1 
Com Dummy variable for commercial 0.00 1 
Inv Dummy variable for investment bank 0.00 1 
Source: Bankscope (Jan, 2002). 
this is the dependent variable in the ahemative profit efficiency model( substituting TC variable) 
0* Islamic banks have zero interest expense, there price of funds is trading expense/total depsosits 
The single equation model used to estimate the cost efficiency scores is : 
In TC, = InTC(Q,, P,, K,, B)+u, +v, 6.11 
we impose a linear homogeneity in the input prices by dividing the cost and input prices by the 
third input price, P3. To estimate the stochastic X-efficiency scores, we use the Frontier-4.1 
software statistical package developed by Battese and Coelli (1992). 
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63.43 Prediction of Firm-Level X-efficiencies: 
Once the model is estimated, bank level measures of X-efficiencies can be calculated using the 
residuals and are usually given by the mean of the conditional distribution of Ui 
given ei, which can be written as 6ý (Udei). The mean of the density function for Ui given 
A 
ei can'be, found in Battese and Coelli (1995). For the half-normal stochastic model this e 
=(uilet) is a consistent estimator for the individual efficiency measure [see Jondrow et 
aL(1982)]. 
These individual bank X-efficiency measures (netting out the stochastic disturbance) are 
generally defined as the estimated cost needed to produce a bank i's output vector if the bank 
were as efficient as the best-practice bank in the sample, divided by the actual cost of bank 
ad usted for random error [for example, Coelli and Battese (1998)]. This ratio between the 
ý 
Ii 
minimum and the actual cost of bank i can be expressed in the form: 
Cost EM = TCm in/ TO 6.12 
Where TO is the actual cost of the ith firm, Mi. is the minimum cost estimated from the 
fitted cost frontier, and Cost EFFj is defined as exp(. ui ). This expression relies upon the 
value of the unobservable Ui being predicted and is achieved by deriving expressions for the 
conditional expectation of these functions of the Ui conditional upon the observed value of 
ei =(vi + ui). 6.13 
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The cost efficiency ratio may be thought of as the proportion of costs or resource that are used 
efficiently. For example, a bank with Cost EFF of 0.85 is 85 per cent efficient or equivalently 
wastes 15% of its costs relative to a best practice firm fiLcing the same conditions. 
63AA Calculation of Scale-Economies and Scale efficiencies: 
To account for differences in scale efficiencies we utilise two measures of scale efficiency to 
test for the efficient-structure hypothesis (ESS), which asserts that "firms have essentially 
equally good management and technology, but some firms simply produce at more efficient 
scales than others, and therefore, have lower unit costs and higher unit profits. These firms are 
assumed to have large market shares that may result in high levels of concentration", (Berger, 
1995, p. 405). 
The first measure of scale efficiency we use is a standard scale economy (or scale elasticity) 
measure. Typically the scale-economies studies estimate an average practice cost function, 
which relates bank cost to output levels and input prices (Mester, 1996). The technique 
implicitly assumes all banks in the sample are using their inputs efficiently- in other words, 
there - is no x-inefficiency- and that the banks are using the same production technology. 
Under the scale-efficiency version of the efficient-structure hypotheses(ESS), firms 
have essentially equally good management and technology, but some firms simply 
produce at more efficient scales than others, and therefore have lower unit costs and 
higher unit profit. Berger (1995, p4O5) 
In the early bank cost literature many of the studies found scale elasticities significantly 
different from unity, [see among others Berger (1993); Hannan et al (1993)];. As a result the 
authors suggested that changes 
in industry structure could produce cost savings through 
increased efficiency. Recent bank cost studies improved upon previous methodologies by 
UtiliZing flexible functional 
forms, accounting for multiproduct pfoduc'tjon' processes, 
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estimating scale measures at both the branch and firm level, distinguishing between branch 
and unit bank technologies resulting from regulatory restrictions, etc. The typical finding from 
the recent studies is that relatively minor scale economies exist in banking since the scale 
elasticity measure differs little from a value of unity [Berger and Mester (1998); Hannan et at 
(1998)]. -ne scale economies measure considers the effect on cost of a proportional variation 
in the levels of all outputs, financial capital, and quality. A natural way to express the extent of 
scale economies is the proportional increase in cost resulting from a small proportional 
increase in the level of output: that is the elasticity of total cost with respect to output. 
The degree of scale economies (SCALE) used her is given by: 
m OIn SCALE= I 
TC 
M OIn Q, 
' Oln TC 
Where represents the sum of individual cost elasticities and can be rewritten as 
ý., Z gln Qj +IZ pvIn p, + 
SCALE + 
i=l i J=l i=l J. 1 
Where there are economies of scale if SCALE < 1, constant returns to scale if SCALE=l 
And diseconomies of scale if SCALE > 1. 
However, a relatively recent development in the literature differentiates between two concepts, 
that is, the scale-eff iciency, and the scale-economy concept. Evanoff and Israilevich (1995), 
strongly, criticized the previous literature for what they call, the common confusion in the 
literature between two relatively straightforward concepts Scale-elasticity and Scale-eff iciency 
I The implication from the conclusions drawn by the authors of numerous studies is that scale 
elasticity and scale efficieny are essentially synonymous; the derivation of one automatically 
provides an accurate or approximate value for the other, until recently, however, studies have 
not typically evaluated scale efficiency. Instead, scale elasticity estimates have been used as a 
proxy for efficiency, and elasticity measures close to 1.0 are taken to imply that scale 
inefficiency is trivial. Scale inefficiency is typically assumed to be linearly related to the scale 
elasticity measure; i. e. equal to one minus the elasticity measure. Empirically, it is also 
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assumed that scale elasticities which are found to be insignificantly different from one in a 
statistical sense imply scale efficiency. Both statements are incorrect. Yet, failure to distinguish 
between the two concepts is common in the banking literature. Intuitively, the two concepts 
differ because they measure different things: elasticity is related to incremental changes in 
output, and inefficiency to the change in output required to produce at the minimum efficient 
scale. The cost savings realized by an incremental increase in output by a scale inefficient firm 
is irrelevant for measuring inefficiency since this is not the savings realized by producing at the 
efficient scale. (Israelivick et al. 1995, p. 1037) 
As noted above, the scale elasticity measure, is e=0 In C/0 In Q, where C is cost and Q 
output, is a point elasticity associated with a particular output level and indicates the relative 
change in cost associated with an incremental change from this output level. Scale 
inefficiency, 1, can be measured as the aggregate cost of F inefficient fuins (e * 1.0) relative 
to the cost of a single efficient firm (c = 1.0), where F= the size of the efficient relative to the 
I 
inefficient one. That is, I=[ECIICE] - 1.0, where C, and CE are the cost of production at the 
inefficient and efficient firms, respectively. 
Furthermore, as with the scale elasticity measure, the inefficiency measure is functional form 
specific, for example, for the quadratic form, C=a+ bQ +. 5cV, the inefficiency measure will 
equal [(b+c. Ql)/(b+c. QE)] [1/all, where, Q, and QF, are the output of inefficient and efficient 
firms, respectively, and it also can similarly derived for alternative forms (Evanoff et al. 
1995). Thus, the two concepts are different because they measure different things: elasticity is 
related to incremental changes in output, and inefficiency to the change in output required to 
produce at the minimum efficient scale (see Israilevich and Evanoff 1995 for more details). 
For our purposes, we follow (Berger, 1995), scale efficiencies are computed from the same 
stochastic cost frontier model and the translog cost functional specification used to estimate 
cost x-efficiency scores. For each bank's output mix and input prices, a U-shaped 
multiproduct average cost curve was traced out and the scale-efficient output vector Y' at the 
bottom of the U shape was determined. Scale efficiency was determined as the ratio of 
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-ddo 
predicted costs for V* to predicted costs for the bank's actual output Y, multiplied by the ratio 
of outputs to correct for absolute size differences: 
33 
S-EFT=exppnlt(Y, w)-Inlt(Yw)]*[(I: yj)I(Ey, ")] 6.13 
J=l k=l 
Where the InCs are predicted cost values. It may be seen that this is an estimate of A&VAC21, 
the ratio of minimum predicted average costs to the actual predicted average costs for bank i's 
output mix and input prices. As with any efficiency measure, S-EFF ranges over (0,1). 
6-3.4.5 Derivation of the Alternative Profit Frontiers: 
An interesting recent development in efficiency analysis is the concept of alternative profit 
efficiency, which may be helpful when some of the assumptions underlying cost and standard 
profit efficiency are not met (De Young et al, 1998). Efficiency here is measured by how close 
a bank comes to earning maximum profits given its output levels rather than its output prices. 
Underlying the profit frontier 7r( P, w,, o ) [and the variable profit frontier 7r( P, wzp ) as well, 
z being a vector of quasi-fixed inputs] is the assumption that prices are exogenous and that 
producers seek to maximize profit ( or variable profit) by selecting outputs and inputs under 
their control. One justification for exogeneity of prices is that producers operate in competitive 
markets. Suppose, to the contrary, that producers have some degree of monopoly power in 
their product markets. Under monopoly, the demands would be exploited to determine output 
prices and quantities jointly, and only input prices would be exogenous. In this context neither 
a traditional cost frontier (which treats outputs as being exogenous) nor a traditional profit 
frontier (which treats output prices as being exogenous) would provide an appropriate 
framework within which to evaluate producer performance. Recently Humphrey and Pulley 
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(1997), and others have introduced the notion of an 'alternative' profit frontier to bridge the 
gap between a cost frontier and a profit frontier. 
An alternative profit frontier is defined as: 
rl'(vwAt5) = rmx,,. fp'y-wx. g(pyw; 6) = 0, D. (xy,, fl): 51) 6.15 
Where the'endogenous variables are (px) and the exogenous variables are (Vw), D. (xv; fl) is 
the output distance function characterizing the structure of production technology, and 
g(p, v, w; 6) represents what Humphrey and Pulley refer to as the producer's 'pricing 
opportunity set', which captures the producer's ability to transform exogenous (yw) into 
endogenous product prices p. Thus, II'(ywfl, 6) has the same dependent variable as the 
standard profit frontier and the same independent variables as the standard cost frontier. 
However, II'(ywfl, &) is not dual to D. (xv; fl), because it incorporates both the structure of 
production technology (incorporated in the parameter vector fl) and the structure of the pricing 
opportunity set ( incorporated in the parameter vector 8). Moreover, without specifying the 
propertie's satisfied by the fuction, g(pyx; 3) it is not possible to specify the properties 
satisfied by rjA(yW,,. fl. 6), although it is reasonable to assume that IIA(ywflJ) is nondecreasing 
in the elements of y and nonincreasing in the elements of w. (Lovell, et, al. p. 213,2000), noted 
that: ' 
In the absence of Shcphard-Hotelling derivative properties, it is not possible to specify 
a system of equations on which estimation can be based, as would be the case with 
standard cost or profit frontiers. Consequently the alternative profit frontier must be 
estimated as a single-equation model, once a finictional form is assigned to 
rI'(v, w; fl, 6) and an assumption is made concerning error structure. 
Alternative profit frontiers have been formulated and estimated by Berger, Cummins, and 
Weiss (1996), Hasan and Hunter (1996), Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey (1997), Berger and 
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Mester (1997), Humphrey and Pulley (1997), and Lozano Vivas (1997). Each has used a 
single-equation model, although a variety of functional forms have been specified, and a 
variety of estimation techniques has been employed. Each has estimated technical 
inefficiency, and its impact on alternative profit, under an assumption of allocative efficiency. 
Berger, et. al (I 997, p. 7) notes that 
Alternative profit efficiency may provide useful information when one or more of the following 
conditions hold: 
There are substantial unmeasured differences in the quality of banking services; 
Outputs are not completely variable, so that a bank cannot achieve every output scale and 
product mix; 
Output markets are not perfectly competilve, so that banks have some market power over the 
prices they charge; and 
iv. Output prices arc not accurately measured, so they do not provide accurate guides to 
opportunities to earn revenues and profits in the standard profit function 
In this study, we estimated the alternative profit efficiency socores, for our sample, by 
applying the same independent variables in our cost function and the dependent variable is 71 
R-C where, R is- total reveneus, and C is total costs, respectively, as it is usually 
estimated, in the standard profit function. Thus, instead of counting deviations from optimal 
output as inefficiency, as in the standard profit function, variable output is held constant as 
in the cost function while output prices are free to vary and affect profits. The alternative 
profit function in log form is: 
In (7r +0)= f(pvz, ) +Inu., +Inv. 6.16 
where a is the variable profits of the firm, which includes all the interest and fee income 
earned on the variable outputs, (interest income in total loans +trading income + income from 
securities portfolio + all other non-interest incom) minus variable costs, C, used in the cost 
function; 0 is a constant added to every firm's profit so that the natural log is taken of a 
positive number; other variables are as defined as in the cost function specification. 
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Furthermore, as in the cost function specification, here, profit price and input prices are 
normalized by the last input price, that is, P, in order to impose linear homogenieity on the 
model (see Mester and Berger (1998). Hence, re-arrange for 2r, to become 
In [(7rlP3)+1(7EIP3).. I+I], where / (nIP3)min / indicate the absolute value of the minimum value 
of (n/P3) over all banks for the same year. Thus, the constant O= [/(n/P3).. i. /+I] is added to 
every firm's dependent variable in the profit function so that the natural log is taken of a 
positive number, since the minimum profits are typically negative. Thus, for the firm with the 
lowest value of (m? 3) for the year, the dependent variable will be In(l)=O, and relabelling the 
composite error term as (Inu, x +Inv& x). The translog functional form with two output( total 
loans and total other eaming assets) and three input prices, pl, is price of fund, p2 is price of 
labour and, p3 is price of capital (the same independent variables in cost function applied here) 
is specified also here for the alternative profit function, moreover, the truncated-normal model 
proposed by Coelli et. al 1995 was also adopted to disintangle profit inefficiency scores from 
rando, m errors. Again we use the Frontier 4.1 statistical software progamme, developed by 
Coelli and others, to estimate the maximum- likelihood function and to compute our profit- 
efficiency scores for the sample of GCC banks. 
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6.4 The Performance-Structure Model: 
The results, presented later, will concentrate on the four hypotheses within Berger's structure- 
performance model, using a multiple regression analysis to test the effects of concentration, 
market share, bank X-efficiency, and scale efficiency on profitability of GCC banks. 
6.4.1: Model Snecification: 
In order to investigate the SCP relationship in GCC banking we follow Berger's (1995) 
modelling approach The model, as set out in equation (6.1), associates firm profit variability 
to market structure and efficient structure measures, and other control variables. One has to 
introduce other independent variables to account for forces other than market structure and 
efficiency and thus increase the explanatory power of the model. Therefore, our full model to 
test for the four competing hypotheses in the GCC banking industry is shown as fbHows: 
al a2 CONC +a3MS+a4X -EFF+a, S-EFF+a, GDPPC + a7 DUM +66.17 
vhere: 
)r, = bank i's profits measured as the return on Assets (ROA) or return on equity 
(ROE), in addition to the mentioned standard accounting profit measures this 
study also utilizes the alternative profit efficiency(APX) measure as a performance 
indicator. 
CONq- = concentration ratio in market j (we use the three-firm assets concentration ratio). 
MS ij = market share measure, we use two market share measures to capture the RNT 
hypotheses, these are bank deposits (BDMS) and loans (BLNIS) market shares. 
GDPPC -= 
Per Capita Gross Domestic Product is included as a measure aimed at capturing 
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specific market demand conditions. 
DUM = Binary variables included to take account of different bank types (commercial 
banks, investment banks, and Islamic banks). 
cI= error term 
A number of studies analyse whether market growth impacts on bank performance. Bourke 
(I 989)'and Molyneux (1993), for example, use money supply growth to account for demand 
conditions impact on bank performance while Short (1979) uses asset growth. Goldberg and 
Rai (1996) use per capita income to proxy for demand conditions and their study fmds a 
negative and significant coefficient for PCI. Our model, however, account for different 
demand characteristics across markets. We will assume that greater levels of income lead to 
increasing demand for loans and increasing supply of deposits from consumers. In other 
words, one would expect that banks operating in high per capita income markets will face 
higher demand for their services than banks operating in low per capita income markets, other 
things remaining equal. Hence, we incorporate into the model a GDP Per Capita income 
variable to account for demand factors in different national markets. The increased demand is 
expected to positively affect bank profits. Finally, we also include a binary variable to 
account for differences in banks type. This distinguishes between Islamic, investment, and 
commercial, banks so as to capture differences in profitability between institutions with 
varying organisational forms. 1be reduced form equation noted above allows all four 
hypotheses to be valid simultaneously. To the extent that any of the key variables have 
positive estimated coefficients, this may be taken as evidence of the marginal contribution of 
the corresponding hypotheses (Berger, 1995). However, according to the structural model of 
the efficient-structure hypotheses presented by Berger (1995) the profit-structure relationship 
is conditional on the fact that the efficient-structure (ES) coefficients must be positively 
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correlated with the market structure measures. Specifically, bank profitability is a function of 
its efficiency, and efficient firms gain market share and this market share may lead to market 
concentration. Thus, in order to ensure that, EFF is positively related to market-structure 
measures as well as to profitability measures (n) noted above, this necessary condition of the 
ES hypotheses, (that efficiency affects market structure) the following equations regression are 
tested for. 
NILSi = f(X-EFFi, S-EFFj, Z,. ) +ej for all i in rn ......................................................... §. 18 
-. CONCrn = f(X-FFi, S-FF, Z., ) +ei .................................................... 6.19 
The following section outlines the broad estimation procedures used. 
6.4.2. Estimation Procedure to Test the Relationship between Market- Structure and 
Bank's Performance in the GCC Member States: 
in this study we use the simple ordinary least-squares multiple regression analysis to test the 
relationship between market structure and bank profitability for GCC banks'. Regression 
analysis is concerned with the study of the relationship between one variable called the 
explained or dependent variable and one or more other variables called independent or 
explanatory variables. A regression model with more than one explanatory variable is known 
as a multiple regression model (GojaratL 1996, p. 182). It is multiple because multiple 
influences (i. e, variables) affect the dependent variable. We can write the multiple regression 
model in the stochastic form as 
EM = 0, +NX2t+03X3t+..... +PkXkt+Ut; t--l n 
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Where X2t, X3t 
. ...... 
Xkt are a set of independent(explanatory) variables, each of which 
influences the dependent variable Yt . is unknown (population) parameters; 
i. e., 
unknown constant partial regression coefficients or partial slope coefficients. The meaning of 
the partial regression coefficient is as follows: B2 measures the change in the mean value of Y, 
E(Y), per unit change in X2, holding the value of X3 constant. Likewise measures the 
change in the mean value of Y per unit change in X3, holding the value of X2 constant. This is 
the unique feasure of a multiple regression, since in the multiple regression model we want to 
find out what part of the change in the average value of Y can be directly attributable to X2 and 
what part to X3, and likewise the other explanatory variables. To ensure the desirable 
properties of the ordinary least squares estimators 01 .... 
Ok and to ensure the validity of the 
standard hypothesis test procedure, the following assumptions about the components of this 
model have been made: 
I- XI..... Xk are nonstochastic; that is, their values are fixed in repeated sampling. 
2- Tle error term u has a zero mean value; that is, E(ud =0 
2 
3- Homoscedasticity, that is, the variance of u, is constant var(ud= 
4- No autocorrelation exists between the error terms uj, and uj,.. cov(uj, uj) ji j 
s' No exact collinearity exists between X4 and Xj ; that is, there is no exact linear relationship 
'between the two explanatory variables. 
6- For hypothesis testing, the error term u follows the normal distribution with mean zero 
22 
and (homoscedastic) variance a. That is, U, ;? N(O, a 
7- The underlying relationship between )ý and Yt is linear; 
I The models were re-estimated using the fixed effects panel data approach using STATA and similar results 
maintained (see Appendix 2). 
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To estimate the parameters of the model, we use the Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS). 
The OLS principle chooses the values of the unknown parameters in such a way that the 
residual sum of squares (RSS)I; et' is as small as possible. This RSS is simply the sum of the 
squared difference between actual Yt and estimated YL Having obtained the OLS estimators of 
the intercept and partial regression coefficients, we can derive the variances and standard 
errors of these estimators. These variances or standard errors give us some idea about the 
variability of the estimators from sample to sample. We need the standard errors for two main 
purposes: (1) to establish confidence intervals for the true parameter values and (2) to test 
statistical hypotheses. Under assumed conditions the OLS estimators are BLUE, that is, they 
are best linear unbiased estimators. Thus, each regression coefficient estimated by OLS is 
linear and unbiased on the average it coincides with the true value. Among all such linear 
unbiased estimators, the OLS estimators have the least possible variance so that the true 
parameter can be estimated more accurately than by competing linear unbiased estimators. We 
have noted above that the betas (B. ) allows us to estimate each coefficient independently and 
that the t-test is used for testing hypotheses about individual coefficients. All these tests will 
require assumptions I to 7 above Me goodness of fit of estimated multiple regression 
analysis is measured by calculating the coefficient of determination. It gives the proportion or 
percentage of the total variation in the dependent variable Y explained jointly by the 
independents (explanatory) variables. It is the quantity that gives this information is known as 
the multiple coefficient of determination and denoted by the symbol Rý. Where: 
TSS =the total sum of squares of the dependent variable Y(= Z2 A 
ESS the explained sum of squares (ie. explained by all the X variables) 
RSS the residual sum of squares. 
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R2 ESS That is, it is the ratio of the explained sum of squares to the total sum of squares. TSS 
The following chapter presents the empirical results of our analysis and our interpretations. 
6.5 Conclusion: 
This chapter outlines the methodology used in this thesis to examine structure-performance 
relationships in GCC banking markets. The first part of the chapter describes the different tests 
that have to be undertaken in order to distinguish between four competing hypotheses, the 
traditional SCP paradigm, the relative market power hypothesis and two versions (X- 
efficiency and Scale efficiency) of the Efficient Structure hypothesis. In order to specifically 
test for the efficiency hypothesis one need to obtain bank-specific estimates of efficiency. We 
therefore outline how cost and alternative profit efficiency estimates-are derived, as well as 
scale efficiency estimates, and show how these are incorporated into the modelling 
framework. 
once these efficiency estimates are derived they can be included into our reduced form profit 
equations. 
The following chapter reports the findings of our analysis. 
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Chapter Vl I 
Empirical Results and Interpretations 
7.1 Introduction 
Analysis of the SCP relationship in banking is used to help evaluate the main policy issue of which 
type of banking structure best serves the public in terins both of cost and the availability of banking 
services. In general two main objectives have been sought; firstly, the affaimmcnt of an 'Cfficicnf 
banking system which in some way, secondly, miný the likelihood of bank failure. 
Molyneux et al. (1996, p. 93) 
Market structure and performance are two important features of industrial organization 
analysis that are employed in an effort to understand how markets operate and what is the 
influence of various economic determinants on the development and evolution of different 
market characteristics. Do changes in market structure (more or less competitive 
environments) affect the profits of banking institutions and by how much? Do banks 
operating in more highly concentrated markets charge higher prices for their products and 
services (higher interest rates on loans and lower interest rates on deposits) than banks 
operating in less concentrated markets? Within this area two main theories have emerged in 
the banking literature to describe the relationship between structure and performance, namely 
the market-power hypothesis and efficient structure hypothesis. In the traditional SCP model, 
markets served by a few firms with significant disparities in size are more likely to be 
characterized by coordination of policies and collusive agreements (Scherer, 1982). This 
results in inferior performance in terms of the quality and quantity of goods and services 
produced higher prices, and profits that exceed a normal return. On the other hand, the 
efficient structure hypothesis posits that the positive relationship observed between market 
structure and performance can be attributed to the gains made in market share by more 
efficient firms, and this may lead to increased market concentration. These two theories, 
however, have radically contrasting implications from mergers and antitrust policies. To the 
extent that the SCP paradigm is evident in a particular market, then altering the market 
structure to be more competitive and allocating resources more effectively are 
likely to be 
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socially beneficial. However, in the eventuality that the efficient structure hypothesis holds in 
that particular market, any restrictions on increasing concentration in the market is not 
warranted. There have been numerous studies that have aimed to test the structure-conduct- 
performance(s-c-p) relationship in the banking industry, and the majority of these 
investigations have concerned US banking where the structure of the market is quite different 
from other countries. The main difference lies in the fact that, in the US, many of the financial 
products such as retail deposits and small loans are offered on a local or regional basis, and 
prices can differ quite significantly among these local markets. Therefore, the research 
emphasis tends to be on the relationship between local market concentration and performance 
measures. Moreover, the US banking market is relatively unconcentrated, as Berger and 
Humphrey (1997, page 195) have noted: 
Although some financial products such as large certificates of deposit and large wholesale loans 
are competed on a nationwide basis, the US national market is extremely unconocntrated by world 
standards. For example, it would take over 2000 banIdng organizations, to account for 90% of 
deposits in the US, while in most other developed countries 90% of deposits would be accounted 
for by fewer than 10 organizations. 
Molyneux et al. (1996) have noted that the analysis of the SCP relationship in banking is 
mainly used to evaluate which type of banking structure best serves the public in terms both 
of the cost and the availability of banking services. Thus, in view of the conflicting 
implications of the above two theories, further investigation of the evidence comparing 
market power and efficiency effects on profit-structure relationship seems advisable, 
particularly in banking markets outside the US. Thus, in order to provide an insight into the 
structure of GCC member states banking markets and to ascertain whether this has any effect 
on the performance of banks operating in these markets, this chapter outlines the empirical 
results of tests of the market-power and efficient-structure hypotheses in the six GCC member 
257 
states banking markets, these are, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United 
Arab Emirates. The empirical investigation investigates the effects of concentration, market 
share (included to test for the market-power hypothesis), X-efficiency, and Scale-efficiency 
(for tests of the efficient-structure hypotheses) on bank performance. The empirical analysis 
has been carried out using the methodology and variables discussed in chapter six. 
Alternative profit X-efficiency scores (APX) as well as standard profit measures (ROA, and 
ROE) are regressed against measures of local market concentration, individual bank's market 
share in its national market (loans and deposits), the individual bank's cost X-efficiency 
scores, and scale-efficiency indicators, and, other control variables included to capture firm- 
specific and market-specific differences similar to those used in previous studies. We pool 
-accounting 
data for banks from the six GCC member states for the five year period 1995- 
1999. The data were obtained from the Bankscope database and were available for 72 banks 
across all five years. According to Bankscope the accounting data provided is standardized 
according to international accounting conventions for cross-country comparison purposes. 
As far as we are aware, this is the first study using alternative profit x-efficiency scores in 
addition to conventional profitability measures (ROE, ROA) to investigate the profit-structure 
relationship in the GCC member states banking sector. The assumption that banks enjoy a 
degree of market power is one of the features assumed in calculating alternative profit 
efficiency measures compared with standard profit efficiency. It can be employed instead of 
standard profit efficiency measures when certain conditions are not met. This includes such 
things as when there are differences in the quality of banking services, or when output 
markets are not fully competitive. Alternative profit efficiency measures in banking are 
estimated when it is assumed that it is not possible for a bank to achieve every output scale 
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and product mix, and the output price data necessary for calculating the standard profit 
measures are not available (see Berger and Mester, 1997). 
Following Berger (1995) we test the market-power and efficient-structure hypotheses by 
estimating single reduced form profits (a) regressions that include direct measures of 
efficiency and nest four hypotheses that help explain the market-power and efficient structure 
hypotheses. In particular, the analysis presented in this chapter allows us to test for whether 
the positive relationship between profits and structure (if it exists) is spurious (that is, 
efficiency drives both profitability and market structure) rather than of direct origin, this is a 
necessary condition for the validity of the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis in its 
interpretation of the profit-structure relationship. The ES hypothesis assumes that both 
efficiency variables (X-Eff or S-Eff) are positively related to both market structure measures 
(concentration or market share), as well as to the profitability measures. Thus, we conduct the 
test, for the relationship between the market structure measures (CONC, and MS) and the 
efficiency variables to see if there is any direct relationship between bank level efficiency and 
industry structure by regressing both market structure measures (CONC, and MS) on the 
respective efficiency measures (X-efficiency and scale-efficiency. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section7.2 recall the model specification previously outlined 
in chapter six, namely the single reduced form profit (7c) equations as well as the market 
structure (CONC and MS) reduced form models. Sources of sample data and variables 
included in our specified model are also outlined. Section 7.3 presents estimates for bank cost, 
and alternative profit efficiency derived from our stochastic ftontier model as well as scale 
economies and scale efficiencies. Moreover, it discusses the empirical findings from the 
pooled cross-country estimates of the relationship between market-structure and efficiency 
variables on pTofitability in GCC banking. Section 7.4 concludes. 
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7.2 The Model Specification 
7.2.1 The Theoretical Framework: 
Berger (1995) attempts to resolve what he called the "observational equivalence problem" 
relating to the structure performance relationship by estimating single reduced form profits 
equations to see how performance in US banking was related to market-power and firm-level 
efficiency measures. Specifically, he included direct measures of both efficiency hypotheses 
(X-efficiency and Scale-efficiency), into the conventional S-C-P paradigm, arguing that "The 
way in which the ES and XT hypotheses are usually tested employs a model that nests, but 
cannot distinguish among most of the hypotheses", (Berger, 1995, p. 406). He introduced the 
following structural forms for the efficient-structure (ES) and market-power (MIP) hypothesis 
and then derived a single reduced form that nests and distinguishes the four hypotheses. The 
structural model underlying the ES hypothesis, [X-efficiency version (ESX) and scale- 
efficiency version (EýS)] to explain the profit -structure positive relationship is: 
7ri = fl (EFFi, Zi. ) +C................ (1) 
MSi 
- 
f2 (EFFi, Zi. ) +F.............. (2) 
CONCni= fi (MSi f, aii. ) ............. (3) 
Where, z measures profitability per unit of output, EFF reflects whichever efficiency concept 
is being modelled (X-EFF or S-EFF), the Z vectors represent control variables, the e is 
random error, m indexes the market, and i indexes the banks in market m. 
This model creates a positive profit-structure relationship as a spurious outcome because both 
profits and structure are related to efficiency. In equation (1), profits are primarily determined 
by differences in cost efficiency. That is, revenues less costs per unit of output principally 
differ because of cost variations created by either X-efficiency or scale efficiency, depending 
on whether the exact hypothesis is ESX or ESS. In equation (2), more efficient firms have 
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greater market shares. This could occur for a number of different reasons. If bank products 
within a local market are undifferentiated, each market may be in competitive equilibrium 
with a common price equal to every banks' marginal cost. More efficient firms are larger and 
have greater shares if they have lower marginal cost at every level of scale. Another 
possibility occurs if bank products are differentiated by location. Under special competition, 
more efficient banks may set prices more favourable to consumers and attract customers from 
further distances. Finally, more efficient banks may have larger market shares in equilibrium 
because of past out-of-equilibrium behaviour in which more efficient banks gained share 
through price competition or through acquisition of less efficient banks. In identity (3), the 
concentration measure is a deterministic transformation S of the market shares into one of the 
concentration concepts that economists use, and this function is the same across all markets. 
Profitability and market structure are spuriously positively related in this model because, 7r, 
CONC, 'and NIS are all positively related to EFF- more efficient firms are more profitable in 
(1); Pore efficient firms have higher MS in (2); and MS is positively related to CONC in (3). 
The 
'structural 
model underlying the market-power (MT) hypotheses, these are [the 
conventional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and relative market power hypothesis 
(RW), is 
Iri 2-- f(Pi, Zini) +C....................... (4) 
Pi =f(STRUCi, Zi. ) + ei.. 
2 
CONC, = f3 (MSi f,,,. u i j. ) (3) 
Where P is a vector of output prices and STRUC is a measure of market structure, either CONC 
or MS, depending on the exact hypothesis being modelled. 
In equation (4), unit profits are primarily determined by differences in prices charged to 
consumers, as opposed to cost differences in the ES model above. This does not rule out 
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efficiency as affecting profits under the W hypotheses-it is just viewed as less important than the 
exogenous effects of market power acting through prices. Thus, the EFF variables may appear in 
the Z vector. In equation (5), prices are primarily determined by market structure. Under SCP, 
CONC is the key exogenous variable represented by STRUC all firms in concentrated markets set 
prices that are relatively unfavourable to consumers (that is, lower rates on depoýits, higher rates 
on loans). Under RMIP, by contrast, MS is the key exogenous variable in (5) firms with large 
market 'shares have well-differentiated products because of advertising, location, or other 
advantages and are able to exercise market power in pricing these products. Again, the EFF 
variables could affect P by being included in Z, but their effects are assumed to be relatively 
small.. The CONC definition (3) is the same as in the ES model above. Under SCP, the positive 
profit -concentration relationship comes about because CONC affects P in (5) and P affects z in 
(4). Similarly, under RNT, the positive prOfit-market share relationship occurs because MS 
affects P in (5) and P affects ;r in (4). Under either of these hypotheses, profits are positively 
correlated with the "other" market structure variable spuriously because CONC and MS are 
positiv ely correlated in (3). 
Furthermore, Berger (1995) introduced the following reduced forms, or main equation that 
include direct measures of efficiency that nests the four hypotheses 
ni = f(CONC., MSi, X-EFFi, S-EFFi, Zi. ) + ei ............... 7.1 
Where 7r is a profit measure, usually a standard profit measure (ROE, and ROA), our study 
also will utilise the alternative profit X-efficiency measure (APX) as a profitability measure. 
CONC is some market concentration measure, MS is an individual bank market share 
measure, X-EFF relates to bank X-eff iciency measure, S-EFF is a scale-eff iciency measure, 
and Za vector of control variables, capturing other firm and market-specific differences, e is 
random, error, in indexes the market, and i indexes the banks in market m. I'his equation can 
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be viewed as the reduced form profits equation for four hypotheses: the traditional structure- 
conduct-performance paradigm (SCP), the relative market-power hypotheses (RW), the X- 
efficiency hypotheses (ESXý, and the Scale-efficiency hypotheses (ESS). For the traditional 
SCP relationship one would expect to see a positive relationship between concentration and 
bank profits, all other things being equal, concentration lowers the cost of collusion for 
market participants, and increases industry profits. Under the efficient-structure hypotheses 
(ES), the coefficient of the appropriate efficiency variable is expected to be positive (banks 
with greater efficiency are more profitable) and the coefficients on other key variables 
(CONC and MS) are statistically insignificant. Similarly under the market-power (MP) 
hypotheses, the appropriate market structure variable, MS is expected to be positive and the 
others should be insignificant. That is, individual firm size determines profitability. For 
instance, if only RAP holds, CONC has a zero coefficient because CONC is only spuriously 
related to ;r through its correlation with MS. Under MP, the EFF are appropriate exogenous 
variables but are viewed as unimportant in explaining variations in bank profits. 
7.2.2 Our Svecified Model: 
The em 
I 
pirical analysis presented in this chapter follows Berger's (1995) model to investigate 
the profit-structure relationship in the banking markets of the six GCC member states. The 
model as set out in equation (7.1) associates firm profit variability to market structure and 
bank efficiency measures, and other control variables. One has to introduce other independent 
variables to account for forces other than market structure and efficiency and thus increase the 
explanatory power of the model. Therefore, our full model to test for the four competing 
hypotheses in the GCC banking industry is as follows 
171 + aý 
CONC + a3MS+a4X - EFF + as S- EFF + a6 GDPPC +a7 DUM +, C . 7.2 
where: 
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91 -= bank i's profits measured as the return on Assets (ROA) or return on equity 
(ROE) in addition to the mentioned standard accounting profit measures this study 
also utilized the altemative profit efficiency(APX) as a profitability measure. 
CONCj = concentration ratio in market j (we use the three-firm assets concentration ratio) 
Msij = market share measure, we use two market share measures to capture the RNT 
Hypotheses, these are bank deposits (BDMS) and bank loans (BLMS). 
GDPPC = Per Capita Gross Domestic Product is included as a measure aimed at Capturing 
specific market demand conditions. 
DUM = Binary variables included to take account of different bank types (commercial 
banks, investment banks, and Islamic banks). 
c= error term. 
This reduced form equation allows all -four hypotheses to be valid simultaneously. To the 
extent that any of the key variables have positive and statistically significant estimated 
coefficients, this may be taken as evidence of the marginal contribution of the corresponding 
hypotheses (Berger, 1995). This will solve what Berger (1995) refers to as "the observational 
equivalence problem". For example, many previous studies regressed profitability on 
concentration and market share and found similar results, but interpreted them differently. 
Some argue that the common finding of a positive, dominating coefficient estimate for market 
share''and an insignificant coefficient for concentration justifies acceptance of RW, which 
relates market share to market power (for example, Shepherd 1982,1986a; b; Rhoades 1985; 
Kurtz and Rhoades 1991). Others argue that this finding supports ESY., since market share 
rI nay be positively related to X-efficiency in the absence of any direct measure of X-efficiency 
in' the equation (for example, Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall 1984,1986; Smirlock 1985; 
Evanoff and Fortier 1988). That is, these authors argue that efficiency is the driving variable, 
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but do not specify it in their equations, they instead, specify market share and assume that it 
will be correlated with the excluded X-efficiency variable. Moreover, in some studies, no 
variable is included to control for scale effects (for example, Gale and Branch 1982; 
Smirlock, Gilligan and Marshall 1984; Stevens 1990), so that market share may pick up 
correlation with excluded scale efficiencies. In these studies, the positive profit-market share 
relationship may support scale-efficiency version (ESS) under the efficient-structure 
hypothesis (ES), under which scale efficiencies are positively related to both variables. Even 
in some of the studies that do control for scale, scale efficiency (ESS) could be the underlying 
explanation of the data. This is because indirect measures of scale efficiencies have often been 
specified that do not allow for U-shaped average cost curves (Berger, 1995). Furthermore, 
many studies have tested the MP hypotheses alone by examining the price-concentration 
relationship, again without the benefit of efficiency variables. Prices are regressed against 
concentration and/or market share, and a finding of less favourable prices for consumers of 
firms in more concentrated markets or with larger market shares is taken as support for the 
appropriate MP hypothesis (for example, Berger and Hannan 1989; Hannan 1991). However, 
such tests are also problematic because the excluded efficiency variables may be correlated 
with both prices and market structure (Hannan, et al. 1998). Under the ES hypotheses, prices 
may be relatively favourable for consumers in concentrated markets or with large shares 
because of the excluded efficiency variables, so that the coefficients of concentration and 
share in such a price equation may represent a net effect of the different hypotheses. 
Nevertheless, according to Berger (1995) a potentially more serious problem is present if 
efficiency is negatively correlated with concentration or market share, this may occur in 
banking because the highest concentration and largest shares are usually in rural markets 
where firms may be of less-than-efficient scale or where management or other factors of 
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production may be of relatively poor quality. In such cases, concentration and market share 
are negatively related to scale efficiencies or X-efficiencies and regressions that do not control 
for'these efficiencies are biased toward finding less favourable prices associated with 
concentration and market share, incorrectly supporting the W hypothesis. Thus, direct 
efficiency measures must be included in the conventional SCP paradigm to avoid this 
observational equivalence problem. 
An important limitation of this single reduced form equation, however, is that it tests only for 
one condition of the two necessary conditions of the validity of efficient structure (ES) 
hypotheses. According to Berger (1995) the implications of the ES hypotheses regarding the 
effects of efficiency on market structure must be tested. A necessary condition for the 
efficient structure (ES) hypothesis be true is that efficiency be positively related to 
concentration and/or market share. Again, direct measures of efficiency are needed for this 
task., This is because the structural model of the efficiency hypotheses creates a positive 
profit-structure relationship as a spurious outcome because both profits and structure are 
related positively to efficiency. That means efficiency is driving both profits and market 
structure. 
Following Berger (1995), the tests employed in this thesis, however, attempt to distinguish 
among all four hypotheses using direct measures of both market structure and efficiency. The 
tests are flexible in the sense that all four hypotheses, SCP, RMIP, ESX, and ESS, are 
represented by different variables, so that any or all of them may be found to be consistent 
with the data. In the above single reduced form equation (7.2), measures of bank profitability 
are regressed on variables measuring concentration (CONC), market share (MS), X-efficiency 
(X-EFF), and scale efficiency (S-EFF), and other control variables. This equation is shown to 
be a valid reduced form for all hypothesis with different coeflicient structures for different 
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hypotheses. Moreover, the implications of the ES hypotheses regarding the effects of 
efficiency on market structure are then tested by regressing the ES variables onto the market 
structure measures, as in equations 7.3 and 7.4, in order to ensure that, EFF is positively 
related to market-structure measures as well as to profitability measures (7r) noted above, this 
is a necessary condition for the efficient structure ES hypotheses to hold. 
MSi = RX-EFFi, S-EFFi, Zi. ) +Ci for aU i in m .......................................... 7.3 
CONCm = f(X-FFi, S-FF, Zi,,,. ) +ci ................................................... 7.4 
7.2.3 Data description and Variables included in our Model: 
-72.3.1 Data Sources: 
We pool accounting data for banks from the six GCC member states for the five year period 
1995-1999. We examine information on 72 banks over the five year period (360 observations) 
in order to provide a comprehensive treatment of the GCC banking industry and to determine 
whether the results are stable over time and across competitive environments. These data are 
collected from the Bankscope database for each of the five years froml995 to 1999. We also 
identify three types of banks that operate in the GCC, commercial, investment, and Islamic 
banks. According to Bankscope the accounting data provided is standardized according to 
international accounting conventions for cross-country comparison purposes. 
The following institutions are excluded from the sample: 
The government-related specialized banks (development banks, industrial banks, real 
estates bank). 
* Central and Monetary Agency banks 
* Off-Shore Banking Units 
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e Foreign exchange offices 
o Other non-banking credit institutions (excluded because there is no sufficient data 
available and their numbers are very small, and most of them are sole proprietorships). 
In order to assure homogeneity within each environment, we include only banks that were in 
existence for all five years, and therefore we use a balanced sample of banks. CONC and MS 
were computed based on all banks in the local markets, not just those in the regression 
sample, although our sample banks accounted for over 70 percent of all bank assets in the 
respective countries because most large banks are included in the sample. 
Table 7.1 Sa ple number of banks. 
Year/Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia U. A. E GC c 
1995 17 12 7 6 10 20 , 72 
1996 17 12 7 6 10 20 72 
1997 17 12 7 6 10 20 72 
1998 17 1 
_12 
7 6 10 20 72 
1999 17 12 7 6 10 20 72 
Total 85 60 35 30 50 100 360 
7.2.3.2 Variables Included: 
X-Eff'iciencv Measures: 
For our measure of firm-specific efficiency we use estimates of bank cost X-efficiency so as 
to be able to test for the X-efficiency version of the efficient-structure hypotheses (ESX) 
which asserts that firms with superior management or production technologies have lower 
costs and therefore higher profits. These firms are also assumed to gain large market shares 
that may result in higher levels of concentration (see Demsetz (1973,1974); Peltzman (1977), 
Smirlock (1985), Evanoff and Fortier (1988), Kurtz and Rhoades (1991), Molyneux and 
Thoronton (1992), Molyneux and Forbes (1995), Berger (1995), Hannan, et, al (1998); Mester 
et, al. (1998); Altunbas et, al, (2000). Generally speaking X-efficiency (allocative efficiency 
and technical efficiency) or differences in managerial ability to control costs or maximize 
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revenues provide a measure of how effectively banks are using their inputs to produce a given 
level of outputs. To measure this invisible input, efficient cost frontiers must be estimated, 
however, this frontier may vary for banks in different countries. However, due to data 
limitations we estimate a stochastic cost function to derive X-inefficiencies for our whole 
sample of GCC banks. This approach labels a bank as inefficient if it's costs are higher than 
those predicted for an efficient bank producing the same combination of input and output and 
if the differences cannot be explained away by statistical noise. For this purpose, we estimate 
cost X-efficiency using a stochastic cost frontier technique and translog functional form 
specification'. 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the bank efficiency literature considers the estimation of 
both cost and profit efficiencies to reveal more accurate information about firm-level 
performance (Wilson, et al, 2000). We therefore also use alternative profit efficiency 
estimates (as well as standard accounting profitability measure) to examine SCP relationships 
in Gulf banking. 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vives (2000) emphasise the importance of including country and other 
specific information in common frontier estimations of bank efficiency. They mentioned that 
the inclusion of environmental variables into a common frontier can neutralise environmental 
differences between countries. In order to derive the bank cost and alternative profit X. 
efficiency models that include firm-specific variables, we employ the control and 
environmental variables detailed in table 7.2. The control variables include the loan loss 
reserves as a percent of total loans and capital strength. The loan loss reserve as a percent of 
gross loans is included to control for asset quality. To take into account the effects of different 
1 As outlined in the previous chapter. 
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levels of equity on costs and earnings (for example, a bank with more equity will have, all 
else being equal, lower interest expenses than one with more debt), we included as an 
independent variable the book value of equity Mester (1996, p I) noted that: 
The cost model we used differs from that used in previous cfficiency studies in that it explicitly 
accounts for the quality of bank's assets and the probability of failure, which can influence banks' 
costs in a number of ways. For example, a large proportion of non-performing loans may signal 
that a bank used fewer resources than usual in the initial credit evaluation and monitoring of its 
loans. Unless quality and risk arc controlled for, one might easily miscalculate a bank's level of 
inefficiency-, e. g. banks scrimping on credit evaluations or producing excessively risky loans might 
be labelled as efricicnt when compared to banks spending resources to ensure their loans are of 
higher quality. 
Dummies are also included to account for geographical location (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Qatar, Oman, UAE, and Kuwait). Finally, to control for product diversity as efficiency might 
be associated with firm's strength in carefully targeting its market niches, dummy variables 
for bank specialisation are also included in the model. The banks in each country are divided 
into three categories; commercial banks, investment banks, and Islamic banks. It has been 
argued that the cost of producing various products might be lower when specialised banks 
produce them rather than when a single bank produces all the products due to diseconornies of 
scope. There are number of studies that have examined the impact of product diversity and 
cost efficiency. Aly et al. (1990) found a negative relationship between product diversity and 
cost efficiency. Ferrier, Grosskopf, Hayes and Yaisawarng (1993) found that banks with 
greater product diversity tend to have lower cost efficiency. Chaffai and Dietsch (1995) 
compared the efficiency of universal versus non-universal (more specialised) banks in Europe 
and found the former to be less cost efficient. We distinguish between these three main banks 
types as they typically focus on different market segments. We conducted our analysis using 
the approach suggested by Battese and Coelli's (1995) who use a technical inefficiency 
effects model that allows us to include firm-specific (and country-specific) variables directly 
into the model as these might explain some of the efficiency differences between banks as 
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well as the variation in bank inefficiency overtime. Battese and Coelli's (1995) model defines 
the inefficiency term uit as non-negative variables that account for technical inefficiency and 
are assumed to be independently and identically distributed (iid) as truncations at zero of the 
N (Sitd, 4it) distribution. According to Coelli (1998), this specification proves to be better 
than that of Pitt and Lee (198 1) two-stage model, who have estimated stochastic frontiers and 
predicted firm-level efficiencies using these estimated functions, and then regressed the 
predicted efficiencies upon firm-specific variables (such as managerial experience, ownership 
characteristics, etc. ) in an attempt to identify some of the reasons for differences in predicted 
efficiencies between firms. Furthermore, the two-stage procedure utilised by Pitt and Lee 
(1981) has been recognised as one which is inconsistent in its assumptions regarding the 
independence of the inefficiency effects in the two estimation stages (Lovell et al, 2000). 
Third Party Material excluded from digitised copy. Please refer to original text to see this material. 
Williams and Gardener (2000, p. 11) mentioned the superiority of Battese and Coelli (1995) 
model to the two stage-model. 
The common frontier is estimated using the technical inefficicncy effects model of Battese and 
Coelli (1995) and includes country-specific and firm-specific variables, which are said to 
ncutralisc cross-country environmental differences that can distort common frontier cfficicncy 
estimates. This model is superior to the "two-stage" method of dcriving efficiency estimates 
from a cost function and regressing them against a set of explanatory variables, because it 
allcviates several of the theoretical anomalies present in the two-stagc approach. 
Moreover, the computer programme, FRONTIER Version 4.1 developed by Coelli has been 
used to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of parameters of our specified models to 
estimate cost and alternative profit efficiency. In fact, FRONTEER Version4.1 can be used to 
estimate a subset of the stochastic frontier production and cost functions which have been 
proposed in the literature (see Coelli et A 1998 for more details). The programme can 
accommodate panel data; time-varying and invariant efficiencies; cost and production 
functions; half-normal and truncated normal distributions; and n ional forms w ch have a fu ct hi 
dependent variable iiý logged or original units. These features of what Frontier 4.1 can and 
cannot do are not exhaustive, but provide an indication of the program's capabilities. 
FRONTIER Version 4.1 is used to estimate the model specifications detailed above and in 
Battese and Coelli (1988,1992 and 1995) and Battese, Coelli and Colby (1989) to estimate 
the cost and profit efficiencies that are used in our SCP analysis. 
Scale efficiency Measure 
To account for differences in scale efficiencies we utilise two measures of scale efficiency to 
test for the efficient-structure hypothesis (ESS), which asserts that "firms have essentially 
equally good management and technology, but some firms simply produce at more efficient 
scales than others, and therefore, have lower unit costs and higher unit profits. These firms are 
assumed to have large market shares that may result in high levels of concentration", (Berger, 
1995, p. 410). 
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The first measure of scale efficiency we use is a standard scale economy (or scale elasticity) 
measure. Typically the scale-economies studies estimate an average practice costfunction, 
which relates bank cost to output levels and input prices (Mester, 1996). The technique 
implicitly assumes all banks in the sample are using their inputs efficiently- in other words, 
there is no x-inefficiency- and that the banks are using the same production technology. 
Under the scale-efficiency version of the cfficient-structure hypotheses (ESS), firms 
have essentially equally good management and technology, but some firms simply 
produce at more efficient scales than others, and therefore have lower unit costs and 
higher unit profit. Berger (1995, p4O9) 
However, productive efficiency requires optimising behaviour with respect to outputs as well 
as inputs. Regarding outputs, optimal behaviour relates to producing the level of outputs that 
correspond to the lowest cost per unit. For the cost function, the optimal output level is 
possible if economies and diseconomies exist at different output levels; that is at some point, 
there will be constant returns defining the optimal level of production. Economies of scale 
exist if, over a given range of output, per unit costs decline as output increases. Increases in 
per unit cost correspond to decreasing returns to scale. A scale efficient firm will produce 
where there are constant returns to scale; that is, changes in output result in proportional 
changes in costs (Evanoff and Israilevich, 1995). 
Given the cost function specification, the scale economy measure is cost elasticity; the percent 
change in cost with respect to a percent change in output. The scale elasticity measure, is an 
elasticity associated with a particular output level and indicates the relative change in cost 
associated with an increment change from this output level. The degree of scale economies 
(SCALE) is given by: 
In OIn TC SCALE F, 
i=i OIn Q, 
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M LIM YC Where I. ep. esents the sum of individual cost elasticities and can be rewritten as 
j=, aInQ, 
MMMMR 
SCALE = fa, + Xf JInQ i +2: 
Ep 
ly 
Inp, 
Where there are economies of scale if SCALE < 1, constant returns to scale if SCALE=] 
And diseconomies of scale if SCALE > 1. 
Economies of scale and Scale-efficienc 
However, a relatively recent development in the literature differentiates between two 
concepts, that is, the scale-efficiency, and scale-economy concept. Evanoff and Israilevich, 
1995, strongly, criticized the previous literature for what they call, the common confusion in 
the literature between two relatively straightforward concepts Scale-elasticity and Scale- 
efficiency 
The implication from the conclusions drawn by the authors of numerous studies is that scale elasticity and 
scale efficieny are essentially synonymous; the derivation of one automatically provides an accurate or 
approximate value for the other, until recently, however, studies have not typically evaluated scale 
efficiency. Instead, scale elasticity estimates have been used as a proxy for cfficiency, and elasticity 
measures close to 1.0 are taken to imply that scale inefficiency is trivial. Scale inefficiency is typically 
assumed to be linearly related to the scale elasticity measure; i. e. equal to one minus the elasticity 
measure. Empirically, it is also assumed that scale elasticities which are found to be insignificantly 
different from one in a statistical sense imply scale efficiency. Both statements are incorrect. Yet, failure 
to distinguish between the two concepts is common in the banking literature. Intuitively, the two concepts 
differ because they measure different things: elasticity is related to incremental changes in output, and 
inefficiency to the change in output required to produce at the minimum efficient scale. The cost savings 
realized by an incremental increase in output by a scale inefficient firm is irrelevant for measuring 
inefficiency since this is not the savings realized by producing at the efficient scale. (Israelivich, et, al. 
1995, p. 1037) 
As noted above, the scale elasticity measure, is e= Oln ClOln Q, where C is cost and Q 
output, is a point elasticity associated with a particular output level and indicates the relative 
change in cost associated with an incremental change from this output level. Scale 
inefficiency, I, can be measured as the aggregate cost of F inefficient firms (e # 1.0) relative 
to the cost of a single efficient firm (e = 1.0), where F= the size of the efficient relative to the 
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inefficient one. That is, I=[F. CIICE] - 1.0, where C1 and CE are the cost of production at the 
inefficient and efficient firms, respectively. 
Furthermore, as with the scale elasticity measure, the inefficiency measure is functional form 
specific, for example, for the quadratic form, C=a+ hQ +. 5cv, the inefficiency measure 
will equal [(b+c. Ql)/(b+c. QE)1 [1/&, ], where, Q, and QF are the output of inefficient and 
efficient firms, respectively, and it also can similarly derived for alternative forms (Evanoff et 
al. ' 1995). Thus, the two concepts are different because they measure different things: 
elasticity is related to incremental changes in output, and inefficiency to the change in output 
required to produce at the minimum efficient scale (see Israilevich and Evanoff 1995 for more 
details). 
For our purposes, we follow (Berger, 1995), scale efficiencies are computed from the same 
stochastic cost frontier model and the translog cost functional specification used to estimate 
cost., x-efficiency scores. For each bank's output mix and input prices, a U-shaped 
multiproduct average cost curve was traced out and the scale-efficient output vector Y" at the 
bottom of the U shape was determined. Scale efficiency was determined as the ratio of 
predicted costs for Y" to predicted costs for the bank's actual output Y, multiplied by the ratio 
of outputs to correct for absolute size differences: 
A33 
S-EFF=exp[InC( w)-InC(Yw)]*[(I: y)I(I: y" 
j=l 
i 
k=l 
Where the InCs are predicted cost values. It may be seen that this is an estimate of A&/AtCL 
the ratio of minimum predicted average costs to the actual predicted average costs for bank Ps 
output mix and input prices. As with any efficiency measure, S-EFF ranges over (0, I). 
Overall, therefore, we test for two different measures of scale in our efficient structure 
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hypothesis tests by including both a scale elasticity and scale efficiency variable in our 
estimates of structure-performance relationships in GCC banking. 
Performance Measures: 
Although many structure-performance studies use bank product prices as the dependent 
variable, banking is a multi product business, and individual prices may be misleading. Prices 
can be utilised only if costs are explicitly accounted for as an explanatory variable. Even then, 
given the regulatory constraints on the industry, the expected structure-price relationship may 
not be realised for a particular- service because of differing pricing strategies among banks. 
The potential for substantial cross-subsidization between products obviously exists as 
marketing strategies in certain markets may differ leading banks to charge low loan rates but 
simultaneously to pay relatively low deposit rates. Pricing strategy, therefore, could obviously 
differ across markets [see among others, (Evanoff and Fortier, 1988) and (Goldberg and Rai 
1996)] and this may create problems if one uses price as a performance measure: 
Most SCP studies also experience difficulties in measuring structure and performance 
variables adequately. Using the price of a single banking product as a measure of 
performance may be misleading because most large banks are multiproduct firms. profit 
measures may be more informative in this respect, but may also be more difficult to 
interpret because of the complexity of the accounting procedures involved. (Goddard, et al, 
2001, p. 73). - 
Given the problems associated with using price as a performance measure, we use pre-tax 
ROA, pre-tax ROE and alternative profit efficiency scores (APX) as bank performance 
measures. The profitability measures, pre-tax ROA and pre-tax ROE, are standard accounting 
measures of performance widely used in the empirical banking literature. In addition to these 
"standard" performance measures we also use alternative profit efficiency measures as 
another indicator of bank performance. These we derived from estimates of a stochastic profit 
frontier that uses the same independent variables as the cost frontier but replaces total cost 
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with profit, as noted in Berger and Mester (1998) this provides us with parametric estimates 
of profit efficiency that can be compared to the results derived from standard profit measures. 
As far as we are aware, this is the first study to use alternative profit efficiency scores as 
performance measures in a structure-performance framework. 
Concentration Measures: 
Among the most important characteristics that define the four main theoretical market 
structures are the number of firms, the degree of product differentiation, and the height of 
barriers to entry. The number and size distribution of firms are usually the most easily 
quantified aspects of market structure. Defining what constitutes the "market" is, of course, 
problematic in banking, in view of the multiproduct nature of the modem-day financial 
services firm. Nevertheless, the most conunonly used measures are the three-firm or five- 
firm deposits or assets concentration ratio (Molyneux et al., 1996, p. 93), 
For computation of the concentration measure, we use the 3-firm assets concentration ratio. 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) and Molyneux and Forbes (1995) in their studies of European 
banking, both use ten-bank assets concentration ratios. While SCP theory indicates that there 
seems to be a link between the level of output controlled by the largest firms there is no 
consensus, however, as to the exact number of firms needed for this relationship to be 
established. Berger (1995) uses the three-firm loans and deposits concentration ratios and the 
Herfindahl index to test profits-markets structure relationships and found similar results 
irrespective of the concentration ratio measure used. While all market structure measures are 
subject to their own idio-syncracies and limitations, they do usually tend to correlate highly 
with one another (Curry and George, 1983; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Goddard et al., 2001). 
For our analysis we use only the three-firm assets concentration ratios. 
Market Share Measures: 
In order to test the Relative Market-Power hypotheses that asserts that "only firms with large 
market'shares and. well-differentiated products, are able to exercise market power in pricing 
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these products and earn supernormal profits" (Berger, 1995, p. 411), we use bank's individual 
market share in terms of deposits and loans as a percentage of the total banking sector 
deposits and loans (in the respective national markets). These measures are standard measures 
of market share in the banking literature. These account for differences in loan demand and 
deposit supply functions that are faced by banks and represent the absolute volumes of each 
bank's participation in various asset and liability categories. While it is difficult to accurately 
define a multi-product banks overall market share (as market share may differ across product 
segments) for banks whose business is mainly national, these are reasonable indicators of 
market share (Berger, 1995). 
Market Demand and other Variables: 
Previous empirical studies, see among others (Smirlock (1985), Evanoff and Fortier (1988), 
Kurtz and Rhoades (1991), Molyneux and Thoronton (1992), Molyneux and Forbes (1995), 
and Berger (1995) have used a wide variety of independent variables to account for market 
demand conditions, depending on the author's intuition. Our model, however, account for 
different demand characteristics across markets. We will assume that greater levels of income 
lead to increasing demand for loans and increasing supply of deposits from consumers. In 
other words, one would expect that banks operating in high per capita income markets will 
face higher demand for their services than banks operating in low per capita income markets, 
other things remaining equal. Hence, we incorporate into the model a GDP Per Capita income 
variable to account for demand factors in different national markets. The increased demand is 
expected to positively affect bank profits. 
Finally, we also include a binary variable to account for differences in banks type. This 
distinguishing between Islamic, investment, and commercial, banks so as to capture 
differences in profitability between institutions with varying organisational forms. 
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7.3 Empirical-findinas 
7.3.1 Estimated Levels of Efficiencv in GCC Banking Svstems. 
The cost efficiency estimates, derived ftom our stochastic frontier model, are summarised in 
tables 7.3-7.5 below. Cost efficiency estimates for banks in the countries under study 
averaged 88% and these estimates have improved over time from 84% in 1995 to 91% in 
1999. This suggests that the same level of output could be produced with approximately 88% 
of current inputs if banks under study were operating at the most efficient level. This level of 
technical inefficiency is similar to the range of 10-15% found in survey of 130 studies 
undertaken by Berger and Humphrey (1997). These results appear slightly lower than the 
levels of inefficiency found in European studies including Gardener, et al. (2000) whose 
findings for a sample of banks, from twelve countries, show mean cost inefficiency of around 
22 % for the period 1989 to 1996. 
Table 7.3 GCC countries banks' Cost X-effidency Scores (0/6) over 5 years 
Year Bahrain Kuwait Oman --Qatar 
SaudLA U. A. E GCC 
Cost. X 
-Eff 
No. of 
Banks 
C. X- 
eff 
No. of 
banks 
C. X 
-Eff 
No. of 
bankm 
- CX 
-Eff 
No. of 
banks 
C. X- 
Eff 
I No. of 
banks 
Cost. 
X- 
Eff 
1 No. of 
banks 
C. X. 
Eff 
1 No. of 
banks 
1995 82 17 84 12 83 7 81 6 88 1 10 83 20 . 84 1 72 
1996 82 17 84 12 85 7 83 6 91 10 85 20 86 72 
1997 83 17 85 1 12 85 1 7 84 6 90 10 87 20 87 72 
1998 84 17 88 12 
- 
86 7 84 6 92 10 90 20 89 72 
1999 86 17 90 12 89 7 F5 6 9. 3 10 91 20 91 72 
Ave. 1 84 1 85 87 60 86 35 83 30 2 9 1 50 1 90 100 88 72 
The efficiency scores based on geographical location, ranged from 83% in Qatar to 92% in 
Saudi Arabia. Referring to table 7.4, the average cost efficiency based on bank specialisation 
ranged from 84% for investment banks to 9101o for Islamic banks. It seems that Islamic banks 
have higher cost efficiency because of their general lower cost of funds compared to 
commercial and investment banks. Finally, cost eff"Iciency scores are similar among different 
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banks' sizes (table 7.5). This finding conflicts with US and European literature that tends to 
find that large banks are more cost efficient (See Goddard et al 2001. 
table 7.4 Cost X-efficiency (%) and Bank Type organ izational form, Commercial, Investment and Islamic 
Year Islamic Banks Commercial Banks Inve ent Banks 
Cost x-efficiency N. of observations Cost X-EFF No of Obs Cost X-EFF No of Obs 
1995 90 10 84 47 83 15 
1996 91 10 86 47 84 is 
1997 91 10 86 47 84 15 
1998 1 92 1 10 87 47 85 15 
1999 92 10 88 47 86 15 
Average 91 50 86 235 84 75 
Source: Autbor's own estimation 
Table 7.5 Cost X-efficiency by ank Asset Size 
Bank Size (assets US$ MWon) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 All 
1-199 84 86 86 88 90 87 
200-299 84 94 87 89 90 87 
300-499 84 85 88 89 91 88 
500-999 85 84 87 89 91 88 
1000-2499 84 86 88 90 92 87 
2500-4999 94 85 87 87 92 88 
5000-9999 84 86 87 89 91 88 
10000+ 84 85 87 80 92 88 
Average 84 1 85 1 87 1 89 91 88 
Source: Authoes own estimation 
As mentioned earlier in the previous section, the bank efficiency literature considers the 
estimation of both cost and profit efficiencies to reveal more accurate information about firm- 
level performance. Profit inefficiency depends both on the production structure and on the 
composition of the product portfolio, which has to be updated by banks at the pace required 
by . general macroeconomic and other trends 
in the economy. In addition, profit eff iciency 
incorporates both the cost and revenue side of a bank's operations and so therefore can be 
considered a more encompassing measure of firm performance. For instance just looking at 
cost efficiency may be misleading as one may find cost efficient banks that are highly 
efficient but they earn low revenues. Profit efficiency estimates therefore encompass bank 
cost and revenue features in the optimisation process. 
280 
Referring to table 7.6 the alternative profit efficiency results show that the average technical 
efficiency estimates are around 68% over the period 1995-1999. It should be noted that this 
level of profit inefficiency is similar to the typical range of profit inefficiency results found in 
US studies, that is about 30% to 40% of the industry's potential profits, according to Berger 
and Humphrey (1997). However, these profit efficiencies in GCC banking seem to be lower 
than those found in European banking. For instance, William and Gardener (2000) estimate 
profit efficiency to be 79.7% in European banking during the 1990s. The mean profit 
efficiency in GCC banking suggests that banks under study lose around 32% of profits that 
could be earned by a best practice institution. 
Based on bank's specialisation, the results show that the profit efficiency scores ranged from 
64% for investment banks to 73% for the Islamic banks (see table 7.6 for details) these results 
similar to A1jarrah (2002). According to A1jarrah (2002) this result might explain the increase 
in Islamic banking activities especially in Bahrain over the past few years; as the cost of funds 
for Islamic banks is relatively cheaper than the cost of funds for other financial institutions. 
The Islamic banks, in gineral, do not pay interest but rather a mark-up which is a profit 
margin based on the way in which the funds are utilised; as indicated in chapter 3. 
In the case of geographical location, profit efficiency ranged from around 64 % in Oman to 
72% in Saudi Arabia. Omani banking are relatively less profit efficient compared to Saudi 
Arabian and Kuwaiti institutions. Based on the size of assets, profit efficiency measures 
seems to be similar across all banks sizes, so these results do not support the view that large 
banks enjoy profit efficiency advantages compared to small banks. 
To summarise the main findings, cost efficiency levels averaged around 88 percent over the 
period 1995-1999. On the other hand, alternative profit efficiency averaged around 68% over 
the same period. It seems that, cost as well as alternative profit efficiency of GCC banking 
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systems have not dramatically altered over the period 1995-1999. Furthermore, the size of the 
cost and profit efficiency estimates for the GCC banks under study are not noticeably 
different from those observed in previous studies on US and European banking. Islamic banks 
are found to be the most cost and profit efficient while investment banks are the least 
efficient. This result may partially explain the motives behind the increase in Islamic banking 
activities over the past few years; as the cost of funds for Islamic banks is relatively cheaper 
than the cost of funds for other financial institution. Based on assets size, there seems to be no 
substantial differences between large and small banks in terms of their cost and profit 
efficiency levels. However, geographically, Saudi Arabia seems to have the most cost and 
profit efficient banking system, while Bahrain is the least cost efficient and Oman is the least 
profit efficient respectively. This may relate to the fact that Saudi Arabia has by far the largest 
banking system in the region. Finally, while the countries under study have implemented 
many economic and financial reforms over the last twenty years or so as indicated earlier, 
these reforms appear to have had little impact on banking sector efficiency in the second half 
of the 1990s. Given our findings, it seems that more reform may be needed to improve 
(especially) their profit efficiency. Perhaps the move to create a single GCC market may help 
to facilitate these developments as the creation of a similar European Single market appears to 
have had a positive impact on European bank efficiency (see European Commission (1997). 
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Table 7.6 : Alternative prorit efficiency in GCC member states over 1995-1999 
Based on geographical location 
Country/Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 All 
Bahrain 63 66 69 70 71 69 
Kux%zit 64 68 69 71 72 70 
Oman 62 66 66 67 67 64 
Saudi Arabia 68 70 70 1 72 1 74 1 72 
Qatar 63 67 68 69 70 67 
United Emirates 64 67 69 71 72 69 
All 64 68 69 70 72 68 
According to bank s organisationa form 
Commercial 64 67 1 68 68 -1 -70 ----- F 69 
Investment 62 64 65 66 66 64 
Islamic 68 72 73 74 75 73 
All 64 68 69 70 72 68 
According to bank's Asset Size(US mfllion 
1-199 63 67 68 69 70 67 
200-299 65 67 67 69 70 68 
300-499 64 70 70 70 71 68 
500-999 65 70 70 70 71 68 
1000-2499 66 70 69 71 70 67 
25004999 04 1 07 -1 
69 70 72 68 
5000-9999 63 67 1 68 70 71 68 
10000+ 62 65 67 69 72 69 
All 64 68 69 70 72 68 
Source: Authoils own estimation 
7.3.2 Estimated Levels of Cost Economies and Cost Efficiencies 
7.3.2.1 Estimated Levels of Cost Economies 
it is possible to obtain a measure of economies of scale (scale elasticity) from the cost 
function by differentiating the cost function with respect to output and summing up the 
coefficients of the exogenous variables (as shown earlier in this chapter); if the sum is 
significantly lower than one, there are scale economies, if it is equal to one there are constant 
returns to scale and if it is larger than one there are diseconornies of scale. Table 7.7 shows 
the cost scale elasticities of GCC banking markets. Geographically, the United Arab Emirates 
banks seem to be benefit from potential economies of scale whereas in the other countries 
diseconomies appear to be prevalent. For instance, the Saudi Arabian banking market shows 
diseconomies of scale, and this may be consistent with the fact that Saudi Arabian banks are 
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the largest in the GCC countries in terms of total assets size (see chapter 3). (This result is 
also consistent with other results in the literature [see among others (Mester et al. 1998); 
Hannan et al. (1998); who find substantial diseconomies for large banks]. Overall, our results 
suggest that optimal banks' assets size is in the range of US$ 3-5 billion. Organisational form 
seems to have no effect on bank's economies of scale, this result may suggest that, small, 
medium and large-sized banks are found throughout all organisational forms. Taken together, 
the results suggest that there are little opportunities, apart for the smallest GCC banks to 
realize scale economies. Even when they are found, they appear to be small. 
Table 7.7 : Cost Scale elasticities In the banking sectors of GCC member sta tes over 1995-1999 
Country/Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 All 
Saudi Arabia 1.05 1.04 1.06 1.08 1.09 - -1.08 
Kuwait . 99 1.04 1.03 1.05 1.03 1.03 Qatar 1.02 0.99 1.03 1.01 1.02 1.02 
U. A. E 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.96 
Oman 0.93 1 1.02 0.98 0.99 _ 1.01 0.98 
Bahrain 1.02 1.03 1.01 0.99 1.03 1.02 
All 103 1.03 1.02 1.03 1 1.03 1.03 
According to ban 's orgadisational form 
Commercial 1.01 1.04 1.02 1.03 1 1.03 1 1.03 
hivestment 1.03 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.02 1.02 
Islan-Lic 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.03 
All 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.03 1M 
According to Bank's Asset Size(U million 
A-199 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.91 
200-299 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.94 . 94 0.94 
300-499 0.95 0.94 . 094 0.95 0.95 0.95 
500-999 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 
1000-2499 1.01 1.01 1.01 . 99 1.01 1.01 
2500-4999 1.01 1.01 0.99 1.01 . 99 1.01 
5000-9999 1.04 1.03 1.12 1.12 1.09 1.08 
10000+ 1.19 1.15 1.16 1.19 1.16 1.15 
All 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.03 
Source: Author's own estimation 
Note : Volumes below 1 represent scale economies, =1 represent constant returns to scale and >1 
rpnresent diseconomies of scale 
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7.3.2.2 Scale Efficiency Scores 
As noted earlier, an alternative to the scale elasticity measure is the scale inefficiency 
indicators as suggested by Evanoff and Israelivich (1995). Whereas scale elasticity is related 
to incremental changes in output, scale inefficiency is related to the change in output required 
to produce at the minimum efficient scale. Given the cost function specification of the 
stochastic frontier, scale efficiency averaged around 67% for banks under study over 1995- 
2000 (see table 7.8). According to geographical location, scale efficiency scores ranged from 
74% for Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates banks to 62% for Qatari banks. Moreover, 
commercial banks are the most efficient with scale efficiencies around 70% while the least 
efficient are the Islamic banks (table 7.8). 
Table 7.8 : Cost Scale inefficiency in the anking secto of GCC member states over 1995-1999 
Country/Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 All 
Bahrain 34 32 37 33 31 33 
Kuwait 37 38 34 32 34 32 
Oman 31 35 32 30 29 31 
Saudi Arabia 27 26 25 26 25 26 
Oatar 35 1 38 1 37 1 37 37 1 38 
United Emirates 30 29 29 29 27 28 
All 32 30 29 32 33 33 
According to bank s organisationa form 
CommercW 29 29 31 1 31 31 
Investment 32 31 33 1 31 31 31 
Islamic 34 33 1 34 34 35 33 
All 31 32 32 32 32 33 
According to bank's Asset Size(US million 
1-199 29 30 26 27 32 29 
200-299 30 28 28 28 28 28 
300499 30 29 30 30 33 30 
500-999 25 27 27 26 26 26 
1000-2499 26 25 25 25 22 24 
25004999 20 22 15 19 19 18 
5000-9, : 999 22 17 14 14 17 15 0+ 10002! 
R 
0 22 19 23 21 18 - - 21 
AII 32 30 29 32 33 33 
cmirre! Author's own estimation 
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The results generally show that some categories of small and large banks are scale efficient 
while other ranges do have similar efficiency levels. Our findings for scale efficiency suggest 
that, on average, many GCC banks lie a distance from their optimal efficient size. So whereas 
scale elasticities are negligible (i. e. the slope of the cost function is flat) the difference 
between average bank size and their most efficient size appears to be considerable. In fact 
scale inefficiency appears to be larger than cost inefficiency, but similar in magnitude to profit 
efficiency. 
To conclude we find that, cost inefficiency levels of GCC are around 15% and profit 
inefficiencies are around 30 percent, these results are generally consistent with the findings in 
US and European banking. Islamic banks are found to be the most cost and profit efficient. 
Banks in Saudi Arabia seem to be slightly more cost and profit efficient, compared to those in 
other GCC countries, however, and this may be because they can benefit from access to a 
larger banking market. The hypotheses that there are significant economies of scale to be 
exploited in the banking industry, does not appear to hold with the exception of very small 
banks. Diseconomies of scale appear to predominate throughout the region's banks although 
there are noticeable differences in scale inefficiency. Taken together, the results suggest that 
banks should focus on improving their revenue performance (improving profit efficiency) as 
well as on trying to operate at optimal scale (scale efficiency). 
7.4 SCP in the GCC Countries: 
I Pooled Cross-Country Data and Eml! irical Results 
This section focuses on the empirical evidence concerning the effects of concentration 
(CONC), market share (MS) and the bank efficiency Variables (X-EFF and S-EFF), on bank 
performance in the GCC banking markets. Tests will be carried out using the mehodology 
04 ou 
and the variables as outlined in the previous sections of this chapter as well as in Chapter 6. 
First of all, we test for the effect of each hypothesis (traditional SCP, RMT, X-EFF and S- 
EFF) on profitability by estimating the complete reduced form a regressions with CONC, MS, 
and the EFF measures. As noted by Berger (1995) this will provide more definitive results 
because they incorporate the reduced forms for all four hypotheses, and their marginal effect 
simultaneously. 
We pooled our sample data for all the GCC member states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain) from 1995 to 1999 and regressed the performance 
measures [either return on assets (ROA) return on equity (ROE) or Alternative Profit X- 
efficiency indicators (APX)] on the concentration measure (CONC), the market share [either, 
individual bank loan (BLMS) or deposits market share (BDMS)]. We used MM*RTAB 12 
statistical software programme to estimate all the regression equations. 2 
Table 7.9 reports the results of the six complete reduced form a (ROE, ROA, APX), 
regressions with CONC, MS, and the EFF measures, with other control and environmental 
variables for the pooled sample of GCC member states banks between 1995 and 1999. The 
results from the six models strongly support the X-efficiency version of the efficient-structure 
hypotheses (X-EFF), that is, that the x-efficiency variable is positive and statistically 
significant in all six models. The results reject the traditional SCP hypothesis, as in the first 
five models the concentration ratio variable (CONC) is negative and statistically insignificant 
and in model six it is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. 
The results also show no strong support for the relative market power hypotheses, as the MS 
variable measured by loan market share (BLMS) is positive and statistically insignificant in 
models (2,3 and 5), and the deposits market share variable (BDMS) is statistically 
2 The models were re-Cstimated using the fixed effects pariel data approach using STATA and similar results 
Inaintained (see Appendix 2). 
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insignificant in models (1, and 4), (however, it is found to be positive and statistically 
significant in model six where we use alternative profit efficiency (APX) as our profitability 
measure). Moreover, the results also show no support for the scale efficiency version of the 
efficient-structure hypothesis, as in model I and model 2 the scale efficiency measure is 
negative and statistically insignificant when profitability is measured by return on equity 
(ROE) and negative and statistically significant in the four other models. These results 
suggest some consistency with the literature that finds mostly a negative and statistically 
insignificant concentration coefficient in SCP type estimates on various banking markets (see 
Lucy (1995), Berger, 1995, and Goldberg and Rai (1996). Regarding other explanatory 
variables, we found that, the market-specific demand conditions variable (GDPPQ is positive 
but statistically insignificant in models (1,2,3 and 4), and positive and statistically significant 
in models 5 and 6. This may support the argument that, greater levels of income lead to 
increasing demand for loans and increasing supply of deposits from consumers. In other 
words, banks operating in high per capita income markets will charge higher prices for their 
services than banks operating in low per capita income markets, other things remaining equal. 
Nevertheless, our empirical findings also suggest that Islamic banks are significantly more 
profitable, than investment and commercial banks. The variable for Islamic banks is positive 
and statistically significant in all the models estimated (see table 7.9). As noted before, this 
may be explained by the fact that, for all Islamic banks deposits are interest-free. Moreover, 
this result may partially explain the motives behind the increase in Islamic banking activities 
over the past few years; as the cost of funds for Islamic banks is relatively cheaper than the 
cost of funds for other financial institutions. In addition, intense competition between 
investment and commercial banks might explain the low profits of investment banks. Overall, 
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these findings are consistent with our previous results on cost and (alternative) profit 
efficiency (that show Islamic banks to be more efficient institutions). 
Finally, the explanatory power of our models (the adjusted Rý values) are between 12% to 
20%, these are higher than the average found in previous SCP studies which average between 
3% to 10% [see Gilbert (1984), Smirlock (1985), Evanoff and Fortier (1988), Timme and 
Yung (1991), Lucy (1995), Molyneux and Forbes (1995), Berger (1995), Golberg and Rai 
(1996)]. This suggests that the ability of banks to improve profits through efficiency increases 
in GCC countries may be higher than in US and European markets. Nevertheless, apparently 
most of the variation in profit is still is due to factors other than efficiency and market 
structure variables. Although, the main findings run strongly counter to the traditional SCP 
paradigm we can not yet distinguish among the other three hypotheses since MS may be 
correlated with the EFF variables. As noted above the results so far strongly support the x- 
efficiency version of the efficient structure (ES) hypotheses. The x-efficiency variable is 
positive and statistically significant when regressed against all profitability variables. 
However, there is some (albeit limited) evidence that the RW may hold as market share is 
found to be positive and statistically significant in one model (the APX estimate). 
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FiUl`e7.9 Models from 1-6 investigate the Influence of narket-power and efficiency on 
GCC bank, 's profitability (ROE, ROA and APX) 
Model (1) The dependent variable is (ROE) and the market share variable is (BDMs) 
Predictor Coef StDev T jP 
Constant 2.25850 0.76920 2.94 0.004 
GDPPC 0.06236 0.08191 0.76 0.447 
CONC -0.28270 0.22121 -1.28 0.202 
BDMS 0.04817 0.03784 1.27 0.204 
X-EFF 0.58431 0.22308 2.62 0.009 
S-EFF -0.77910 0.56496 1.38 0.169' 
Commercial banks 0.33177 0.11207 2.96 0.003 
Investment banks 0.33980 0.12307 2.76 0.006 
R-Sq - 10.1% R-Sq(adj) 8.2% 
Model (2) The t variable is (ROE) and market share variable Is (BLUS) 
Predictor Coef StDev T 
Constant 2.34206 0.76660 3.06 0.002 
GDPPC 0.06944 0.08219 0.84 0.399 
CONC, -0.31244 0.22810 -1.37 0.172 
BIMS 0.05251 0.03843 1.37 0.173 
X-EFF 0.51653 0.21870 2.36 0.019 
S-EFF -0.82136 0.51750 -1.59 0.113 
Commercial banks 0630909 0.11360 2.72 0.007 
Investment banks 0.29441 0.13480 2.18 0.030 
R-Sq - 10.2% R-Sq(adj) -8.4% 
Model (3) The dependent variable Is (ROA) and market share variable is (BIRS) 
Predictor Coef StDev T P 
Constant 0.06487 0.01983 3.27 0.001' 
GDPPC 0.00005 0.00023 0.22 0.825 
CONC -0.01313 0.01009 -1.30 0.194 
BLMS 0.00297 0.01311 0.23 0.821 
X-EFF 0.03791 0.01138 3.33 1 0.001 
S-EFF -0.06176 0.01353 -4.57 0.006 
commercial banks 0.01103 0.00406 2.71 0.007 
investment banks -0.00579 0.00387 -1.50 0.136 
3t-Sq 19.3% R-Sq(adj) - 17.9 
model (4) The dependent variable Is (ROAL) and market share variable Is (BEM) 
Predictor Coef StDeV T P 
Constant 0.06669 0.01821 3.66 0.006- 
GDPPC 0.11443 0.08944 1.28 0.202 
CONC -0.01349 0.09276 -1.45 0.147 
BDMS 0.00778 0.01217 0.64 0.523 
X-Eff 0.03827 0.01136 3.37 0.001 
S-EFF -0.06469 0.01396 -4.63 0.000 
Commercial banks 0.011099 0.04014 2.76 , 0.006 
investment banks -0.05979 0.03871 -1.54 0.125' 
19.2% R-Sq(adj) 17.6% 
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Model (5) The dependent variable is (AXP) and market share variable I, (BLMS) 
Predictor Coefj StDev Tj P 
Constant 0.42770 '0.17885 2.39 0.017 
GDPPC 0.00834 0.00208 4.01 0.000 
C CONC -0.11656 0.09092 -1.28 0.201 
BILMS 0* 16228 0.11824 1.37 1 0.171 
X-Eff X- 0.00456 0.00102 4.45 0.000 
S-EFF S- -0.20665 0.12195 -1.69 0.091 
Commercial banLsLI Co 0.01041 0.03494 0.3 0 0.766 
In Investment banks 1 -0.04218 0.03664 1 -1.15 0.250 
R-Sq -13.7% R-Sq(adj) - 12.0% 
140del(6) The dePendent variable Is (AXP) and market abare, variable Is (BDms) 
Predictor Coef StDev T p 
Constant 0.55861 0.18021 3.10 0.002 
GDPPC 0.00802 0.00020 3.89 0.000 
CONC -0.15665 0.08935 -1.75 0.080 
BDMS 0.31511 0.10934 2.88 0.004 
X-Eff 0.00474 0.00107 4.66 0.000 
S-EFF -0.32860 0.12742 -2.58 0.010 
Coxmercial banks 0.02073 0.03486 0.59 0.552- 
Investment banks -0.04568 0.03619 -1.26 0.2089 
K-sq = i3. j-/o x-sq(adj) = 13.61/9 
Note: Commercial= binary variable for commercial banks where commercial banks=1 and other banks 0 
Investment- binary variable for Investment banks where investment banks--l and other banks 0 
The constant picks up the term for Islamic banks. 
As such, and following Berger (1995), our analysis proceeds to test to see whether it is the 
market-power or efficiency effects associated with market share (MS) included in the profit 
equation that impact on the CONC coefficient. This is a key point in the debate between AD 
and ES advocates in the literature. We test for this condition empirically, in two stages. First 
of all, we exclude the market structure measures from the full models [in this case the 
concentration ratio (CONC) and the market share measures (MS) [both the deposit (BDMS) 
and loan market share (BLMS)] from the full model and regress only efficiency measures 
with other control variables on the profitability measures (ROE, and ROA and AM), 
however, in the second stage we replicate the same regressions by including separately the 
two MS measures in the regression equations to test for the individual marginal effect of each 
'of 
the two variables in the model, to see to what extent this will effect the regressions 
explanatory Power. 
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Table 7.10 testing for the influence of efficiency and Market share 
variables on bank profits excluding concentration 
ModeM Dependent variable Is (A3? X) (market share varlables excluded] 
I pr cr Coef I StDev Tp = 
t Eon 0.2488321 0.136100 1.83 0.068 
- GDPPC 0.0091478 0.019398 4.73 0.000 
X-Ef f 0.00453911 0.001024 1 4.43 1 0.000 X-Ef f 
S-EFF -0.1151125 1 0.106812 1 -1.08 1 0.282 S-EFF 
Mercial banks 1 -0.0016687 0.033979 1 -0.05 0.961 Co II 0 ercia CT 
estment hAnl-ft I 
p 
1n 0.0405715 0.0359151 1.131 0.259 rl 
SS0.179, 0.1792 R-Sq 13.1% R-Sq(adj) 11.9% 
Model8. . DeZ 3z Mo, e18 . Model8: DNependent varlable Is (APX) and market share varlable ls(BLUS) 
Predictor Coef StDev T P 
Constant 0.2877568 0.141700 2.03 - 0.043 
GDPPC 0.0009300 0.000194 4.79 0.000 
BLMS 0.1097764 0.110213 0.99 0.323 
X-Eff 0.0044959 0.001025 4.39 0.000 
S-EFF -0.1623167 0.117016 -1.39 1 0.166 
Cornmercial banks 0.0000000 0.034010 0.00 1.000 
Investment banks -0.0353542 0.036288 -0.97 0.331 
R-Sq 13.3% R-Sq(adj) - 11.9% 
Model9: Dependent variable to (ROE)[market share varlables excluded] 
Predictor Coef StDev T p 
Constant -2.5206563 0.731965 -3.44 0.001 
GDPPC 0.0823486 0.076604 1.07 0.283 
X-Eff, 0.5180469 0.218331 2.37 0.018 
S-Eff -1.3826096 0.342578 _ -4.04 0.000 
C -0.3142331 0.108855 -2.89 0.004 
In -0.3672452 0.116531 
73.15 0.002- 
iR-Sq 9.6% R-Sq(adj) - 8.3% 
ModellO: Dependent varlable ls (ROE) [market share variable is (BLi4s] 
Predictor Coef StDerv T 
Constant 2.6135254 0.741446 3.52 0.000' 
GDPC 0.0989633 0.079415 1.25 0.214 
BLKS 0.0268489 0.033599 0.80 0.425 
X-Eff 0.5066116 0.218932 2.31 _ 0.021 4L 
S-Eff 1 -1.1296342 0.466263 1 -2.42 0.016 0 
ý16 
cornmercial banks 0.2904785 0.112975 1 0.011 011 
investment banks_[ 
_ 
-0.3141143 0.134284 -2.34 
gO. 
02 0 
1 
0 
J2O 
(adj) - 8.5% 
Model (11) D nt varlable Is (ROE) [market share variable is ( BnHs] 
-Fr-edictor Coef StDev - T p 
Z-o-nstant 2.5566245 0.733711 3.4F 0., 001 
GDPC ý 
-0.0942535 0.078092 -1.21 0.228" 
_ _ BDMS 0.0271667 0.034114 0.80 0.426 
X-Eff ý 0.5448171 0.221032 2.47 0.014 
S-Eff 
F ýE 
-1.0762985 1 0.51538 -2.09- - 0.037 
ial banks co: = erc -0.3029437 1- 0.109826 -2.76 0.006 
1 
inve; -t-ment banks A -0.3358659 1 0.123056 -2.73 0.007 
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Table 7.10 (Continued) 
Model (12) Dependent variable Is ROA [market sh re variables are excluded from the model] 
Predictor Coef StDev T 
Constant 0.0501530 0.0150819 3.32 0.001 
GDPPC 0.0000006 0.0000021 0.28 0.776 
X-Eff 0.0003698 0.0001134 3.26 0.001 
S-EFF -0.0580454 0.0118300 -4.90 0.000 
Commercial banks -0.0045781 0.0037641 -1ý. 22 0.22 5 
investment banks 0.0119365 0.0039786 3.00 0.003 
R-Sq - 18.8% R-Sq(adj) - 17.6% 
Model (13)Dependent v riable Is ROA and market share variable Is (BDMS) 
Predictor Coef StDev T P 
Constant 0.0512214 0.01604 3.19 0.002 
GDPPC 0.0006357 0.00021 0.29 0.770 
BDMS 0.0023100 0.01159 0.20 0.842 
X-Eff 0.0370456 0.01136 3.26 0.001 
S-EFF -0.0593978 0.01365 -4.35 0.000 
Commercial banks -0.0046081 0.00377 -1.22 0.223 
Investment banks 0.0119909 0.00399 3.00 0.003 
R-Sq - 18.8% R-Sq(adj) - 17.4% 
Model (14) Dependent variable Is ROA and market share variable Is (BOAS) 
Predictor Coef StDev T P 
Constant 0.0648712 0.01983 3.27 0.001 
GDPPC 0.0000005 0.0000023 0.22 0.825 
BLMS 0.0029747 0.01311 0.23 0.821 
X-EFF 0.0003791 0.0001138 3.33 0.001 
S-EFF -0.0617611 0.01353 -4 5 0.000 
Commercial banks 0.0057952 0.003876 30 1.50 0.136 
investment banks 0.0110301 0.004064 71 2.71 0. O N 
3R-sq - 19.3% R-Sq(adj) - 17.996 
In fact, the inclusion of MS variables do not help in explaining profit variability, and do not 
increase the regressions explanatory power. Thus, results of models 7 to 14 shown in table 7. 
10 suggest that it is the efficiency effects associated with the MS variable included in the 
profit regression and not the market power effects through MS. Overall, the values of Rý 
changed very slightly and X-eff coefficients did not change in a meaningful way when the 
MS variables were added to the regressions. 
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A 
Since MP is controlled for in these regressions, these results suggest that ES hypotheses (X_ 
EFF) again, explain part of the profit-structure relationship. However, we cannot formally 
confirm that efficiency is the determinant of the profit-structure relationship, unless the 
efficiency variables positively correlates with market structure measures (concentration and 
market share). According to the structural model of the efficient-structure hypotheses 
presented by Berger (1995) the profit-structure relationship is conditional on the fact that the 
efficient-structure (ES) coefficients must be positively correlated with the market structure 
measures. Specifically, bank profitability is a function of its efficiency, and efficient firms 
gain market share and this market share may lead to market concentration. To examine this 
necessary condition of the ES hypotheses, (that efficiency affects market structure), we 
regressed the_CONC and NIS measures on the efficiency measures as outlined in the reduced 
forms for CONC and NIS in equations (7.3) and (7.4). The results of these models are shown 
in table 7.11. When CONC and NIS are regressed on the EFF measures and other control 
variables, all of the X-Eff and S-Eff coefficients are positive, quantitatively large and 
statistically significant, consistent with the efficient-structure hypotheses. This reinforces the 
results found earlier that the X-efficiency version of ES hypotheses strongly supports the 
profit-structure relationship in GCC banking markets. Or to put it another way, more efficient 
banks have higher levels of profitability, this results is them growing market share, leading to 
greater levels of concentration. The main factor influencing GCC bank pro itability (RO f A, 
ROE or alternative prorit efficiency) is bank cost X-efficiency. (The table 7.11 also shows 
that bank scale efficiency is related to market concentration and market share but we have 
already shown that scale efficiency 
is not important in explaining bank profitability). 
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Table 7.11 Models (15,16, and 17) Test for relationship between market- 
rx: ýwer and efficient-structure. rinding that a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between market-structure and efficient-structure 
Ineasures can be taken as evidence that supports the efficient structure (ES) 
hypotheses. 
model (15) Dependent variable in concentration (CONC) 
pzvkdictor Coef StDev T 
Constant 1.0410923 0.0847422 12.29 0.000 
GDPPC 0.0000886 0.0000120 7.36 0.000 
X-EFF 0.1859712 0.0665010 2.80 0.005 
S-Eff 0.0960634 0.0211556 4.54 0.000- 
Commercial banks 0.0195998 0.0223514 ý 3.56 0.000 
investment banks -0.0008004 1 0.0006373 -1.26 1 0.210 
R-Sq - 18.60 R-Sq(adj) - 17.50 
Model (16) D*pen nt variable in bank*& deposits market share (BDms) 
jF"--dictor Coef StDev 
T 
P 
constant 0.0002606 0.0005210 0.50 0.617 
' 
GDPPC 0.0000084 0.0000098 0.85 0.395 
X-EFF 0.4654909 0.0692754 6.72 0.000 
F-_ýEFF 0.5850775 0.0543623 10.76 0.000 
Commercial banks 0.01276341 0.0172945 0.74 0.461 
: Envestment banks -0.0233423 0.0182723 -1.28 
1 0.202 
I; t-sq - 32.7% R-Sq(adj) - 31.80 
Model (17) Dependent variable is bank$ a loans market share (ELMS) 
pznedictor 
Coef StDev T 
constant 0.35512 0.06519 5.45 0.000 
- a-DPPC 0.00000142 0.00000093 1.54 0.125 
P X-EFF 
0.04670 0.01720 2.72 0.007 
S 
JE _FF 0.43092 0.05115 8.42 0.000 
Commercial banks- 0.01493 0.01627 0.92 0.359- F: r s 
; 
ks 
WEb 
0.0004027 0.0004903 0.82 0.412 
M 25.5% R-Sq(adj) -2 - 4.5% 
To surnmarise our results are in some way similar to those of Timme and Yang (1991). They 
regressed x on measures of MS and 
X-EFF, but included the level of total assets in place of a 
direct rneasures of S-EFF. Similar to our results they found that X-EFF has a positive, 
statistically significant effects on x, and 
CONC has mostly negative effects. They also found a 
positive and statistically significant 
NIS coefficient in contrast to our findings. Our results are 
295 
also in contrast to those of Molyneux and Forbes (1995) who found support for the traditional 
interpretation of the SCP paradigm and Berger (1995), where his empirical results indicate 
that market share appears to represent evidence of the relative market power hypothesis in US 
banking. Overall, our analysis suggests that the X-efficiency version of the efficient-structure 
hypotheses explains the profit-structure relationship in GCC banking. 
7.5 Conclusion 
in this chapter we tested for evidence of the market-power and efficient-structure hypotheses 
in six GCC's banking sectors, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
United Arab Emirates. Following Berger (1995) we distinguish among the four hypotheses 
[the two market power (NT) hypotheses (traditional SCP, and RM[P) and the two efficient- 
structure hypotheses (X-efficiency and Scale-efficiency)] by incorporating into our 
performance models direct measures of X-efficiency and scale-efficiency. This provides more 
definitive results because the model specification can incorporate the reduced forms for all 
four hypotheses, and tests of the four hypotheses were performed by regressing measures of 
concentration, market share, X-efficiency and scale-efficiency against profitability (ROE, 
ROA and Alternative profit efficiency (APX). Our empirical findings strongly support the X_ 
efficiency version of the efficient -structure 
hypotheses that cost X-efficiency helps in 
explaining the variability of bank profits. 
X-efficiency or superior management of resources is 
consistently associated with higher profits when controlling 
for the effects of the other three 
ihypotheses. The results show no support for the Scale-efficiency version of the ES hypotheses 
which assumes that banks are equally 
X-efficient (the differences in the quality of 
inanagement and 
in production technologies are negligible), but some banks simply operate at 
greater efficient scale than others and 
therefore, these banks are assumed to enjoy higher 
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profits and increased market shares. Support for the other necessary conditions of the ESX 
that X-efficiency hypotheses is positively related to concentration or market share so that it 
can explain the positive profit-structure relationship, is relatively strong. Moreover, both 
market structure variables (market share and concentration) are statistically insigdificant and 
mostly negatively associated with bank profits. Our findings are in contrast with Berger's 
(1995) findings in one way and consistent with Berger's (1995) in other.. Our findings 
strongly support the X-efficiency version of the efficient-structure hypotheses, however, 
Berger found a strong statistically significant positive relationship between profits and market 
shares but only very little limited support for the x-efficiency hypotheses. However, our 
findings are consistent with Berger's (1995) in that the results show no support at all for the 
scale efficiency hypotheses and the traditional structure-conduct-performance paradigm. 
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Chapter VIII 
Conclusion and Limitations 
8.1 Conclusion 
This thesis enters the debate between market-power (MP) and efficient-structure (ES) 
explanations of the profit-structure relationship in GCC banking industry by adding direct 
measures of both X-efficiency and scale efficiency into an. empirical analysis of the SCP 
relationship in Gulf banking. As far as we are aware, this is first study applying the SCP 
paradigm to the GCC member states (these are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and 
United Arab Emirates) banking markets. 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) modelling forms a substantial part of industrial 
organisations literature and has been widely tested on the US banking system, although recent 
interest has focussed on European banking systems, particularly in view of the implementation 
of the EU's single market programme. This thesis extends the established literature by 
investigating the relationship between structure and performance in GCC banking markets as 
well as providing an analysis of bank cost and profit efficiency in the region. The general 
findings of our research are as follows. 
The'first part of this thesis (chapters 2, and 3) examined the main features of GCC member states 
economýies and their economic and financial development processes over the last two decades. It 
can be seen that these countries can be classified economically as oil exporting countries. 
Revenue for oil exports played a key role in their economic development process over the last 
two decades. Although GCC governments have realised the importance of diversifying their 
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revenue sources, the oil income still dominates the economic environment. During the 1980s and 
first half of the 1990s the economic growth of these countries(as measured by real GDP) slowed 
averaging 1.5 percent compared to 4 percent for other developing countries over the same 
period. Slow economic growth led to low levels of investment and high levels of unemployment, 
also associated with rising levels of external indebtedness in some countries (Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait) and fiscal deficits in all countries except UAE. As a result, many of GCC countries have 
undertaken various reforms in order to promote economic growth. Over the last decade, the 
economic performance indicators of those countries have generally improved compared to the 
1980s, despite the difficult situation faced by various individual economies. Annual GDP growth 
. averaged 5.5 percent between 1990-2000 compared to 5 percent for the world's developing 
countries over the same period. The other main economic performance indicators including those 
on trade, investment levels, rates of inflations, external indebtedness and external reserves have 
all witnessed improvemýnts over the same period. 
The financial sectors of GCC countries have witnessed improvements, although, these systems 
are characterized by a lack of innovative financial investment instruments and the dominance of 
commercial banks in these markets. For example, market share of commercial banks ranges from 
50% in Saudi Arabia to 80% in Qatar. In addition, the banking systems of these countries are 
concentrated (for instance, the share of the largest three banks ranged from about 55% of the 
banking sectors in Saudi Arabia to about 75% in Qatar). During the 1990s the financial 
performance of banks operating in the countries under study have shown significant 
irnprovements in terms of their asset quality, capital strength and profitability. Moreover, the 
financial sectors of these countries have become deeper according to various financial sector 
ilidlicators. Finally, although, stock markets in GCC countries are still at early stages of 
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development there has been a recent opening of new stock exchange floors in various countries 
(Qatar, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and the electronic system in Saudi Arabia) and a slowly increasing 
number of publicly traded companies. Ongoing reforms aim to further promote the capital 
markets, helping to provide local and foreign investors (individuals and institutions) with a 
broader range of investment opportunities. 
The second part of this thesis presents a theoretical overview (chapters 4,5 and 6) and empirical 
evidence (chapter 7) of the structure-conduct-performance and banking efficiency literature and 
how such issues are important for GCC countries. Our analysis builds on the previous work of 
Berger (1995) in order to examine SCP relationships in Gulf banking. In particular we test for 
evidence of the traditional SCP paradiM the Relative Market Power hypothesis; the X- 
Efficiency hypothesis and the Scale Efficiency hypothesis across the Gulf banking systems. We 
investigate the efficient structure hypothesis in an attempt to determine whether efficiency or 
market power factors are the main explanatory feature determining banking performance in 
GCC member states. The efficient structure hypothesis is tested by using a stochastic cost 
frontier technique to derive measures of cost and profit efficiency and scale efficiency and then 
these are incorporated in SCP regression models. The advantage of adopting this approach is that 
the relationship between performance and market structure will become clearer once the issue of 
efficiency has been adequately addressed (Berger (1995). 
The general findings of our research are as follows. Firstly, when we test for evidence of the four 
competing hypotheses-the traditional structure-conduct-perfor7nance (SCP) hypotheses, the 
relative market-power hypotheses (RMP), the X-efficiency version of efficient structure 
hypotheses (ES) and the scale-efficiency version of efficient-structure hypotheses- across GCC 
banking markets, we found that, the link between market concentration and performance that is 
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assumed within the traditional SCP paradigm is not present amongst GCC systems. However, the 
pooled estimates show strong evidence that bank efficiency (the X-eff iciency version of 
efficient-structure hypotheses) is an important determinant of bank performance. In other words, 
x-efficiency explains the performance of GCC banks. These findings indicate that; firstly, there 
is no evidence that market concentration enables banks to earn higher profits due to collusion. 
Secondly, market share appears to reflect bank's efficiency and not relative market power. The 
most important implications of these findings for GCC's policymakers is that, they should not be 
widely concerned about increasing concentration levels in banking markets fi7om a competition 
standpoint. In other words, mergers and consolidations across the financial institutions should 
not be restricted by policymakers as there is no evidence that higher levels of concentration leads 
to uncompetitive pricing on profits performance in the banking sector. In fact, our results may 
suggest that merger policies should be encouraged by the authorities in the GCC markets as this 
may lead to stronger and more efficient financial institutions. In particular, it follows from the 
findings in this thesis that it would be in the interests of the relevant authorities in GCC member 
states to focus their attention on mergers encouraging between smaller banks in order to improve 
their scale-efficiency and also to benefit from scale economies that exist within the small banks 
sector. 
8.2 Limitations of the study 
overall, the above analysis provides an informative and new insight, employing a hitherto 
infrequently used and substantial dataset to the SCP relationship across GCC banking markets, 
from which certain tentative policy prescriptions can be drawn. The analysis, however, is not 
without its limitations. In a study of this nature a major problem relates to accounting for 
country-specific differences and definition of the banking markets. The country-specific 
variables used in the analysis may not take account of all c0untry-specific characteristics thus, 
301 
average industry profitability levels may vary from one country to another for reasons not 
accounted for in the model. One of the ways to avoid this problem is to examine the structure- 
performance relationship in a particular country, thereby avoiding cross-country differences. 
This, however, creates further difficulties because detailed regional data are not widely available 
(as far as we are aware) for many GCC countries banking inarkets. Data on specific products or 
services are also mainly unavailable. Given this data problem, it is very difficult to obtain 
anything but market structure variables on a national and yearly basis. 
Our empirical analysis uses sub-market total banking sector assets, total banking sector deposits 
and total banking sector loans as the definition of the market. We recognise that this definition is 
adequate but not ideal. Given that various organisational forms, different ownership structures 
and specialisations within the banking sector make it difficult to precisely define the market. 
Further research should therefore focus on defining regional or sub-market structural variables 
that account for all these differences within individual banking systems, so that more 
representative, cross-sectional estimates of the SCP relationship can be evaluated. Detailed 
regional and sub-market breakdowns for various products and services could also facilitate 
further research testing for cooperative and rivalrous behaviour in individual banking markets. 
This could be of particular interest to national authorities banking regulators and merger 
policymakers. 
Other limitations relate to the nature of the data used in the empirical study. The various bank- 
specific and country-specific variables used in the analysis are very broad and only crudely 
proxy for the features they purport to measure. The SCP methodology also models the 
relationship in a linear multiple regression model when there is no strong reason to believe why 
such relationships are non-linear. 
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Finally, despite strong support for the X-efficiency version of the Efficiency hypothesis, it does 
not appear that any of the efficient-structure (ES) hypotheses or market-power hypotheses (NT) 
are of major importance in explaining bank profits. The small value of the coefficient of 
determination (that is the adjusted W which is mostly between 10% and 20% in the literature) 
raises the question about the importance and the validity of market-power and efficient-structure 
hypotheses in explaining bank profits. However, no doctoral thesis can hope to cover all of this 
related ground on even a fairly specialised area of research. This thesis started with specific 
aims, which have been broadly achieved, but with an awareness of their inherent limitations and 
constraints. Given that, as far as we are aware, no study of this kind has to date been undertaken 
on GCC banking. We hope the findings open a fruitful avenue for future research in the area of 
bank structure and performance in these countries. 
I 
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(Appendix 1) 
CHARTER OF THE CO-OPERATION COUNCIL FOR THE ARAB STATES OF 
THE GULF 
THE STATES OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
THE STATE OF BAHRAIN 
THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 
THE SULTANATE OF OMAN 
THE STATE OF QATAR 
THE STATE OF KUWAIT 
Being fully aware of their mutual bonds of special relations, common characteristics and 
similar systems founded on the Creed of Islam which binds them; and based on their faith in 
the common destiny and destination that link their peoples; and in view of their desire to effect 
co-ordination, integration and interconnection between them in all fields; and based on their 
conviction that co-ordination, co- operation and integration between them serves the higher 
goals of the Arab Nation; and in order to strengthen their co-operation and reinforce their 
common links; and in an endeavour to complement efforts already begun in all vital scopes 
that concern their peoples and realise their hopes for a better future on the path to unity of their 
States; and in conformity with the Charter of the League of Arab States which calls for the 
realisation of closer relations and stronger bonds; and in order to channel their efforts to 
reinforce and serve Arab and Islamic causes, have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE ONE: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNCIL 
A council shall be established hereby to be named The Co-operation Council for the Arab 
States, hereinafter referred to as the Co-operation Council G. C. Q. 
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ARTICLE TWO: HEADOUARTERS: 
The Co-operation Council shall have its headquarters in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
XRTICLE THREE: CO-OPERATION COUNCIL MEETINGS: 
The Council shall hold its meetings in the state where it has its headquarters, and may convene 
in any member state. 
ARTICLE FOUR: OBJEC71WS: 
1. The basic objectives of the Co-operation Council are: 
2. To effect co-ordination, integration and interconnection between member states in all 
fields in order to achieve unity between thern. 
3. To deepen and strengthen the relations, links and scopes of co-operation now : 
prevailing between their peoples in various fields. 
4. To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, mineralogy, 
agriculture, water and animal resources; to establish scientific research centres, 
implement Of common projects, and encourage Co-operation by the private sector for 
the good of their peoples. 
5. To formulate similar regulations in various fields, including the following: Economic 
and. financial affairs, Conunerce, customs and communications, Education, culture, 
social, health affairs, Information, tourism, legislation and administrative affairs. 
ARTICLE FIVE-f-OUMC-EL AWMBERSIUP 
The Co-operation Council shall be formed of the six states that participated in the Foreign 
Ministers' meeting held at RiYadh on 4 Febnjary 1981. 
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ARTICLE SIX: ORGANIZATION OF THE CO-OPERATION COUNCIL 
1. The Co-operation council shall have the following main organizations: 
2. The Supreme Council to which shall be attached the 1. Commission for the Settlement 
of Disputes. 2. The Ministerial Council. 3. The Secretariat General. 
3. Each of these organizations may establish branch organizations as necessary. 
ARTICLE SEVEN: SUPREME COUNCIM 
1. The Supreme council is the highest authority of the Co-operation Council and shall be 
formed of heads of member states. Its presidency shall be rotating based on the 
alphabetical order of the names of the member states. 
2. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every year. Extraordinary sessions 
may be convened at the request of any member seconded by another member. 
3. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the territories of member states. 
4. A Supreme Council shall be considered valid if attended by two thirds of the member 
states. 
ARTICLE EIGHT: THF, FUNMONS OF TIME SUPREME COUNCIL 
The Supreme Council shall endeavour to achieve the objectives of the Co- operation 
Council, particularly as concerns the following: 
Review matters of interest to the member states. 
3. Lay down the higher policy for the Co-operation Council and the basic lines it should 
follow. 
4. Review the recommendations, reports, studies and common projects submitted by the 
Nfinisterial Council for approvat 
5. Review reports and studies which the Secretary General is charged to prepare. 
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6. Approve the bases for dealing with other states and international organizations. 
7. Approve the rules of procedures of the Commission for Settlement of Disputes and 
nominate its members. 
8. Appoint the Secretary GeneraL 
Amend the Charter of the Co-operation Council. 
10. Approve the Council's internal Rules. 
11. Approve the budget of the Secretariat General. 
ARTICLE NINENOTING IN THE SUPREME COUNCIL 
1. Each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote. 
2. Resolutions of the Supreme Council in substantive matters shall be caff ied by 
unanimous approval of the member states participating in the voting, while resolutions 
on procedural matters shall be carried by majority vote. 
ARTICLE TEN: COMMISSION FOR SEWLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
1. The Co-operation Council I shall have a commission called "Commission for 
Settlement of Disputes" which shall be attached to the Supreme Council. 
2. The Supreme Council shall form the Commission for every case separately based on 
the nature of the disPute. 
3. If a dispute arises over interpretation of the implementation of the Charter and such 
dispute is not resolved within the Ministerial Council the Supreme Council, the 
Supreme Council may refer such dispute to the Commission for Settlement of 
Disputes. 
The Commission shall submit its recommendations. or opinion, as applicable, to the 
Supreme Council for appropriate actiom 
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ARTICLE ELEVEN: AHNISTERL&L COUNCIL 
1. The Ministerial Council shall be formed of the Foreign Ministers of the member states 
of other delegated Ministers. The Council's presidency shall rotate among members 
every three months by alphabetical order of the states. 
2. The Ministerial Council shall convene every three months and may hold extraordinary 
sessions at the invitation of any member seconded by another member. 
3. The Ministerial Council shall decide the venue of its next session. 
4. A Council's meeting shall be deemed valid if attended by two thirds of the 
memberstates. 
ARTICLE TWELVE: FUNMONS OF THE MIMSTERIAL COUNCIL 
The Nfinisterial Council's functions shall include the following: 
Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects aimed at developing 
co-operation and co-ordination between member states in the various fields and adopt 
required resolutions or recommendations concerning thereof 
2. Endeavour to encourage the development and the co-ordination of activities existing 
between member states in all fields. Resolutions adopted in such matters shall be 
referred to the Ministerial Council for further submission with recommendations, to the 
Supreme Council for appropriate action. 
3. Submit recommendations to the Ministers concerned to formulate policies whereby the 
Co-operation Council's resolutions may be put into action. 
4. Encourage co-operation and co-ordination between the various private sector activities, 
develop existing co-operation between the member states' chambers of commerce and 
industry and encourage the flow of working citizens of the member states among them. 
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5. Refer any of the various facets of co-operation to one or more technical or specialized 
committees for study and presentation of relevant proposals. 
6. Review proposals related to amendments to this Charter and submit appropriate 
recommendations to the Supreme CounciL 
7. Approve the Ministerial Council's Rules of Procedures as well as the Rules of 
Procedures of the Secretariat Genera[ 
8. Appoint the Assistant Secretaries General as nominated by the Secretary General, for a 
renewable period of three years. 
9. Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and regulations related to 
administrative and financial affairs proposed by the Secretary General and submit 
recommendations to the Supreme Council for approval of the budget of the Secretariat 
General. 
10. Xbke arrangements for the Supreme Council's meetings and prepare its agenda. 
11. Review matters referred to it by Supreme Council. 
ARTICLE THMTEEN: VOTING AT THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL 
1. Every member of the Ministerial Council has one vote. 
2. Resolutions of the Ministerial Council in substantive matters shall be carried by 
unanimous vote of the member states present and participating in the vote, and in 
procedural matters by majority vote. 
ARTICLE FOURTEEN: T FE SECRETARIAT GENERAL 
The Secretariat General shall be composed of a Secretary General who shall be 
assisted by assistants and a number of staff as required. 
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2. The Supreme Council sball appoint the Secretary General, who sball be a citizen of 
one of the Co-operation Council states, for a period of three years which may be 
renewed for one time only. 
3. The Secretary General shall nominate the Assistant Secretaries General. 
4. The Secretary General sbaH appoint the Secretariat General's staff from among the 
citizens of member states, and may not nuke exceptions without the approval of the 
Ministerial Council. 
5. The Secretary General shall be directly responsible for the work of the Secretariat 
General and the smooth flow of work in its various organisations. He shall represent 
the Co-operation Council with other parties within the powers vested in 
ARTICLE FIFTEEN: FUNCTIONS OF THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL 
The Secretariat General shall undertake the following functions: 
1. Prepare studies related to co-operation and co-ordination, and to integrated plans and 
programmes for member states'common action 
2. Prepare periodic reports on the Co-operation Council's work. 
3. Follow up the execution by the member states of the resolutions and recommendations 
of the Supreme Council and Ministerial Council. 
4. Prepare reports and studies ordered by the Supreme Council for Ministerial Council. 
5. Prepare the draft of administrative and financial regulations commensurate with the 
growth of the Co-operation Council and its expanding responsibilities. 
6. Prepare the Co-operation Council's budget and closing accounts. 
7. Nlake preparations for Meetings and prepare agendas and draft resolutions for the 
Mnisterial CounciL 
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8. Recommend to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council the convocation of an 
extraordinary session of the Council whenever necessary. 
9. Any other tasks entrusted to it by the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council. 
ARTICLE SIXTEEN 
The Secretary General and the Assistant Secretaries General and all the Secretariat General's 
staff shall carry out their duties in complete independence and for the common interest of the 
member states. They shall refrain from any action or behaviour that is incompatible with their 
duties and from divulging confidential matters relating to their appointments either during or 
after their tenure of office. 
AIRTICLESEVENTEEN: PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNMES 
1. The Co-operation Council and its organizations shall enjoy on the territories of all 
member states such legal competence, privileges and immunities as required to realize 
their objectives and carry out their functions. 
2. Representatives of the member states of the Council and Council's employees shall 
enjoy such privileges and immunities as are specified in agreements to be concluded 
for this purpose between the member states. A special agreement shall organise the 
relation between the Council and the state in which it has its headquarters. 
3. Until such time as the two agreements mentioned in item 2 above are prepared and put 
into effect, the representatives of the member states in the Co-operation Council and its 
staff shall enjoy the diplomatic privileges and immunities established for similar 
organizations. 
ARTICLE ErrHTEEN: 
The Secretariat General sWi have a budget to which the member states shall contribute equal 
amounts. 
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ARTICLE NINETEEN: THE TWLEMENTATION OF CHARTER 
1. This Charter sball go into effect as of the date it is signed by the heads of state of the 
six member states mmed in this Charter's preamble. 
2. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with Saudi Arabia's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs which shall act as custodian and shall deliver a true copy there of to 
every member state, pending the establishment of the Secretariat General at which time 
the latter shall become depository 
ARTICLE TWENTY: AMENDMENTS TO CHARTER 
1. Any member state may request an amendment of this Charter. 
2. Requests for Charter amendments shall be submitted to the Secretary General who 
shall refer them to the member states at least four months prior to submission to the 
Nfinisterial CounciL 
An amendment shall become effective if unanimously approved by the Supreme 
Council. 
ARTICLE TWENTY ONE: CLOSING PROVISIONS 
No reservations may be voiced in respect of the provisions of this Charter. 
ARTICLE TWENTY TWO 
The Secretariat General shall arrange to deposit and register copies of the Charter with the 
League of Arab States and the United Nations, by resolution of the NIinisterial Council. 
This Charter is signed on one copy in Arabic language at Abu Dhabi City, United Arab 
Emirates, on 21 Rajab 1401 corresponding to 25 NIay 198 1. 
The United Arab Emirates; The State of Bahrain; The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia The 
Sultanate of Oman; The State of Qatar; The State of Kuwait. 
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(APPENDIX 1) 
THE UNMED ECONOMIC AGREEMENT OF THE CO-OPERATION COUNCIL 
FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF 
With the help of God the almighty; The Governments of the Member States of the Arab Gulf 
Co-operation Council; In accordance with the Charter thereofý which calls for closer relations 
and stronger links; and Desiring to promoteý expand and enhance their economic ties on solid 
foundations, in the best interest of their peoples; and Intending to co-ordinate[ and unify their 
economic, financial and monetary policies, as well as their commercial and industrial 
legislation, and customs regulations; have agreed as follows: 
CHAPTER ONIE: TRADE EXCHANGE 
ARTICLE-1 
1.1. The Member States shall permit the importation and exportation of agricultural, 
animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of national origin. Also, they 
shall permit exportation thereof to other Member States. 
2. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are from 
3. Member States shall receive the same treatment as national products. 
ARTICLE 2 
1. All agricultural, animal industrial and natural resource products that are of national 
origin shall be exempted from customs duties and other charges having equivalent 
effect. 
2. Fees charged for specific services such as demurrage, storage, transportation, haulage 
or unloading shall not be considered as customs duties when they are levied on 
domestic products. 
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ARTICLE 3 
1. For products of national origin to qualify as national manufactured products, the value 
added ensuring from their production in Member States shall not be less than 40 
percent of their final value. In addition, the share of the Member States citizens in the 
ownership of the producing plant shall not be less than 51 percent. 
2. Every item to be exempted hereby shall be accompanied by a certificate of origin duly 
authenticated by the government agency concerned. 
ARTICLE 4 
1. Member States shall establish a uniform minimum customs tariff applicable to the 
products of countries other than GCC Member States. 
2. One of the objectives of the uniform customs tariff shall be the protection of national 
products from foreign competftion. 
3. The uniform customs tariff shall be applied gradually within five years from the date 
on which this agreement becomes effective. Arrangements for its gradual 
implementation shall be agreed upon within one year from the said date. 
ARTICLE 5 
Member States shall grant all facilities for the transit of any Member State! s goods to other 
Member States, exempting them from any duties and taxes whatsoever, without prejudice to 
the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 2. 
ARTICLE 6 
Transit shall be denied to any goods that are barred from entry into the territory of a Member 
State by its local regulations. Lists of such goods shall be exchanged between the customs 
authorities of the Member States. 
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ARTICLE 7 
Member States shall co-ordinate their comnercial policies and relations with other States and 
regional economic groupings and blocs with a view to creating balanced trade relations and 
favourable circumstances and terms of trade therewitIL To achieve this goal, the Member 
States shall make the following arrangements: 
1. Co-ordination of import/export policies and regulations. 2. Co-ordination of policies 
for building up strategic food stocks. 3. Conclusion of coNective economic agreements 
in cases where joint benefits to 4. Member States would be realised taking of action for 
the creation of collective negotiating power to strengthen their negotiating position vis- 
a-vis foreign parties in the field of importation of basic needs and exportation of major 
products. 
CHAPTER TWO: THE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL, CffIZENS AND THE 
EXERCISE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVIES: 
ARTICLE 8 
The Member States shall agree on the executive rules which would insure that each Member 
State shall grant the citizens of all other Member States the same treatment granted to its own 
citizens without any discriminations or differentiation in the following fields: 
1. Freedom of movement, work and residence. 2. Right of ownership, inheritance and bequest. 
3. Freedom to exercise economic activity. 4. Free movement of capital. 
ARTICLE 9 
The Member States shall encourage their respective private sectors to establish joint ventures 
in order to link their citizens' economic interest in the various spheres of activity. 
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CHAPTER TUREE: CO-ORDINATION OF DEVELOPMENT 
ARTICLE 10 
Ile Member States shall endeavour to achieve co-ordination and harmony among their 
respective development plans with a view to achieving integration in economic affairs. 
ARTICLE 11 
1. The Member States shall endeavour to co-ordinate their polices with regard to all 
aspects of the oil industry including extraction, refiming, marketing, processing, 
pricing, exploitation of natural gas and development of energy sources. 
2. The Member States shall endeavour to formulate unified oil policies and adopt 
common positions vis-a-vis the outside world, and in the international and specialised 
organisations. 
ARTICLE 12 
To achieve the objectives specified in this agreement, the Member States shall perform the 
following: 
1. Co-ordinate industrial activities, formulate policies and mechanisms aimed at the 
industrial development and the diversification of their productive bases on an 
integrated basis. 
2. Standardise their industrial legislation and regulations and guide their local production 
units to meet their needs. 
3. Allocate industries between Member States according to relative advantages and 
economic feasibility, and encourage th6 establishment of basic as well as ancillary 
industries. 
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ARTICLE 13 
Within the framework of their co-ordination activities, the Member States shall pay special 
attention to the establishment of joint ventures in the fields of industry, agriculture and 
services, and shall support them with public, private or mixed capital in order to achieve 
economic integration, productive interface and common development on sound economic 
bases. 
CHAPTER FOUR: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION 
ARTICLE 14 
The Member States shall collaborate in finding spheres for common technical co operation 
aimed at building a genuine local base founded on encouragement and support of research and 
applied sciences and technology as well as adapting imported technology to meet needs of the 
region and to achieve the objectives of progress and development. 
ARTICLE 15 
The Member States shall establish procedures make arrangements and lay down terms for the 
transfer of technology, selecting the most suitable or introducing such changes thereto as 
would serve their various needs. Member States shall also, whenever feasible, conclude 
uniform arrangements with foreign governments and scientific or commercial firms to achieve 
these objectives. 
ARTICLE 16 
The Member States shall formulate policies and implement coordinated programmes for 
technical, vocational and professional training and qual ication at all levels and stages. They if' 
shall also upgrade educational curricula at all levels to link education and technology with the 
development needs of the Member States. 
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ARTICLE 17 
Ile Member States shall co-ordinate their manpower policies and shall formulate uniform and 
standardised criteria and classifications for the various categories of occupations and crafts in 
different sectors in order to avoid harmful competition among themselves and to optimise the 
utilisation, of available human resources. 
CHAPTER RYE: TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION 
ARTICLE 18 
The Member States shall accord means of passenger and cargo transportation belonging to 
citizens of the other Member States, when transiting or entering their territory, the same 
treatment they accord to the means of passenger and cargo transportation belonging to their 
own citizens, including exemptions from all duties and taxes whatsoever. However, local 
means of transportation are excluded. 
ARTICLE 19 
1. The Member States shall co-operate in the fields of land and sea transportation and 
communication. They shall also co-ordinate and establish infrastructure projects such 
as seaports, airports, water and power stations and roads, with a view to realising 
common economic development and linking their economic activities with each other. 
2. The contracting States shall co-ordinate aviation and air transport policies among them 
and promote all spheres ofjoint activities at various levels. 
ARTICLE 20 
The Member States shall allow steamers, ships and boats and their cargoes, belonging to any 
Member State freely to use the various port facilities and grant them the same treatment and 
privileges granted to their own in docking or calling at the ports as concerns fees, pilotage, and 
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docking services, haulage, loading and unloading, rmintenance, repair, storage of goods and 
other similar services. 
CHAPTER SIX: FINANCRL AND MONETARY CO-OPERATION 
ARTICLE 21 
The Member States shall seek to unify investment in order to achieve a common investment 
policy 'aimed at directing their internal and external investments towards serving their interest, 
and realising their peoples'aspirations in development and progress. 
ARTICLE 22 1. 
-- 
The Member States shall seek to co-ordinate their financial, monetary and banking policies 
and enhance co-operation between monetary agencies and central banks, including an 
endeavour to establish a common currency in order to further their desired economic 
integration. 
ALRTICLE 23 
. N4ember 
States shall seek to co-ordinate their external polices in the sphere of international 
and regional development aid. 
LOSING PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE 24 4=Z-W-ý 
In the execution of the Agreement and determination of the procedures resulting there from 
consideration shall be given to differences in the levels of development between the Member 
States and the local development priorities of each. Any Member State may be temporarily 
exempted from applying such provisions of this Agreement as may be necessitated by 
temporary local situations in that State or specific circumstances faced by it. Such exemption 
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shall be for a specified period and shall be decided by the Supreme Council of the Gulf Arab 
States Co-operation Council. 
ARTICLE 25 
No Member State shall give to any non-member state any preferential privilege exceeding that 
given herein. 
ARTICLE 26 
a. This Agreement shall enter into force four months after its approval by the 
Supreme CounciL 
b. This Agreement may be amended by consent from the Supreme Council. 
ARTICLE 27 
In case of conflict with local laws and regulations of Member States, execution of the 
provisions of this Agreement shall prevail. 
ARTICLE 28 
Provisions herein shall supersede any similar provisions contained in bilateral agreement. 
Drawn up at Riyadh on 15 Muharrarn 1402, corresponding to II November 1982. 
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Appendix 2 
Estimations of Panel Data 
The Fixed Effects Anvroach: 
One way to take into account the " individuality" of each company or each cross-sectional 
unit is to let the intercept vary for each company but still assume that the slope coefficients. 
are constant across firms. In the literature, this is known as the fixed effects (regression) 
model (FEM), it is also known as the Least -Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) regression 
model (Gujarati, 2002). The term "fixed effects" is due to the fact that, although the intercept 
may differ across individual observations, each individual's intercept does not vary over time; 
that is; it is time invariant. 
Although easy to use, the LSDV model has some problems that need to be borne in mind. 
First, if too many dummy variables introduced this may will run up against the degrees of 
freedom problem, specifically in the case of small samples. Second, if the model has a large 
number of variables there is always the possibility of multicollinearity, which might make 
precise estimation of one or more parameters difficult. We re-estimated our six full models 
using a fixed effects panel data approach to take into account the individuality of each 
company or each cross-sectional unit. As noted earlier we run the complete reduced form X 
regressions with CONC, MS, and the EFF measures. We find that the fixed effects results are 
very similar to those maintained from simple ordinary least squares estimates. These results 
are shown in the following tables: 
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Table 1 The following Models are tests for the influence of market-structure and 
efficiency measures on bank's profitability other control and environmental 
variables as Included to increase the model predictions. 
Modell: Return on Equity(ROE) Is the profitability measure and bank loan's (blms) 
Is the market share measure, with other control and environmental variables 
Predictor Coef. Std. Err. t _ P>JtJ 
constant . 0070823 . 0039008 1.82 0.070 
gdppc . 0003125 . 0801546 0.00 0.997 
conc -. 0255704 . 1096128 -0.23 0.816 
blms . 0422653 . 0812181 0.52 0.603 
xeff . 0015712 1 . 0006851 2.29 1 0.022 
seff -. 1292225 . 0898964 -1.44 0.151 
commercial banks . 0345579 . 0233931 1.48 0.141 
investment banks -. 0165455 . 0244813 -0.68 0.500 
Adjusted R-sq: -0.027 
Model 2 Return On Equity(ROE) Is the profitability measure and bank' a deposits 
(bdms) Is the market share measure, With other control variables 
Pridictor Coef. Std. Err. t P>JtJ 
constant . 0076093 . 0039236 1.94 0.053 
gdppc . 0093565 . 0036133 0.09 0.927 
_ conc -. 0275596 . 1094833 -0.25 0.801 
bdms . 0422505 . 0812052 0.52 0.603 
xeff . 0015706 1 . 0006853 2.29 0.022 
seff -. 1291924 . 0898811 -1.44 0.152 
commercial banks 
. 
-. 0345477 . 0233924 -1.48 0.141 
investment banks -. 0165447 . 0244809 -0.68 0.500 
Adjusted R-sq: 0.0273 
Mode3 Return on Assets (RM is the profitability measure and bankos deposits 
(bdms) is the-market share measure, with other control variables. 
Predictor Coef. Std. Err. t P>ItI 
constant . 0526157 . 0267478 1.97 0.050 
gdppc . 0088262 . 0133445 0.66 0.509 
conc -. 0242261 . 0182240 -1.33 0.185 
bdms . 0149667 . 0127146 1.18 0.240 
xeff . 0003938 . 0001140 3.45 0.001 
seff -. 0732223 . 0157597 -4.65 0: 000 
Commercial banks . 0077117 . 0040683 1.90- 0.059 
investment banks -. 0848627 . 1604506 -0.53" 0.597 
Adjusted R-sq: -0-1803 
Model4: Return on Assets (ROA) -is the profitability measure and bank"s loans (blms) 
is the market share measure, with other control variables. 
pridictor Coef. Std. Err. T P>ItI 
constant . 0080078 . 0040823 1.96 0.051 
Eqpy_c_ý . 0090437 . 0133658 0.68 0.499 
_ conc -. 0241261 . 0182779 -1.32 . 188 
blms . 0067002 . 0135431 0.49 0.621 
xeff . 0003853 . 0001142 3.37 0.001 
seff -. 0664816 . 0149902 -4.44 0.000 
commercial banks . 0372558 . 7805461 0.05 0-. 962 
Investment banks . 1277079 . 1303286 0.98 1 0.328 
Ad 
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Table 1: (Continued) 
model 5 Alternative profit efficiency scores (APX) Is the profitability measure and 
the bank's loan (blms) is the market share measure with other control variables. 
-ir--idictor Coef . Std. Eror t P>JtJ 
constant . 2322567 . 1133839 2.05 0.041 
gdppc . 1154148 . 1118992 1.03 0.303 
conc -. 0271415 . 1530241 -0.18 0.859 
blms . 5833354 1.0911218 0.53 0.593 
xeff . 0047059 . 0009564 4.92 0.000 
seff -. 2864792 . 1254991 -2.28 0.023 
commercial banks -. 0322576 . 0326577 -0.99 0.324 
Investment banks -. 0037021 . 0341769 0.11 0.914- 
Adjusted R-sq:. 0.1548 
model 6 Alternative profit efficiency scores (APX) Is the profitability measure and 
the bank's deposits (bdms) Is the market share measure with other control variables 
PrIdictor Coef. Std. Err. t P>JtJ 
constant . 0016722 . 0007051 2.30 0.022 
gdppc . 1191032 . 1108322 1.07 0.283 
conc -. 0349285 . 1513576 -0.23 0.818 
bdms . 3508361 . 1055986 3.32 0.001 
xeff . 0049116 . 0009471 5.19 0.000 
seff, -. 4040942 -- - . 
1308891 -3.09 0.002 
commercial bani-s " . 0441055 . 0325864 1.35 0.177 
Investment banks -. 0047864 . 0337882 -0.14 0.887 
Adjusted R-s: - 0.1787 
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Table 2: Validity of efficient- structure hypotheg e that efficiency 
measures im, t be positively related to both profitality measures as well as 
market structure measures. The following models are testfor this condition. 
Model 1: The De 
PrIdictors 
pendent varlable 
Coef. 
Is market concentration measure (CONC) 
S td. Err. t P>Itl 
constant . 0001172 ' . 
0003347 0.35 0.726 
gdppc . 15 59981 . 0382949 4.07 
0.000 
xeff 2.2425823 . 3625723 6.19 
0.000 
sef . 0433298 . 0383668 1*13 
0.260 
c =- 0037859 . 0114357 1 0. 
0.741 
inv -. 0012686 . 0119447. -0.11 0.915 
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ApRendix 2 
The Transloi! Snecification of Cost and Alternative Profit Efficienev 
in most of the research on the banking cost efficiency topic, banks are assumed to have a 
common production structure; what makes them different from each other is an invisible 
input, called "managerial ability". To measure it, an efficient production frontier is estimated, 
from which it is possible to infer the level of costs or profits that each bank could realize if it 
had the managerial ability of the best bank of the sample; in fact, the benchmark is the best 
practice bank, not the one that achieves in theory the best results. 
To estimate an efficient frontier function, residuals from the cost or profit function must be 
analyzed; they measure the difference between expected and observed costs or profits. 
Residuals are composed of two parts: a random one, due to measurement errors or 
idiosyncratic shocks and a systematic one that identifies every single firm. To separate the 
two components, it is necessary to make assumptions on their probability distributions. 
Usually, the random component is assumed to have a normal distribution with zero mean and 
finite variance; the systematic component is assumed to have a semi-normal or a truncated 
normal distribution with finite variance (Stevenson 1980). The two components are separated 
using the technique first proposed by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmidt (1982); it is then 
possible to estimate the efficiency level of each firm and of the sample. The systematic part of 
the residual is an eff iciency indicator that can be used to compare firms; the ratio between the 
residual of a firm and the highest residual (for profit functions, the lowest for cost functions), 
that identifies the best practice firm, is a measure of relative efficiency. Given the impo ce I rtan 
of the residuals for the measurement of efficiency, it is particularly important to minimize 
specification errors due to wrong functional forms that could bias the results. The translog 
function (Christensen and Greene 1976) is flexible in that it allows to estimate a large family 
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of functional forms. Its high number of parameters makes it difficult to adopt when estimating 
frontiers on a small sample. The translog is a second-order approximation around the mean 
values of the sample therefore measures for data points far away from it are necessarily 
imprecise. Furthermore, the translog is a quadratic function; its symmetrical structure forces 
symmetry on the data; for example, if there are strong economies of scale in the sample for 
small firms, the translog, which tends to fit U-shaped curves, will erroneously find 
diseconomies of scale for the larger firms of the sample. 
A semi-parametric flexible form, that overcomes the problems of a translog function, is in fact 
a translog with trigonometric factors added on, derived from a Fourier transform of the 
variables (Gallant 1981). The Fourier-flexible function is the best global approximation of an 
unknown function, such as a cost or profit function, but the number of parameters that have to 
be estimated is so high that it can be used only on very large samples. Due to the limited size 
of our sample, we use a translog to estimate the cost and profit functions. The cost functional 
form is: 
TC 23 
In( )=a, )+I: allnQ, +I: P, Inp, +TklnK+, rsInS+ A J-1 
2333 
,; V, In A In p, +, rkkInKInK+T. InSInS]+ +I12C2: 
j:, 5, InQ, InQ, +j: 2: 
1=1 J=3 i=l i=l 
23232 
+ZZpulnCjllnp, +2La,, tlnQllnK+2: p., klnp, InK+I: a,, InQ InS+ 1=1 1=1 j=l j 3 
+Epj, lnpjlnS+. r, t InKInS+, v, 
Where TC is a measure of the costs of production, comprising operating costs and financial 
costs (interest paid on deposits); the Qj. (i= 1,2 ........ m) are output quantities, Pj 
(jý-- 1,2 ......... n) are 
input prices. Moreover, standard symmetry has to be imposed on the 
translog function that is: 
332 
Sy = 5ji and yy = 7ji, where (i--1,2) and (jý--1,2,3), and the following linear restrictions are 
necessary and sufficient for linear homogeneity in factor prices: 
n 
i=0 and pij 
j=l j=l 
In this study the parameters of the stochastic frontier cost function, are estimated using the 
2 
Maximum-likelihood (ML) approach. For instance, the ML estimates ofAC and 'y are 
S 
obtained by finding the maximum of the log-likelihood function as specified in Coelli et. al 
(1995). The nature of the log-likelihood function of the model given the distributionI 
assumptions on v and u can be also found in Battese and Coelli (1995,1998). 
Derivation of the Alternative Prorit Frontiers: 
An interesting recent development in efficiency analysis is the concept of alternative profit 
efficiency, which may be helpful when some of the assumptions underlying cost and standard 
profit efficiency are not met. Efficiency here is measured by how close a bank comes to 
earning . maximum profits given its output levels rather than its output prices. For our analysis 
purposes, the alternative profit efficiency estimates are derived from the following translog 
functional form: 
;r23 
In(-'- )=a(, +EallnQ, +I:, Bjlnpj 
+ Tk InK+. rsInS+ 
A J=l 
2333 
+112jZj: 8ylnQ, lnQj+j: I: yvlnpllnpj+, rkkInKInK+, r. InSInS]+ 1=1 J=3 i=l i=l 
23232 
+EE, D#InQ, Inp, +I: a, kInQ, InK+I:, 
8j., 
klnpjlnK+I: a,,, 
InQ, InS+ 
1=1 J=l j=l J=j 
3 
+I: fl,, InpjlnS+rk., InKInS+, v, 
j=l 
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